JUDGMENT Brijesh Kumar, J. - Only a short question arises for consideration in this writ petition. It appears that after departmental proceedings the petitioner was given punishment of dismissal by the disciplinary authority. The petitioner preferred an appeal against the order of dismissal which was, though, allowed but it was provided by the appellate order that proceedings shall take place afresh from the stage of the defence in the enquiry. The petitioner challenged the order of the appellate authority directing to start the disciplinary proceedings afresh from the particular stage. The claim petition was, however, dismissed by the U.P. Public Services Tribunal and the review petition filed against that order also met the same fate. 2. Learned counsel for the petitioner has submitted that the relevant provision of the Police Regulations conferring appellate power, does not specifically confer the power to remand a matter, therefore, the appellate authority could only uphold, set aside or modify the order passed by the disciplinary authority. Unless there is specific provision for remand of the matter the appellate authority cannot pass that order. However, it has been conceded that in cases when the order of Punishment is set aside because of some technical lacuna or on the ground that the principles of natural justice have not been complied with it is open to hold a fresh enquiry in the matter but ascot mug, to the teamed counsel for the petitioner, this decision can only be taken by the disciplinary authority and not by the appellate authority According to petitioner, after the order of dismissal was set aside by the appellate authority, it was still open for the disciplinary authority to take decision in the matter as to whether a fresh enquiry could legally be initiated and should be initiated or not but this cannot be done by the appellate authority. 3. On a perusal of the appellate order it appears that the appellate authority has not dealt with the matter on merits but has observed that the petitioner had himself made certain entries in the General Diary, dated April 28, 1981 which were relevant on the merits but were not taken into account by the punishing authority. At one place it has also been observed that the defence plea of the petitioner has not been adequately perused. At one place it has also been observed that the defence plea of the petitioner has not been adequately perused. In this view of the matter that the defence plea of the petitioner was ignored while passing the order of punishment the appellate authority thought it fit that the punishing authority may consider that aspect of the matter and then pass the order. The relevant part of the order of the appellate authority reads as follows : "Proceedings against the appellate will be taken afresh from the defence stage and the appellant will be called upon to lead his full defence which will be taken into consideration for a fair decision. The appellant will be allowed to cross-examine the prosecution witnesses of these proceedings if he so desires." 4. From the above direction it is clear that the appellate authority only intended to provide adequate opportunity of hearing to the petitioner which, according to the appellate authority, was not properly made available to the petitioner. It may also be observed that by means of a show cause notice the petitioner was required to show cause within eight days. The petitioner had received show cause notice on January 1, 1983 to which he has submitted a reply, dated January 8, 1983 that is to say, within the time allowed. However, the appellate court found that it was received on January 11, 1983 whereas the impugned order of punishment was passed on January 10, 1983. This also appears to have weighed in the mind of the appellate authority that the reply submitted by the petitioner to the show cause notice could not be considered before passing the order of dismissal. For these reasons, it appears, that which a view to afford the petitioner an opportunity to substantiate his defence case this direction has been given to the disciplinary authority to have an enquiry afresh from the defence stage. Not that alone, the petitioner has, also been given an opportunity to cross-examine witnesses of the department if he so desires. Learned counsel for the petitioner has submitted that during the first enquiry the petitioner had not adduced any evidence in defence. He perhaps apprehended that the petitioner may be compelled to adduce an evidence but I find that there is no basis for any such apprehension. No one may be compelled to adduce any evidence even in his defence. Learned counsel for the petitioner has submitted that during the first enquiry the petitioner had not adduced any evidence in defence. He perhaps apprehended that the petitioner may be compelled to adduce an evidence but I find that there is no basis for any such apprehension. No one may be compelled to adduce any evidence even in his defence. It will always be open for the petitioner to indicate before the punishing authority or Enquiry Officer, if he so desires, that he would not like to produce any evidence in defence. 5. The learned counsel for the petitioner has placed reliance upon certain cases but has, however, conceded that in case where the order of punishment is set aside on technical ground or for violation of principles of natural justice and not on merits, it is open for the department to initiate fresh proceedings. He has also submitted that he does not contends me position that in the present case the order of punishment has been set aside on such grounds as mentioned above. However, his main contention is that this direction could not be given by the appellate authority but, if at all, it could be left open for the disciplinary authority to decide as to whether any fresh proceedings were to be take a or not. 6. In support of the contention that the appellate authority could not remit the ease for starting the enquiry afresh, learned counsel for the petitioner has referred to paragraph 508 of the Police Regulation as well as paragraphs 510, 511 and 513 to indicate that these paragraphs, which deal with appellate jurisdiction of the authorities do not provide for remand of a matter. For that matter it may be pointed out that under none of these paragraphs it is provided that the appellate authority may uphold the order of the punishing authority or dismiss the appeal or set aside or modify the order of punishment. If the contention of the petitioner is accepted, perhaps then it may not even be possible for the appellate authority to set aside or modify the order of punishment. It has then been rightly submitted that the appellate authority could exercise general powers of the appellate court and in that connection he has placed reliance upon a case reported in 1971 (1) SCC 662 , Makeshwar Nath Srivastava v. The State of Bihar and others. It has then been rightly submitted that the appellate authority could exercise general powers of the appellate court and in that connection he has placed reliance upon a case reported in 1971 (1) SCC 662 , Makeshwar Nath Srivastava v. The State of Bihar and others. In this case it appears that, while dealing with the matter against an order of reversion, the appellate authority had passed the order of dismissal of the petitioner. This amounted to enhancement of punishment which, of course, cannot be done unless the appellate authority has been given power to enhance punishment. In that context the Hon'ble Supreme Court observed : "In the absence of any other provision of law or any rule conferring on the State Government the power to pass an order of dismissal in exercise of its re visional power or power of general superintendence the general principle must prevail, namely, that an appellate authority in an appeal by an aggrieved party may either dismiss his appeal or allow it either wholly or partly and uphold or set aside or modify the order challenged in such appeal. It cannot surely impose on such an appellant a higher penalty and condemn him to a position worse than the one he would be in if he had not hazarded to file an appeal." 7. From the above observation it has been sought to be argued that general powers which vest in the appellate authorities are only to dismiss or allow the appeal partly or wholly or to modify the order challenged in such appeal. The observation of the Hon'ble Supreme Court was made in context with the order passed by the appellate authority enhancing punishment. Once it is conceded that in cases where the order of punishment is set aside not on merits, but on other technical ground, it is open to hold To enquiry afresh, then there would be no bar for the appellate authority in sending back the matter or considering it afresh in the light of the observation male in the appellate order. On behalf of the petitioner no provision has been shown to indicate that in such circumstances the disciplinary authority alone will be competent to take the decision for holding the enquiry afresh. On behalf of the petitioner no provision has been shown to indicate that in such circumstances the disciplinary authority alone will be competent to take the decision for holding the enquiry afresh. From the observations made by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Makeshwar Nath Srivastava (supra) it cannot be impliedly inferred that the appellate authority cannot pass such an order as passed in the present case. Learned counsel the petitioner has then submitted that unless it is by necessary implication that the appellate authority can exercise the power of remand and such power is necessary for the exercise of jurisdiction, such power could not be exercised. In this connection he has referred to a case reported in AIR 1986 SC 984 , Smt. Savitri v. Govind Singh Rawat. The matter related to providing for interim maintenance pending final disposal of a petition under Section 125, Cr. P.C. It was held that such power of interim maintenance was thereby necessary implication otherwise it may defeat the very object of the Legislation, in Para 6 of the judgment it was also observed that in the alienee of any express prohibition, it is appropriate to construe the provisions in Chapter IX as conferring implied power on the Magistrate to direct the person to pay some reasonable sum by way of maintenance to the applicant pending final disposal of the application. In the present case as well we find that there is no express prohibition for the appellate authority against sending the matter back to the disciplinary authority to pass afresh order after considering the relevant material which was not considered while passing the impugned order. In certain circumstances, as in the present case, it may be necessary for the appellate authority to pass such an order in exercise of its appellate jurisdiction in appropriate case. It may also be noted that the order passed by the appellate authority does not re-open the whole matter. It does not provide any opportunity to the department to lead any further evidence in support of the charges levelled against the petitioner. In that sense the matter is not to be re-opened. It only provides that the punishing authority may pass the order after taking into account certain documents having material bearing on the merits of the defence taken by the petitioner. In that sense the matter is not to be re-opened. It only provides that the punishing authority may pass the order after taking into account certain documents having material bearing on the merits of the defence taken by the petitioner. His reply to the show cause notice, which appears to have reached the authority a day after the order of punishment was passed, may also be taken into account including one entry in the general diary made by the petitioner. It further affords opportunity to the petitioner to lead his defence evidence and to cross-examine the witnesses of the department examined for proof of the charges. The proceedings have started afresh from the stage of the defence therefore, it cannot be said that such a direction given by the appellate authority would in any manner prejudice the petitioner. In this view of the matter also the appellate order does not require any interference. 8. In view of the discussion held above, I do not think that a case is made out for interference in the order pasted by the appellate authority. The writ petition is thus dismissed. There would, however, be no order as to costs.