Judgment :- 1. Respondent Poulose and his wife, deceased Annamma, were blessed with two children. They were aged 2 and 4. The elder was with Annamma's father PW 6. While the other three alone were in the house on 3-8-85, Annamma had homicidal death inside the house in between 8 and 9 PM. On the basis of the extra judicial confession made by the respondent and after seeing the dead body, PW 1 gave information to the police. Next morning, appellant surrendered before the police. Next morning, appellant surrendered before the police station. In the trial on murder charge appellant was acquitted. State has come up in appeal. 2. Medical evidence of PW 12 and Ext. P7 postmortem certificate prepared by him show that death was homicidal and not suicidal. Cause of death is strangulation by tightening a towel as ligature around the neck. The ligature with the knot was in position around the neck in the dead body. It was so seen by PWs 1 to 3 as well as PWs 4 and 12. There was contusion around the neck involving subcutaneous tissues and sterno mastoid muscles. Upper bones of the thyroid cartilage were broken. PW 12 emphatically said that application of so much force which caused the above injuries coupled with the knot in position is impossible in a case of suicide. 3. There is no direct evidence regarding murder. So also, this is an appeal against acquittal. Even then, as in this case, when the circumstances established by the prosecution evidence are so clear and convincing in favour of the guilt of the accused and capable of excluding all hypothesis in favour of his innocence, and the conclusions arrived at by the trail judge are not at all reasonably possible, interference is a must. The reasonings adopted, both factual and legal, could even be turned perverse. 4. The evidence of PWs 1 to 3 and 6 show that the accused is a drunkard who habitually indulged in picking up quarrels with the deceased and manhandle her. His property was mortgaged to PW 8 for Rs.800/-. PW 6 paid the money by taking a loan. On the date of incident, he came to the house of the accused to persuade him to sell paddy to pay off the loan. Accused refused and there was a quarrel. His property was mortgaged to PW 8 for Rs.800/-. PW 6 paid the money by taking a loan. On the date of incident, he came to the house of the accused to persuade him to sell paddy to pay off the loan. Accused refused and there was a quarrel. It was only thereafter that he was forced to agree and the paddy was sold to PW 7. Though these facts are clear from the evidence of PWs 6 to 8, the Sessions Judge refused to accept it as motive for the reason that in the quarrel the deceased did not support PW 6 or oppose the accused. This conclusion was ignoring the evidence regarding quarrels of the accused with the deceased and the impact of the quarrel with her father which acted as the immediate motive. 5. The evidence of PW6 shows that the deceased, the accused and their younger child aged two alone were in the house in the afternoon of the date of incident when he left. This is admitted when questioned under S.313. Thereafter, he raised a plea of alibi and failed to establish the same. False plea of alibi or failure to establish the plea is having the effect of establishing his presence as alleged by the prosecution though criminality has to be positively proved otherwise. Further, the evidence of PWs 1 to 3 and 5 clearly establish that the accused was in the house when the homicide took place. The dead body was in the room lying flat on the ground on a mat. The door was lying open with alighted chimney inside. The only other living being in the house, other than the accused, was the child. Immediately after homicide, he took the child and went to PWs 1 to 3 and 5 and others to make the extra judicial confessions that he murdered her by strangulation using a cloth as ligature. That was found to be true on verification. 6. The last seen theory is applicable with greater force in this case not only on account of the relationship and joint residence. He was the only person who was there and who could have known how death happened. To anybody who saw the dead body it was not difficult to realise that it was a clear case of homicide by strangulation. He was the only person who was there and who could have known how death happened. To anybody who saw the dead body it was not difficult to realise that it was a clear case of homicide by strangulation. His conduct was not that of a husband who saw his wife murdered by somebody else. Even ignoring the extra judicial confessions, his conduct in surrendering before the police coupled with his refusal to offer any explanation as to how his wife died are clinching. Keeping the dead body alone in the house, from about 9 PM onwards the appellant went to PWs 1 to 3, 5 and others with the child on his shoulders informing that he strangulated her to death and they need not go to verify since he is going to surrender to the police. The words, as nearly as possible, spoken to by the accused were reproduced by these witnesses except PW 1, whose testimonies are having a ring of truth. They are absolutely disinterested and independent neighbours against whom there is not even a suggestion of any ground for discrediting them. 7. Among them, PW 1 is the first informant. He alone turned hostile. He admitted having given and signed Ext. P1 after hearing it read over. In Ext. P1 he admitted the confession made by the accused and the verification of the truth of it by going to the house in the company of PWs 2,3,5 and others. In the box also, he admitted the accused having come to him and conveyed the information. The accused also admits this. But both would say that he only conveyed the information of death and did not make any confession. The statements in Ext. P1 were denied by PW 1. It is clear that he was speaking against his conscience to help the accused. He was contradicted and discredited with Ext. P1. It is true that Ext. P1 cannot be used as evidence. 8. In the inquest report the apparent cause of death was stated as homicide by the accused. The materials collected in support of the cause of death are also there in the inquest. In another column therein a descriptive statement is also there that the deceased was living well with her husband. Strangely enough, the Sessions Judge relied on this statement to the exclusion of everything else to overrule homicide. The materials collected in support of the cause of death are also there in the inquest. In another column therein a descriptive statement is also there that the deceased was living well with her husband. Strangely enough, the Sessions Judge relied on this statement to the exclusion of everything else to overrule homicide. PW 2 went to the house of the deceased on getting information of death, but his brother who had also the same information did not go. Though one of the extra judicial confessions spoken to by PW 3 was made in front of the church to the hearing of persons coming out of the church, the accused did not go to the priest inside the church to make a confession. These irrelevant factors also weighed with the Sessions Judge in rejecting the evidence of guilt. The possibility from the medical evidence and other circumstances is that homicide could have happened while the deceased was alseep in the mat on the ground. In that contingency, resistance or possibilities of cries or marks of violence on the body need not be there and neighbours need not be attracted also. But those aspects also prevailed with the Sessions Judge completely ignoring the sure homicidal death. While the Sessions Judge said that the ligature was loose indicating suicide, medical evidence supported by PW4 is otherwise. Another ground of acquittal is that though the accused surrendered before police only the next morning investigation was not had as to what he was doing in the night after murder. Finally the Sessions Judge said that extra judicial confession without corroboration from any other source cannot be the basis of conviction. This is factually and legally incorrect. 9. Extra judicial confession was considered to be an expression of conflict of emotions; a conscious effort to stifle the pricked conscience; an argument to find excuse or justification for his act; or a penitent or remorseful act of exaggeration of his part in the crime (Sahoo v. State of Utter Pradesh - ALR.1966 S.C. 40). Evidence about extra judicial confession was considered in the nature of things as a weak piece of evidence (Jagta v. State of Haryana - A.I.R. 1974 S.C.1545 and State of Punjab v. Bhajan Singh and others - A.I.R. 1975 S.C. 258). Evidence about extra judicial confession was considered in the nature of things as a weak piece of evidence (Jagta v. State of Haryana - A.I.R. 1974 S.C.1545 and State of Punjab v. Bhajan Singh and others - A.I.R. 1975 S.C. 258). Even in cases where extra judicial confession is established by cogent evidence in the exact words used by the accused, it was thought that prudence and justice demand that such evidence cannot be made the sole ground of conviction and it could be used only as a corroborative piece of evidence. 10. In Rao Shiv Bahadur Singh and another v. State of Vindh. P (AIR. 1954 S.C. 322), Their Lordships of the Supreme Court rested the conviction of the accused on the extra judicial confession made by him before two independent witnesses. Mulk Raj v. State of Uttar Pradesh (A.I.R. 1959 S.C 902) laid down that the value of the evidence as to confession, just like any other evidence, depends upon the veracity of the witness to whom it is made and it will have to be proved like any other fact. Even though the court requires the witness to give the actual words used by the accused as nearly as possible, but it is not an invariable rule that the court should not accept the evidence, if not the actual words but the substance were given. It is for the court having regard to the credibility of the witness, his capacity to understand the language in which the accused made the confession, to accept the evidence or not. 11. An unambiguous confession, if admissible in evidence and free from suspicion of falsity, is a valuable piece of evidence possessing a high probative force. But in the process of proof of a confession, the court must be satisfied that it is voluntary, that it does not appear to be the result of inducement, threat of promise as contemplated by S.24 of the Evidence Act and the surrounding circumstances do not indicate that it is inspired by some improper or collateral considerations suggesting that it may not be true. For this purpose, the court must scrutinise all relevant factors, such as, the person to whom the confession was made, the time and place of making it, the circumstances in which it was made and finally the actual words (Thimma v. State of Mysore -A.I.R. 1971 S.C.1871). For this purpose, the court must scrutinise all relevant factors, such as, the person to whom the confession was made, the time and place of making it, the circumstances in which it was made and finally the actual words (Thimma v. State of Mysore -A.I.R. 1971 S.C.1871). The possibility of vitiating circumstances may be higher in a case where the confession is made to a person in authority. Depending upon facts and circumstances a voluntary confession, which the accused is not in any way bound to make, when made to a person of confidence or one whom he believes to be capable of and prepared to help him may have comparatively more credibility and authenticity. That does not mean that voluntary confession to others who do not come under these categories should be discarded. An extra judicial confession made to any independent witness in whose evidence the court has satisfaction could be accepted if it is considered acceptable. 12. Law relating to acceptability of evidence relating to extra judicial confession has thus undergone a radical change. Now it is held acceptable as any other item of evidence. It cannot be said to be a weak form of evidence. When oral evidence relating to such a confession comes from a person who says he heard it, it is direct evidence satisfying the test of S.60 of the Evidence Act so far as the confession is concerned even though for some other purpose it may be rejected as hearsay evidence. If at all this type of evidence has any weakness it could only be because it may not be capable of a thorough test of cross examination for which the scope is limited. That cannot be a ground to reject that type of evidence. It is for the court to consider its veracity in each case. A generalisation that it is a weak type of evidence may not be correct. Possibilities of introducing falsities are there in all forms of evidence. Law does not require that evidence of an extra judicial confession should in all cases be corroborated (Piara Singh and others v. State of Punjab - A.I.R. 1977 S.C. 2274). What is involved is only a rule of prudence and caution. Possibilities of introducing falsities are there in all forms of evidence. Law does not require that evidence of an extra judicial confession should in all cases be corroborated (Piara Singh and others v. State of Punjab - A.I.R. 1977 S.C. 2274). What is involved is only a rule of prudence and caution. When the extra judicial confession is proved by an independent and trustworthy witness who bore no animus against the accused it could normally be accepted and made the basis of conviction even without corroboration. It can be made by an accused to an independent witness other than one in authority and could be accepted Darshan Lal v. State of Jammu and Kashmir - A.I.R. 1975 S.C. 898). Only thing is it should be free from infirmity and made under circumstances which are found to be reliable. 13. The argument that evidence relating to extra judicial confession is a weak and tainted form of evidence is fundamentally wrong (Maghar Singh v. State of Punjab - A.I.R. 1975 S.C.1320). Corroboration is required only by way of abudent caution if the court thinks so. There is no rule of law nor of prudence that extra judicial confession should be corroborated. If the evidence comes from the mouth of a witness, who appears to be unbiased, not even remotely inimical to the accused, and in respect of whom nothing is brought out which may tend to indicate that he may have a motive for attributing an untruthful statement to the accused and the words spoken to by the witness are clear, unambiguous and unmistakably convey that the accused is the perpetrator of the crime and nothing is omitted by the witness which may militate against it, then after subjecting the evidence of the witness to a rigorous test on the touch stone of credibility, if it passes the test, the extra judicial confession could be accepted and made the basis of conviction. In such a situation, to go in search of corroboration, itself tends to cast a shadow of doubt over the evidence (State of Uttar Pradesh v. M.K. Anthony - A.I.R. 1985 S.C.48). 14. We are satisfied on close scrutiny that the evidence of PWs 2, 3 and 5 could stand scrutiny of all these tests. Further, there are many other corroborating materials. 14. We are satisfied on close scrutiny that the evidence of PWs 2, 3 and 5 could stand scrutiny of all these tests. Further, there are many other corroborating materials. Credibility of a witness has primarily to be decided by reference to his evidence and finding out as to how he fared in cross examination and what impression is created by his evidence taken in the context of the other facts of the case. Criminal cases cannot be put in a strait jacket. There would always be shades of difference between facts of cases which are crucial. Decided cases can be of help only on questions of law like admissibility of evidence or applicability of some general rule of evidence. That apart, reference to decided cases is hardly apposite when the question before court is whether the evidence of a particular witness should or should not be accepted (Charan Singh and others v. State of Punjab - A.I.R. 1975 S.C. 246). In the circumstances of this case, the prosecution evidence could be safely accepted to conclude that the accused is guilty of murder. The conclusion of innocence is one which cannot flow from the evidence. We are not satisfied that the case deserves the extreme penalty. Criminal appeal is allowed. Acquittal is reversed. Respondent is convicted for murder punishable under S.302 of the Indian Penal Code and sentenced to undergo imprisonment for life. Sessions Judge will take steps to execute the sentence.