JUDGMENT : G.B. Patnaik, J. - The order of the Member, Board of Revenue in exercise of his powers u/s 59(2) of the Orissa Land Reforms Act (Hereinafter to be referred as the 'Act')' annexed as Annexure-5 is being assailed in this application, inter alia, on the grounds, that the power under; Section 59(2)of the Act is not exercisable against a revisional order and, also the said power having been exercised after lapse of a pretty, length of time the revisional order is unjust and is liable to be interfered with. The constitutionality of Section 59(2) of the Act has also been challenged on the ground that no guide line having been fixed, the said power is capable of being abused and arbitrarily exercised. The Petitioner filed an application u/s 26(1) of the Act for resumption, and to bring it under personal cultivation from opposite party No. 6 Chintamani Majhi. the said application was disposed of in favour of the Petitioner and the Tahasildar by his order dated 17-1968 directed opposite party No. 6 to deliver possession of five acres of land to the Petitioner. The said order has been annexed as Annexure-l. Opposite party No. 6 preferred an appeal against the aforesaid Order u/s 58(1) at the Act being appeal case No. 14 of 1968. The Sub-Divisional Officer who is the appellate authority under the Act, Set aside the order of the Tahasildar under Annexure-l on a finding, that opposite party No. 6 acquired right of occupancy over the land in question as would appear from the rent appeal case No. 84/64 and, therefore, the, question of resumption under the Act does not arise, his order of the appellate authority has, been annexed, as Annexure-2. The Petitioner then filed a revision u/s 59 of the Act which was registered as revision case No. 7 of, 1973 and, the Additional District Magistrate allowed the said revision, and set aside the order of the Sub-Divisional Officer and affirmed the order of the Tahasildar under Annexure-I. The order of the revisional authority has been annexed as Annexure-3. This order of the revisional authority is dated 3-8-1976. Opposite party No. 6 made an application to the Collector on 17-9-1976 for moving the Member. Board of Revenue against the order of the Additional District Magistrate contending therein that the order of the Additional District Magistrate is wholly illegal. This order of the revisional authority is dated 3-8-1976. Opposite party No. 6 made an application to the Collector on 17-9-1976 for moving the Member. Board of Revenue against the order of the Additional District Magistrate contending therein that the order of the Additional District Magistrate is wholly illegal. The Collector registered that application as a revisional Miscellaneous case and forwarded the matter to the Member, Board of Revenue in exercise of his powers under Sub-section (2) of Section 59 of the Act. The Member, Board of Revenue finally by the, impugned order dated 14th December, 1979 set aside the order of the Tahasildar as well as the older of the Additional District Magistrate and affirmed the order of the Sub-Divisional Officer. 2. Mr. Murty appearing for the Petitioner raises the following contentions, in assailing the said order of the Member Board of Revenue. (i) Section 59(2) of the Orissa Land Reforms Act, not having provided for any limitation during which the power can be exercised is capable of being abused and arbitrarily exercised and consequently the order is unconstitutional; (ii) even if the order is held: to be constitutional, but the action of the Board in setting aside the revisional order dated 3-8-1976 having been passed on 14-2-1979 long after two years, the order is bad in as much as the rights accrued in favour of the Petitioner has been unsettled after such length of time; (iii) Section 59 of the Act read as a whole would indicate that the power of the Board of Revenue under Sub-section (2) can be exercised only when no revision has been filed under Sub-section (1) and cannot be exercised against a revisional order of the prescribed authority passed under Sub-section (1) of Section 59 of the Act and in that view of the matter, the Board of Revenue in the present case had no jurisdiction to set aside the revisional order of the Additional District Magistrate. All these contentions though prima facie sound attractive, but do not stand to a deeper scrutiny. 3. So far as the first contention of Mr. All these contentions though prima facie sound attractive, but do not stand to a deeper scrutiny. 3. So far as the first contention of Mr. Murty is concerned, it is based on an assumption that the power of revision has been conferred on the Board of Revenue under Sub-section (2) which can be exercised at any time and, therefore, no guide line having been fixed IS capable of being abused by Member, Board of Revenue and consequently the said provision is vitiated on account of arbitrariness. In support of the aforesaid contention, Mr. Murty, the learned Counsel for the Petitioner placed reliance on two decisions of the Supreme Court in the case of West Bengal State Electricity Board and Others Vs. Desh Bandhu Ghosh and Others and in the case of Workmen of Hindustan Steel Ltd. and Another Vs. Hindustan Steel Ltd. and Others. In order to appreciate the aforesaid contention, it would be appropriate to extract Section 59(2) of the Act in extenso: 59(2). The Board of Revenue may, at any time on being moved in that behalf by the Collector of a district or by the Land Reforms Commissioner, revise any order passed by any authority under this Act. It is undoubtedly true that there is no limitation prescribed under Sub-section (2) of Section 59 of the Act for the Board to exercise its power on being moved in that behalf by the Collector of a district or by the Land Reforms Commissioner. But merely because no time limit has been filed under Sub-section (2), it would be difficult for us to hold that an arbitrary power has been conferred under the said section upon the Board of Revenue. The two decisions on which Mr. Murty for the Petitioner strongly relies have absolutely no application to the present case. In West Bengal State Electricity Board and Others Vs. Desh Bandhu Ghosh and Others Regulation 34 of the West Bengal State Electricity Board's, Regulation conferring power on the Board to terminate the service of a permanent employee by serving three months notice or on payment of salary for the corresponding period in lieu thereof was held to be an arbitrary conferment of power which is capable of vicious discrimination and was considered as a naked hire and fire rule and. therefore was struck down as it suffered from the vice of enabling discrimination. therefore was struck down as it suffered from the vice of enabling discrimination. The other decision, namely, Workmen of Hindustan Steel Ltd. and Another Vs. Hindustan Steel Ltd. and Others was also the case of an employee under the Hindustan Steel Limited where the Standing Order 32 dispensing with the enquiry was held to be arbitrary in nature and in consonance with the philosophy of Article 311(2) proviso and therefore, was struck down. We are not in a position to appreciate as to how the ratio of the aforesaid two decisions support Mr. Murty's contention in attacking Section 59(2) of the Act as an arbitrary piece of legislation. Sub-section (2) of Section 59 is in the nature of a suo motu revision to be exercised by the Board on being moved By the Collector of a district or by the Land Reforms Commissioner. The Board of Revenue is the highest revenue authority in the State. Such a power has been conferred on the highest revenue authority to enable him to collect facts and to cure the illegalities which might have otherwise been committed by the subordinate authorities but not brought to the notice of the Board by an aggrieved party. It is for that reason when the Collector of a district or the Land Reforms Commissioner moves the Member, Board of Revenue for correcting some patent errors committed by the subordinate officers in exercise of their revisional or appellate power then the Board can entertain the same and can revise an illegal order passed by any authority under the Act, after giving due notice to the parties concerned. Essentially Sub-section (2) of Section 59 of the cast a duty of the Collector of a district or the Land Reforms Commissioner to move the Member, Board of Revenue if they are satisfied that some patent illegality has been committed by their subordinate officers in exercise of their powers under the Act whereupon the Board had the obligation to hear the matter after giving due opportunity of hearing the parties concerned and finally revise the order if the Board is of the opinion that the order in question is contrary to law. This being the position, we are usable to accept the contention of Mr. Murty the learned Counsel for the Petitioner that the power is arbitrary or capable of being abused. This being the position, we are usable to accept the contention of Mr. Murty the learned Counsel for the Petitioner that the power is arbitrary or capable of being abused. Merely because the statute does not put any limitation as to the light of time within which the power can be exercised. In fact the legislature for avowed reasons have not provided for any limitation in exercise of such power by the Board and the matter is left to the discretion of the Board. The discretionary power is not necessarily discriminatory and abuse of such power cannot be assumed. A provision in a statute can not be held to be discriminatory in nature merely because it confers some discretion on the authority on an assumption that such authority will abuse the discretion and would exercise the same in discriminatory manner. In The State of Punjab Vs. Ajaib Singh and Another, their Lordships of the Supreme Court repeated the contention regarding discrimination and observed that the fact that an Administrative. Tribunal is empowered to exercise its discretion and dispose of cases in different ways according to the circumstances of each case does not make the Act under Which the Tribunal is constituted open to challenge under Article 14 of the Constitution. The question whether in any given case the Act canters a naked arbitrary power on the authority and thereby contains the seeds of fine quality or confers a discretionary authority on the executive to carry out the polley of the Act thereby offending Article 14 of the Constitution must depend upon the interpretation of the very Act itself. Examining power of the Member, Board of Revenue on Sub-section (2) of Section 59 of the Act and the purpose for which such power was conferred by way of an amendment as well the criteria for exercise of such power is fixed in the said subsection, we are not in a position to come to the conclusion that absolute naked and arbitrary power has been conferred upon the Member, Board of Revenue under the said Sub-section thereby infringing Article 14 of the Constitution. In fact similar power has been conferred upon different authorities under the Orissa Estates Abolition Act (see Section 38-B of the Orissa Estates Abolition Act as well as under the provisions of the Orissa Consolidation of Holdings and Prevention of Fragmentation of Land Act, 1972 (See Section 37(1) of the said Act). Accordingly the first contention of Mr. Murty is devoid of any substance and rejected. 4. So far as the second submission of Mr. Murty is concerned, the same is based on the assumption that there has been unusual delay in exercise of the power under Sub-section (2) of the Act. There is no substance in the aforesaid contention in as much as the basis itself is erroneous the revisional order of the Additional District Magistrate is dated 3-8-1976 and immediately thereafter opposite party No. 6 moved an application before the Collector on 17-9-1976. The Collector thereafter made a preliminary enquiry and the forwarded the matter to the Member, Board of Revenue by his order dated 16-10-1978 and the Member, Board of Revenue after giving an opportunity of hearing to the Petitioner finally disposed of the matter by his order dated 14-12-1979. Thus there has been no delay in initiating an action to invoke the jurisdiction under Sub-section (2) of Section 59 of the Act. If the matter remained for sometime pending before the Member, Board of Revenue, that cannot be a ground to hold that the order is bad. Pendency before an authority for some time to enable- the parties to have their say cannot be held to be unreasonable and, therefore, the second contention of Mr. Murty also in our opinion, does not merit consideration. The same is accordingly rejected. 5. The only other contention which survives for our consideration is whether a second revision is maintainable under Sub-section (2) of Section 59 of the Act. According to Mr. Murty, the power of revision has been conferred u/s 59 of the Act. Section 59(1) of the Act confers a power of revision on an application by an aggrieved party to the prescribed authority against an order passed in an appeal under the Act provided the same is filed within the prescribed period. Sub-section (2) according to Mr. Murty, the power of revision has been conferred u/s 59 of the Act. Section 59(1) of the Act confers a power of revision on an application by an aggrieved party to the prescribed authority against an order passed in an appeal under the Act provided the same is filed within the prescribed period. Sub-section (2) according to Mr. Murty, which is also the revisional power of the Board, must be construed to be a power conferred upon the Board only when a power of revision has not been exercised by the prescribed authority under Sub-section (1) of the Act. This argument, in our considered opinion, is wholly untenable and is contrary to the plain meaning of the statute. Section 59 of the Act is extracted herein below in extenso: 59, Revision: The prescribed authority may on application by any party aggrieved by any order passed in an appeal under any provision of this Act filed within the prescribed period, revise such order. (2) The Board of Revenue may, at any time on being moved in that behalf by the Collector of a district or by the Land Reforms Commissioner, revise any order passed by any authority under this Act. (3) For the purpose or revising any order, the prescribed authority and the Board of Revenue shall follow such procedure as may be prescribed and shall have power to call for and examine the records of the proceedings wherein such order was passed and to pass such order as they deem fit: Provided that no order under this Section shall be passed without giving the parties concerned a reasonable opportunity of being heard: The aforesaid provision makes it abundantly clear that while Sub-section (1) provides for a revision by any party aggrieved by any order passed in an appeal under the Act to the prescribed authority Sub-section (2) is, the power of the Board of Revenue to revise any order passed by any authority under the Act, which in our opinion, also includes the revisional authority under the Act, but to be exercised on being moved in that behalf by the Collector of a district or by the Land Reforms Commissioner. The language of Sub-section (2) does not in any manner spell out the legislative intention that the said power can be exercised only when the power of revision has not been exercised by the prescribed authority under Sub-section (1). The language of Sub-section (2) does not in any manner spell out the legislative intention that the said power can be exercised only when the power of revision has not been exercised by the prescribed authority under Sub-section (1). It is a cardinal rule of interpretation that when the plain meaning of a statute is unambiguous, it is not the duty of the Court to give strained meaning at the cost of violence to the language. While construing the provision of all statutes, the Court has solemn duty to give effect to the natural meaning of the words used therein, if the words are clear enough. It is only when there is ambiguity, the court would be entitled to take an extrinsic aid to find out the true meaning of a statute. In view of the clear and unambiguous language of Sub-section (2) of Section 59, which in our opinion is not susceptible to a construction limiting the power of revision of the Member only to those cases where the prescribed authority has not exercised his jurisdiction under Sub-section (1) of the Act. We are unable to accept the contention of Mr. Murty, the learned Counsel for the Petitioner. We would accordingly reject the said submission. 6. No other contention having been raised and all the contentions having failed, this writ application is devoid of merits and is accordingly dismissed, but in the circumstances without any order as to costs. K.P. Mohapatra, J. 7. I agree. Application dismissed. Final Result : Dismissed