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1989 DIGILAW 107 (BOM)

Keshav son of Shantaram Kaole v. State of Maharashtra

1989-04-05

M.M.QAZI

body1989
JUDGMENT - M.M. QAZI, J.:---Since both these revisions arise out of a common judgment, they are being disposed of by this common judgment. 2. Criminal Revision Application No. 81 of 1988 has been filed at the instance of the accused who was convicted by the trial Court for the offence under section 325 of the Indian Penal Code and was sentenced to a fine of Rs. 800/- and R.I. for one day i.e. till rising of the Court. That order was challenged by the accused before the Sessions Judge, Nagpur. The learned Session Judge vide order dated 19-4-1968 dismissed the appeal. However while dismissing the appeal, he modified the sentence to two months rigorous imprisonment and a fine of Rs. 800/-. It is this order which is being challenged before me by way of Criminal Revision Application No. 81 of 1988. 3. Criminal Revision Application No. 168 of 1988 is filed at the instance of complainant Sharawan for enhancement of sentence. According to him, the sentence of two months' rigorous imprisonment with a fine of Rs. 500/- for offence under section 325 of the Indian Penal Code is ridiculous and therefore, it should be enhanced. It is necessary to give certain background in order to appreciate the peculiar facts and circumstances which have given rise to the present revisions. 4. The Judicial Magistrate, First Class Nagpur, had convicted the accused of the offence under section 325 of the Indian Penal Code and sentenced him till rising of the Court and a fine of Rs. 500/- Complainant Sharawan filed Criminal Revision No. 251 of 1985 before this Court for enhancement of sentence. The High Court allowed the revision vide order dated 14-11-1986 and sentenced the accused to two months' rigorous imprisonment and a fine of Rs. 500/-. Criminal Application No. 802 of 1986 was filed by the accused under section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure before this Court, seeking direction that in view of the pendency of his appeal before the Sessions, Judge Nagpur, a direction should be issued that the Sessions Judge shall decide the appeal ignoring the sentence imposed by the High Court vide order dated 14-11-1986 passed in Criminal Revision Application No. 251 of 1985. The High Court allowed this application and made it clear vide order dated 1-12-1986 that the Sessions Judge should dispose of the appeal on merits ignoring the order passed in Criminal Revision application No. 251 of 1985 in the matter of enhancement of sentence. The High Court further clarified that none of the parties brought to its notice that the appeal at the instance of the accused challenging his conviction under section 325 of the Indian Penal Code was already pending before the Sessions Judge, Nagpur. It was after these developments that the appeal (Criminal Appeal No. 184 of 1985) came to be disposed of by the Sessions Judge, Nagpur, vide order dated 19-4-1988. It may be mentioned here that notwithstanding the order of the High Court that the Sessions Judge should dispose of the appeal on merits, the Sessions Judge took into consideration the order of the High Court passed on 14-11-1986 enhancing the sentence to two months. Following observations of the Sessions Judge leave no doubt that not only he took into consideration the order of the High Court dated 14-11-1986 but he thought that he was bound by the same. The relevant observations in para 15 of the judgment are reproduced below : "Now, coming to the question of the sentence, I feel that I am bound by the observations of the High Court in Criminal Revision Application No. 251/85. This may indeed involve enhancement of the sentence but in view of the clear directions by the High Court in that revision applications that the sentence imposed by the High Court shall be implemented if the appeal fails." It is thus clear that essentially on account of the order of the High Court passed in Criminal Revision Application No. 251 of 1985, that the Session Judge thought that it was necessary for him to impose a sentence of two months' rigorous imprisonment and a fine of Rs. 500/-. 5. Mr. Somalwar, learned Counsel appearing on behalf of the accused, vehemently agreed that the conviction and sentence of the accused cannot be sustained in view of the glaring discrepancies in the evidence led by the prosecution. According to him, the witnesses who were named in the first information report as eye-witnesses were not examined by the prosecution, and instead the witnesses who were not named, were examined. According to him, the witnesses who were named in the first information report as eye-witnesses were not examined by the prosecution, and instead the witnesses who were not named, were examined. He has further pointed out that P.W. 3 Abdul Hafiz and P.W. 4 Bhola are not the eye witnesses and yet their evidence has been treated as the evidence of the eye-witnesses. He has also submitted that the evidence of the prosecution witnesses inter se is contradictory and inconsistent and therefore has to be discarded. 6. I have given anxious consideration to these submissions and after hearing him at some length, I think, it would not be possible for me to appreciate the evidence afresh while exercising the revisional jurisdiction. Suffice it to say, the incident was reported so immediately by the complainant and relevant details were mentioned in the first information report itself. There is also medial evidence which is supported by the oral evidence that the complainant suffered a fracture to his left ulna. According to Mr. Somalwar, since the X-ray plates were not produced by the prosecution it would not be safe to conclude that the complainant suffered a fracture. It is true that the x-ray plates were not produced, but nonetheless the evidence of P.W. 8 Dr. Kakde coupled with the evidence of the complainant leave no doubt that the complainant suffered a fracture. The doctor has specifically deposed that he noticed the fracture and in cross-examination there is no challenge to this part of the evidence. Having to these facts, I do not see any reason to differ with the concurrent finding of fact that the complainant suffered a fracture. 7. Mr. Somalwar submitted that the Sessions Judge has no power to enhance the sentence which was imposed by the trial Court. According to him, the Sessions Judge could either acquit the accused allowing the appeal or dismiss the same. He could not have enhanced the sentence. Mr. Naik and Mr. Ahmed appearing on behalf of the State have pointed out that the Sessions Judge has no power of enhance the sentence. Even Mr. Ziauddin, learned Counsel for the complaint, has fairly conceded that the Sessions Judge has no has no power of enhancemant of sentence. The power of enhancement is only available to the High Court under section 377 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. Even Mr. Ziauddin, learned Counsel for the complaint, has fairly conceded that the Sessions Judge has no has no power of enhancemant of sentence. The power of enhancement is only available to the High Court under section 377 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. In view of this, there can be no doubt that the order of the Sessions Judge on the point of sentence is wholly without Jurisdiction. However, Mr. Ziauddin submitted that the High Court in Criminal Revision Application No. 251 of 1985 has already enhanced the sentence to two months at the instance of the complainant and, therefore, no fault could be found with the order of the Sessions Judge even on the point of sentence. In my view, this argument cannot be accepted. As I have already shown above, the High Court passed the order in Criminal Revision Application No. 251 of 1985, enhancing the sentence thinking that the accused did not challenge his conviction and no appeal was pending before the Sessions Judge. None of the parties brought it to the notice of the High Court that appeal was pending. The accused realised this mistake and therefore, he moved the High Court by way of Criminal Application No. 302 of 1986 under section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, seeking direction to the Sessions Judge who was seized of his Appeal No. 184 of 1985, that the said appeal should be decided without taking into consideration the order of the High Court in Criminal Revision Application No. 251 of 1985. In view of this, I have no doubt that the order of the High Court in Criminal Revision Application No. 251 of 1985 could not have been taken into consideration at all by the Sessions Judge, Nagpur. Having regard to these facts, I have no doubt that the order of the Sessions Judge, Nagpur, on the point of sentence was wholly without jurisdiction, though on merits he could allow or dismiss the appeal, which was filed before him under section 374 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. 8. The question that falls for consideration before me is as to whether Criminal Revision filed by the complainant for enhancement of sentence is tenable. 8. The question that falls for consideration before me is as to whether Criminal Revision filed by the complainant for enhancement of sentence is tenable. I have already shown above that the complainant had earlier moved the High Court for enhancement of sentence, challenging the order of the trial Court in Criminal Revision Application No. 251 of 1985. However, because of the subsequent developments that order could not be taken into consideration. The powers of the High Court for enhancement of sentence are exhaustive under section 401 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, which reads thus : "401. High Court's powers of revision.---(1) In the case of any proceeding the record of which has been called for itself or which otherwise comes to its knowledge the High Court may, in its discretion exercise any of the powers conferred on a Court of Appeal by sections 386, 389, 390 and 391 or on a Court of Session by section 307 and when the Judges composing the Court of revision are equally divided in opinion, the case shall be disposed of in the manner provided by section 392." It is quite clear from the wordings of section 401 that the Code has conferred extensive powers on the High Court as that of section 386 and other provisions of the Code. It appears from the wordings of section 401 that the High Court in a given case can even send for the record and examine and pass such orders as may be necessary in the interest of justice. Since it has already been brought to the notice of this Court at the instance of the complainant that the sentence imposed on the accused is inadequate and out of proportion looking to the nature of the offence. It is true that the sentence of two months is not the proper sentence for an offence under section 325 of the Indian Penal Code. Mr. Somalwar has submitted that the incident is of the year 1982, and since about seven years a sword has been hanging on the accused, this is a second round of litigation upto the High Court, hence a lenient view should be taken. It is true that it would not be expedient to send him to jail after about seven years even though he is being convicted for the offence under section 325 of the Indian Penal Code. It is true that it would not be expedient to send him to jail after about seven years even though he is being convicted for the offence under section 325 of the Indian Penal Code. I think, in view of the peculiar facts and circumstances of the case, ends of justice would be, met if he is sentenced to a fine of Rs. 1,500/-, in default of payment of fine to undergo rigorous imprisonment for two months, and to undergo imprisonment till rising of the Court. It is further directed that out of the fine if paid, Rs. 1,000/- will be paid to the complainant Sharawan. One month's time is granted to the accused to pay the amount of fine. Both the revisions are disposed of accordingly. Order accordingly. -----