P. R. GOKULAKRISHNAN, J. ( 1 ) THIS Special Civil Application is for issuing a writ direction or order for quashing and setting aside the sanctioned plan wherein the Surat Urban Development Authority had shown final Plot No. 109 of the petitioners for reservation of the cottage industry by the Surat Municipal Corporation. There is a further prayer for restraining the respondents in any way from implementing the said plan. Further consequential prayers have also been made in this Special Civil Application. Rule was issued. Mr. G. N. Desai the learned Counsel appears for the and respondent and waives service of Rule. Mr. Chhaya appears for the 1st respondent and waives service of Rule. As far as the 3rd respondent is concerned we feel that this petition can be disposed of in his absence on the facts and circumstances of this case. Since the learned Counsels appearing for the petitioners and the 1st and 2nd respondents are agreeable to dispose of the matter finally we have taken up this petition for final disposal. Hence we have heard the respective learned Counsels for the petitioners and 1st and 2nd respondents. ( 2 ) THE short facts of this case for the purpose of disposal of this Special Civil Application are that the petitioners who own Plot No. 109 in the Town Planning Scheme object for inclusion of this plot in the town planning and reserving it for cottage industries by the Surat Municipal Corporation. ( 2 ) THE short facts of this case for the purpose of disposal of this Special Civil Application are that the petitioners who own Plot No. 109 in the Town Planning Scheme object for inclusion of this plot in the town planning and reserving it for cottage industries by the Surat Municipal Corporation. They question the preliminary and final Town Planning Scheme on the grounds that original draft development plan was made under the provisions of the Bombay Town Planning Act 1954 and hence the preliminary and final scheme settled under the provisions of the Gujarat Town Planning and Urban Development Act; 1976 cannot be sustained that the provisions of the Bombay Town Planning Act 1954 and the Gujarat Town Planning and Urban Development Act 1976 for settling the Town Planning Scheme are different and as such there must be fresh development plan as per the Gujarat Town Planning and Urban Development Act 1976 and then only the preliminary and final Town Planning Scheme can be settled; that there was no notice before settling preliminary Town Planning Scheme nor the subsequent final Town Planning Scheme to the petitioner herein and as such the same is null and void that the original purpose for which the development plan was submitted is for having a play ground for a school while the present purpose is for cottage industries and as such the same has to be struck down and that it is not the function of the Municipal Corporation to have cottage industries as per the provisions of the Bombay Provincial Municipal Corporations Act and as such the acquisition under the Town Planning Scheme for cottage industries cannot be sustained. With the abovesaid contentions the petitioners wanted to quash the Town Planning Scheme. Mr. R. N. Shah the learned Counsel appearing for the petitioners putforth the abovesaid contentions and submitted that the Town Planning Scheme. in respect of Plot NJ. 109 has to be quashed. Mr. With the abovesaid contentions the petitioners wanted to quash the Town Planning Scheme. Mr. R. N. Shah the learned Counsel appearing for the petitioners putforth the abovesaid contentions and submitted that the Town Planning Scheme. in respect of Plot NJ. 109 has to be quashed. Mr. G. N. Desai the learned Counsel appearing for the Surat Municipal Corporation pointed out Sec. 124 of the Gujarat Town Planning and Urban Development Act 1976 and contended that the proceedings started under the Bombay Act 27 of 1952 are saved; that the notice was given before the Town Planning Scheme was settled; that the preliminary Town Planning Scheme was settled as early as 1980 and it is too late on the part of the petitioners to question both the preliminary and final Town Planning Scheme as late as 1988 that the Surat Municipal Corporation has ample power to establish cottage industries and acquire the land for the same that the petitioners had notice with regard to the purpose for which the land is included in the Town Planning Scheme that there is absolutely no merits in any of the contentions putforth by the petitioners herein. ( 3 ) WE have carefully considered all the submissions made by the respective Counsels appearing for the parties herein. ( 4 ) THE draft development plan in this case was made as early as 6 Naturally this was under the Bombay Town Planning Act 1954 Section 18 (2) of the Bombay Town Planning Act 1954 deals with the provisions that have to he made in the Town Planning Scheme. Section 18 (2) (e) reads as follows:"18 Subject to the provisions of this Act or any other law for the time being in force: (2) such town planning scheme may make provisions for any of the following matters: (E) the allotment or reservation of land tot roads open sprees gardens recreation grounds schools markets green belts and dairies transport facilities and public purposes of all kinds". By virtue of this provision the draft development plans spelt out the purpose in this case as required for a school building. Subsequent to this draft development plan no other progress was made with regard to the Development plan and in the meantime the Gujarat Town Planning and Urban Development Act 1976 came into force on 1-2-1978. On 27-9-1978 preliminary scheme was prepared and on 27-10-1980 the said preliminary scheme was sanctioned. Subsequent to this draft development plan no other progress was made with regard to the Development plan and in the meantime the Gujarat Town Planning and Urban Development Act 1976 came into force on 1-2-1978. On 27-9-1978 preliminary scheme was prepared and on 27-10-1980 the said preliminary scheme was sanctioned. On 28-7-1987 the final scheme was sanctioned. In the preliminary scheme and in the final scheme the purpose for acquiring this land is mentioned as cottage industry. The original purpose for which the land is sought to be acquired for town planning is for school building. Mr. R. N. Shah submitted that when the purpose is changed there is no question of continuing the old development plan made in the old Act but a fresh exercise has to be made once over again for the purpose of sanctioning the Town Planning Scheme. In this connection Mr. Shah reads Sec. 52 which states:"draw in the prescribed from the preliminary and the final scheme in accordance with the draft scheme Provided that the Town Planning Officer may make variation from the draft scheme but no such variation if it is of a substantial nature shall be made except with the previous sanction of the State Government and except after hearing the appropriate authority and aay owners who may raise objections. EXPLANATIONS: (i) For the purpose of this proviso variation of a substantial nature means a variation which is estimated by the Town Planning Officer to involve an increase of ten par cent in the costs of the scheme as is described in Sec. 77 or Rupees one lac whichever is lower on account of the provisions of new works or the allotment of additional sites for public purposes included in the preliminary scheme drawn up by the Town Planning Officer. (III) If there is aay difference of opinion between the Town Planning Officer and the appropriate authority as to whether a variation made by the Town Planning Officer is of substantial nature or not the matter shall be refereed by the appropriate authority to the State Government whose decision thereon shall be final". Mr. Shah further states that in modifying the scheme no notice was given. Mr. Shah further states that in modifying the scheme no notice was given. In the letter dated 6 1978 written from the office of the Additional Town Planning Officer Surat to the husband of the 1st petitioner it has been specifically stated that a temporary/reconstituted plan has been prepared and the said reconstituted plan is made available for inspection in the office during office hours and that the party can get the explanation in person regarding the same. There is further averment in this letter to the effect that if within a period of 15 days from the receipt of the said letter no representation is made it will he presumed that the party has not made any representation about the said tentative reconstitution of the plan and suitable further proceedings for finalising the said plan will be initiated. By letter dated 13 the son of Pitamber Devchand who is the husband of the 1 petitioner herein had agreed to before the Town Planning Officer as follows:"town Planning Scheme Surat No. 6 (Majuza-Khatmdara) R. S. No. City Survey No. Original Dvn. No. 39a Plot No. 39b Final Plot No. 399 The Town Planning Officer according to the tentative reconstitution plan a proposal is explained to us in connection with reconstitution and reallotment of our original Plot No. 2 39a 39b on finalising Town Planning Scheme Surat No. 6. I Dhansukhbhai Pitambardas Umrao on behalf of my father inform by this writing that the proposal that in place of land bearing final Plot No. 39a and 39b the land bearing final Plot No. 39 which is made the same is agreed to by us. The plan at the Town Planning Department wherein Plot No. 109 is mentioned is comprised of original Plot No. 39a. Thus the letter extracted above clearly reveals that the reconstituted purpose for acquiring this land was put on notice to the parties concerned and that the same was agreed to by the son of Pitamber Devchand. Hence there is absolutely no substance in stating that there was no notice that the purpose for acquiring the land was changed. Further the Sec. 52 (3) (xi) extracted above in its proviso clearly gives power to the Town Planning Officer to make variation from the draft scheme. Hence there is absolutely no substance in stating that there was no notice that the purpose for acquiring the land was changed. Further the Sec. 52 (3) (xi) extracted above in its proviso clearly gives power to the Town Planning Officer to make variation from the draft scheme. The purpose for which the acquisition for town planning both at the original stage and at the subsequent reconstituted stage is for public welfare. There is no substantial change or variation in such acquisition. Therefore there is no question of any transgression of statutory provisions as suggested by Mr. R. N. Shah. There is also no substance in stating that the Surat Municipality cannot reserve the land for cottage industry since it is not the function of the Municipality to have cottage industry. Section 40 (3) (e) of the Gujarat Town Planning and Urban Development Act 1976 clearly states that the Town Planning Scheme may make provision for public purposes of all kinds. Having regard to the purpose for which this plot is intended we cannot say that there is no public purpose involved in it. ( 5 ) THE argument to the effect that the scheme cannot be finalised in respect of the draft development plan published under the old Act has absolutely no substance in view of Sec. 124 of the Gujarat Town Planning and Urban Development Act 1976 Section 124 reads as follows:" (1) The Bombay Town Planning Act 1954 is hereby repealed. ( 5 ) THE argument to the effect that the scheme cannot be finalised in respect of the draft development plan published under the old Act has absolutely no substance in view of Sec. 124 of the Gujarat Town Planning and Urban Development Act 1976 Section 124 reads as follows:" (1) The Bombay Town Planning Act 1954 is hereby repealed. (2) Notwithstanding such repeal anything done or any action taken (including any declaration of intention to make a development plan or town planning scheme any draft development plan or draft town planning scheme published by a local authority any application made to the State Government for the sanction of any draft development plan or draft town planning scheme any sanction given by the State Government to the draft development plan or draft town planning scheme or any part thereof any restriction imposed on any person against carrying out any development work in any building or in on over any land or upon an owner of land or building against the erection or re-erection of any building or work any commencement certificate granted any order or suspension of rule bye 18 regulation notification or order made any purchase notice served on a local authority any interest of an owner compulsorily acquired or deemed to have been acquired by it in pursuance of such purchase notice any revision of development plan any appointment made of Town Planning Officer any proceeding pending before and any decision of a Town Planning Officer or a Board of Appeal any final scheme forwarded to or sanctioned varied or withdrawn by the State Government any delivery or possession enforced any eviction summarily made any notice served any action taken to enforce a scheme any costs of scheme calculated and any payments made to local authorities by owners of plots included in a scheme any recoveries made or to be made or compensation awarded or to be awarded in respect of any plot any rules or regulations made under the repealed Act shall in so far as it is not inconsistent with the provisions of this Act be deemed to have been done or taken under the corresponding provisions of this Act and provisions of this Act shall have effect in relation thereto. (3) All proceedings pending before a Town Planning Officer or a Board of Appeal under the Act hereby repealed on the date of commencement of this Act shall be disposed of by the Town Planning Officer or the Board of Appeal as the case may be appointed or constituted under this Act in accordance with the provisions of this Act. (4) The mention of particular matters in sub-sec. (2) shall not affect the general application to the repeal of the said Act of Sec. 7 of the Bombay General Clauses Act 1904 (which relates to the effect of repeal)". Except the fact that the land vests after the preliminary scheme as per the new Act and other minor procedural aspects we do not find any inconsistency between the old Act and the new Act in preparing and finalising the Town Planning Scheme. Hence as per the provisions of Sec. 124 of the new Act the proceedings taken under the old Act was continued and the preliminary scheme came to be sanctioned as early as 27-10-1980 which was subsequently made final on 28-7-1987. Section 65 (3) of the new Act which reads. On and after the date fixed in such notification the preliminary scheme or the final scheme as the case may be shall have effect as it was enacted in this Act makes it clear that once the preliminary scheme is sanctioned it becomes the part of the Act. Section 67 of the new Act also states as follows:"67 On the day on which the preliminary scheme comes into force: (A) all lands required by the appropriate authority shall unless it is otherwise determined in such scheme vest absolutely in the appropriate authority free from all encumbrances (B) all rights in the original plots which have been re-constituted into final plots shall determine and the final plots shall become subject to the rights settled by the Town Planning Officer". Thus it is clear that not only the lands included in the preliminary scheme vest absolutely in the appropriate authority but the preliminary scheme shall have the effect as if it where enacted in this Act. Thus it is clear that not only the lands included in the preliminary scheme vest absolutely in the appropriate authority but the preliminary scheme shall have the effect as if it where enacted in this Act. In the decision in the case of Dungarlal v. State reported in [1976] XVII GLR 1152 a Full Bench of our High Court has held:"so far as the validity of such legislative measure is concerned the validity can be gone into even in writ jurisdiction only to the limited extent whether there is any transgression of jurisdiction of the authorities concerned and whether the scheme as finally emerged is totally inconsistent with the Act. It is only the fundamental breaches that is where minimum statutory essentials are not complied with which result in a total lack of jurisdiction and not other procedural errors or defects that would render a scheme which had become a legislative measure and a part of the Act liable to attack or challenge in a Court on the ground that it is null and void". Proceeding further the Full Bench held:"xxx it was open to 8 person affected to waive individual special notice specified in sub-rule (3) which was only as an additional safeguard for the Individual concerned. Therefore that could never constitute the minimum essential of the scheme or such a basic requirement that Its non-compliance would have any nullifying consequence". The Full Bench further held:"the provisions of Rule 21 (1) lay down the minimum essentials for protecting Public interest after the Town Planning Officer commences his work. That sub-rule is introduced in accordance with the principles of `audi alteram partem Special individual notices under old sub-rule (3) cannot therefore be regarded as an essential minimum safeguard as in the case of sub-rule (1) so as to have the consequence of nullifying the final scheme". Finally the Full Bench held:"sec. That sub-rule is introduced in accordance with the principles of `audi alteram partem Special individual notices under old sub-rule (3) cannot therefore be regarded as an essential minimum safeguard as in the case of sub-rule (1) so as to have the consequence of nullifying the final scheme". Finally the Full Bench held:"sec. 51 (3) which gives effect to the final scheme as if enacted in the Act made it an Act of the legislature 60 as to make it immune from the challenge on the ground of procedural defects which did not amount to exceeding the limit of jurisdiction under the Act to frame a Town Planning Scheme under the Act but were only in the nature of the breach of additional procedural safeguard and which were not in the nature of essential minimum requirements will not under the scheme null and void so as to entitle the party to challenge it under Art. 226 or in any Court after it becomes a part of the Act under Sec. 51 (3)". This decision in our opinion clearly satisfies the position to the effect that the settled preliminary scheme cannot be a subject matter of a writ proceeding unless otherwise it come within the parameter mentioned in this Full Bench decision. The short facts of the present case which we have discussed above clearly establish that the scheme is not inconsistent with the Act nor any fundamental breaches have been committed by the authority in sanctioning the schemes nor any limited statutory essentials have been violated which will result in a total lack of jurisdiction. ( 6 ) IN yet another Full Bench decision of our High Court -in the case of Saiyed Ahmedabad v. Ahmedabad Municipal Corporation reported in [1977] XVIII GLR 549 the Full Bench dealing with the impugned notice of eviction observed:"in view of Sec. 53 once property has vested absolutely in the local authority and all rights of these persons occupying the same have come to an end the eviction power would be merely an administrative power of eviction. Such eviction would be of the same nature as of the persons who are evicted under the provisions of the Land Acquisition Act after the required land has vested in the State and the matter is only of taking possession". Such eviction would be of the same nature as of the persons who are evicted under the provisions of the Land Acquisition Act after the required land has vested in the State and the matter is only of taking possession". In this decision the Pull Bench has observed that once the land vests with the authority concerned as per the scheme the scheme has become a legislative measure under which the rights of the patties have totally cased to occupy the property and the power of eviction in such a context would be in the nature of an administrative power and therefore when the parties admittedly have no right under the final scheme to continue their occupation they could never invoke any prejudice or consideration of the principle of fair play and justice so as to have these impugned notices invalidated. ( 7 ) CONSIDERING the abovesaid decisions and also the fact that the preliminary scheme has been already sanctioned as early as 27-10-1980 which has become the part of the Act the same cannot be questioned as late as in the year 1988. ( 8 ) FROM the foregoing discussions we do not find any merits in any of the contentions raised by Mr. R. N. Shah the learned Counsel appearing for the petitioners and as such this Special Civil Application is dismissed. Rule is discharged with no order as to costs. ( 9 ) IT is prayed by Mr. R. N. Shah learned Counsel appearing for the petitioners that the ad interim relief granted earlier may be extended for a further period of three months. Mr. Desai learned Counsel appearing for Surat Municipal Corporation has opposed such extension to interim relief. Mr. Shah submits that the petitioners have to approach the Supreme Court of India for necessary relief and further submitted that the occupants of these lands are poor persons and they must be given some time to vacate. ( 10 ) CONSIDERING these submissions ad interim relief granted originally in terms of para IX (D) is extended for a period of 10 weeks from today. Status quo as on date in respect of the suit land will be maintained by both the parties. Petition dismissed. .