Judgment B.P.Singh, J. 1. This application under Sec. 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure is directed against the order dated 4-7-1988 passed by the Sessions Judge, Dhanbad, in Sessions Trial No. 196 of 1987 permitting the holding of a test identification parade on the application of the Investigating Officer. Since the aforesaid order of the learned Sessions Judge was passed in a trial pending before him, instead of admitting the matter, the parties were directed to make detailed submissions at the admission stage itself so that the matter could be disposed of expeditiously. Accordingly learned Counsel for the petitioner as well as the State have been heard at length and this application is being finally disposed of by this order. 2. Sessions Trial No. 196/87 is pending before the Sessions Judge, Dhanbad. The case relates to the murder of late B.P. Sinha, a prominent labour leader of South Bihar. The petitioner along with others is charged of having committed the offence under Sec. 302/34 of the Indian Penal Code. Charges were framed and the prosecution had examined several witnesses before the Trial Court. At this stage, on 4-7-1988, an application was made by the Deputy Superintendent of Police, the Investigating Officer, before the Sessions court submitting that the prosecution proposes to hold a T.I. Parade on the 11th of July, 1988 and in that connection accused Ramprabesh Dubey and Jugal Singh may be directed to be present on 11-7-1988 at 10.30 a.m. It was also prayed that the Chief Judicial Magistrate maybe directed to nominate a Judicial Magistrate for the purpose. It appears that the petitioner was in custody but accused Ramprabesh Dubey was on bail. The learned Sessions Judge, after hearing the parties, allowed time for holding T.I. Parade in regard to accused Jugal Singh. He also directed Jugal Singh to appear personally for facing the T.I. Parade on 11-7-1988. 3. It appears that T.I. Parade was held on the 11th of July, 1988. On 26-11-1988 the petitioner Raghunath Singh was produced from custody while accused Jugal Singh and Ramprabesh Dubey filed their appearance in court. Accused Jugal Singh also filed an application praying for confirmation of the provisional bail. On the date, the petitioner Raghunath Singh filed an application stating that in the midst of the trial the police prayed for holding of T.I. parade and the T.I. Parade was actually held. Accused Jugal Singh also filed an application praying for confirmation of the provisional bail. On the date, the petitioner Raghunath Singh filed an application stating that in the midst of the trial the police prayed for holding of T.I. parade and the T.I. Parade was actually held. This, according to him, was unheard of and not in accordance with law. He made a grievance that the accused are prejudiced by reason of the fact that though the trial has commenced the police is still making further investigation and holding T.I. Parade in respect of persons against whom charges have already been framed It was, therefore, prayed that some time maybe given to the petitioner to move the High Court against the procedure adopted by the police. Having regard to the prayer made by the petitioner, the Trial Court adjourned the trial till the 16th of December, 1988 to enable the petitioner to obtain an order of stay from the High Court. The instant application was filed on 14th of December, 1988 and was listed for admission on the 16th December, 1988. Instead of admitting the application. I directed the learned Counsels to come prepared to argue, matter so that it could be finally disposed of No. order staying the trial was passed. 4. At the outset, learned Counsel appearing on behalf of the State submitted that such an application was not maintainable since it was really in the nature of a revision petition against an interlocutory order. He further objected on the ground that the application filed by the Investigating Officer was for holding a T.I. Parade in respect to Jugal Singh and not the petitioner. The petitioner, therefore, was not aggrieved. Moreover, the T.I. Parade had already been held and if the petitioner was really aggrieved by the order dated 4th of July, 1988, he ought to have moved this Court earlier against that order. 5. Learned Counsel appearing on behalf of the petitioner submitted that once a trial has commenced before a Sessions Judge the investigation of the case must come to an end. He submitted that no report contemplated under Sec. 173(8) of the Code Criminal Procedure could be submitted before the court of sessions. The Sessions Judge had no power to make any orders relating to investigation of a case pending trial before him or for collection of evidence in connection with the case. He submitted that no report contemplated under Sec. 173(8) of the Code Criminal Procedure could be submitted before the court of sessions. The Sessions Judge had no power to make any orders relating to investigation of a case pending trial before him or for collection of evidence in connection with the case. He referred to the provisions of the Code of Criminal Procedure, particularly, Secs. 225 to 237 of the Code in support of this submission. He also contended that if any accused person is required for the purpose of holding a T.I. Parade, it is open to the investigating agency to serve a notice upon the accused to appear for that purpose and if the accused does not appear, then bailors may be called upon the produce the accused. Even if that does not succeed, the prosecution can pray for cancellation of bail. But in any event, no application such as the one made by the investigating Officer in the instant case, could be made before the Sessions Judge, nor could the Sessions Judge pass an order for holding the T.I Parade and for deputing Magistrate for the purpose. According to him, such an order could have been passed by the concerned Magistrate and it was not proper for the Sessions Judge to have lent its assistance to the prosecution for this purpose. He submitted that the sessions court could not take upon itself the duties of a Magistrate. According to him, by permitting the prosecution to hold T.I. Parade, an opportunity was given to the prosecution to fill up the lacuna in the prosecution case. In any event there was considerable delay in holding the T.I. Parade and the identification by any witness such belated T.I. Parade was of no value whatsoever. In fact, the application filed by the Investigating Officer did not disclose any such material which could have persuaded even a Magistrate to pass such an order. 6. Learned Counsel appearing on behalf of the State submitted that there was no bar in laws preventing the investigating agency to further investigate a matter if fresh material came to light. He further submitted that the decision to hold the T.I. Parade was that of the prosecution and not of the Sessions Judge. 6. Learned Counsel appearing on behalf of the State submitted that there was no bar in laws preventing the investigating agency to further investigate a matter if fresh material came to light. He further submitted that the decision to hold the T.I. Parade was that of the prosecution and not of the Sessions Judge. Since the trial was pending before the Sessions Judge, only his permission was sought for as a matter of respect of the court which was in seisin of the matter. The T.I. Parade was held without the aid of the court bf a competent Magistrate. No relief could be given to the petitioner since the T.I. Parade had already been held and it was open to the defence to challenge the said T.I. Parade on such grounds as may be available to them at the trial. The question relating to the evidentiary value of such T.I. Parade was not to be decided at this stage. 7. The next question urged before me by the counsel for the petitioner was that once cognizance had been taken and in fact, the trial before the court of sessions had commenced the prosecution was barred from making any further investigation into the matter. According to the learned Counsel, trial begins when investigation ends and hence the commencement of the trial barred the investigating agency from making any further investigation into the matter. The holding of T.I. Parade being a part of investigation, was, therefore, barred. 8. Learned Counsel appearing on behalf of the petitioner placed reliance upon a decision of a learned Single Judge of this Court State of Bihar V/s. N. Nagmani.1 In that case, learned Judge held that even if it was assumed that the power of submitting a further report after further investigation is available to the investigating agency, during the pendency or continuance of the trial, such a report should not be submitted to the court of sessions while the sessions case is pending trial or is being heard from day to day. It was held that in terms Sec. 173(8) of the Code of Criminal Procedure provided that the Officer-in-charge of the Police Station shall forward to the Magistrate a further report or reports regarding such evidence in the form prescribed. The word "Magistrate" used in this Sub-sec. could only mean the Magistrate contemplated in Sub-Sections 2 to 6 of Sec. 173. It was held that in terms Sec. 173(8) of the Code of Criminal Procedure provided that the Officer-in-charge of the Police Station shall forward to the Magistrate a further report or reports regarding such evidence in the form prescribed. The word "Magistrate" used in this Sub-sec. could only mean the Magistrate contemplated in Sub-Sections 2 to 6 of Sec. 173. The Investigating Officer therefore, could not submit the result of such further investigation directly to the court of sessions. The submission that the word "Magistrate" had been used in this subsection to mean the same thing as "court" was rejected. It was further held that even if such a report was submitted to the Magistrate concerned, the same could not be forwarded to the court of Sessions. Although the police had statutory power to investigate into a case, still, if the sessions trial had commenced, then no such report as contemplated by Sec. 173(8) could be forwarded to the court of sessions either directly or through the Magistrate who had taken cognizance and had summoned the accused persons or had committed the accused to the court of sessions. The learned Judge was of the view that there was no provision in the Code which enabled the Magistrate to send the record of the supplementary case diary to the court of sessions. 9. Considering the provisions of Sec. 319 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, the learned Judge doubted, even if he did not decide that the Sessions Judge during the course of trial could summon any accused person against whom no order of commitment had been made. According to the learned Judge, if the Sessions Judge could do so, that would lead to an anomalous position. I may only observe that so far as this question is concerned, it now stands concluded by a Full Bench judgment of this Court reported in 1985 B.B.C.J. page 470 holding that under Sec. 319 of the Criminal Procedure Code, a court of Session can summon any person not already summoned or discharged by the police on perusal of the reports before it after commitment. The learned Judge held that even if such a supplementary report could be submitted to the Magistrate who took cognizance the said, Magistrate could not forward the aforesaid report to the Sessions Judge, the reasons being that before an order of commitment under Sec. 239 could be made or trial is to commence, the procedure prescribed by Sec. 237 is required to be followed. The court had to see to it that all necessary documents had been furnished to the accused. If supplementary case diary is sent to the Magistrate who took cognizance and summoned the accused or the Magistrate who passed the order of commitment under Sec. 209 of the Code, they cannot furnish the same to the accused because the accused is not before them. There was no provision under which the Magistrate could send the record of the supplementary case diary to the court of sessions. In a nutshell, without observing the procedure under Sections 207 and 209 of the Code, an accused could not be sent straight away to the court of sessions. The other practical difficulty posed by the learned Judge was that if such procedure was permissible, any supplementary case diary to mean the witnesses and the materials collected, could he sent to the court of sessions even after the prosecution had closed its case and the accused had been examined and had entered upon defence. He, therefore, concluded that although the police had statutory power to investigate into the case, still, if the sessions trial had commenced, then no such report, as contemplated by Sec. 173(8) can be forwarded to the court of sessions directly or through the Magistrate who had taken cognizance and had summoned the accused persons, or had committed the accused to the court of sessions. The learned Judge observed that there was a vital difference between the Trial before a Magistrate and that before the court of sessions. The trial before a Magistrate is held by a Magistrate who has summoned the accused or to whom to case has been transferred for disposal. It is well settled that such transferee Magistrate had all the powers that original Magistrate had. This, according to the learned Judge could not be said as a proposition of law so far as the court of sessions was concerned. 10. It is well settled that such transferee Magistrate had all the powers that original Magistrate had. This, according to the learned Judge could not be said as a proposition of law so far as the court of sessions was concerned. 10. Relying upon the judgment of this court in State of Bihar v N. Nagmani, it was contended on behalf of the petitioner the if a test identification parade was held while the sessions trial was in progress necessarily the Investigating Officer had to submit a supplementary case diary in relation to the aforesaid test identification parade. Such a supplementary report could not be submitted before the court of sessions directly or, through the Magistrate concerned. If that could not be done, there was no justification for holding of a test identification parade. 11. The submission of the learned Counsel for the petitioner is no doubt supported by the observations of this court in State of Bihar V/s. N. Nagmani (supra). But I am of the view that in view of proposition laid down by the Supreme Court in a later decision Ramlal Narang V/s. State of Delhi Administration)2, the law laid down by this court in State of Bihar V/s. N. Nagmani does not hold good. In Ramlal Narangs case the Supreme Court was concerned with the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898 and not with the provisions of the Code of 1973. The Court noticed the fact that there was no provision in the 1898 Code prescribing procedure to be followed by the police where after the submission of a report under Section 173(1) of the Code of Criminal Procedure and after the Magistrate had taken cognizance of the offence, fresh facts came to light which required further investigation. There was no express provision prohibiting the police from launching upon an investigation into the fresh facts coming to light after the submission of the report under Sec. 173(1) or after, the Magistrate had taken cognizance of the offence. It was generally thought by many High Court though doubted by a few, that the police were not barred from further investigation by the circumstances that a report under Sec. 173(1) had already been submitted and a Magistrate had already taken cognizance of the offence. It was generally thought by many High Court though doubted by a few, that the police were not barred from further investigation by the circumstances that a report under Sec. 173(1) had already been submitted and a Magistrate had already taken cognizance of the offence. It was under these circumstances, that the Law submission in its 41st report recommended that the right of the police to make further investigation should be statutorily affirmed that is how Sub-sec. (8) of Sec. 173 was introduced in the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973. The Supreme Courts noticed the judgment of some of the High Courts which had upheld the right of the police to make repeated investigation even under the old Code. The Supreme Court also considered the authorities in support of the preposition that with the submission of a charge-sheet under Sec. 173 the power of the police to investigate came to an end and the magistrates cognizance of the offence started and that any further investigation by the Police would trench upon the Magisterial cognizance. When a case was pending before a Magistrate, the action of the police in resuming the investigation and putting up a new charge against a person not originally an accused as a result of the further investigation, was unauthorised and unlawful. The police could not "tinker" with the proceedings pending in the court. After considering the conflicting decisions of the High Courts the Supreme Court succinctly laid down the principles in the following words: "Anyone acquainted with the day-to-day working of the Criminal courts will be alive to the practical necessity of the police possessing the power to make further investigation and submit a supplemental report. It is in the interests of both the prosecution and the defence that the police should have such power. It is easy to visualise a case where fresh material may come to light, which would implicate persons not previously accused or absolve persons already accused. When it comes to the notice of the investigating agency that a person already accused of an offence has good alibi, is it not the duty of that agency to investigate the genuineness of the plea of alibi and submit a report to the Magistrate? After all the investigating agency has greater resources at its command than a private individual. When it comes to the notice of the investigating agency that a person already accused of an offence has good alibi, is it not the duty of that agency to investigate the genuineness of the plea of alibi and submit a report to the Magistrate? After all the investigating agency has greater resources at its command than a private individual. Similarly, where the involvement of persons who are not already accused comes to the notice of the investigating agency, the investigating agency cannot keep quiet and refuse to investigate the fresh information. It is their duty to investigate and submit a report to the Magistrate upon the involvement of other persons. In either case, it is for the Magistrate to decide upon his future course of action depending upon the stage at which the case is before him. If he has already taken cognizance of the offence, but has not proceeded with the enquiry or trial, he may direct the issue of process to persons freshly discovered to be involved and deal with all the accused in a single enquiry or trial. If the case of which he has previously taken cognizance has already proceeded to some extent, he may take fresh cognizance of the offence disclosed against the newly involved accused and proceed with the case as a separate case. What action a Magistrate is to take in accordance with the provisions of the Code of Criminal Procedure in such situations is a matter best left to the discretion of the Magistrate. The criticism that a further investigation by the police would trench upon the proceedings before the court is really not of very great substance, since whatever the police may do, the final discretion in regard to further action is with the Magistrate. That the final word is with the Magistrate is sufficient safeguard against any excessive use or abuse of the power of the police to make further investigation. We should not however be understood to say that the police should ignore the pendency of a proceeding before a court and investigate every fresh fact that comes to light as if no cognizance had been taken by the court of any offence. We should not however be understood to say that the police should ignore the pendency of a proceeding before a court and investigate every fresh fact that comes to light as if no cognizance had been taken by the court of any offence. We think that in the interests of the comity of the various agencies and institutions entrusted with different stages of such administration it would ordinarily be desirable that the police should inform the court and seek formal permission to make further investigation when fresh facts come to light." 12. The Supreme Court, therefore, held that either Sec. 173 nor Sec. 190 could lead De to hold that the power of the police to further investigate was exhausted by the Magistrate taking cognizance of the offence. Practice, convenience and preponderance of authority permitted repeated investigation on discovery of the facts. Notwithstanding that the Magistrate d taken cognizance of the offence upon police report the right of the police to further investigate was not exhausted and the police could exercise such right as often as necessary en fresh information come to light. Where the police decide to make a further investigation, the police can express their regard and respect for the court by seeking its formal permission to make further investigation. 13. It must be held that the law is now fairly established by the Supreme Court in Ramlal Narangs case that when fresh material comes to light implicating person not previously accused or absolving persons already accused the investigating agency cannot keep quiet and refuse to investigate fresh information. It is their duty to investigate and submit a report. When such a report is submitted, it is for the Magistrate to decide his future course of action depending upon the stage at which the case is before him. In the interest of independence of the magistracy and the judiciary and in the interest of purity of the administration of criminal justice and in the interest of the various agencies and institutions entrusted with different stage to stage administration, where a proceedings is pending before a court it is desirable that the police should inform the court and seek formal permission to make further investigation when fresh facts came to light. Under the old Code, there was no express provision prohibiting the police from launching upon investigation into fresh facts coming to light after the submission of the report under Sec. 173(1) of the Code. In the new Code, however, there is a express provision to be found in subsection (8) of Sec. 173 for this purpose. The principles upon which this jurisdiction or authority to make further investigation is founded, applies as much to a case pending before the court of a Magistrate as to a case pending before the court of sessions. The practical necessity for the existence of power to make further investigation and the interest of justice furnished the justification for such authority and these principles apply to any criminal trial whether pending before the court of a Magistrate or before the court of sessions. In my view there is in principle no distinction between the court of a Magistrate and the court of sessions so far as to make further investigation by the police is concerned. The practical difficulties pointed out by the learned Single Judge in the case State of Bihar v. Nagman; can be no justification for denying authority to the investigating agency for as the Supreme Court has observed, once such a supplementary report is submitted before the Magistrate it is for him to decide upon his future course of action depending upon the stage at which the case is before him. The same principles must apply to a case pending before court of sessions. It has been held by Full Bench of this court in Latfur Rahmans case (supra) that in the exercise of power under Sec. 319 of the Code of Criminal Procedure even the court of sessions can summon any person already summoned or discharged by the police or perusal of the record before it after commitment. Those practical difficulties pointed put by the learned Single Judge in the Stare of Bihar V/s. N. Nagmani would apply also to a case where the Sessions Judge for the first time summons an accused to stand his trial. Those practical difficulties pointed put by the learned Single Judge in the Stare of Bihar V/s. N. Nagmani would apply also to a case where the Sessions Judge for the first time summons an accused to stand his trial. Having regard to the principles laid down by the Supreme Court it is for the court concerned to decide upon the future course of action depending upon the stage at which the case is before it The case may be tried separately if it is against an accused person not charge-sheeted by the police and committed to the court of sessions or the court may after complying with the requirements of law proceed with the trial so that no prejudice is caused to the accused persons. 14. The mere fact that there is no provision for the Magistrate to submit a supplementary report before the court, of sessions or that Sec. 173(8) of the Code does not refer to a court of sessions, cannot, in my view, make any difference. Full Bench of this Court in Latfur Rahman held that there was no rationale whatsoever for holding that under identical and in any case similar power under Secs. 227 and 228 of the Code, the court of sessions should be denuded of the right to summon an additional accused who has not been sent up by the investigating agency or not committed by the Magistrate. Such a power undoubtedly existed in a Magistrate trying a warrant case in considering the question of a framing of the charge under Secs. 239 and 240 of the Code. The full Court observed that as a superior court, the Sessions Judge would and obviously should, have the same, if not wider powers than the Magistrate in an identical situation. Indeed, a closer analysis showed that the powers of the court of sessions under Secs. 227 and 228 of the Code were closely similar if not identical to those of the Magistrate under Secs. 239 and 240 of the Code, and necessarily the legal position and the result cannot possibly the different, Following these principle. I hold that if a supplementary report can be submitted by the investigating agency before a Magistrate before whom a case is pending, such a supplementary report can also be submitted before a court of sessions if the proceeding is pending before it. I hold that if a supplementary report can be submitted by the investigating agency before a Magistrate before whom a case is pending, such a supplementary report can also be submitted before a court of sessions if the proceeding is pending before it. In either case, it is for the court to decide upon the future course of action depending upon the stage at which the case is before it. Whatever the police may do, the final discretion in regard to further action is with the court concerned, which is a sufficient sefeguard against any excessive use or abuse of the power of the police to make further investigation. It must, therefore, be held that no illegality was committed if pending the trial before the court of sessions, prosecution decided to further investigate into the matter and hold a test identification parade. Indeed I find that the prayer was made before the court of sessions which was in seisin of the matter. This was the only proper course to follow consistent with the observation of the Supreme Court that the police should inform the court and seek formal permission to make further investigation when fresh facts come to light. If the prosecution proceeded with further investigation without the permission of the Sessions Judge its action would have been exposed to the criticism that its action tended to disregard, and showed disrespect to the court. 15. Learned Counsel for the petitioner urged before me that the powers of the Sessions Judge were enumerated in the provisions contained in Secs. 225 to 237 of the Code and anything for which there was no provision in those provisions, could not be done by the Sessions Judge. Having regard to the judgment of the Full Bench of this court in Latfur Rahmans case this cannot be accepted as a correct proposition of law. There are other provisions of law which may require the Sessions Judge to exercise any power or to act in accordance with any procedure laid down. One may usefully refer to the provisions of Sec. 319 of the Code as also Sec. 313 thereof. 16. The objection of learned Counsel for the State that the instant application though one under Section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure was really a revision application against interlocutory order, has much force. One may usefully refer to the provisions of Sec. 319 of the Code as also Sec. 313 thereof. 16. The objection of learned Counsel for the State that the instant application though one under Section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure was really a revision application against interlocutory order, has much force. But since I have considered that order on merit, out of sheer deference for the learned Counsel appearing for the petitioner who addressed the court at some length since the question in his view was of utmost importance, it will not be proper to dismiss this application merely on this ground. Having regard to the fact that the petitioner suffered an impression that the Sessions Judge was aiding the prosecution to fill up the lacuna in its case. I have considered the matter on merit in the interest of justice and only to clarify that the investigating agency sought formal permission of the Sessions Judge as matter of regard and respect for the court since the matter was pending before it, and the Sessions Judge acted as he should have, in granting such permission. It was contended on behalf of the petitioner that a T.I. parade held after so many years had no value and no conviction could be based upon the result of such a test identification parade. It is not necessary to express any opinion on this question since questions relating to the evidentiary value of any evidence or material have to be considered by the Court trying the case. The question of evidentiary value is a question quite distinct from the question of admissibility or relevancy of any material or evidence. 17. In the result, this application is rejected.