JUDGMENT M.P. Singh, J. - This is a defendant's appeal arising out of suit for ejectment, recovery of rent and damages. 2. The plaintiff's case was that he was owner of a piece of land which he purchased, for constructing his own house, from Jagannathpuri Housing Cooperative Society, Mathura. He raised the boundary wall on all the four sides and also fixed a gate to that. Since he was in service and wanted to settle after his retirement, this property was purchased. He let out this open piece of land to the defendant on the following terms and conditions :- (i) The tenancy will start from 8.1.1968 and the monthly rent shall be Rs. 75/- per month which shall be payable every month after obtaining receipt. (ii) The lessee would not allow any sub-tenant nor he will raise any construction kachha or pucca over the disputed land though he may put a thatch or a tin-shed over the same. (iii) The tenancy shall be for one year but it can be extended up to five years. After the expiry of five years the defendant would vacate the land. (iv) If the defendant-appellant did not pay rent for two months he shall be liable to ejectment. (v) If the defendant does not vacate the land after the receipt of notice from the plaintiff-respondent, he will be liable to pay damages at the rate of Rs. 300/- per month. 3. The defendant stopped paying the rent with effect from 8.12.1971. A notice was served on him terminating the tenancy and demanding arrears of rent but neither he paid the rent nor vacated the premises. So the necessity of filing the suit arose. 4. The suit was contested by the defendant on the ground that the disputed land was let out by the plaintiff on a monthly rent of Rs. 75/-. The lease granted by the plaintiff was a permanent one. The defendant was entitled to raise permanent construction over the same. He has invested about Rs. 5,000/- and raised the construction with the consent of the landlord. The rent up to 12th December, 1971 had been paid by the defendant. After that, the rent was sent by money order which was refused by the plaintiff. The notice terminating the tenancy was not served on him. He was entitled to the benefit of Section 29-A of U.P. Act XIII of 1972. The rent up to 12th December, 1971 had been paid by the defendant. After that, the rent was sent by money order which was refused by the plaintiff. The notice terminating the tenancy was not served on him. He was entitled to the benefit of Section 29-A of U.P. Act XIII of 1972. The jurisdiction of the Court was also challenged. It was stated that the suit should have been filed in the Court of Judge Small Causes. 5. The learned trial Court decreed the suit holding that the land was let out to the defendant only for one year. He was not a permanent lessee. The defendant had executed a rent note. Section 29-A of the U.P. Act XIII of 1972 was not attracted in the instant case. The Court had jurisdiction to try the suit. The defendant did not raise any construction on the disputed land with the consent of the landlord. 6. The appeal filed by the defendant-appellant against the judgment of the trial Court was also dismissed on 23.1.1962 upholding the findings of the trial Court, against which the present second appeal has been filed. 7. Heard Sri K.N. Tripathi, learned counsel for the appellant and Shri G.N. Verma, learned counsel for the respondent. 8. The first point raised by Sri K.N. Tripathi was that Ex. 8 was a lease deed, it required registration and for want of the same became inadmissible in evidence. Its terms and conditions were not binding on the parties. In order to determine the worth of this agreement the nature of this document is to be looked into whether it was a rent note or a lease deed. 9. Section 105 of the T.P. Act defines lease as under : "105. A lease of immovable property is a transfer of right to enjoy such property, made for a certain time, express or implied, or in perpetuity, in consideration of a price paid or promised, or of money, a share of crops, service or any other thing of value, to be rendered periodically or on specified occasion to the transferor by the transferee, who accepts the transfer on such terms." Thus the essentials of lease are :- (i) There must be a lessor who is able to make the lease. (ii) There must be a lessee. (iii) There must be a thing demised which is demisable. (ii) There must be a lessee. (iii) There must be a thing demised which is demisable. (iv) If the thing demised or the thing expressed to be granted be not grantable without a deed, the lease must be made by a deed, containing a sufficient description of the lessor, the lessee, the thing demised, the term granted, and the rent and covenants; and all necessary circumstances must be observed. (v) If it be a lease for years, it must have a certain commencement, at least when it takes effect in interest or possession, and a certain determination either by an express enumeration or years or by reference to a certainty that is expressed, or by reducing it to a certainty upon some contingent event, which must happen before the death of the lessor, or lessee, unless, it should be added, the lease is a permanent one. A lease is the outcome of the rightful separation of ownership and possession. Before the lease the owner had the right to enjoy possession of the land but by the lease he excludes himself during its currency from that right. A lease is therefore, not a mere contract, but is a transfer of interest in land. In order to create or bring a new tenancy into existence there must be a bilateral act. 10. The document in question (Ex. 8) is an unilateral documents executed by the defendant Mahabir Prasad. Paragraphs 3 and 5 are the most relevant. Paragraph 3 reads : "Yah ki filhal ukta plot me moyee bhi nirman kachcha ya pakka kisi bhi prakar ka na karunga albatta chapper, sayban, tin aadi dal sakoonga." Then in paragraph 5 of the said document it has been stated :- "Yah ki filhal uktas plot ek saal ke kiraya per liya hai, Lekin agar ek saal ke baad kirayadar raha to bhi inhi sharton ki mujh per poori pabandi hogi". 11. Two important features emerge out of these two paragraphs. Firstly, that the defendant was let out open piece of land and he was not allowed to raise any kachcha or pakka construction. Only he could put a tin shed on some temporary wall and secondly, that he would continue as a tenant only for one year and in case he was allowed to continue beyond that, then the same terms and conditions will apply. 12. Only he could put a tin shed on some temporary wall and secondly, that he would continue as a tenant only for one year and in case he was allowed to continue beyond that, then the same terms and conditions will apply. 12. In paragraphs 2, 3 and 7 of the written statement the defendant has come forward with a case that though he had taken the plot on rent at the rate of Rs. 75/- per month but he never executed the said rent note Ex. 8. It was stated that the plaintiff obtained his signature on a blank paper and got the contents written thereafter. In order to support his case the defendant has examined himself as D.W. 1, Shanker as D.W. 2 and one Madan Lal as D.W. 3. The plaintiff has also examined himself as P.W. 1 and one Ram Nath as P.W. 2 to prove that this deed (Ex. 8) was executed by the defendant. The signature is said to have been obtained on 7.12.1968 but no complaint was made to the police that the plaintiff-respondent has obtained his signatures on a blank paper by fraud. For the first time after four years on 16.12.1972 the defendant gave a notice and thereafter remained quiet for another four years. The defendant knew it well that if a registered lease-deed was to be executed, there was no occasion for him to put signatures on blank paper. Another equally important aspect of the case is that even his witnesses Shanker and Madal Lal had also put their signatures on the rent note (Ex. 8). It is impossible to believe that witnesses had also put their signatures on blank stamp paper. These two witnesses have failed to give any satisfactory explanation as to why they put their signatures on the blank paper. 13. It has also come in the statement of D.W. 3 Madan Lal that the defendant Mahabir Prasad has purchased a stamp paper of the said rent note. The value of the stamp paper is Rs. 20.25. If a registered lease-deed was to be executed then the defendant could not have purchased the stamp papers worth Rs. 20.25. They should have been of a higher value. 14. The value of the stamp paper is Rs. 20.25. If a registered lease-deed was to be executed then the defendant could not have purchased the stamp papers worth Rs. 20.25. They should have been of a higher value. 14. Now coming to the question of admissibility of the document, it has been contended by the learned counsel for the appellant that it being an unregistered document was inadmissible in evidence. According to him a lease for more than one year needs registration and has placed reliance upon Section 107, T.P. Act which reads as follows :- "107. Leases how made. - A lease of immovable property from year to year, or for any term exceeding one year or reserving a yearly rent, can be made only by a registered instrument. All other leases of immovable property may be made either by a registered instrument or by agreement accompanied by delivery of possession. Where a lease of immovable property is made by a registered instrument, such instrument or, where there are more instruments than one, each such instrument shall be executed by both the lessor and the lessee; Provided that the "State Government may ....... from time to time, by notification in the Official Gazette, direct that leases of immovable property other than leases from year to year, or for any term exceeding one year, or reserving a yearly rent, or any class of such leases, may be made by unregistered instrument or by oral agreement without delivery of possession". This contention of the learned counsel for the appellant can hold good only if this Court comes to the conclusion that it was a lease deed and not a rent note. The contents of the documents have been placed by the learned counsel and I have also looked into the document very carefully. It is unilateral act of the defendant and only a rent note and is not a lease-deed within the meaning of Section 105 T.P. Act. I find support from two decision of this Court, firstly reported in 1942 All. It is unilateral act of the defendant and only a rent note and is not a lease-deed within the meaning of Section 105 T.P. Act. I find support from two decision of this Court, firstly reported in 1942 All. WR (HC) 217 : Ganga Sahai v. Badrul Islam wherein it has been held :- "In a Kirayanama signed by the defendant it was agreed by him that he was taking the plot of land for the purposes of constructing a kachcha house on it and to live in it as a reyaya and it was further agreed that whenever the landlord wanted he could get the land vacated. In a suit for possession by the landlord..... Held that the kirayanama could not operate as a lease but it could be enforced against the lessee who was bound by the document unless he was able to prove fraud or coercion". The second case is reported in AIR 1949 Allahabad 455 Magboo Ahmad v. Debi in which it has been held - "A mere rent note or a qabuliat does not amount to a lease. The person executing the rent note is however bound by its terms as a matter of his undertaking although the other party who has not signed the document would not be bound by them." After reading paragraph 5 of the deed it leaves no doubt that the defendant was permitted to continue in possession only for one year and not for more than that. Only a saving clause was added which will not override the main clause. Thus even if for the sake of argument this document is taken to be a lease deed, it did not require any registration as it was only for one year. 15. In the case of Gyasi Ram v. Ram Chandra Singh reported in AIR 1978 Allahabad 376 it has been held as under :- "The requirement of registration contained in Section 107, T.P. Act cannot be circumvented or allowed to be defeated by setting up a case of permanent tenancy on the basis of oral evidence. 15. In the case of Gyasi Ram v. Ram Chandra Singh reported in AIR 1978 Allahabad 376 it has been held as under :- "The requirement of registration contained in Section 107, T.P. Act cannot be circumvented or allowed to be defeated by setting up a case of permanent tenancy on the basis of oral evidence. In view of the first para of the said section which says "a lease of immovable property from year to year, or for any term exceeding one year, or reserving a yearly rent, can be made only by a registered instrument", it is not permissible to set up a case of permanent tenancy on the basis of oral agreement or under an unregistered instrument. Of course, if a tenancy started prior to the coming into effect of the T.P. Act then one can set up a case of permanent tenancy on the basis of oral agreement or on the basis of an unregistered instrument". In that case the trial Court granted a decree on the basis of material alteration made by the defendant without the consent of the plaintiff. Lower appellate Court maintained the decree on the ground that open piece of land was let out to the defendant. Section 29-A of the U.P. Act XIII of 1972 was not applicable. This case in no way helps the defendant so far the instant case is concerned. 16. The cumulative effect of the foregoing discussion is that Ex. 8 was a rent note validly executed by the defendant and was admissible in evidence. It did not require any registration. It was not a lease-deed. Section 107 of the T.P. Act was not attracted. The contention of the learned counsel for the appellant has no force and is accordingly rejected. 17. The second point raised by the learned counsel for the appellant is that he is entitled to the benefit of Section 29-A of the U.P. Act XIII of 1972. This section was inserted by U.P. Act 28 of 1976 with effect from 5.7.1976. Sub-section (2) of Section 29-A reads as under :- "(2) This section applies only to land let out, either before or after the commencement of this section, where the tenant, with the landlord's consent has erected any permanent structure and incurred expenses in execution thereof". This section was inserted by U.P. Act 28 of 1976 with effect from 5.7.1976. Sub-section (2) of Section 29-A reads as under :- "(2) This section applies only to land let out, either before or after the commencement of this section, where the tenant, with the landlord's consent has erected any permanent structure and incurred expenses in execution thereof". The defendant-appellant can get benefit of this section only if it is proved that the tenant has erected any permanent structure or incurred expenses in execution thereof with the consent of the landlord. Thus two important ingredients are required to be there - (i) permanent structure (ii) consent of the landlord. He relied upon a decision of this Court reported in AIR 1924 Allahabad 750 Gauri Shanker v. Mithai wherein it has been held - "a kachcha thatched house may be a work as permanent character where it has been used as residence for good many years and there is no evidence to indicate that it was only a temporary structure". 18. In the instant case from a reading of paragraph 3 of the rent note the intention of the parties is absolutely clear that the defendant was permitted only to have a thatch or tin-shed but no construction of permanent nature was to be raised and if he raised any such construction, it was without the consent of the landlord. 19. The learned counsel for the appellant has placed much reliance upon paragraphs 26, 45 and 53 of the statement of P.W. 1 Baijnath. The plaintiff has stated only this much that he has permitted the defendant to put a Chhapper. There is no statement that he has permitted to raise any permanent construction. This cannot be deemed to be an admission on that question as suggested by the learned counsel. 20. The plaintiff has stated only this much that he has permitted the defendant to put a Chhapper. There is no statement that he has permitted to raise any permanent construction. This cannot be deemed to be an admission on that question as suggested by the learned counsel. 20. Sub-section (6) of Section 29-A of the Act provides as under :- "(6)(a) In any suit or appeal or other proceeding pending immediately before the date of commencement of this section no decree for eviction of a tenant from any land to which this section applies, shall be passed or except on one or more of the grounds mentioned in sub-section (2) of Section 20, provided the tenant, without a period of three months from the commencement of this section by an application to the Court, unconditionally offers to pay to the landlord, the enhanced rent of the land for the entire period in suit and onwards at the rate of ten per cent per annum of the prevailing market value of the land together with costs of the suit (including costs of any appeal or of any execution or other proceedings). (b) In every such case, the enhanced rent shall, notwithstanding anything contained in sub-section (5), be determined by the Court seized of the case at any stage. (c) Upon payment against a receipt duly signed by the plaintiff or decree-holder or his counsel or deposit in Court of such enhanced rent with costs as aforesaid being made by tenant within such time as the Court may fix in this behalf, the Court shall dismiss the suit, or, as the case may be, discharge the decree for eviction, and the tenancy thereafter, shall continue annually on the basis of the rent so enhanced. (d) If the tenant fails to pay the said amount within the time so fixed (including any extended time, if any, that the Court may fix or for sufficient cause) allow the Court shall proceed further in the case as if the foregoing provision of this section were not in force". 21. This sub-section requires a tenant to move an application within three months from the commencement of this Act if his case is covered by Section 29-A of the Act. This section came into force on 5.7.1976. 21. This sub-section requires a tenant to move an application within three months from the commencement of this Act if his case is covered by Section 29-A of the Act. This section came into force on 5.7.1976. The applicant moved an application under Section 29-A of the Act on 4.1.1977, i.e. much after the expiry of three months from the commencement of the act. The defendant's contention is that he had no knowledge of the suit till 9.12.1976 when the notice was served upon him by publication. This is not the correct position. On 1.2.1973 a notice was sent to the appellant who filed his objections 15/c and affidavit 16/c on 4.12.1973 against the attachment application filed by the plaintiff. Thus he had knowledge of the suit on that date. He filed the application much after the expiry of three months. Section 29-A is not applicable. The submission of the learned counsel is accordingly rejected. 22. The third and the last contention of the learned counsel for the appellant was that the notice under Section 106 T.P. Act was not validly served on the defendant-appellant. 23. The plaintiff's case was that the notice dated 14.9.1972 was sent to the defendant at his correct address who refused to accept the same on 4.10.1972. It is presumed that the notice has been served. Much reliance has been placed by the learned counsel for the appellant on paragraph 12 of the replication according to which the notice was sent by ordinary post. He further contended that once there was a rebuttal from the side of the defendant about service, then the question of presumption of service loses all its importance. The plaintiff cannot take the advantage of Section 27 of the General Clauses Act or Section 11-E of the Evidence Act. For this purposes he has placed reliance upon a decision of this Court reported in 1979 (UP) RCC 5 Ram Nakshatra Misra v. Girdhar Das Kashya wherein it has been held - "It is well settled that when a registered notice is sent to a tenant, at his correct address, a presumption arises about its service even though the registered envelope is returned back with an endorsement of refusal. In such a case, the plaintiff-landlord need not produce the postman or any other evidence to prove refusal of service of notice as the notice shall be presumed to have been served. In such a case, the plaintiff-landlord need not produce the postman or any other evidence to prove refusal of service of notice as the notice shall be presumed to have been served. But this presumption is rebuttable. If the tenant rebuts the presumption then burden would shift on the plaintiff to prove service of notice". 24. So far as the legal position is concerned, there is no dispute that this presumption is rebuttable and the burden shifts on the plaintiff to prove the service of notice. 25. The contention of the learned counsel for the respondent was that this question involves re-appraisal of the entire evidence which is not permissible in second appeal. He relied upon a decision reported in 1979 (UP) RCC 397 Ram Pati Tiwari v. Ambika Prasada Shukla wherein it has been held - "It is incumbent upon the lower appellate Court to see whether the presumption of service of notice stood rebutted or did not stand rebutted on the evidence before him. The defendant as mentioned orally had denied that he refused the service of notice on 18.12.1968. The lower appellate Court, however, on a consideration of evidence came to the conclusion that the presumption of service of notice had not been rebutted. The lower appellate Court has considered the evidence produced by the defendant and has not chosen to believe the defendant when he stated that he never refused to accept the service of notice. The finding of the lower appellate Court is finding of fact based on a consideration of evidence and cannot be interfered with in second appeal". His contention is that the Court below, however, on a consideration of evidence led by both the parties came to the conclusion that the presumption of service of notice had not been rebutted. It is not the case of the appellant that the lower appellate Court has omitted to consider any material evidence or has misread the evidence. The Court below after considering the evidence has not believed the defendant. The finding of the lower Court is a pure finding of fact. This Court has its own limitations under Section 100 CPC to reappreciate the entire evidence again. I agree with the contention of the learned counsel for the respondent. The appellant cannot be permitted to raise questions of fact in the second appeal. 26. The finding of the lower Court is a pure finding of fact. This Court has its own limitations under Section 100 CPC to reappreciate the entire evidence again. I agree with the contention of the learned counsel for the respondent. The appellant cannot be permitted to raise questions of fact in the second appeal. 26. Moreover, it is an admitted fact that the notice was sent at the correct address. When a registered article or registered letter is handed over to an accepting or receiving post office it is the duty of the postal authority to make delivery of it to the addressee. Human experience shows that except in a few exceptional cases letters or article received by the post office are duly, regularly and properly taken to the addressee. Consequently as a proposition it cannot be disputed that when a letter is delivered to the post office it is reasonably expected that in the normal course it would be delivered to the addressee. That is the official and the normal function of the post office. On the valid service of the notice on the defendant the learned counsel for the respondent has relied upon a Full Bench decision of this Court reported in AIR 1970 Allahabad 446 Ganga Ram v. Smt. Phulwati in which the effect of Section 14 of the Post Offices Act and Section 114 of the evidence Act along with Section 27 of General Clauses Act have been considered. The proposition of law laid down in that case is not at all disputed by the learned counsel for the appellant. His only contention is that once the presumption has been rebutted, then the burden shifted on the plaintiff to prove the service which he has failed to do. On this question, I have already recorded my finding rejecting this plea. I hold that the finding of service of notice also does not suffer from any error of law. 27. No other point was pressed. 28. I see no force in this appeal. It is accordingly dismissed with costs.