JUDGMENT M. S. Mukherjee, (F. C).—This case arises out of the revenue petition filed by Shri Nathu Ram, petitioner against the order, dated 10-2-1988 by my learned predecessor in the revenue appeal case No. 9/87. Briefly speaking, the facts of the case are that Deputy Commissioner, Bilaspur sanctioned on 26-7-1985 Government land comprised in Khasra Nos. 36/1, 36/2, 44/1, 48/1 and 66/1 measuring 0-7 biswas in total in favour of the petitioner Shri Nathu Ram in exchange of the petitioners private land comprised in Khasra number 65/2 measuring 0-10 biswas situated in Mauza Toba-Sangwana, Sub-Tehsil Shri Naina Deviji. The respondents filed an appeal before the learned Divisional Commissioner, Mandi against the aforesaid order of the Deputy Commissioner and the learned Divisional Commissioner vide his order dated 25-10-1986 accepted the appeal partially and remanded the case back to Deputy Commissioner for spot inspection, also for fresh decision after hearing the appellant and the panchayat members concerned. He further directed that in case the plea of the appellants (present respondents was found to be true on the spot, the objectionable piece of land might be reduced from the granted land in exchange. 2. The petitioner then filed an appeal before my learned predecessor against that order of the Divisional Commissioner. My learned predecessor in his order dated 10-2-1988 upheld the order of the Divisional Commissioner and dismissed the appeal. The present Review Petition is against the aforesaid order of my learned predecessor. 3. I have heard the parties and have gone through the records. Counsel for the petitioner has assailed the impugned order of my learned predecessor and that of the learned Divisional Commissioner dated 25-10-1986 mainly on following grounds, namely :— (i) This is not a case under Nautor Rules as the land was given to him in exchange under land acquisition proceedings. Since this was not a case of grant of nautor land, no appeal was competent before the Divisional Commissioner under provisions of the Nautor Rules. (ii) The petitioners land was originally notified for acquisition under section 4 of the Land Acquisition Act and this notification subsequently lapsed due to limitation imposed by the amended provisions of the Land Acquisition Act. Meanwhile since Government land had been given to the petitioner by the Deputy Commissioner in exchange of his private lands, under Land Acquisition Act proceedings, the Government is now debarred to cancel the allotment already made. Meanwhile since Government land had been given to the petitioner by the Deputy Commissioner in exchange of his private lands, under Land Acquisition Act proceedings, the Government is now debarred to cancel the allotment already made. (iii) The petitioner has further stated before me that the Education Department has already taken possession of his private lands for the purpose of a School. Government land given to him in exchange by the impugned order of the Deputy Commissioner dated 26-7-1985, is less attractive. This was not the case of his voluntarily seeking exchange of land under the Nautor Rules, but that it was a case of exchange of Government land on the occasion compulsory acquisition of private lands. The learned lower Courts were, therefore, wrong in reopening the matter under the provisions of the Nautor Rules. (iv) The Divisional Commissioner allegedly decided the case on 25-10-1986 without giving the petitioner an opportunity of being heard. The petitioner had not been served summons for the hearing and there is not even an order of the learned Divisional Commissioner to proceed against him ex parte. So essentially speaking, the petitioners main objections are against the jurisdiction of the revenue courts under the provisions of the Nautor Rules. His contention is that as the Government land was given to him in exchange under provisions of Land Acquisition Act, no appeal/revision proceedings under rules would lie. 4. I am unable to appreciate these arguments. First of all, there is no conclusive evidence to suggest that he was allotted Government land under provisions of the Land Acquisition Act. Even if the order of the Deputy Commissioner dated 26-7-1985 suggests that the sanction of the land was in exchange of his private lands taken by the Education Department, there is no indication that the order is under the provisions of Land Acquisition Act. In fact, even under Nautor Rules land can be allotted in exchange of compulsory acquisition. 6. Then the relevant text of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894, dealing with the provisions for allotment of Government land in exchange, occurs under clause (3) of section 31, ibid. In fact, even under Nautor Rules land can be allotted in exchange of compulsory acquisition. 6. Then the relevant text of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894, dealing with the provisions for allotment of Government land in exchange, occurs under clause (3) of section 31, ibid. This reads as follows:— "(3) Notwithstanding anything in this section the Collector may, with the sanction of the appropriate Government, instead of awarding a money compensation in respect of any land, make any arrangement with a person having a limited interest in such land, either by the grant of other lands in exchange, the remission of land revenue on other lands held under the same title, or in such other way as may be equitable having regard to the interests of the parties concerned". (Emphasis mine). A plain reading of this clause clearly indicates that first of all it is not mandatory on the part of the Government to allot alternative Government land in exchange of any acquisition of private property. The law only enables the State to allot such lands. But this is a matter of discretion, when other conditions are simultaneously satisfied. Secondly, such allotment of Government land can be made only where the acquisition of orivate land has taken place. Thirdly, and more importantly, such allotment of Government land can be made by the Collector only with the sanction of the appropriate Government. 6 Now in the instant case, there is no indication that Deputy Commissioner, Bilaspur (Collector) had obtained sanction from the Government for allotment of the Government land in exchange. Learned Counsel for the petitioner could not also adduce any evidence in this regard. Secondly as specifically expressed and admitted by the petitioner, the compulsory land acquisition proceedings in respect of his private lands had not been completed* inasmuch as the section 4 Notification was not followed up by the Education Department with subsequent proceedings under the Land Acquisition Act. The entire land acquisition proceedings, therefore formally lapsed. So, since Land Acquisition Act proceedings were not applied in the case of petitioners private lands, how could he, in the same breach, claim that the Government land was given to him in exchange under the provisions of the same Land Acquisition Act? Moreover the other important prerequisite conditions of the sanction of the Government was not available for the allotment of Government land. 7. Moreover the other important prerequisite conditions of the sanction of the Government was not available for the allotment of Government land. 7. Under these circumstances, I would dismiss the petitioners contention that the Government land was allotted to him under provisions of Land Acquisition Act and that lower revenue courts have no jurisdiction to deal with the case in appeal/revision under Nautor Rules. In fact the land in question should be held to have been allotted to him under the Nautor Rules. Therefore, there is relevant jurisdiction on the part of the revenue courts to deal with the case in appeal/revision. 8. The next issue is, whether despite such existence of jurisdiction, the impugned order of the Divisional Commissioner dated 25-10-1986 should be upheld. There are two important considerations in this regard. Firstly, the learned Commissioner remanded the case to the Deputy Commissioner for fresh determination through spot inspection, after hearing the appellant and the panchayat members concerned. One of the objections on the part of the respondents is that the Government 1 and in question is used for religious purposes by the pilgrims. My learned predecessor in his impugned order dated 10-2-1988 has rightly observed that if a land is used for religious purposes such as resting and bathing place of pilgrims, fair celebrating place etc., in no case, such land should be allotted in exchange under Nautor Rules or otherwise as such grant affects the sentiments of not only the Village-right holders but also of the general public. I concur in this view. However, since the factual position is yet to be ascertained at site keeping in view the relevant principles, it is naturally very necessary that the case is remanded to the Deputy Commissioner for spot inspection and disposal. 9. However, the second objection of the petitioner is that the impugned order of learned Divisional Commissioner was passed at his back. This factual defect is not even contested by the respondents. This is obviously a grave defect- On this ground in isolation, the impugned order of the learned Divisional Commissioner dated 25-7-1985 deserves to be quashed. 9. However, the second objection of the petitioner is that the impugned order of learned Divisional Commissioner was passed at his back. This factual defect is not even contested by the respondents. This is obviously a grave defect- On this ground in isolation, the impugned order of the learned Divisional Commissioner dated 25-7-1985 deserves to be quashed. Yet the net result of the case, in the overall context of the foregoing analysis and conclusions, will be that the matter has to be freshly remanded to the Deputy Commissioner (Collector) Bilaspur for fresh spot inspection in the presence of the parties and for a fresh decision in accordance with the operative partition of the impugned order of the Divisional Commissioner. 10. Finally, if eventually, as a result of the fresh proceedings, the petitioners allotment of Government land is revoked, the question arises, as to what would happen to the matter of compensation to him for his private lands already surrendered to the Education Department. Strictly speaking this is not within the scope of the instant Revenue Revision petition concerned with the allotment of the Government land under Nautor Rules. Yet in the interest of equity and fair-play, the petitioner deserves some consideration from the Government. The petitioner has already admittedly given the possession of his private lands to the Education Department, for the purpose of a school. It was normally for him to ensure that the Education Department should have occupied this land after first completing the necessary acquisition proceedings or after making the necessary payment. Perhaps, this was not contemporaneously demanded by him in good faith that in the end he would be getting Government land in exchange. But as already held above, allotment of Government land in exchange is no mandatory requirement of the law. Therefore, if eventually, he does not get the Government land, it is still open to the petitioner to seek from the Education Department the necessary payment. 11. May be the Education Department may face problems as to the determination of basis on which payments are to be made at this stage, since old Land Acquisition Act proceedings have lapsed. But this problem can be overcome, if the petitioner voluntarily seeks from the Department payment of compensation related to the market prior as on the date of the lapsed section 4 (of Land Acquisition Act, 1894). But this problem can be overcome, if the petitioner voluntarily seeks from the Department payment of compensation related to the market prior as on the date of the lapsed section 4 (of Land Acquisition Act, 1894). Notification, plus the other necessary ingredients of the award, as if the Land Acquisition Act proceedings have not lapsed. Any payment to be made by the Education Department on this principle would then be just and fair, in the context of the circumstances of the case and can then be formally treated as payment through negotiations. 12. The petitioner is, therefore, at liberty to exercise this option if necessary and to seek the payment from the Department of Education accordingly. Otherwise he is at liberty to seek alternative reliefs from the Education Department as admissible under law. Order accordingly.