P. R. GOKULAKRISHNAN, J. ( 1 ) THE petitioner has come forward with the present Special Criminal Application for quash- ing and setting aside the externment orders which are Annexures-B and C. The Sub-Divisional Mag- istrate Veraval issued notice on 5-12-1988 under Section 56 (a) (b) of the Bombay Police Act 1951 alleging the following acts committed by the petitioner in Hudco Colony Vivekanand Colony and on the way leading to Hudco Colony situated at the sim of village Dari which are within the limits of Prabhaspatan Police Station. 1 You are forcibly collecting money from the innocent persons by detaining them those who are living in the aforesaid area of persons passing through the way and if they do not pay money you give threat to kill them. 2 You are consuming liquor and under the influence of liquor in public you are picking up quarrels and committing offences in relati on to property and undue liberty with women. 3 lf any person lodges a case against you you pressurise him to enter into compromise by giv- ing threat of killing the person concerned and create tense situation and as a result of which nobody is ready to give evidence against you in public. ( 2 ) IN this notice it has been stated that it is proposed to remove the petitioner from Junagadh Rajkot and Amreli Districts which are adjacent to each other for a period of two years. In the notice we also find that the petitioner is a dangerous and fierceful person and that the witnesses of the aforesaid incidents are afraid of safety of life and properly and as such they are not prepared to give evidence against the petitioner. There is a further allegation in the notice that if the petitioner is not removed from the aforesaid limits of the districts there are possibilities that the petitioner will continue the aforesaid activities. ( 3 ) THE explanation was called for and subsequently the externing authority passed an order of externment dated 11-4-1989 externing the petitioner from the limits of Junagadh Rajkot and Amreli districts for a period of two years from the next day of receipt of the said order. ( 3 ) THE explanation was called for and subsequently the externing authority passed an order of externment dated 11-4-1989 externing the petitioner from the limits of Junagadh Rajkot and Amreli districts for a period of two years from the next day of receipt of the said order. As against this order the petitioner preferred appeal under Section-60 of the Bombay Police Act and the Government of Gujarat in its Home Department confirmed the said order passed by the externing authority by its order dated 5-7-89. ( 4 ) BEING aggrieved by these orders the petitioner has come forward by way of this habeas corpus petition invoking the jurisdiction of this Court under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. ( 5 ) MR. Raval learned Counsel for the petitioner strenuously contended that the show cause notice is vague; that no proper opportunity was given to the petitioner to represent his case; that looking to the incident which is referred in the externment order the officer who has recorded the complaint and who is the present externing authority are the same and therefore the ex- terning authority ought to have transferred the case to some other officer and that there is non- application of mind by the externing officer in as much as mechanical order has been passed ex- terning the petitioner. ( 6 ) WE do not find that it is necessary to consider all these points raised by Mr. P. M. Raval learned Counsel for the petitioner since we are of the view that the Special Criminal Application can be disposed of on the argument of the learned Counsel to the effect that the externing authority has taken into consideration the incident which has not been stated in the notice issued to the petitioner under Section 56 of the Bombay Police Act. ( 7 ) THE show cause notice has given three instances alleged to have been committed by the petitioner in a particular locality and during a particular period. These instances have already been extracted in para 1 above. In the externment order it is stated that:it is also staled in the complaint that the persons those who are having status and means have shifted from it so that they may not become victim of such torts by the petitioner. These instances have already been extracted in para 1 above. In the externment order it is stated that:it is also staled in the complaint that the persons those who are having status and means have shifted from it so that they may not become victim of such torts by the petitioner. Thus it is clear from the externment order that the externing authority who has also re- corded the complaint has taken into consideration an averment in the complaint which has not been put on notice to the petitioner herein while issuing notice under Section 56 (a) (b) of the Bombay Police Act. This circumstance according to Mr. Raval learned Counsel appearing for the petitioner is vital in nature and vitiates the whole externment proceeding. It has been repeat- edly held in various decisions that in view of the very wide effect on the liberty of a citizen espe- cially when such Act is invoked against a particular person the authority is bound to follow strictly the safeguards for the exercise of this wide power and should follow certain guidelines before it exercises that power. Therefore the nature of the offences would not be the sole criteria and the authority will have to go into the other pertinent question as to whether the offending activity of the individual concern has reached that degree of harm to the society that the interest of the society or even of that particular locality requires that this individual who has become public menace should be externed from the locality. Bearing the principle in mind which has been succinctly stated in the decision rendered by a Bench of our High Court in the case of Koli Dana Nathu v. Sub- Divisional Majistrate Rajkot 34 GLR 209 we can consider the present facts involved in this ease. No doubt the show cause notice is able to give the area in which the petitioner was commit- ting the offence and also the period during which such offences were committed. The notice also states the particulars of offences committed by the petitioner which is clear from the government to the effect that the petitioner is a dangerous and fierce person and that the witnesses are not com- ing forward to depose against him due to fear to their life and property. The notice also states the particulars of offences committed by the petitioner which is clear from the government to the effect that the petitioner is a dangerous and fierce person and that the witnesses are not com- ing forward to depose against him due to fear to their life and property. The instances which have been enumerated in the show cause notice no doubt make out a case for externment; neverthe- less the order of externemnt adds one more instance to the effect that it is also stated in the complaint that the persons those who are having status and means have shifted from it so that they may not become victim of such torts by the petitioner. Mr. B. D. Desai learned A. P. P. ap- pearing for the State no doubt states that this observation by the externing authority cannot vitiate the order of externment is as much as there is enough material on record to extent the peti- tioner from the locality and also for a particular period but it is clear that this factual aspect which is borne out from the complaint has not been put to the petitioner herein in the show cause notice issued by the externing authority. In this connection we can usefully refer to the principle enun- ciated by a Bench of our High Court in the case of Madan Magan Patel v. Commissioner of Police Surat and Anr. 1988 0 GLH 100. In that decision the Bench has referred to the decision reported in AIR 1954 SC 179 wherein it was observed as under:the first contention raised by the learned Counsel raises however a somewhat important point which requires careful consideration. It has been repeatedly held by this court that the power to issue a detention order under Section 3 of the Preventive Detention Act depends entirely upon the satisfaction of the appropriate authority specified in that Section. The sufficiency of the grounds upon which such satisfaction purports to be based provided they have a rational probative value and are not extraneous to the scope or purpose of the legislative provision cannot be challenged in a court of law except on the ground of mala fides. (Vide the State of Bombay v. Atma Ram AIR 1951 SC 157 ). (Vide the State of Bombay v. Atma Ram AIR 1951 SC 157 ). A Court of law is not even competent to enquire into the truth or other- wise of the facts which are mentioned as grounds of detention in the communication to the detenu under Section-7 of the Act. What has happened however in this case is somewhat peculiar. The Government itself in its communication dated the 13th of March 1953 has plainly admit- ted that one of the grounds upon which the original order of detention was passed is unsub- stantial or non-existent and cannot be made a ground of detention. The question is whether in such circumstances the original order made under Section 3 (1) (a) of the Act can be allowed to stand. The answer in our opinion can only be in the negative. The detaining authority gave here two grounds for detaining the petitioner. We can neither decide whether these grounds are good or bad nor can we attempt to assess in what manner and to what extent each of these grounds operated on the mind of the appropriate authority and contributed to the creation of the satisfaction on the basis of which the detention order was made. To say that other ground which still remains is quite sufficient to sustain the order would be to substitute an objective judicial test for the subjective decision of the executive authority which is against the legislative policy underlying the statute. In such cases we think the position would be the same as if one of these two grounds was irrelevant for the purpose of the Act or was wholly illusory and this would vitiate the detention order as a whole. This principle which was recognised by the Federal Court in the case of Keshav Talpade v. Emperor AIR 1943 FC 72 seems to us to be quite sound and applicable to the facts of this cases. ( 8 ) AFTER referring to that decision the Bench has held:applying the above said decision we have to consider only the subjective satisfaction ar- rived at by the Deputy Commissioner of Police who is the externing authority in this case. ( 8 ) AFTER referring to that decision the Bench has held:applying the above said decision we have to consider only the subjective satisfaction ar- rived at by the Deputy Commissioner of Police who is the externing authority in this case. The abovesaid decision is also an authority for the proposition that if one of the grounds mentioned in the original order is substantial or non-existent to say that the other ground which still remains is quite sufficient to sustain the order would be to substitute an objective judicial test for the subjec- tive satisfaction of the executive authority which is against the legislative policy underlying the statute. ( 9 ) AS far as the present case is concerned it cannot be said that unsubstantial or non-existent ground has been taken into consideration but a ground which is germane for the purpose of externing a particular person has been taken into consideration by the externing authority without putting the externee on notice as regards that ground. If that be so the Court cannot substitute objective judicial test for the subjective satisfaction of the executive authority and come to the conclusion that the executive authority dehors the said ground which has not been put on notice to the externee was able to arrive at a decision for the purpose of externing the person concerned in that particular case. Thus it is clear that reference to a particular instance such as persons of status and means have shifted from the locality so that they may not become the victim of such tort committed by the petitioner herein is a clear instance to show that the activities of the petitioner concerned have reached that degree of harm to the society that the interest of the society or even of that particular locality required that this individual who has become a public menace should be externed from the locality. This particular instance has not been put on notice to the externee though it finds place in the externment order. Natural justice requires that the person affected should have notice of the relevant materials on which the authority concerned bases its conclu- sion. The fact that the persons with status and means have shifted from their place so that they may not become vicum of such torts by the externee concerned is one of the essential and relevant circumstance for externing a person. The fact that the persons with status and means have shifted from their place so that they may not become vicum of such torts by the externee concerned is one of the essential and relevant circumstance for externing a person. This essential circumstance on which the ex- terning authority relied was not put on notice to the externee. As we have stated already this cir- cumstance finds place in the order of externment. The failure on the part of the externing authority to put on notice to the externee regarding this particular circumstance in our opinion clearly vitiates the order of externment and offends the principle of fair-play and justice. For all these reasons the order of externment is quashed and set aside. Rule is made absolute. .