JUDGMENT Bhawani Singh, J.—This appeal, under section 39 of the Indian Arbitration Act, arises out of the order in case No. 1/2 of 1978, decided on June 1, 1979, dismissing the application filed by the appellant under section 20 of the Arbitration Act, having been filed after the lapse of three years, The appellant assails this order by way of this appeal. 2. The facts, in nut shell, are that in pursuance of the agreement dated August 5, 1972, for the supply of stationary, the appellant supplied the same and claimed price there for and having, failed to secure the payment, a notice dated August 27, 1974 was issued to the respondent to which a reply dated November 16, 1974 (Ex. AW 1/C) was received. In this communication the liability for the payment has been disputed and in the penultimate para it has been said as under:— "If you feel, that a dispute within the terms of the agreement has arisen, you may refer the matter to arbitration as agreed to by your client." 3. Thereafter the appellant appears to have approached Shri B. K. Khanna, Arbitrator, as appears from Ex. PA-l/D and it is further apparent from this communication dated May 31, 1975 that the arbitrator has called upon the appellant to submit its case alongwith a copy to the Secretary, Himachal Pradesh State Electricity Board, Simla-4. As a sequel to this, a detailed letter of July 19, 1975 has been sent by the appellant to the respondent mentioning therein the whole case and the balance amount claimable from the respondent. Thereafter the arbitrator did not proceed further in the matter nor was the respondent called upon to file any reply to the claim of the appellant, 4. An application under section 20 of the Arbitration Act was moved by the appellant for calling upon the respondent to file the agreement in the Court. This application was moved in the court of the Senior Subordinate Judge, Ambala on May 22, 1976 and it was opposed by the respondent on the ground of want of jurisdiction in that court. The objection relating to jurisdiction was decided on November 8, 1977 and it was held that the court of the Senior Subordinate Judge at Ambala had no jurisdiction in the matter and direction was made for the return of the application to the appellant for presentation to the proper court. The objection relating to jurisdiction was decided on November 8, 1977 and it was held that the court of the Senior Subordinate Judge at Ambala had no jurisdiction in the matter and direction was made for the return of the application to the appellant for presentation to the proper court. The application appears to have been returned on November 9, 1977 and consequentially it was filed in the court of the Senior Subordinate Judge, Simla on December 15, 1977 as is apparent from the endorsement of the Senior Subordinate Judge, Simla, appearing on the application so returned by the Senior Subordinate Judge, Ambala. By his order dated June 1, 1979 the learned Senior Subordinate Judge* Simla, dismissed this application as having become time-barred. 5. The sole question for determination in this case, is whether the decision holding that this application barred by time, is legally sustainable. 6. In Major (Retd.) Inder Singh Rekhi v. Delhi Development Authority, 1988 (2) SCC 338, Justice Sabyasachi Mukharji, J, speaking for the Court observed in para 4 as under:— "Therefore, in order to be entitled to order of reference under section 20, it is necessary that there should be an arbitration agreement and secondly, difference must arise to which this agreement applied. In this case, there is no dispute that there was an arbitration agreement. There has been an assertion of claim by the appellant and silence as well as refusal in respect of the same by respondent. Therefore, a dispute has arisen regarding nonpayment of the alleged dues of the appellant. The question is for the present case when did such dispute arise. The High Court proceeded on the basis that the work was completed in 1980 and, therefore, the appellant became entitled to the payment from that date and the cause of action under Article 137 arose from that date. But in order to be entitled to ask for a reference under section 20 of the Act there must not only be an entitlement to money but there must be a difference or dispute must arise. But in order to be entitled to ask for a reference under section 20 of the Act there must not only be an entitlement to money but there must be a difference or dispute must arise. It is true that on completion of the work a right to get payment would normally arise but where the final bills as in this case have not been prepared as appears from the record and when the assertion of the claim was made on February 28, 1983 and there was non-payment, the cause of action arose from that date, that is to say, February 28, 1983 It is also true that a party cannot postpone the accrual of cause of action by writing reminders or sending reminders but where the bill had not been finally prepared, the claim made by a claimant is the accrual of the cause of action. A dispute arises where there is a claim and a denial and repudiation of the claim. The existence of dispute is essential for appointment of an arbitrator under section 8 or a reference under section 20 of the Act. See Law of Arbitration by R. S. Bachawat, first edition, page 354. There should be dispute and there can only be a dispute when a claim is asserted by one party and denied by the other on whatever grounds. Mere failure or inaction to pay does not lead to the inference of the existence of dispute. Dispute entails a positive element and assertion of denying, not merely inaction to accede to a claim or a request. Whether in a particular case a dispute has arisen or not has to be found out from the facts and circumstances of the case." 7. The judgment has been relied upon and principle reiterated by the Court in Union of India and another v. M/s. L. K. Ahuja and Co., 1988 (3) SCC 76. 8. There is no dispute that for moving an application under section 20 of the Arbitration Act, Art. 137 of the Limitation Act prescribing a period of three years applies. The question is as to from which date this period of three years is to be counted in the light of the facts of the present case. 8. There is no dispute that for moving an application under section 20 of the Arbitration Act, Art. 137 of the Limitation Act prescribing a period of three years applies. The question is as to from which date this period of three years is to be counted in the light of the facts of the present case. It is clear from the communication, dated November 16, 1974 that the claim of the appellant, who had already a grievance for non-payment of its dues, had been repudiated by the respondent. Further, it has been specifically pointed out in this communication that in case the appellant felt that a dispute within the terms of the agreement had arisen, the same could be referred to arbitration by the appellant. What else is left? This is the crucial date from which the period is to be counted and in this way the period of three years would expire on November 15, 1977, The application filed before the Senior Subordinate Judge, Ambala, was returned to the appellant on November 9, 1977. The petitioner had sufficient time to file the same at Simla within the period of limitation. However, the same was ultimately filed on December 15, 1977. In this way it is clearly barred by time and the protection sought to be availed by the appellant through application C. M. P. No. 157 of 1988 under sections 5 and 14 of the Indian Limitation Act for condonation of delay in filing the application under section 20 of the Arbitration Act is not available because the appellant had enough time after the return of the same by the Court of the Senior Subordinate Judge, Ambala, to file the same in the court of the Senior Subordinate Judge, Simla. 9. Further no sufficient cause has been shown for failure to file the same on December 15, 1977 In view of the above discussion the relief sought for by this application cannot be allowed and the same is rejected. 10. The net result of the aforesaid discussion is that there is no substance in the submissions of the appellant and the impugned decision is legally correct and does not call for any interference. The appeal is accordingly dismissed with no order as to costs. Appeal dismissed.