Judgment :- 1. Two youngsters armed with lethal weapons-revolver and knife-made entry into the residence of a medical practitioner and demanded money at gun point, but before they could get the booty they had to flee out as the neighbours rushed in. This is the gravamen of the prosecution story. Two more persons were also arraigned as accused along with them, as the investigation revealed their involvement along with other two. 2. The principal assailant who had the revolver was not alive during trial as he committed suicide before the commencement of trial. (He will be referred to as the first accused for convenience). So, the case proceeded against the remaining accused. The Assistant Sessions Judge convicted the appellant for the offences under S.393 of the Indian Penal Code and S.25(1B) of the Arms Act and sentenced him to imprisonment and fine. The term of imprisonment awarded for the first count was seven years being the minimum prescribed by S.398 of the IPC. 3. The synopsis: P.W.1 is a doctor attached to Government service. His residence has a provision for consultation room. On 8-11-1986, around mid night, the first accused and the appellant visited the doctor's house pretending that the appellant was suffering from some abdominal disorders. The doctor examined him and wanted to give him an injection and he prepared the syringe for that purpose. But abruptly the visitors turned into robbers. As the first accused raised a revolver and the appellant raised a knife, the doctor became dump founded. First accused then led the doctor to the attached toilet. With one part of a bath towel the hands of the doctor were tressed up from behind, and with the other part his mouth was muffled. He was then taken to the bed room. On seeing the doctor in this frightening appearance, his wife became stunned and transfixed and she grimaced at the intruders. The first accused asked them to surrender all the cash with them. She then offered to give her gold bangles, but the first accused declined to accept them. He insisted on getting currency notes. In the meanwhile, the appellant had decoyed two domestic servants of the house to the kitchen room and locked them up. However, those servants found their way out through the rear door and cried alarm to the hearing of the neighbours. He insisted on getting currency notes. In the meanwhile, the appellant had decoyed two domestic servants of the house to the kitchen room and locked them up. However, those servants found their way out through the rear door and cried alarm to the hearing of the neighbours. As the neighbours were rushing in, both the intruders flinched and escaped. The matter was reported to the local police station on the next day. Within a week all the accused were arrested and the revolver, the knife and some cartridges were recovered by the police. 4. The doctor, his wife and one of the domestic servants (PWs.1 to 3) narrated the incident in the trial court. They identified the appellant as the knife holding intruder. One of the neighbours who rushed to the scene, a college Professor (PW. 4), has corroborated the version regarding the incident, although he did not identify the intruders. The Assistant Sessions Judge found that the appellant had attempted to commit robbery, and was in possession of the revolver and cartridges without licence. He was accordingly convicted and sentenced as aforesaid. 5. Learned counsel for the appellant did not seriously dispute the prosecution case that two persons entered the house of the doctor and threatened him to part with money. His main contention is that the evidence of identification of the appellant is flimsy. No test identification parade was conducted during investigation and the witnesses have no case that they had previous acquaintance with the appellant. Upon those facts, learned counsel contended that the evidence is not sufficient to convict the appellant. A few decisions of the Supreme Court were cited by the counsel to support the contention that absence of test identification parade is fatal if the witness had no previous acquaintance with that accused. A Division Bench of this Court had referred to those judgments in two decisions of this Court and laid down the legal position on that aspect. It is enough to refer to one of those two decisions (Chandran v. State of Kerala 1987 (1) KLT 391). The following principle has been reiterated by the bench in that decision: "When a stranger witness makes identification of an accused in Court, the Court, by way of caution or prudence, seeks assurance before accepting the identification as correct. That assurance would be available from the positive result of test identification parade. The following principle has been reiterated by the bench in that decision: "When a stranger witness makes identification of an accused in Court, the Court, by way of caution or prudence, seeks assurance before accepting the identification as correct. That assurance would be available from the positive result of test identification parade. Successful identification parade renders it safe for the court to act upon the identification made in Court. However, it cannot be said that absence of test identification parade is fatal in all cases. Assurance could be available from other sources and circumstances. It cannot be laid down as a principle of law that after lapse of a period, witness, would, in no case, be able to identify a person whom he had seen for the first time earlier. Witness might have had a fair opportunity of seeing the accused, of noting his features and appearance. There might have been something in the context, manner and circumstances of the meeting which would render it easy for the appearance of the accused to fix itself in the memory of the witness; something might have taken place shortly thereafter which would have enabled the. witness to recollect the prior meeting and the person concerned. Presence of these features may also lend assurance to the Court in acting on the identification made in Court by a witness even in the absence of a test identification parade". 6. It is settled law that substantive evidence of identification of an accused is the evidence given and identification made by a witness in Court and it is for the investigating agency to consider whether test identification parade should be arranged for furnishing to the investigating agency an assurance regarding the identity of the person concerned. This is not a case where the witnesses had only a fleeting chance to have the glimpse of the face of the intruders. The doctor had very distinct opportunity to focus his attention on the appellant whom he examined for complaints of abdominal disorders. It is very probable that the doctor would have pointedly looked at his patient to observe the facial changes during the examination to make a correct diagnosis. When the patient suddenly turned into a robber, the doctor would naturally have watched his face for the volte-face in the patient's pose. It is very probable that the doctor would have pointedly looked at his patient to observe the facial changes during the examination to make a correct diagnosis. When the patient suddenly turned into a robber, the doctor would naturally have watched his face for the volte-face in the patient's pose. P.W.3, the servant boy, would very probably have closely looked at the face of the appellant with curiosity and anxiety. The wife of the doctor, of course, might not have had sufficient opportunity to notice the facial features of the intruder who had the knife, as she would have focussed her look at the face of the man with the revolver. It is significant that the doctor had mentioned some special features of the two assailants even in the First Information Statement, the correctness of which has not been disputed in cross-examination. I have no reason to doubt the acceptability of the identification evidence spoken to by P.Ws.1 and 3. Learned Assistant Sessions Judge has therefore rightly concluded that the appellant was one of the intruders. 7. However, the appellant cannot be convicted for possession of the revolver and the cartridges, since the prosecution has not proved that the appellant was in possession of them. The prosecution story itself reveals that the possessor of the revolver was the first accused. On the facts of this case it is immaterial that the revolver and cartridges were recovered by the investigating officer pursuant to the information supplied by the appellant. He is therefore not liable to be convicted for the offence under S.25 (1-B) of the Arms Act. 8. It was next contended that the offence, if at all any proved, would only be attempt to commit extortion and not attempt to commit robbery. Extortion is defined in S.383 of the IPC thus: "Whoever intentionally puts any person in fear of any injury to that person, or to any other, and thereby dishonestly induces the person so put in fear to deliver to any person any property or valuable security, or anything signed or sealed which may be converted into a valuable security, commits 'extortion'." S.384 of the IPC is the penal section for extortion whereas S.385 is for attempt to commit extortion. Learned counsel contended that since extortion involves delivery of property or article demanded by the accused, the question of robbery does not even arise when there was no delivery of article. Inorder to complete the act of extortion the person who was put in fear, must have been induced to deliver the property. In other words, the act of inducement caused by the wrong doer should bring forth its result atleast by the victim consenting to deliver property even if actual delivery does not take place due to any fortuitous circumstance. To constitute extortion, it is not enough that the wrong doer has done his part, it must produce the result also. If it fails to produce the requisite effect, the act would remain only in the stage of attempt. Shah, C. J. and Baxi, J. have observed in Labhshanker v. State (AIR 1955 Saurashtra 42) that "the essence of the offence of extortion is in the actual delivery of possession of the property by the person put in fear and the offence is not complete before such delivery". But it is not correct to say that if the act amounts only to attempt to commit extortion, it would not amount to attempt to commit robbery. No doubt, robbery includes extortion. The commencing words in S.390 are these: "In all robbery there is either theft or extortion". Extortion is robbery if the offender at the time of committing extortion is in the immediate presence of the person put in fear of instant death, or of instant hurt, or of instant wrongful restraint. The interrelation between extortion and robbery arises when there is coerced delivery of property to another. Extortion and robbery are akin to each other and the difference between them is reduced to one of degree. eg:- When A threatens B through telephone saying "unless you send the money demanded, you will be killed", it is extortion, if B consents to send the amount. But if A goes to B's room with a weapon and tells him that he would be killed unless the money is given and if B consents to give money pursuant thereto the offence of extortion snowballs into robbery. When extortion is committed in the immediate presence of the victim, extortion is robbery because of the fear of instant death or instant hurt or instant wrongful restraint caused thereby. When extortion is committed in the immediate presence of the victim, extortion is robbery because of the fear of instant death or instant hurt or instant wrongful restraint caused thereby. So, an attempt to commit extortion, in certain situations, will amount to attempt to commit robbery. 9. In this case the extortion attempted was in the immediate presence of the victim. The weapon used by the offender was so lethal as to put the victim in fear of instant death or at least instant grievous hurt. Therefore, I cannot agree with the contention of the learned counsel that the acts proved in this case do not amount to attempt to commit robbery. Hence conviction for S.393 of the IPC is confirmed, and that of S.25(1B) of the Arms Act is set aside. 10. Learned Counsel lastly contended that this is a fit case for application of the provisions of the Probation of Offenders Act, 1958 (for short 'the Act'). It was pointed out that the appellant was a young boy of 18 on the date of offence and was only twenty at the time of conviction, and that he was in jail for nearly one year. S.6(1) of the Act says that when any person under twenty one years of age is found guilty of having committed an offence not punishable with imprisonment for life, the court by which the person is found guilty "shall not sentence him to imprisonment unless it is satisfied that, having regard to the circumstances of the case including the nature of the offence and the character of the offender it should not be desirable to deal with him under S.3 or S.4. ". Here the offence has only reached the stage of attempt, the principal offender had committed suicide, and the appellant's acts did not cause any injury to any one. Considering his young age (below 21). I am inclined to apply S.4 of the Act provided there is no adverse report about his character. I, therefore, direct the trial court to call for a report from the Probation Officer and pass such orders according to law. I make it clear that if the report contains adverse remarks about the character of the appellant, the trial court is not bound to apply the provisions of the Act to this appellant. Appeal is disposed of in the above terms. I make it clear that if the report contains adverse remarks about the character of the appellant, the trial court is not bound to apply the provisions of the Act to this appellant. Appeal is disposed of in the above terms. Office will send the records to the trial court forthwith.