JUDGMENT : ( 1. ) THIS is plaintiffs appeal against dismissal of his suit for eviction concurrently by both the Courts below. ( 2. ) THE plaintiff is a tenant and the defendant is a sub-tenant but for the purposes of this suit, the plaintiff is the landlord of the defendant. The suit accommodation was sublet on monthly rent of Rs. 40/- as found by the lower appellate Court. ( 3. ) ON 30-12-1983, the plaintiff filed a suit for eviction on the grounds Under Sections 12 (l) (a) and 12 (l) (e) of the M. P. Accommodation Control Act, 1961 (hereinafter in short called the Act ). The trial Court dismissed the suit on findings that the plaintiff, not being the owner of the accommodation, is not entitled to evict the defendant on the ground of bona fide need as also the deletion of Section 12 (l) (e), w. e. f. 15-8-1983 by the M. P. Accommodation Control (Amendment) Act, 1983 (XXVII of 1983); for the suits before the civil Courts. The ground Under Section 12 (l) (a) was not proved. ( 4. ) DURING the pendency of the first appeal, Section 12 (l) (e) of the Act was restored with effect from 27-11-1985 by the M. P. Accommodation Control (Amendment) Ordinance, 1985 (No. 1 of 1985 ). Therefore, it was argued before the lower appellate Court that the relief of eviction Under Section 12 (1) (e) could be granted in view of the subsequent revival of the provision. The lower appellate Court declined to accept the argument on the ground that the trial Court had no jurisdiction to entertain the suit on the ground of bona fide need on the date it was filed and that the revival of the provision is prospective and not retrospective since the amendment does not relate to procedure. ( 5. ) THE question for decision is whether the plaintiff was not entitled to benefit of the Amending Act reviving Section 12 (1) (e) conferring jurisdiction on the civil Court to entertain and decide the suit on the ground as well. It is well settled that Statutes dealing with merely matters of procedure are retrospective unless such a construction is textually inadmissible. No person has a vested right in any course of procedure. It is well settled that Statutes dealing with merely matters of procedure are retrospective unless such a construction is textually inadmissible. No person has a vested right in any course of procedure. A change in the law of procedure operates retrospectively and unlike the law relating to vested right is not only prospective. Anant Gopal Sheorey v. State of Bombay, AIR 1958 SC 915 . A change of forum is a matter of procedure as laid down in New India Insurance Co. Ltd. v. Shanti Misra (Smt.), AIR 1976 SC 237 . ( 6. ) IN Sunderlal v. Har Prasad, 1980 MPLJ 182, the Division Bench of this Court held that the restrictions enacted by Section 12 (1) of the Act create essentially a procedural disability on landlords right, to evict his tenant under the general law, and not to confer substantive right on the tenants. The preamble of Section 12 (1), does not in terms require that the grounds specified in clauses (a) to (p) should exist prior to the filing of the suit for eviction. If the landlord wants to introduce in the plaint by amendment, any ground other than those falling Under Section 12 (l) (a), (c), (d) and (o), becoming available after the institution of suit, the inclusion thereof is not inhibited by the Act. After the amendment, the suit which was for ejectment, continues to be for ejectment, though based on additional ground so introduced. During pendency of eviction suit, on the ground of unlawful subletting, the Bench visualised arising of a new cause of action, namely, the ground of bona fide requirement, and observed that to drive the plaintiff to a new suit is too technical with a vengeance. It will simply be adding to multiplicity of proceedings, which must be avoided. ( 7. ) REFERENCE was also made to B. Banerjee v. Anita Pan, A9r 1975 SC 1146. In this case during the pendency of the suit governed by West Bengal Premises Tenancy Act (12 of 1956) was amended by W. B. Premises Tenancy (Second Amendment) Act (34 of 1969 ). By this amendment, mandatory restrictions protecting tenants, were introduced prohibiting the landlords from instituting suits for a period of three years. The Supreme Court held that the amendment was merely procedural and would apply retrospectively to the pending suits. By this amendment, mandatory restrictions protecting tenants, were introduced prohibiting the landlords from instituting suits for a period of three years. The Supreme Court held that the amendment was merely procedural and would apply retrospectively to the pending suits. By these amendments much more had to be proved by the landlord before he could get eviction than when he was called upon under earlier corresponding provision of the basic Act. Moreover, three years prohibition against institution of the suit was altogether new. It followed, therefore, that on the allegations and evidence, the landlord, could not get a decree, his suit having been instituted at a time when he could not have foreseen the subsequent enactment saddling him with new conditions. Repelling the argument that the suit must be dismissed straightway, institution being invalid, the Supreme Court observed : "we cannot be ritualistic in insisting that a return of the plaint and a representation thereof incorporating amendments is the sacred requirement of law. On the other hand social justice and the substance of the matter find fulfilment when the fresh pleadings are put in, subject of course to the three-year interval between the transfer and the filing of the additional pleading. Section 13 of the Amendment Act speaks of suits including appeals. It thus follows that these fresh pleadings can be put in by the plaintiff either in the suit, if that is pending, or in appeal or second appeal if, that is pending. Thereupon, the opposite-party, tenant, will be given an opportunity to file his written statement and the Court will dispose of it after giving both sides the right to lead additional evidence. It may certainly be open to the appellate Court either to take evidence directly or to call for a finding. Expeditious disposal of belated litigation will undoubtedly be a consideration with the court in exercising this discretion. The proviso to Sub-section (3a) can also be complied with if the plaintiff gets the permission of the Rent Controller in the manner laid down therein before filing his fresh pleading. " The Supreme Court observed : "we are conscious that to shorten litigation we are straining language to the little extent of interpreting the express institution of the suit as amounting to filing of fresh pleading. " The Supreme Court observed : "we are conscious that to shorten litigation we are straining language to the little extent of interpreting the express institution of the suit as amounting to filing of fresh pleading. By this construction we do no violence to language but, on the other hand, promote public justice and social gain, without in the least imperilling the protection conferred by the Amendment Act. " ( 8. ) IN view of the law as aforesaid, it must he held that the plaintiff is entitled to seek eviction on the ground Under Section 12 (l) (e) which was restored during the pendency of the appeal, even though on the date of institution of the suit, namely, 13-12-1983, the civil Court had no jurisdiction to entertain the suit for eviction on the ground Under Section 12 (1) (e) of the Act. ( 9. ) THE lower appellate Court found that the plaintiff is living in a rented accommodation and that he has no other reasonably suitable accommodation of his own. It also rightly held that it was not essential for the plaintiff to prove that he is the owner of the accommodation. Therefore, a decree for eviction must follow on the findings of the Court below, on the ground Under Section 12 (1) (e) of the Act. ( 10. ) THE learned counsel for the respondent submitted that he may be allowed a years time to search out alternative accommodation. Learned counsel for the appellant opposed the prayer. Considering the paucity of accommodations as also the urgency and the pressing need of the plaintiff, interest of justice demands, the respondent should be allowed time upto 30-6-1989 to vacate the premises subject to the conditions that within ten days from the date of this judgment, the tenant furnishes a security bond in the sum of Rs. 3,000/- undertaking that he shall vacate the premises on or before 30-6-1989, failing which he shall be liable to compensate the plaintiff by paying the said sum of Rs. 3,000/- in addition to all those which the plaintiff is entitled under the decree. ( 11. ) THE appeal is allowed with costs throughout. The judgment and decree passed by the Courts below are set aside and instead, the plaintiffs suit is decreed as indicated above. Counsels fee Rs. 200/-, if certified.