Judgment Padmanabhan, J. Two accused were tried for offences punishable under Secs.302 and 201 with the aid of Sec.34 of the Indian Penal Code. Both were convicted under each section and sentenced to imprisonment for life and rigorous imprisonment for three years respectively, permitting the sentences to be suffered concurrently. Criminal Appeal No.236 of 1986 was filed by the first accused and the other accused by the second accused. 2. Second accused Rosama is the widow of deceased Unni alias Devassia. They have a son (P.W.2) and a daughter (C.W.4). First accused Joy alias Job was assisting the deceased in his work and residing along with him and his family in a house having only one room. Illicit intimacy developed between accused 1 and 2. Deceased was found a hindrance. Therefore, in furtherance of the common intention of both the accused, at about midnight on 3.7.1984 when the children were fast asleep, first accused murdered Unni by cutting his chest just below the neck with M.O.3 axe inside the residential building at Malom Village and buried the dead body in the paramba itself with the intention of screening themselves from legal punishment by causing disappearance of evidence regarding commission of murder. This is the prosecution case. Second accused is said to have directed and assisted the first accused. 3. Case was registered under the caption “man missing” on 27.7.1984 when Ext.P1 complaint filed by P.W.1, brother of the deceased. Same day, P.W.14, Assistant Sub Inspector questioned both the accused and came to know that Unni was murdered and the dead body buried in the compound itself. The next day, P.W.15, Circle Inspector took up investigation and laid the charge for the above offences. 4. The case depends purely on circumstantial evidence. The circumstances relied on by the prosecution are: (a) The deceased was last seen in the company of the accused sleeping at their residence and thereafter nobody saw him alive and the accused have no explanation at all; (b) The suspicious conduct of accused 1 and 2 after the disappearance of Unni; (c) The information given by accused 1 and 2 to P.W.14 which led to the recovery of the incriminating objects, namely, the dead body, dress, mat, weapon used for murder and implement used for burial of the dead body; and (d) The motive for doing away with Unni. After an elaborate discussion of the evidence, the Sessions Judge accepted these circumstances as conclusive. 5. Before convicting an accused on the basis of circumstantial evidence, it is necessary to ensure that the chain of the circumstantial evidence is complete and conclusive without even a missing link. The effect of all the links separately and of the chain cumulatively should lead only to the guilt and not in any way to the innocence. No circumstance should be capable of any explanation on any hypothesis other than the guilt. In such cases, guilt being an inference from proved circumstances, there should not be anything consistent with the innocence and the inference of guilt must be conclusive. Moral conviction however strong cannot be accepted as a substitute for legal evidence. 6. In this case, the very edifice of the prosecution story regarding the last seen theory and the conduct of the accused was on the assaumption that Unni died on the night of 3.7.1984. If that theory is shaken, the entire evidence based on it must go. The evidence of all the relevant witnesses examined by the prosecution is that from 4.7.1984 onwards Unni was never seen and there after his dead body alone was found on exhumation on 28.7.1984. The evidence of P.W.2, the son of Unni and the second accused, is that after Unni slept with them on the night of 3.7.1984 he was never seen from the morning of 4.7.1984 onwards. The alleged murder was during midnight on 3.7.1984. 7. But all the witnesses, including the official witnesses who were present at the time of exhumation of the body, unanimously said that except peeling of the skin and hair here and there and missing of one eye, the body was other wise in tact, though there was decomposition, and it was easily identifiable as that of Unni by the general features and dress. This is quite in consonance with the medical evidence of P.W.7 who conducted autopsy on 28.7.1984 and Ext.P2 post-mortem certificate issued by him that: “From the symptoms noted in the certificate and from the symptoms of putrefied body that has been exhumed the body is that of a man who died within five days. It could be well within this side of five days since the body is identified by others at the first sight. When opened stomach wall was in tact”. It could be well within this side of five days since the body is identified by others at the first sight. When opened stomach wall was in tact”. The evidence of the Executive Magistrate, examined as P.W.9, is also supporting this. If that be so, death could have taken place only on or after 23.7.1984. But the case is that he was murdered on 3.7.1984 and he was not seen alive thereafter. 8. Ext.P3 inquest report prepared on 28.7.1984 and the evidence of P.W.15 who prepared the same is that the pit was of very recent origin and the tapioca cultivation in heaps above the pit and surroundings was only approximately three days old. This is almost in consonance with the medical evidence and shows that death and burial might have been only somewhere near 25.7.1984. There is no reason for any doubt on the basis of the medical evidence and inquest evidence that it is a case of homicide by cutting with some weapon causing a very deep injury. It is very difficult to comprehend why, even after all these facts became known, P.W.15 did not direct further investigation to ascertain when, where and how the death took place instead of banking on the alleged confession and blindly proceeding as if homicide was inside the house on the night of 3.7.1984. If death was on 3.7.1984, after the expiry of 25 days on 28.7.1984 the body would definitely not have been in that shape and form. If actually P.W.15 proceeded as if the murder took place inside the house, it is not known why he did not try to ascertain whether there was any blood mark or other symptoms of murder inside the house. Investigation appears to be far from being satisfactory. We feel that P.W.15 was discharging his duty in an inexperienced and casual manner. 9. If actually Unni was missing from 3.7.1984 no witness including P.W.2 had a case that he ever came back. It then remains a mystery as to when and where or who murdered him and how the dead body happened to be there. We have absolutely no reason to doubt the identification of the deady body by witnesses including close relations as that of Unni. We can safely conclude that Unni was murdered by someb5dy after 23.7.1984 and the dead body was buried in the compound and tapioca planted above it. We have absolutely no reason to doubt the identification of the deady body by witnesses including close relations as that of Unni. We can safely conclude that Unni was murdered by someb5dy after 23.7.1984 and the dead body was buried in the compound and tapioca planted above it. Prosecution did not even attempt to prove who planted the tapioca or who is responsible for the same. 10. If this is the position, the last seen theory propounded by the prosecution must be taken as completely tumbled down. So also any explanation alleged and proved to have been offered by the second accused regarding the where abouts of Unni before the possible date of his death, whether consistent or inconsistent, cannot be taken as incriminating circumstances at all. So long as the prosecution did not succeed in establishing the company of the deceased with the accused after 3.7.1984 the explanation proved to have been offered by her to P.W.1 on 26.7.1984 also is of no consequence. 11. The only circumstance attempted to be brought out against the first accused is through P.Ws.3 and 5. They said that two or three days before 28.7.1984 when P.W.5 and others were engaged in clearing forest, a rat ran to the place of exhumation and when P.W.3 chased it and thrust a stick there he was threatened by the first accused. That appears to be an artificial link connected in the chain. Even accepting that circumstances to be true, that is not one inconsistent with innocence because it could equally be a bona fide step to prevent the new cultivation being destroyed. 12. Alleged motive was not at all attempted to be established. Nobody said that accused 1 and 2 were in love with each other or they had any illicit connection. There is nothing to indicate that they wanted to eliminate the deceased for any reason. The only evidence in that line is that of P.W.2 who said that after the first accused began residence in the house about seven months before the incident there were frequent quarrels between second accused and the deceased. He also said that the deceased thereafter used to come drunk and one day on account of the quarrel, first accused went away from the house. But P.W.2 did not connect the quarrel or the new drinking habits of the deceased with the arrival of first accused. He also said that the deceased thereafter used to come drunk and one day on account of the quarrel, first accused went away from the house. But P.W.2 did not connect the quarrel or the new drinking habits of the deceased with the arrival of first accused. Quarrel can equally be on account of the new drinking habits of the deceased and that possibility was not ruled out by P.W.2. Further P.W.2 himself said that when the first accused went away from the house, the second accused and deceased together went and brought him back. Thus none of these circumstances are established to be incriminating. 13. The only circumstance left is the recovery under Sec.27 of the Evidence Act. The relevant informations are Ext.P12 given by the first accused and Ext.P13 by second accused, both to P. W.14 Assistant Sub Inspector on 27.7.1984, the date on which Ext.Pl was given by P.W.1. What the first accused is alleged to have said is “if you come with me, I shall show you the places where the dead body is buried and the axe, hoe and shirt are placed” and the statement of the second accused is “Joy (A1) washed the axe and hoe and brought and placed them in the hosue”. We fail to understand how the information of the second accused could be brought under Sec.27. It does not distinctly relate to any fact thereby discovered. That is a statement given by an accused during investigation to the police officer not coming under Sec.27 of the Evidence Act and it is not admissible at all. 14. The statement of the first accused is also admissible only in so far as it relates distinctly to the fact thereby discovered as a direct and proximate consequence of it, provided it is deposed to by the investigating officer to whom it was given and he also says that the discovery was made in consequence of the information. So also it must be shown that the information conveyed by the accused was not previously known to the police. P.W.14 admitted more than once that it was two hours after leaving the spot and after reaching the police station that he questioned and recorded the statements of accused 1 and 2 and Exts.P12 and P13 are extracts from the same. P.W.14 admitted more than once that it was two hours after leaving the spot and after reaching the police station that he questioned and recorded the statements of accused 1 and 2 and Exts.P12 and P13 are extracts from the same. So also, from his chief examination and cross examination, it is clear that even before questioning the accused, he became aware of the place where the dead body was buried. This is more or less clear from the evidence of the other witnesses also. These testimonies show that even before the accused were questioned and their statements recorded the place of burial was also pointed out. He unambiguously admitted in cross examination that even before leaving the scene with the accused on the 27th and before questioning them in the police station and recording their statements, he was aware of the places where the dead body and the axe and hoe were also kept. It is curious to note from the evidence of P.W.9 that the same hoe which is claimed to have been recovered from P.W.15 on information under Sec.27 was actually used by the first accused for exhumation of the dead body. Discovery is after the exhumation. That means, Sec.27 was misused to make a farce of it. P.W.14 arrested the accused only after the alleged informations to him, but that may not be very material because even without a formal arrest, custody could be found. Anyhow, when they gave the alleged information it was not recorded and no discovery was made. The same information was elicited again in the police station and recorded and Exts.P12 and P13 are extracts from that recorded statement. Even though an attempt was made in re-examination to make out that the information was received for the first time from the accused though it was not then recorded, the indications in chief and cross are that even otherwise the informations were there to P.W.14. The evidence of P.Ws.1 and 4, the brothers of the deceased, in chief examination itself show that on the spot itself on the 27th, even before taking to the police station and recording their statements, P.W.14 questioned accused 1 and 2 in their presence and the place was also pointed out. The evidence of P.Ws.1 and 4, the brothers of the deceased, in chief examination itself show that on the spot itself on the 27th, even before taking to the police station and recording their statements, P.W.14 questioned accused 1 and 2 in their presence and the place was also pointed out. Thus it is clear that whether from the information of accused 1 and 2 or otherwise P.W.14 had all the informations even before the originals of Exts.P12 and P13 were recorded. Therefore, Exts.P12 and P13 for that reason also, cannot be treated as informations under Sec.27 of the Evidence Act. 15. Neither P.W.14 nor P.W.15 said that any discovery was made on the basis of Exts.P12 and P13. Though Exts.P12 and P13 were recorded on 27.7.1984 by P.W.14, who claims to have arrested the accused on 27.7.1984 itself, Ext.P4 recovery mahazar prepared by P.W.15 Circle Inspector shows that he arrested the accused on 28.7.1984 and recorded statements after questioning them on that day. His recovery of the axe and hoe seems to be on the statement recorded on 28.7.1984. Ext.P3 inquest report or the evidence of P.W.15 Circle Inspector do not show that the dead body was exhumed on the information given by the accused. Curiously enough, the chief examination of the investigating officer (P.W.15 Circle Inspector) in a murder case depending on circumstantial evidence alone does not contain anything at all. Nothing useful for the case is stated by him or elicited from him. Regarding the discovery of the dead body or any information on the basis of which it was discovered his evidence is significantly silent. No question was asked about it and he did not divulge any information. That means none of the investigating officers gave evidence regarding the discovery of the dead body as in consequence of any information of the accused. The Circle Inspector as P.W.15 has spoken only to the recovery of M.Os.III, IV and V. Regarding the information leading to discovery what he stated is only, “on the basis of the confessional statement and as pointed out”. What that statement is has not been brought out. It is highly necessary in the interest of justice that investigating officers and public prosecutors should get themselves acquainted as to how they should properly and effectively discharge their duties without the risk of justice being allowed to suffer. What that statement is has not been brought out. It is highly necessary in the interest of justice that investigating officers and public prosecutors should get themselves acquainted as to how they should properly and effectively discharge their duties without the risk of justice being allowed to suffer. In short, the conduct of the investigating officers and the public prosecutor made it impossible for the court to have recourse to Sec.27 of the Evidence Act. 16. What is not ‘covered’ cannot be ‘discovered’. The very sanctity of the discovery which acts as assurance to the truth of the information given by the accused is his exclusive knowledge which acts as the immediate and distinct cause of the discovery which is the immediate and proximate effect of the information. In that respect, neither P.W.14 nor P.W.15 supplied any useful information. On the other hand, their evidence only disprove that fact for the reasons stated above and show that the informations were there to the police and the people even otherwise. What Sec.27 of the Evidence Act permits is only proof of that part of relevant information given by the accused. The extent of the admissible information and its effect in deciding the guilt will depend upon facts of cases. That will have relation to the extent of criminality which the proved information is capable of placing on the accused. The deficiency, if any, will have to be supplied by other items of admissible evidence. The information acting as the ‘cause’ and the discovery of ‘fact’ operating as the immediate and proximate ‘effect’ of the information, when put together could only lead to the legitimate inference possible. Information regarding the whereabouts of the dead body (subject to identification in cases of dispute) and the consequent discovery may, in the absence of cogent exculpatory explanation, in some cases lead to inference of concealment by the maker and his involvement in the crime. If the information only leads to the inference of the knowledge of the maker that the dead body is there without any involvement on his part in the crime it may not by itself be sufficient to fix criminality and the remaining links may have to be supplied by the prosecution because his knowledge can be that somebody else placed the dead body there. If authorship of the concealment is also part of the information given by the accused that is an additional circumstance to fix criminality on him in the absence of any acceptable explanation leading to innocence. 17. Then what is relevant is only the evidence of P.W.15 that the first accused pointed out M.Os.III to V to him on the 28th. That could at the best amount to conduct coming under Sec.8 of the Evidence Act. In the above circumstances, the conduct in pointing out M.Os.III to V cannot be taken as incriminating for the further reason that they are not proved to be incriminating objects. What P.W.9 the Executive Magistrate said is that on the 28th “both the accused showed the place” of burial. Such a joint conduct is not admissible and even if admissible it cannot be found who among them pointed out. Such pointing out on the 28th was spoken to by P.Ws.1, 2,4 and 6 also. That is of no consequence because the places were known to all by that time. Further no acceptable information has been proved regarding authorship of the concealment which alone could connect the accused with the crime on the basis of the information. Otherwise, the conduct could only show knowledge simpliciter of the places of concealment. Such knowledge by itself in the above circumstances, when it was known to others also, cannot be taken as incriminating. Irrespective of the doubt regarding the date of death, if the prosecution was liable to establish that the dead body identified to be that of Unni and the incriminating objects connected with murder were recovered from the places of hiding on the basis of the informations supplied by the accused and exclusively available to them alone, convictions and sentences could have been sustained in the absence of any plausible explanation. P.W.14 ought to have properly recorded these informations and P.W.15 ought to have made recoveries on the basis of the informations received by P.W.14 and spoken to that fact. 18. Thus practically there is no evidence at all. It is true that we have a strong moral conviction that in all probability the crime must have been committed by the accused. But that cannot be substitute for legal evidence. Therefore, we are of compelled to interfere for the purpose of acquitting both the accused. 19. 18. Thus practically there is no evidence at all. It is true that we have a strong moral conviction that in all probability the crime must have been committed by the accused. But that cannot be substitute for legal evidence. Therefore, we are of compelled to interfere for the purpose of acquitting both the accused. 19. Both the criminal appeals are allowed and convictions and sentences are set aside. Both appellants are acquitted and ordered to be set at liberty, if not wanted in any other case.