( 1 ) 1. This appeal is directed against the order dated 23-10-1982 in final decree proceedings arising out of O. S. No. 104 of 1964. The present appellants were impleaded in the final decree proceedings as defendants 5 to 7, inter alia, on the ground that they were purchasers, pendente lite, of some of the immovable properties situate in Raichur Town, while the plaintiffs suit for partition was pending disposal in the Court of the Civil judge at Yadgir in Gulbarga District. ( 2 ) WE may make a passing reference that the suit was filed by one Zeharabi, since deceased by her legal representatives, against one Gulam Mahaboob and two others, some of whom also died and are represented by their respective legal representatives since. ( 3 ) THE suit was originally filed in the court at Gulbarga in the year 1950. Later, on the establishment of the Court of the Civil judge at Yadgir, the suit was transferred there and was renumbered as O. S. No. 104 of 1964. That a preliminary decree came to be passed in favour of the plaintiff declaring her 1/8th share in the suit schedule properties which consist of several immovable house properties as well as agricultural lands situate in Raichur District, is not in dispute. After passing the preliminary decree, the court proceeded to appoint a Commissioner to make a division of the properties by metes and bounds. It was at that time discovered that some of the properties had been sold to third parties and therefore identification of the properties as well as division of them by metes and bounds was practically impossible. It was in those circumstances, the Counsel appearing for the parties submitted to the court that the Court may proceed to sell the properties in public auction and divide the sale proceeds amongst the various sharers in proportion to which they were entitled to under the preliminary decree. Then auction took place in which, as is apparent from paragraph-7 of the order under appeal, the parties to the proceedings i. e. , the final decree proceedings, also participated and bid at the auction held after issuing sale proclamation and sale warrant. Then auction took place in which, as is apparent from paragraph-7 of the order under appeal, the parties to the proceedings i. e. , the final decree proceedings, also participated and bid at the auction held after issuing sale proclamation and sale warrant. ( 4 ) WE should digress a little at this stage from our Judgment and state that this appeal was originally filed as Miscellaneous First appeal in this Court and when it was held by this Court that Miscellaneous First Appeal was not maintainable, it was treated as regular First Appeal. But, unfortunately that appeal was re-registered as Regular first Appeal without proper valuation of the subject-matter of the appeal and without proper Court fee being paid. This Court has now become helpless as that was a Judicial order made on 12-8-1987. Therefore, we may not state anything more at this stage. ( 5 ) IT appears, originally Regular First Appeal was filed against the order under appeal and on the Office objections, it was converted into Miscellaneous First Appeal and again it was reconverted into Regular First appeal. This matter had been heard at length on more than one occasion by more than one Bench to one of which one of us was a party. Today it has been again heard on the short question whether the appellants, who claim to be bona fide purchasers without notice of the sale proceedings and who were permitted to be impleaded as defendants 5 to 7, are entitled to the relief seeking to set aside the auction sales held by the Court pursuant to the agreement reached by the parties through their respective Counsel to have the properties sold and sale proceeds divided in accordance with the shares allotted to each of them under the preliminary decree. ( 6 ) THE Lower Court has considered every aspect and every argument advanced on behalf of the appellants. It has proceeded to distinguish some of the Authorities cited holding that the Rulings cited had no application to the facts of the case on hand with which we cannot have any serious difference. ( 6 ) THE Lower Court has considered every aspect and every argument advanced on behalf of the appellants. It has proceeded to distinguish some of the Authorities cited holding that the Rulings cited had no application to the facts of the case on hand with which we cannot have any serious difference. The compelling circumstance which induced the Court below to deny the relief asked for by the newly added defendants, the purchasers pendente lite, was that when they purchased the properties merely on the representation made by their vendors who did not disclose the pendency of the partition suit involving the properties, their cause of action would be strictly against their vendors and therefore they were not entitled to question the sale which was otherwise brought about by the parties to the suit as the properties could not be divided by metes and bounds and sharers put in possession. Perhaps, there would have been nothing for the sale of these properties had the original parties to the suit remained alive on the date of the order directing sale of the properties by public auction. As we have already pointed out, the original plaintiff and some of the defendants to the partition suit died and their legal representatives were brought on record, each of whom were entitled to fractional share in the properties which their father or mother would have been entitled to. In the result, the question of dividing the properties by metes and bounds had since disappeared and that was supported by the commissioner's report obtained by the court which had appointed the Commissioner pursuant to the passing of the preliminary decree. It was in that circumstances that the trial Court has observed in para-8 of the Judgment under appeal (if it may be so- called) as follows:-"in this ruling, their Lordships have observed that when the question as to equitable distribution of the properties between the several parties arises, the court should also consider the question of allotment of any particular property which may have been transferred by a particular defendant. But, in the present case, in view of the order passed by my predecessor for sale of the suit properties, the question of allotment of any particular property does not arise. Admittedly, the defendants have purchased the properties during the pendency of the proceedings. Hence, the principles of is pendence apply to their sale. But, in the present case, in view of the order passed by my predecessor for sale of the suit properties, the question of allotment of any particular property does not arise. Admittedly, the defendants have purchased the properties during the pendency of the proceedings. Hence, the principles of is pendence apply to their sale. So, if the defendants have blindly purchased the properties relying on the representations made by these vendors, they must thank themselves. Now their only remedy is to wait and see as to how much amount their vendors will get at the time of passing the final decree and their remedy is only to proceed against their vendors. "thereafter, he has proceeded to make an observation that even if the earlier order passed by the Court of the Civil Judge directing sale in terms of the partition Act was one without jurisdiction, too much had happened since then and that should not be disturbed. ( 7 ) SRI Santosh Hegde, learned Senior counsel appearing for the appellants, contended that it would be open to the Court seized of the preliminary decree to make suitable adjustments in the allocation of properties on equity consideration even in favour of the bona fide purchasers, without setting aside the sale. ( 8 ) WE have already expressed that we cannot find fault with the trial Court or blame the trial Court for rejecting the prayer of the defendants to set aside the sales which had taken place by the time the defendants came on record and which sales were confirmed and sale certificates issued to the purchasers. Now it is clear that sale by a Court under the Code of Civil Procedure can take place only in accordance with the procedure prescribed under Order 21 and in no other mode. The purchasers who are appellants before us should have either resisted possession being given to the auction purchasers in terms of rule 97 of the said Order 21 or independently by claim petition under Rule 58 of Order 21 c. P. C. relating to the respective immovable properties which they had purchased. In that event, the Court could have independently investigated into their title. Instead, they chose to attack the order of sale made in terms of the agreement reached between the parties to the suit. In that event, the Court could have independently investigated into their title. Instead, they chose to attack the order of sale made in terms of the agreement reached between the parties to the suit. Therefore, as long as the sales were not set aside in accordance with the procedure known to law or could not be set aside in accordance with the procedure known to law, it will not be open to the appellants to question the same in this appeal. ( 9 ) IN fact, when the matter was specifically put to the learned Senior Counsel appearing for the appellants, he expressed his inability to point out any particular provision in the Code of Civil Procedure under which he could claim a legal right to have the sale set aside except the equity built up in the appellants' favour as bona fide purchasers. In fact, so far as we are concerned here in this Court, there is hardly any evidence on record to show that they were bona fide purchasers without notice except their mere assertion in the written statement that they did not ask for additional statement on that question nor had they led any evidence to prove their case. ( 10 ) WE are satisfied that no injustice would be caused by the order under appeal and the appellants arc entitled to recover the amounts paid by them together with damages if any in proceedings to be instituted hereinafter after the final decree has been fully implemented as observed by the trial Court. ( 11 ) WE therefore dismiss the appeal as devoid of merit. Appeal dismissed. --- *** --- .