A point of some importance requires decision in this revision. Brief narration of facts would make this point clear. The same are that a suit was filed for ejectment in the Court of clear. ed Munsiff, Mangaldoi who passed an order of injunction restraining the petitioner from making permanent construction on the suit land. An appeal was preferred against that interim order of injunction before the learned Assistant District Judge who admitted the appeal and granted stay. This was on 28. 11.78. Because of the stay order, the petitioner started making construction which led the opposite party to approach the learned Assistant District Judge in 1981 whereupon fresh injunction order was pissed stopping further construction work. Against this order an appeal was preferred by the petitioner before the learned District Judge who held by the impugned order that the appeal before him was not maintainable. 14ie learned District Judge therefore ordered to file the appeal before appropriate Court. 2. The point under examination therefore is if an injunction order is passed for the first time by an appellate authority like the assistant District Judge whether that order would at all be appealable and if so the appeal would lie before which forum. The answer to the question depends upon the construction of section 104 (2), 106 and 107 (2) of the Civil Procedure Code. 3. Shri Roy contends that the order passed by the learned Assistant District Judge should be treated to have been passed in exercise of his original jurisdiction and not in exercise of appellate jurisdiction. The learned counsel is however very fair to bring to my notice certain decisions of different High Courts of the country which have held that in such matter by virtue of what has been stated in section 104 (2) of the Code no appeal will lie inasmuch as the order should be treated to have been passed in appeal because of which bar of section 104 (2) would operate. The first decision is that of Chellapan to. K. P. Varughese, AIR 1964 Kerala 23 which was followed in C. Kalahasti vs. P. C. Munuswamy Chetti, AIR 1975 Madras 3 and Hari Damn ys. Pedro Pereira, AIR 1975 Goa 15 , 4. The first decision is that of Chellapan to. K. P. Varughese, AIR 1964 Kerala 23 which was followed in C. Kalahasti vs. P. C. Munuswamy Chetti, AIR 1975 Madras 3 and Hari Damn ys. Pedro Pereira, AIR 1975 Goa 15 , 4. It is submitted by Shri Roy that if what has been stated in the above decisions is accepted this would deny altogether any right of appeal against the order of the present nature in view of what has been laid down in section 104 (2) of the Code. This section prevents filing of appeal from "any order passed in appeal" under this section. Shri Roy urges that this could not have been taken to be the intention of the legislature inasmuch as it cannot be that against some injunction orders appeals are allowed and against some none at all. I have found force in the submission of Shri Roy and according to me the present order passed by the learned Assistant District Judge was not passed in exercise of appellate jurisdiction but was in exercise of original jurisdiction of which reference has been made in section 107 (2) of the Code. The interim order passed had in fact no relation with the appeal before the learned Assistant District Judge inasmuch as the necessity for seeking injunction did not arise because of anything which was subject matter of the appeal but had its independent existence. As presently advised I am therefore of the opinion that the order of injunction was an appealable order. Now if it an appealable order under the provision of Order 43 Rule l(r) of the Code, appeal would lie to the District Judge, in view of what has been stated in section 1C6 of the Code in view of the valuation of the suit/ appeal, which was Rs. 1435/-. lam, therefore, of the opinion that the appeal before the learned District Judge was maintainable. 5. In the result the petition is allowed by setting aside the impugned order. The learned District Judge is directed to take back the appeal to his file and to dispose of the same on merits.