Judgment :- 1. The revision petitioner is the decree-bolder in two suits. In both these suits the judgment-debtors are the same. The decrees are for arrears of rent for different periods for the same building, let out to the Ist judgment-debtor. In execution the decree-holder sought to consolidate the petitions for execution of the two decrees. By the order impugned in this CRP. the lower court allowed that petition. The only contention on behalf of the Ist judgment debtor, who is the revision petitioner, is that the execution court has no jurisdiction to order consolidation of two execution petitions. 2. It is well settled that it is the duty of the court executing the decree to aid the decree-holder in realising the amount due under the decree, and it should therefore offer him all possible and reasonable facilities for realising the decretal amount in as short a time as possible-see Maharaj Bahadu v. Mafizuddin Chowdhry (AIR. 1936 Calcutta 238) and Damodar Das v. Bindeshwari Singh (AIR. 1936 Patna 76). 3. There is no specific provision in the Code of Civil Procedure for consolidation of different proceedings. However, it has been held that the court has inherent power to consolidate suits and appeals, as may be necessary for the ends of justice or to prevent abuse of process of the Court, (see In re, G. Krishnayachandrulu, AIR 1930 Madras 376 F. B. at Page 379). S.151 of the Code of Civil Procedure indicates that the court has power to make such orders as may be necessary under its inherent power to do real and substantial justice. The contention of Sri B. Krishnamoni learned counsel for the revision petitioner-judgment-debtor, is that consolidation of execution petitions cannot be ordered under the inherent power of court. Learned counsel for the respondent-decree-holder, Sri C. S Narayanan, on the other hand contended that the court has inherent power to order consolidation of execution petitions. 4. Vaidialingam J., as he then was, in Philip v. Bata Shoe Co. Ltd. (1959 KLT.1346) relying on Bailey v. Curson of Kedleston (Marchioness) (1932, (2) K. B. 392) observed that the court has got ample jurisdiction in proper circumstances to consolidate suits when a common question has to be decided. In Hukum Chd Boid v. Kamalanand Singh (ILR. 4. Vaidialingam J., as he then was, in Philip v. Bata Shoe Co. Ltd. (1959 KLT.1346) relying on Bailey v. Curson of Kedleston (Marchioness) (1932, (2) K. B. 392) observed that the court has got ample jurisdiction in proper circumstances to consolidate suits when a common question has to be decided. In Hukum Chd Boid v. Kamalanand Singh (ILR. 33 Calcutta 927), Woodroffe, J. rejected the contention that the court has no power in matters of procedure other than those expressly conferred by the court, in the following words: "This argument assumes that the Code was intended to be and is exhaustive. It is one with which in previous judgments I have had to deal, it having been then as now (and as appears not uncommonly to be the case) though that it is sufficient (without anything more) to defeat an application or to reverse an order, that no precise section of the Code can be cited as an authority for it. For my part I am always slow to believe that the Court's powers are unequal to its desire to order that which it believes to be just. As was said in Durga Dihal Das v. Anorajl (1894) ILR 17 All 29,31) the Code is not exhaustive, there are cases which are not provided for in it, and to adopt the observations made in that case I decline to believe that those are cases, where this Court must fold its hands and allow injustice to be done.... ... ...The Court has, therefore, in many cases, where the circumstances require it, acted upon the assumption of the possession of an inherent power to act ex debito justitiae and to do that real and substantial justice for the administration, for which alone it exists. It has thus been held that, although the Code contains no express provision on the matters hereinafter mentioned, the Court has an inherent power ex debito justitiae eo consolidate; postpone pending the decision of a selected action; " The Supreme Court in Keshardeo v. Radha Kishen (AIR 1953 SC 23) proceeded on the basis that the inherent power under S, 151 CPC. can be exercised by an execution court. Bhaskaran, J., as be then was, in Kochupennamma v. The Bank of Deccan Ltd. (ILR. 1973 (2) Kerala 214) held that the execution court may exercise inherent powers under S.151 CPC. 5. can be exercised by an execution court. Bhaskaran, J., as be then was, in Kochupennamma v. The Bank of Deccan Ltd. (ILR. 1973 (2) Kerala 214) held that the execution court may exercise inherent powers under S.151 CPC. 5. At the game time it should not be forgotten that the powers saved by S.151 CPC. are not substantive rights which a litigant possesses (see Padam Sen v. State of U.P., AIR 1961 SC 218) and that S.151 CPC. does not confer any additional jurisdiction on the court (see State of W. B. v. Indira Debt, (1977) 3 SCC. 559). But the main factors to be examined are whether the order that is proposed to be passed under S.151 is necessary for the ends of justice or to prevent abuse of the process of the court (see Nainsingh v, Koonwarjee (AIR. 1970 SC. 997 at 998). It cannot be said that the inherent power of court will depend upon the nature of the proceeding before a court, unless of course the statute under which the proceeding is taken specifies that the Presiding Officer of the court is to function as a persona designata and not as a court. Whether the jurisdiction is exercised by the court under the Code of Civil Procedure or some other statute like the Indian Succession Act, the court can exercise its inherent power (sse Chithalan v. C. Ammu Amma, 1968 KLJ.123 in which a Division Bench of this Court proceeded on the basis that irrespective of the number of applications for probate there can only be one probate issued and that should be issued after consolidating all those proceedings and that when there is nothing in common in two petitions, no consolidation is possible without the consent of the parties to the petition). As held by the Supreme Court is N. S. Mills v. Union of India (AIR 1976 SC. 1152) the inherent power has its roots in necessity and its breadth is coextensive with the necessity. There is some indication in the Code of Civil Procedure itself that the Code envisage that the execution court has power to consolidate proceedings before it. (see O.21 R.18 C.P.C.). 6. Merely because the court is executing a decree it cannot be said that the court is precluded from exercising its inherent powers. There is some indication in the Code of Civil Procedure itself that the Code envisage that the execution court has power to consolidate proceedings before it. (see O.21 R.18 C.P.C.). 6. Merely because the court is executing a decree it cannot be said that the court is precluded from exercising its inherent powers. Inherent powers are vested in the court and the exercise of that power will not normally depend on the nature of the proceeding before it. Under the circumstances I hold that in exercise of its inherent powers, the court can consolidate execution petitions also. In this case the court has exercised its powers properly. Hence there is no merit in this C. R. P. It is accordingly dismissed. However, there will be no order as to costs.