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Allahabad High Court · body

1989 DIGILAW 118 (ALL)

Surendra Narain Pandey v. State Of U. P.

1989-01-25

D.S.SINHA, S.K.DHAON

body1989
JUDGMENT S.K. DHAON, J. 1. THE petitioner alleges to be a duly appointed Lecturer in Sanskrit in the P. D. N. D. Inter College, Chunar (hereinafter referred to as the institution). His prayer is that the respondents may be directed to treat him to be in continuous service from 19th December, 1986 and pay him accordingly till a candidate duly selected by the U. P. Secondary Education Service Commission (hereinafter referred to as the Commission) joins the post held by him. 2. THE material averments are these. A substantive vacancy arose in the post of a Lecturer in Sanskrit in the institution. Due notice was given to the Commission by the management but no selection was made within the time specified in the statute. Therefore, the management took steps to fill up the post on ad-hoc basis. An advertisement was issued inviting applications. Candidates were interviewed. THE Committee of Management of the institution drew up a panel of three persons. In the panel the petitioner's name was put on the top. THE Committee of Management took this decision on 10th December, 1986 and on 12th December, 1986, the petitioner joined as a Lecturer in Sanskrit. THE District Inspector of Schools granted his approval to the appointment of the petitioner on 12th February, 1987. However, he made it clear that the appointment of the petitioner was to ensure till a candidate duly selected by the Commission joined the post held by the petitioner or till 20th May, 1987, whichever event occurred earlier. THE petitioner is continuing to function as a Lecturer. However, he has not been paid any salary after 20th May 1987. THE respondents do not consider the petitioner to be in service after 20th May 1987, hence no salary has been paid to him with effect from 21st May 1987. THE Commission has not selected any candidate for permanent appointment as yet. A counter-affidavit has been filed by the Authorised Controller of the institution. In it, the material averments are these. The Committee of Management, on 10th February, 1986, inadvertently placed the petitioner's name in the panel on the top. In fact, another candidate, namely, Sri Ashok Kumar Shukla should have been given a preference over the petitioner. On 3rd January 1987, Sri Ashok Kumar Shukla made a representation to the District Inspector of Schools. It was received by him on the same day. In fact, another candidate, namely, Sri Ashok Kumar Shukla should have been given a preference over the petitioner. On 3rd January 1987, Sri Ashok Kumar Shukla made a representation to the District Inspector of Schools. It was received by him on the same day. In this representation Sri Shukla pointed out the irregularities and illegalities committed by the Committee of Management in drawing up the panel. This representation was forwarded by the District Inspector of Schools to the Authorised Controller for comments. On 7th January, 1987, the Authorised Controller reported to the District Inspector of Schools that there was a mistake in the resolution of the Committee of Management. No letter of appointment was ever issued to the petitioner. Inspite of the pendency of the representation of Sri Shukla, the District Inspector of Schools on 12th February 1987, accorded his approval to the appointment of the petitioner even without disposing of the representation of Sri Shukla. Despite the approval of the District Inspector of Schools, no letter of appointment was issued to the petitioner by the management. In connivance with the principal of the institution, the petitioner commenced teaching in the institution. On 16th April 1987, the Authorised Controller directed the principal to stop taking work from the petitioner. Since the petitioner had not been appointed as a Lecturer by the management of the institution, he is not entitled to be treated as such. 3. A rejoinder-affidavit has been filed by the petitioner. In it, the material averments are these. The petitioner had been rightly selected by the Committee of Management as he secured 48 quality marks whereas Sri Shukla had secured only 46 marks. The petitioner was not given a copy of the representation made by Sri Shukla. The petitioner was allowed to join the institution as a Lecturer as his appointment had been approved by the District Inspector of Schools. The Authorised Controller signed the salary bill of the petitioner and forwarded the same to the District Inspector of Schools. The respondents illegally stopped paying the salary to the petitioner after 20th May 1987 and the Authorised Controller stopped sending the salary bills of the petitioner to the District Inspector of Schools. The petitioner is functioning as a Lecturer and that his assertion stands corroborated by a certificate issued by the principal. The issuance of letter of appointment, was a formality. 4. The petitioner is functioning as a Lecturer and that his assertion stands corroborated by a certificate issued by the principal. The issuance of letter of appointment, was a formality. 4. IT is an admitted position that no letter of appointment was ever issued to the petitioner by the management. IT is the petitioner's own case that he had been appointed as an ad-hoc Lecturer in accordance with section 18 of the U. P. Secondary Education Services Commission and Selection Board Act, 1982 (hereinafter referred to as the Act). This provision, in so far as material, inter-alia, provides that the management may appoint, by direct recruitment or promotion, a teacher on purely ad-hoc basis from amongst the persons possessing qualifications prescribed under the Intermediate Education Act, 1921 or the regulations made thereunder. So far as the appointment of an ad-hoc teacher is concerned there is no express provision either in the Act or in the Rules framed thereunder providing for the issue of a letter of appointment, yet the question is t Whether the petitioner was appointed as a Lecturer by the Management, Our answer is no. Section 2 (k) of the Act defines "Teacher" to mean a person employed for imparting instruction in an institution and includes a Principal or a Head Master. The expression "employed" has a meterial bearing for determining the controversy. It has a legal connotation. It connotes the existence of a jural relationship of master and servant between the employer and the employee. To put it differently, it involves the concept of employment under a contract. One of the dictionary meanings of the expression "appoint" is to designate or nominate. It follows that in the context and in the setting of the relationship of employer or employee or master or servant there has to be an actual act of posting a person to a particular office. All this was not done. Therefore, the question still is as to whether it was the requirement of the law that a letter of appointment should have been issued. 5. WITH regard to a permanent appointment there is no scope for any speculation that a letter of appointment has got to be issued. Section 9 of the Act lays down the powers and duties of the Commission, one of them being to make recommendation regarding the appointment of selected candidates and their promotion. 5. WITH regard to a permanent appointment there is no scope for any speculation that a letter of appointment has got to be issued. Section 9 of the Act lays down the powers and duties of the Commission, one of them being to make recommendation regarding the appointment of selected candidates and their promotion. Section 11 provides for the preparation of a panel of the selected candidates by the commission. Rule 7 provides that the Commission shall prepare a institution-wise panel of those found most suitable for appointment and arrange them in order of merit. Under Rule 8 the Commission is enjoined to forward the panel to the Deputy Director of Education who in turn shall send two copies of the panel to the District Inspector of Schools and within 10 days of the receipt of the panel by the Deputy Inspector of Schools he (the District Inspector of Schools) intimate the name of the first candidate selected in order of merit etc. to the Manager of the concerned institution with a direction that, on authorisation under resolution of the management, an order of appointment in the proforma given in Appendix-B be issued in favour of the candidate by registered post. This Rule also provides that a candidate should normally report to the Manager of the institution within 10 days from the date of receipt of the order of appointment by him from the Manager. Appendix-B contains the proforma of the letter of appointment to be issued by the Manager of the institution concerned. Section 32 provides that the provisions of the Intermediate Education Act, 1921 and Regulations made thereunder in so far as they are not inconsistent with the provisions of the Act shall continue to be in force for the purposes of selection, appointment, promotion, dismissal, removal, termination or reduction in rank of a teacher. Here, we are concerned with the appointment. We have already indicated that in the Act and the rules framed thereunder there is no provision at all for the issue of a letter of appointment in the case of an ad-hoc appointment. Therefore, we have to find out as to whether there is any provision either in the Intermediate Education Act or the Regulations framed thereunder. We get an immediate answer when we turn to Regulation 6 framed under Chapter III. Therefore, we have to find out as to whether there is any provision either in the Intermediate Education Act or the Regulations framed thereunder. We get an immediate answer when we turn to Regulation 6 framed under Chapter III. This regulation provides that all appointments shall be made under formal orders or letters of appointments with the sanction of the appointing authority. 6. IT is thus abundantly clear that the issue of a letter of appointment in the case of the petitioner was a must. IT follows that in the absence of a letter of appointment no jural relationship of employer or employee or a master or servant between the petitioner and the management of the institution came into existence at any stage. Emphasis has been laid by Sri G. C. Dwivedi, the learned Senior Advocate appearing on behalf of the petitioner, on the order of the District Inspector of Schools dated 12th February 1987, according approval to the appointment of the petitioner. This has to be read in the light of the resolution of the Committee of Management dated 12th December, 1986. By this resolution the management merely placed the petitioner at SI No. 1 in the panel of three names suggested by it by its resolution, on 10th December, 1986, the management did not purport to appoint the petitioner. In fact no final decision was taken by it on 10th December, 1986. It merely proposed or contemplated the appointment of the petitioner. The approval of the District Inspector of Schools merely gave a green signal to the management to exercise its statutory right of making an appointment of the petitioner as a Lecturer. The District Inspector of Schools under the statute had no jurisdiction at all to make an appointment. Likewise, the District Inspector of Schools could not compel the management to appoint the petitioner. On the contrary, the only limitation in the way of management was that it could not make the appointment of any teacher as Lecturer without obtaining approval of the District Inspector of Schools. Therefore, in the absence of a letter of appointment, the petitioner did not acquire right of being treated as a lecturer on ad-hoc basis merely on the basis of the order of the District Inspector of Schools approving his appointment. 7. Therefore, in the absence of a letter of appointment, the petitioner did not acquire right of being treated as a lecturer on ad-hoc basis merely on the basis of the order of the District Inspector of Schools approving his appointment. 7. IT is to be remembered that it is the case of the petitioner that he started teaching in the institution with effect from 12th December, 1986. IT is also to be seen that the approval was given by the District Inspector of Schools on 12th February 1987. Therefore, there appears to be a ring of truth in the case set up by the Authorised Controller in this court that the petitioner in connivance with the principal of the institution commenced teaching in the institution. Much has been made out of the fact that the Authorised Controller had signed the pay bills of the petitioner. This assertion has been made for the first time in the rejoinder affidavit. Normally such an averment should have been made in the writ petition itself so that the Authorised Controller should have had an opportunity of offering his explanation. Assuming that the Authorised Controller had done so, no letter of appointment by necessary implication in favour of the petitioner could come into existence. If the statutes require the issue of a letter of appointment, the Authorised Controller is not estopped from contending that in the absence of such a letter the petitioner is not entitled to the issue of a writ of mandamus from this court on the footing that he had acquired a legal right as a duly appointed ad-hoc lecturer, that right was being infringed and the respondents were under corresponding legal obligation not to interfere with that right. IT is trice that there cannot be any estoppel against the statute. 8. TWO other hurdless have to be crossed by the petitioner. First, the Authorised Controller, on 7th January 1987, submitted a report to the District Inspector of Schools, which had been asked for upon the representation dated 3rd January 1987, made by Sri Ashok Kumar Shukla. Annexure II to the counter affidavit is a true copy of the said report. In this report the Authorised Controller pointed out that the resolution of the Committee of Management dated 10th December, 1986, was defective. This, in our opinion amounted to an implied withdrawal of the resolution by the Authorised Controller. Annexure II to the counter affidavit is a true copy of the said report. In this report the Authorised Controller pointed out that the resolution of the Committee of Management dated 10th December, 1986, was defective. This, in our opinion amounted to an implied withdrawal of the resolution by the Authorised Controller. Therefore, on 12th February, 1987, when the District Inspector of Schools purported to accord approval to the resolution of the Committee of Management there was nothing before him to be approved of. Secondly, there is ample material on record to suggest that on 3rd January, 1987, Sri Ashok Kumar Shukla had submitted his representation to the District Inspector of Schools. Indeed, this fact has not been denied by the petitioner even in the rejoinder affidavit. It is the case of the authorised controller in the counter affidavit and this too has not been controverted in the rejoinder affidavit that the representation of Sri Shukla is still pending before the District Inspector of Schools. It necessarily follows that the District Inspector of Schools bad on 12th February, 1987, accorded his approval without disposing of the representation of Sri Shukla. In the order of approval dated 12th February, 1987, there is no reference at all of the said representation of Sri Shukla. Thus the District Inspector of Schools not only acted without jurisdiction but also arbitrarily and illegally in according his approval dated 12th February, 1987. 9. WE now come to the question as to what order should be passed in this case. WE are clear that the petitioner is entitled to no relief. However, despite the dismissal of the writ petition the statement will continue. The paramount consideration should be the interest of the institution. An ad hoc Lecturer in Sanskrit has to be appointed as the Commission has yet to perform its statutory obligation. 10. HAVING considered the matter, we direct that the management shall take fresh steps to make an appointment of an ad hoc lecturer in Sanskrit in accordance with law. It shall do so with utmost speed. If the petitioner makes an application again, it shall be dealt with by the management on merits and in accordance with law. Subject to the above observation, this petition is dismissed. Petition dismissed.