The respondent M/S. Martin & Harris is a Private Limited Company which has a factory; in Bombay and manufactures various products in Its factory and sales the products' through its sales branch offices at different places including one such Sales Branch Office at Jaswanta Road, Pan bazar, Gauhati. The Gauhati branch does the work in connection with the sale and distribution of the products of respondent's factory in the North Eastern Region. These are all-admitted facts. 2. The factory of the respondent is covered under the Emplo­yees' State Insurance Act/1948; (hereinafter called as the 'Act') and the employees contribution payable in respect of the employees employed in the said factory in Bombay were paid, but the contributions payable in respect of the employees of the Branch Office at Gauhati were not paid. According to the appellants, namely, Employee's State Insura­nce Corporation, Gauhati and its Regional Director, the contributions under" the Act in respect of the employees of the Branch Office at Gauhati are payable, and so, the appellants by their letter-No. 41-5156-34 dated 9.7.1975 demanded payment of a sum of Rs. 21,666.75 P as Employer's Special; Contribution and on account of Employees' contribution from the respondent. But the respondent instead of payment, preferred an application under section 75 of the 'Act' before the Employees' Insurance Court, Gauhati whereupon the Prosecution Case No. 1 of 1975 began for adjudication of the dispute as to whether the employees of the respondent in the Branch Office at Gauhati are covered under the Act. 3. The respondent petitioner's case was that the Gauhati Office of the petitioner is neither a factory with manufacturing process nor is an establishment to which the Act applies; and that petitioner's company only carries on the business of sales of various products at its Gauhati Office And the State Government of Assam has not issued any notification under section 1(5) of the Act, so the employees of the company of the Gauhati Branch Office are not covered by the Act and the company is not to pay any contribution as demanded by the opposite parties (appellants by their letter dated 97.1975. 4. 4. Whereas the appellants-opposite parties contested by stating that the employees of the respondent in the Branch Office at Guahati are employed for wages in or in connection with the work of the factory of the respondent and are employed in the work connected with the sale and distribution of products of the factory of the res­pondent and as such they are Employees' within the meaning of section 2(9) of the Act, and so. the petitioner company is liable to pay the contribution as demanded within the provision of the Act; that it was not at all necessary for a separate notification by the State Government (Assam) under section 1(5) of the Act extending the provision of ;the; Act to cover sales and distribution Branch Office at Gauhati ,of the respondent-company. 5. In deciding the controversy, the Employees' State Insurance Court, Gauhati framed 6 issues of which Issue Nos. 2,3 and 4 are prominent. Deciding these issues, the Court by its judgment dated 15.12.1976 has held that the employees of Gaubati Branch Office had no connection with the factory at Bombay while working in conne­ction with tl[ie, sales and distribution of the products of that factory, and so it would be necessary for the State .Government to declare the Gauhati Branch Office as establish me it under section 1(5) of the Act and that no such notification had. been issued under the said provision and therefore, the petitioner company (responds) is not liable to make contribution in respect of its employees of the branch office at Gauhari under the provision of the Act. 6. The appellants have assailed the said judgmented date 15.12.1976. The submissions of learned counsel Mr.P N. Goswami for the appell­ants carry substance backed by law. Whereas, the submissions of learned counsel Mr.P.Deka for the respondent are found to be vague three sons, namely Rameswar Goenka (defendant 1), Mahabir Goenka (defendant 2) and Biswanath Goenka (defendant - 3) as his true and lawful attorney authorising each of them to act jointly or severally on his behalf. After the death of Jibaa Ram Goenka, the defendants as legal heirs continued to constitute the Joint Hindu family gove­rned by Mitakshara School of Hindu Law with Rameswar, defendant 1 as the Karta. The defendant -2,3,4 and 5 executed a fresh power of attorney appointing defendant-1 Rameswar as true and lawful attorney. After the death of Jibaa Ram Goenka, the defendants as legal heirs continued to constitute the Joint Hindu family gove­rned by Mitakshara School of Hindu Law with Rameswar, defendant 1 as the Karta. The defendant -2,3,4 and 5 executed a fresh power of attorney appointing defendant-1 Rameswar as true and lawful attorney. During the pendency of the suit defendant - 1 Rameswar Goenka died on 8.2.84 at Shillong leaving behind him his widow Mani Devi and his three sons, namely Jagdish Prasad, Sushil and Krishna, as his legal heirs. On 24.5.84, the plaintiff made an applic­ation for substituting the heirs of Rameswar in place of deceased Rameswar as his legal representatives. Since the application was barred by limitation, it was rejected 4. Before the trial Court, the question arose whether the suit has abated in its entirety. The trial Court has held that the suit has abated so far as the deceased defendant is concerned and not as a whole. Hence this revision petition. 5. The question then is whether the interest of the heirs of the deceased me ber has been represented by any members of the Hindu Joint family who are on the records of the case. 6 On a reading of plaint, it appears that the suit has not been instituted in the name of the Hindu undivided family carrying on business under any name., as provided under O 30 R 10, CPC and that the suit has been instituted against the Karta and other members of the family. 7. Section 6 of the Hindu Succession Act,1956, for short the "Act" Heals with the question of coparcener in a Mitakshara coparcenery during after coming into operation of the Act. Under section 6 there are two classes of devolution of property namely survivorship and succession. Under section 6 if a male Hindu dies, after the commencement of the Act, having at the time of his death an interest in a Mitakshara corparceoery property, his interest in the property shall devolve by survivorship upon the surviving members of the coparcenery and not in accordance with the Act. Under section 6 if a male Hindu dies, after the commencement of the Act, having at the time of his death an interest in a Mitakshara corparceoery property, his interest in the property shall devolve by survivorship upon the surviving members of the coparcenery and not in accordance with the Act. Under the proviso to section 6, if the deceased had left .surviving female relative speci­fied in the Class I of the schedule or a male relative specified in that class who claims through such female relative, the interest of the deceased in the Mitakshara coparcenery property shall devolve by testamentary or intestate succession, as the case may be, under the Act and not by survivorship. The Explanation - 1 added to section 6 pro­vides that, for the purpose of! section 6, the interest of Hindu Mitakshara coparcener shall be deemed to be the share in the property that would have been allotted to him if partition of the property had taken place immediately before his .death, irrespective of whether he was entitled to claim partition or not. 8. After the coming of the Act into force, the Mitakshara Joint Hindu family is broken on the death of a coparcener if he dies leaving behind him his female relative or male relative claiming through such a female relative specified in section 6. In such a case, if the Karta and all other coparceners are parties and a coparcener dies, the Karta or the other members on record cannot represent the estate of the heirs of the deceased member and the heirs of the deceased must be brought on record. 9. As already stated, defendant - 1 Rameswar died leaving behind him his widow Mani Devi. Mani Devi as one of the heirs speci­fied in Class I of the schedule. Therefore, the joint family had been broken and the share of the defendant - I shall devolve on his heirs as provided under proviso to section 6. But interest of Mani Devi and other heirs has not been represented in the suit. Therefore, the suit has abated so far as the deceased defendant. I is concerned. 10. The next question which arises for consideration is whether the suit has abated as a whole. But interest of Mani Devi and other heirs has not been represented in the suit. Therefore, the suit has abated so far as the deceased defendant. I is concerned. 10. The next question which arises for consideration is whether the suit has abated as a whole. The learned counsel for the petitioner has placed reliance to support his contention on the decisions in Jugal Kishore vs. Wardhasa, AIR 1955 Nag 166 (DB) and Arjun Singh Y.S.Matukdhari Singh, AIR 1955 Pat 391 (DB). 11. In Jugal Kishore (AIR 1955 Nag 166), it has been, held : “In-the instant case the suit is to enforce the contract of lease made by the plaintiff with all the defendants. The suit is not brought against the Karta of the family in his representative capacity but against individual members who are the contracting parties Each defendant represents his own interest This appears to be the ratio of the. decision in Mt. Laxmibai vs. Amritlal (B)' (Cit, sup). Where a suit is brought against the individual members of a joint family and not in a representative capacity, the interest of the widow of a deceased member is not represented by the other members of the joint ' family on the record of the ' case,-'Awadh Bihari Prasad vs. Jhaman Mahtion, AIR 1953 Pat 324 (J). In this view the wid­ows are necessary legal representatives.” 12. In Arjun Singh ( AIR 1955 Pat 391 ) during the pendency of appeal, in a suit for partition of joint family property brought aga­inst individual members of the family, one of the defendant-respondents died leaving a widow and son who was already on record. The widow was, however, not brought on record as a party to the appeal within time. In the context of the case, it was held that the entire appeal abated. 13. The facts in the above two cases are different from those of the present case. That apart, those decisions were made before the Hindu Succession Act came into operation and when the Hindu Women's Right to Property Act was in force. Therefore, the two decisions do not help the petitioner. 14. It is settled that in cases relating to contracts by or on behalf of a Joint Hindu family the manager effectively represents all the other members, and the family as a whole is bound by the decision. Therefore, the two decisions do not help the petitioner. 14. It is settled that in cases relating to contracts by or on behalf of a Joint Hindu family the manager effectively represents all the other members, and the family as a whole is bound by the decision. Therefore, the members are jointly liable in cases relating to contracts, although they may be liable only to the extent of their interest in the family properties. Since unlike the English Law, the Indian Law makes all the joint liability, joint and several in the absence of the agreement to the contract. It is, therefore, open to the plaintiff to sue any one or more of the defendants and it is not defence to such a suit that all the members of the Joint Hindu family must be made parties (See Jainarayan vs. Surajmall, AIR 1949 FC 211) 15. It is also equally settled that, on account o£ the partial abatement or a suit, it becomes, for any reason, impossible to proceed with the suit to its final conclusion the entire suit shall abate. But if a suit can proceed to a final adjudication in the absence of the legal representatives of the deceased defendant, the partial abatement will not affect the rest 61 the suit. Such a final adjudication is also possible when the interest of the deceased defendant can be separ­ated from those of the others. 16. Coming to the present case, the contract was entered into between the Governor of Assam of one part and Karta of the family Jiban Ram, of other part. It Has already been concluded that, in cases relating to contracts by or on behalf of a Joint Hindu family the Karta represents all the other members of the family, and the liability of the members of the family, is joint and several, and that the liability can be enforced against one or more of the members of the family. Therefore, on the death of defendant-1 Rameswar, the suit did not abate as a whole as the other defendants could be sued individually for recovery of the alleged amount due from the joint family business. In such a situation, the interest of deceased member can be separated. This view of mine finds support from the decision of the Supreme Court in Municipal Board, Lucknow vs., Paonalal, AIR 1976 SC 1091 . In such a situation, the interest of deceased member can be separated. This view of mine finds support from the decision of the Supreme Court in Municipal Board, Lucknow vs., Paonalal, AIR 1976 SC 1091 . In that case, the Supreme Court has held : “We are, however, unable to agree that the question of abatement in this case would arise in view of the fact that even if the suit had been dismissed against defendant the defendant 1 to 3 could individually be sued for rendering accounts and for recovery of the amount due from them. Whether they would be ultimately found by the Court to be liable for the plaintiff's claim is a different matter and will be decided in the suit. There is therefore, no substance in the plea that the appeal as a whole has abated on account of the death of Mohd. Yusuf." 17. For the foregoing reasons, the petition is dismissed. No costs.