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1989 DIGILAW 105 (KAR)

STATE OF KARNATAKA v. MANAGING DIRECTOR

1989-03-20

M.P.CHANDRAKANTARAJ, M.RAMAKRISHNA RAO

body1989
( 1 ) 1. We consider this appeal to be one in somewhat unusual circumstances. The appellant is the State of Karnataka. ( 2 ) WE will refer to the parties in the course of this judgment by the ranks assigned to them in the trial Court. ( 3 ) THE plaintiff doing business in quarry- ing Shahabad stones filed the suit in O. S. No. 149 of 1987 in the Court of the Civil Judge at gulbarga for permanent injunction restrain- ing the defendant- State of Karnataka from collecting dead rent at the enhanced rate of rs. 5,000/- per acre for Shahabad stones and rs. 500/- per acre for sand contrary to the provision for payment of dead rent of rs. 500/- per acre for Shahabad stones and rs. 50/- per acre for sand in the lease. The suit was presented on 13-4-1987 on which date the Court directed notice to the defendant returnable by 18-4-1987. We will make a reference to it later in the course of the order. However, the judgment under appeal states that the vacation intervened and therefore the learned District Judge as Vacation judge called for the records of the lower court and received them on 25-4-1987 and posted the matter to 27-4-1987 for hearing. On 27-4-1987 he passed a preliminary order stating that the State shall not demand dead rent from the plaintiff and that was to say that sufficient time was granted to file counter and written statement. Thereafter- wards, the case was posted to 7-5-1987. On 7-5-1987 the suit was disposed of by the judgment under appeal. By the said judgment, the learned District Judge decreed the suit despite the request made by the Government pleader to permit him to file counter and written statement. Aggrieved by the same, the State of Karnataka has preferred this appeal, inter alia, on the ground that there was no adequate opportunity to defend the suit and that, in any event, there was no need for the Vacation Judge to pass a final decree when, in the given circumstances, it was sufficient if he had granted temporary injunction, which alone had been prayed for in I. As. No. I and II. ( 4 ) UNDOUBTEDLY, certain facts cannot be disputed. No. I and II. ( 4 ) UNDOUBTEDLY, certain facts cannot be disputed. They are: the filing of the suit in the court of the Civil Judge at Gulbarga on 13-4-1987 along with I. A. No. I and on 18-4-1987 emergent notice of I. A. No. I was ordered to the defendant and it was to be called on 21-4-1987. We have already briefly slated the parties to the suit. Undoubtedly, there was some urgency because the demand notice had been issued to the lessee by the defendants to pay dead rent at the enhanced rate. Therefore, having regard to the order made by the learned Civil Judge, the plaintiff appears to have moved the vacation Judge on 20-4-1987 by an application purporting to be one under Section 28 (b) of the Karnataka civil Courts Act seeking urgent relief on i. As. I and II in the original suit on the file of the Civil Judge, Gulbarga. Those applications were allowed and records were called for. Immediately on receipt of the records, the case was posted to 27-4-1987 to hear the parties. On 27-4-1987 the Court passed a preliminary order directing the State not to demand dead rent from the plaintiff and thereafter the case was adjourned to 7-5-1987 and despite the Government Pleader seeking time to file counter and written statement, the learned District Judge proceeded to dispose of the matter finally after hearing both sides. ( 5 ) IN paragraph-4 of the Judgment, we find the following issues framed by him:-1) Whether I should grant time to the district Government Pleader to file his written statement and objections?2) If not, whether I should proceed to pass judgment in this case?3) What order? ( 6 ) WE wonder how in the absence of a written statement, these could be termed as the issues framed by the learned District judge, that too having denied an opportunity to file written statement. ( 7 ) WE find that the application of the law and the conclusion reached by the District judge are indeed in accordance with the decision rendered by this Court in exercise of its jurisdiction under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution. It is also not in dispute that some documents were marked in evidence by consent of the parties. It is also not in dispute that some documents were marked in evidence by consent of the parties. On perusal of the order and the records, we see that no evidence as such was adduced on behalf of the plaintiff under oath. To us, it appears that justice must not only be done but it must appear to have been done. Therefore, the manner in which justice is dispensed is as important as the ends of justices themselves. There can be no short-cuts, no dispensation with procedure and no dispensation of favours with or without sufficient provocation judicial or otherwise. ( 8 ) ASSUMING for a moment that the learned District Judge was moved by the application made under Section 28 of the Karnataka Civil Courts Act, he was required to give relief as a Vacation Judge allowing i. A. No. I or LA. II or both, as the case may be, and granting temporary injunction restraining the defendant-State of Karnataka from collecting dead rent at the enhanced rates. That could have met the ends of justice completely and the plaintiff could not have asked for anything more. But we fail to see why the learned District judge proceeded to dispose of the suit itself inspite of the learned Government Pleader seeking time to file counter and written statement. The law that was declared by this court in regard to the specific notification amending the Karnataka Minor Minerals concession Rules, 1969 by which rates in respect of many of the minerals had been enhanced, would not have changed by the time the Court re-opened after summer vacation. There was hardly any chance for it. In fact, this Court has disposed of not one or two but hundreds of writ petitions challenging the validity of the said notification following the earlier judgment of this Court declaring the notification effecting amendment to the minor Mineral Concession Rules to be prospective and not applicable to the leases granted prior to the publication of the notification. ( 9 ) WE have no other alternative but to come to the conclusion that, without any provocation, the Vacation Judge had refused time and acted beyond the demands of situation as on 7-5-1987 when the Courts were going to re-open on 22nd or 23rd May of that year. ( 9 ) WE have no other alternative but to come to the conclusion that, without any provocation, the Vacation Judge had refused time and acted beyond the demands of situation as on 7-5-1987 when the Courts were going to re-open on 22nd or 23rd May of that year. ( 10 ) IN that circumstance, we have to infer that the Judge is incorrect both in procedure and judicial conduct to have hastened to pass the judgment with no more than following the decision rendered by this Court in w. P. No. 16330 of 1986 which he has referred to. That could have been done by the Civil judge after summer vacation. We have already noticed that mere grant of temporary injunction would have met the demands of the situation. Therefore, we should come to the conclusion that the Judge was motivated in disposing of the suit itself. This Court in mallayya v Thotayya, (1) I. L. R. 1989 KAR 807. , following the decision of the Supreme court in Modula India v Kamakshya Singh deo, (2) A. I. R. 1989 SC 162. , has held that every plaintiff who comes to the Court must prove the cause pleaded and the defendant must have adequate opportunity to cross-examine the plaintiffs witnesses and to address the arguments on the basis of the plaintiffs case. Therefore, we cannot but pass strictures on the conduct of the learned district Judge for his undue haste in proceeding to pass the final judgment. ( 11 ) IN the circumstances, the judgment and decree under appeal are liable to be set aside and are accordingly set aside. The matter stands remitted to the Civil Judge, gulbarga, with a direction to dispose of the suit, in accordance with law, after affording adequate opportunity to the defendant to defend the suit. However, it is made clear that the temporary injunction granted shall be operative till the disposal of the application by the Civil Judge in accordance with the provisions of Order 39 CPC. Let a copy of this judgment be placed before the Hon'ble the Chief Justice. Send a copy of this judgment to the concerned District Judge wherever he is now. Return the records forthwith. --- *** --- .