JUDGMENT B.L. YADAV, J. 1. BY the present petition under Article 226 of the Constitution of India, the petitioners have prayed for issuance of a writ of Certiorari quashing the order dated 9-1-81 passed by the Deputy Director of Consolidation (Annexure 11 to the petition), allowing the revision under section 48 of the U. P. Consolidation of Holdings Act, (for short the Act), and setting aside the order of the Settlement Officer (Consolidation) dated 28-1-79 (Annexure 6 to the petition) dismissing the appeal filed by respondent Nos. 2 and 3 as time barred, who were admittedly minors when consolidation proceedings started in the village. 2. THERE are a number of plots in dispute contained in Khata Nos. 175, 225, 520, 529 and 544. In the basic year Khatauni these plots, according to the case of petitioners, were entered in the names of respondent nos. 2 and 3, sons of Kapildeo along with other co-tenure holders. The case was that they were also co-tenure holders of these plots. Respondent no. 2 was aged about 14 years and respondent no. 3 was aged about 11 years. Even though the mother of the minors was alive, but Gajraj, their uncle, appears to have been appointed as guardian as stated in para 4 of the writ petition. But this statement of fact has been denied in para 6 of the counter affidavit filed by Sharda Prasad Singh, and it was stated that Gajraj was never appointed as guardian as the mother of the minors Smt. Swarnmati was still alive. The Asstt. Consolidation Officer passed an order of conciliation on 4-6-67 and Gajraj signed the conciliation on behalf of the minors respondent nos. 2 and 3. As a consequence thereof, the names of minors were expunged and the names of present petitioners were entered in their place. The record was missing, consequently, after a considerable delay the appeal was filed, but the same was dismissed as time barred. The appeal as stated above, filed on behalf of the minors was dismissed by order dated 28-1-79 (Annexure-6 to the petition), as time barred. But their revisions succeeded and the orders of Settlement Officer Consolidation and Assistant Consolidation Officer were set aside. The appeal as stated above, filed on behalf of the minors was dismissed by order dated 28-1-79 (Annexure-6 to the petition), as time barred. But their revisions succeeded and the orders of Settlement Officer Consolidation and Assistant Consolidation Officer were set aside. In the operative portion, however, nothing was stated as to what shall happen to basic year entries and to the entries in the names of petitioners made in pursuance of the order of the Assistant Consolidation Officer. About the delay in appeal also no mention was made. Learned counsel for the petitioner urged that the order of Deputy Director of Consolidation was manifestly erroneous. Reliance was placed on a Division Bench decision of this Court in Teerath v. Joint Director of Consolidation, 1985 AWC 347, Udai Bhan Singh v. Board of Revenue, 1974 AWR 41 and Ramesh v. Gendalal Motilal Patni, AIR 1965 SC 1446. 3. LEARNED counsel for the respondents, on the other hand, urged that under the circumstances of the case even though no specific order was passed about the consolidation of delay in appeal by the Deputy Director of Consolidation, but nevertheless on merits, when the Consolidation proceedings commenced, respondent nos. 2 and 3 were minors, no proper guardian was appointed while their mother was alive, the uncle was not the proper guardian, further it was not proved by the petitioners that the interest of uncle was not adverse to that of the minors and in any view of the matter, it was urged that in case the question of limitation was assumed to be decisive, but as respondent nos. 2 and 3 were minors on the relevant date and no proper guardian was appointed, there was sufficient cause for consolidation of delay and the matter instead of remanding to the Settlement Officer Consolidation, may be remanded to the Consolidation Officer so that the controversy between the parties about the basic year entries and respective legal rights might be adjudicated upon on merits. 4. HAVING heard the learned counsel for the parties, the basic question for determination is whether the Deputy Director of Consolidation could allow the revision without considering the question of delay in preferring the appeal. This point is covered by a Division Bench decision of this Court in Teerath v. Joint Director of Consolidation, (supra) and I am bound by that decision. This point is covered by a Division Bench decision of this Court in Teerath v. Joint Director of Consolidation, (supra) and I am bound by that decision. There is no denying the fact that the Deputy Director of Consolidation before deciding the revision on merits, must have considered the question of delay first. The controversy between the parties appears to be slightly different. Even though the question of delay was there, but the delay was caused by the persons who were minor (i.e. respondent nos. 2 and 3), on the relevant date and no proper guardian was appointed. There is no evidence on record that under Rule 14 steps were taken to appoint a proper guardian. Consequently, if the delay has been caused by some minors without there being a guardian, in such matters minors need not be blamed. It would be just an exercise in futile if the matter is remanded to be disposed of on merits before the Settlement Officer Consolidation. Every court and tribunal is supposed to be the guardian of minors and consequently their interest has to be supervised with great vigilance. Unless a person becomes major, he has no legal capacity to understand the proceedings in a court of law. It would not be appreciable if the matter is remanded to the appellate court to decide this question of delay which has been caused by minors. In the case of Udai Bhan Singh v. Board of Revenue, (supra) a reference has been made to Ramesh v. Gendalal Motilal Patni, (supra). In that case controversy was as to what is the scope or nature of writ proceedings and whether the writ petition or special appeals relating to rights in agricultural land after the commencement of consolidation operations must be stayed under Section 5 (2-A) of the Act. In that connection a number of other decisions of the Supreme Court including the case of Ramesh v. Gendalal Motilal Patni, (supra) was referred. The relevant observations under para 16 of the above case are set out below:- "We are concerned here with the exercise of extraordinary original civil jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution. Under that jurisdiction the High Court does not hear an appeal or revision. The relevant observations under para 16 of the above case are set out below:- "We are concerned here with the exercise of extraordinary original civil jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution. Under that jurisdiction the High Court does not hear an appeal or revision. The High Court is moved to intervene and to bring before itself, the record of a case decided by or pending before a Court or tribunal or any authority within the High Court's jurisdiction. A petition to the High Court invoking this jurisdiction is a proceeding quite independent of the original controversy. The controversy in the High Court, in proceedings arising under Article 226 ordinarily is whether a decision of or a proceeding before a Court or tribunal or authority, should be allowed to stand or should be quashed, for want of jurisdiction or on account of errors of law apparent on the face of the record. A decision in the exercise of this jurisdiction, whether interfering with the proceedings impugned or dealing to do so, is a final decision so far as the High Court is concerned because it terminates finally the special proceedings before it." 5. IT is well settled that the High Court cannot substitute its own order or decree for the order or decree impugned, but must send back to the court or the authority concerned for deciding the case in accordance with law declared by it. (See Constentine v. Imperial Hotel Ltd., 1944 KB 693, Rees v. Huges, 1946 K.B 517 ; Bert v. Samuel Fox and Co. Ltd., 1952 AC 716). IT is to be remembered that when there is a right, there is a remedy (UBDUS IBI REMEDIUM). Indeed it is a vain thing to imagine a right without remedy. They are reciprocal. 6. THERE is no denying the fact that the matter has to be remanded back. It is to be decided as to whether it has to be decided by the Settlement Officer (Consolidation) who dismissed the appeal of minors as time barred or has it to be remanded to the Consolidation Officer. No doubt respondent nos. 2 and 3 were minors on the relevant date and no guardian was appointed and according to respondents themselves the minors have legitimate right. Their names were entered in the basic year also which is supposed to be true unless the contrary is proved. No doubt respondent nos. 2 and 3 were minors on the relevant date and no guardian was appointed and according to respondents themselves the minors have legitimate right. Their names were entered in the basic year also which is supposed to be true unless the contrary is proved. When the parties have a legal right, they must have appropriate forum. As the consolidation proceedings commenced in view of the provisions of Section 9-A and other relevant sections of the Act, the rights of the parties have to be adjudicated upon keeping in view the basic year entries and other evidence. In this back ground and under the particular facts of the case there could be no formula of mathematical exactitude which could be applied about remanding the matter to a particular authority or tribunal. In this connection there must have been some indication on .the lines of Order 41 rule 23 or rule 25 of the CPC. But under the Consolidation of Holdings Act there is no such guideline. About the matters of law its nature and Characteristic certain references appear to be pertinent. The beauty of the process of law making has been described by Sir A. Helps as follows : 'You chuckled over those people who could see beauty only in pictures, but you cannot imagine the beauty of an intricate, many law process embodying the doubts and subtleties of generations of men " According to Rousseau: "The universal spirit of the laws of all countries is to put always the strong against the weak, and him who has against him who has nothing. The disadvantage is inevitable and it is without exception." According to Macklin: "The law is a hocuspocus science that smiles in your face while it picks your pocket; and the glorious uncertainty of it is mair use to the professors than the justice of it. "According to Butler: "Law does not put the least restraint upon our freedom, but maintain. For wholesome laws preserve us free. By stinting our liberty." According to Burnet: "The law of England is the greatest grievance of the nation, very expensive and dilatory." 7. IN view of the aforesaid different opinions of great thinkers about the nature of law itself and under the facts and circumstances of the case and as respondent nos. For wholesome laws preserve us free. By stinting our liberty." According to Burnet: "The law of England is the greatest grievance of the nation, very expensive and dilatory." 7. IN view of the aforesaid different opinions of great thinkers about the nature of law itself and under the facts and circumstances of the case and as respondent nos. 2 and 3 were minors on the relevant date and no guardian was appointed, it would not be proper that they may be directed to explain the delay caused in preferring the appeal. IN such a situation a lenient view has to be taken about the consolidation of delay so as to advance a substantial justice and the delay thus caused in preferring the appeal deserves to be condoned. I am accordingly of the considered opinion that the matter may be remanded to the Consolidation Officer for deciding the case afresh by permitting the petitioners and respondent nos. 2 and 3 and others concerned to lead evidence and to decide the matter in accordance with law. 8. IN view of the premises aforesaid, the impugned orders of the Deputy Director of Consolidation and that of the Settlement Officer Consolidation cannot be sustained. In the result, the petition succeeds and is allowed. The impugned orders dated 28-1-79 and 9-1-81 are quashed and the case is remanded to the Consolidation Officer for deciding the case afresh in accordance with law. As the matter has dragged on for too long, what is required is expedition. The Consolidation Officer shall dispose of the matter as expeditiously as possible. The parties are directed to bear their own costs. Petition allowed.