Research › Browse › Judgment

Rajasthan High Court · body

1989 DIGILAW 12 (RAJ)

Hari Mohan Dubey v. State of Rajasthan

1989-01-06

P.C.JAIN, S.N.BHARGAVA

body1989
JUDGMENT 1. - In this writ petition under Article 226 of the Constitution, the petitioner has prayed for issuance of an appropriate writ, order or direction quashing the order dated 29th September 1988 (Annx. 2). passed by respondent No. 2 in so far as it pertains to the transfer of the petitioner. 2. Briefly stated the facts of the case are that the petitioner who is holding the post of Head Master was transferred from Madanpur (District Bharatpur) to Rarah, vide order dated 23th August, 1988. The petitioner joined on the post of Head Master in Government Secondary School at Rarah on 2nd September 1988 While the petitioner remained at Rarah for about a month, by order dated 29th September. 1988, the Director. Primary and Secondary Education, Rajasthan, Bikaner, transferred him from Rarah to Naoli. This order of transfer, dated 29th September. 1988. is under challenge in this writ petition. The contention of the petitioner is that the order was passed after a ban had already been imposed by the State Government on transfer of teachers effective from 1st October, 1988 and, further order of transfer is exfacie mala fide and arbitrary. The petitioner has also submitted that neither there was any administrative exigency nor any urgency for transferring the petitioner from Rarah to Naoli. Further contention of the petitioner is that the order dated 29th September, 1988 has been passed male fide and for extraneous reasons in order to accommodate one Shri Purushottam Lal at Rarah in place of the petitioner. It is further the case of the petitioner that the transfer order has been made on account of political influence and pressure exercised by Shri Purushottam Lal who wanted posting at Rarah and, in order to achieve this object Shri Purushottam Lal managed to obtain a desire letter from the Education Minister and the transfer of the petitioner has been made solely and only with a view to satisfy the desire of the Minister concerned. For challenging the order of transfer, the petitioner has also asserted that his physical condition is not such in which it is feasible for him to work at Naoli as he is suffering from hyper-tension and was operated upon for anal fissure and piles. However, at the time of arguments this point was not pressed. 3. For challenging the order of transfer, the petitioner has also asserted that his physical condition is not such in which it is feasible for him to work at Naoli as he is suffering from hyper-tension and was operated upon for anal fissure and piles. However, at the time of arguments this point was not pressed. 3. Notices were issued to the respondents to show cause as to why the writ petition should not be admitted and disposed of Shri Purushottam Lal who was transferred in place of the petitioner at Rarah moved an application for impleading him as party to the writ petition on the ground that he is a person directly affected by the said order passed by this Court on 7th October, 1988, whereby the implementation of the order dated 29th Sept, 1988 was stayed. He was impleaded as a party vide order of this Court dated 18th November. 1988 as respondent No. 4. who filed reply to the writ petition. The other respondents did not file any reply. The petitioner filed rejoinder to the reply filed on behalf of respondent No. 4. In the reply, respondent No. 4, has submitted that the petitioner was promoted on the post of Head Master in the year 1979-80. There are number of complaints about his conduct and working by various sections of the public. The petitioner was transferred in June 1987 and was posted at Maua, on account of complaint. Again, he was transferred from Maua to Madanpur on complaint. At Madanpur also, there were complaints against him. Knowing that there are complaints against him and he is bound to be transferred from Madanpur. the petitioner himself voluntarily sought his transfer from Madanpur to Rarah. At Rarah,it was found that his conduct was not proper. The Sarpanch of the Gram Panchayat and Pradhan, Panchayat Samiti Sevar and Panchayat Samiti Kumher made representations to the Education Minister and respondent No. 2 - Director, Primary and Secondary Education, Government of Rajasthan, Bikaner - for transferring the petitioner. Respondent No. 4 has, thus, submitted that on account of these representations containing complaints against the petitioner, the cider (Annx. 2) dated 29th September, 1988, was passed Respondent No. 4 has also submitted that the order of transfer was passed before the ban was imposed. The allegations of mala fides have been denied. Respondent No. 4 has, thus, submitted that on account of these representations containing complaints against the petitioner, the cider (Annx. 2) dated 29th September, 1988, was passed Respondent No. 4 has also submitted that the order of transfer was passed before the ban was imposed. The allegations of mala fides have been denied. Respondent No. 4 has also slated that the order of transfer has not been passed to accommodate him as he did not desire his transfer. 4. In rejoinder, the petitioner has denied about any complaint against him. He has submitted that during his posting at Government Secondary School, Maua, the petitioner had given good result in the Board's examination in the academic session 1981-82, 1983-84, 1984-85, 1985-86 and 1986 87, wherein the result, respectively was 78% 50% 50% 47% and 50%, which is above the desired result fixed by the Department. The petitioner has further pleaded in the rejoinder that he was transferred from Maua to Madanpur in order to make room for one Shri Umaid Singh who desired transfer from Madanpur to Maua. The petitioner has also averred in the rejoinder that after his posting at Madanpur, the Board's result for academic session 1987-88 was 75% at the annual examination. In the rejoinder, the petitioner has again reiterated that the transfer was made on account of political influence and 'the desire expressed by the Education Minister. 5. Shri A.K. Sharma, learned counsel for the petitioner, placed reliance on (1) Achyutananda Behera v. State of Orissa. 1985(2) SLR 16 .wherein it was held that when allegations are levelled against an employee it is desirable, may, imperative that the Administrator should himself ascertain the truth and act upon his own satisfaction that the circumstances warrant a transfer. 5. Shri A.K. Sharma, learned counsel for the petitioner, placed reliance on (1) Achyutananda Behera v. State of Orissa. 1985(2) SLR 16 .wherein it was held that when allegations are levelled against an employee it is desirable, may, imperative that the Administrator should himself ascertain the truth and act upon his own satisfaction that the circumstances warrant a transfer. The contention of Shri Sharma is that, in fact, there were no complaints against the petitioner and even if there were any complaint, then also respondent No. 2 should not have acted mechanically on the representations made by the Sarpanch, Gram Panchayat, Rarah and Pradhan, Panchayat Samiti, Sevar and Panchayat Samiti, Kumher but should have made an enquiry himself to ascertain the truth and, in case, on enquiry if it is found that the petitioner had indulged in undesirable activities, or was negligent in the discharge of his duties or that his presence at the school at Rarah was detrimental to the interest of the students or the public at large, Respondent No. 2 was, then, within his jurisdiction to transfer the petitioner to any other place. Shri Sharma has also pointed out that in all the representations, alleged to have been made against the petitioner, the name of respondent No. 4. Purushottam Lal, was suggested which clearly shows that the transfer was effected in order to accommodate Shri Purushottam Lal. 6. Shri G.S. Singhvi, learned counsel for respondent No. 4, has submitted that there is no merit in the writ petition as no case has been made out for any interference under Article 226 of the Constitution of India in the matter of transfer. His contention is that there are no allegations of mala fide against the respondent and the circumstances enumerated by respondent No. 4 in the reply to the writ petition, are sufficient to indicate that the order of transfer was made on administrative exigency. 7. The learned counsel for the parties placed reliance on the following authorities: 2. Asu Singh v. State of Rajasthan (Raj.) (1983(3) SLR 783) 3. B. Varadha Rao v. State of Karnataka (SC) (1986 (3) SLR 60) 4. S.N. Umap v. State of Maharashtra (Bom.) (1984(2) SLR 328) 5. Achyutananda Behera v. State of Orissa (Orissa) (1985(2) SLR 16) 6. K.B. Shukla v. Union of India (1979(2) SLR 58) 7. A.K. Vasudeva v. State of HP (HP) (1982 (1) SLR 446 8. B. Varadha Rao v. State of Karnataka (SC) (1986 (3) SLR 60) 4. S.N. Umap v. State of Maharashtra (Bom.) (1984(2) SLR 328) 5. Achyutananda Behera v. State of Orissa (Orissa) (1985(2) SLR 16) 6. K.B. Shukla v. Union of India (1979(2) SLR 58) 7. A.K. Vasudeva v. State of HP (HP) (1982 (1) SLR 446 8. Nirmal Chandra v. Union of India, (1988 Lab I.C. 1581) 8. In view of the principle of law laid down in the aforesaid rulings, it is now more than settled that orders of transfers can be challenged mainly on the ground of mala fides. It is also well settled that transfer is an incident of service and an Appointing Authority his a wide discretion in the matter. The Government is the best judge to decide how to distribute and utilise the services of its employees because it is the Government which has to run the administrative machinery. However, this power and discretion must be exercised honestly, bonafide and reasonably. It should be exercised in public interest. It is also true that if power of transfer is abused, or the exercise of power is baised on extraneous consideration or for achieving a lone purpose of an oblique motive, it would amount to malafide and colourable exercise of powers and the exercise of power is vitiated. It is also well settled and is a basic principle of rule of law and good administrative vision, that the administrative actions should be just and fair. Transfer is malafide when it is made not for the professed purpose, such as in normal course or in public or administrative interest or in the exigency of service, but for other purpose i.e. to accommodate any other person for undisclosed reasons. It is also well settled that allegations of malafide are often more easily made than proved and it is easy to make such allegations, but difficult to prove and that heavy onus lies on the person who alleges malafides. 9. A learned Single Judge of this Court in Asu Singh v. State of Rajasthan (Raj.) (Supra) had the occasion to consider the circumstances when this Court should interfere under Article 226 of the Constitution, in the matter of transfer. It is the unanimous view of all the High Courts that orders of transfer can be challenged mainly on the ground of mala fides. It is the unanimous view of all the High Courts that orders of transfer can be challenged mainly on the ground of mala fides. There are no specific allegations of mala fides against respondent No. 2 who passed the order of transfer. The only allegation of mala fide alleged in the writ petition is that order dated 29th September, 1988 is absolutely mala fide arbitrary and illegal inasmuch as the same has been made in order to accommodate Purushottam Lal on account of political influence and pressure brought upon the competent authority by Purshottam Lal through the desire of the Minister for Education. Such allegations in the instant case are with- out any material particulars and consequently should be eschewed from consideration. A very heavy onus lay upon the petitioner alleging mala fides, but he miserably failed to prove the same. There is no proper affidavit to support the allegation. Thus, in our opinion, no case is made out for any interference under Article 226 on the ground of malafides. 10. There is yet another ground which requires some consideration as law is well settled that if an order of transfer is effectedwith the object of accommodating some one at a particular station for undisclosed reasons, it may be presumed that the order was not for public interest, or it was not for any administrative purpose. It can, however, be assumed that the order is for collateral purposes and cannot be sustained and the court can interfere in such order as inference of malafide may be made. For this proposition reliance may by placed on Asu Singh v. State of Rajasthan (Supra) and A.K. Vasudeva v. State of HP (Supra). In both these cases, it has been laid down that if an order of transfer is effected on political ground to accommodate some favourite of a local MLA or other authority, it cannot be regarded as proper transfer on the ground of administrative reasons and public interest. 11. This court is flooded with writ petitions in the matter of transfers wherein allegations of mala fides, nepotism and political interference are made. In some writ petitions, the allegations are that the Government is not following its own policy which it had published through various notifications circulars and guidelines for transfers. In some writ petitions. 11. This court is flooded with writ petitions in the matter of transfers wherein allegations of mala fides, nepotism and political interference are made. In some writ petitions, the allegations are that the Government is not following its own policy which it had published through various notifications circulars and guidelines for transfers. In some writ petitions. there are telling examples of flagrant abuse of power in it, much as frequent transfer orders have been passed within a short duration. We are making these observations as it is high time that the administrative machinery particularly the persons who are concerned with the policy of transfer, should personally look into the matter and see that the guidelines issued by the Government from time to time in the matter of transfer are faithfully observed and the abuse of power of transfer is stopped, and this Court's valuable time is saved for doing some useful work. 12. It is true that public representatives such as MLA and other representatives have a right to ventilate the grievance of the public against the defaulting officers who may be indulging in nefarious activities or whose conduct is impeachable and the authorities who are concerned with the transfer are apt to consider such grievance. We feel that there is nothing wrong in considering such grievances or the complaints made by the public representatives, but equally it is true that the allegations of mala fides are often more easily made than proved; and it is easy to make the allegations of mala fides but difficult to prove. It is also true that if the authorities instead of following the policy departs from it, then the people get an opportunity to make allegations of mala fides. This could be avoided if an uniform policy is laid down and scrupulously followed. It cannot be disputed that if an interference of the public representatives is allowed in the normal manner, it would amount to creation of a situation that the Government employees should run after those who are taking part in politics or public life for getting orders of transfer or for seeking better posting. It would further lead to nepotism and corruption. In such circumstances, a balance is required to be struck. When the complaints are made through public representative. it should be the duty of the concerned authority to make an enquiry to ascertain the truth in such allegations. It would further lead to nepotism and corruption. In such circumstances, a balance is required to be struck. When the complaints are made through public representative. it should be the duty of the concerned authority to make an enquiry to ascertain the truth in such allegations. There should be fair play in the action and if the authority concerned is satisfied that an employee has indulged in undesirable activities or was negligent in the discharge of his duties, or that his presence at the place of posting is detrimental to the interest of the administration and is not in public interest, the authority will have jurisdiction to shift such employee to other place. In such circumstances, on complaint, an endeavour should be made to ascertain the truth and the authority should not act on the prodding of the MLA or other public representatives, or on the complaint of the villagers, that is, the authority should not act on the dotted lines, but should exercise his own wisdom in a bona fide manner and there should be fair play in his action. 13. Turning to the facts of the case, the petitioner was transferred from Madanpur to Rarah vide order dated 23rd August, 1988. The petitioner joined at Rarah on 2nd September 1988. While the petitioner had remained at Rarah for about a month only vide order dated 29th Sept., 1988, he was transferred from Rarah to Naoli. It is this order of transfer which is under challenge in this writ petition. As already stated above it has been challenged on the ground of malafides and further on the ground that it has been passed for extraneous reasons in order to accommodate one Shri Purushottam Lal at Rarah, in place of the petitioner. It is contended in the writ petition that on account of political influence and pressure exercised by Purushottam Lal who wanted posting at Rarah, the aforesaid order was achieved by obtaining a desire letter from the Education Minister of Rajasthan which resulted in the transfer of the petitioner and shift of Purshottam Lal to his place. We have already observed that the petitioner has failed to prove grounds of malafides in the writ petition and, as such the order of transfer dated 29th September, 1953, cannot be quashed on the ground of mala fides. We have already observed that the petitioner has failed to prove grounds of malafides in the writ petition and, as such the order of transfer dated 29th September, 1953, cannot be quashed on the ground of mala fides. From the facts disclosed in the reply to the writ petition, on behalf of respondent No.4 it appears that there were certain complaints against the petitioner. From the original file, which has been placed for our perusal, it is borne out that, in fact, there were certain complaints against the petitioner while he was at Maua before his posting at Madanpur. At Madanpur also there were complaints against him and the petitioner himself sought his voluntary transfer and then he come to Rarah. At Rarah certain representations were made against the conduct of the petitioner by Sarpanch. Gram Panchayat. Rarah, Pradhan Panchayat Samiti Sever and Panchayat Samiti, Kumher and representations were made to the Education Minister and respondent No. 4. for transfer of the petitioner. It was, thus contended that the petitioner was transferred from Rarah to Naoli on account of serious complaints. These complaints are on the record and the same were before the Education Minister and respondent No.2. From these facts, it is clear that respondent No. 2 passed the order of transfer in a bonafide manner. But the, story does not end here. From the record, we have seen that there were complaints and on account of complaints and for administrative reasons it might have been desirable for the authorities to shift the petitioner to some other place. But one pertinent fact cannot be ignored in this case, which is that together with making, request to transfer the petitioner from Rarah, a request was also inserted to transfer Purushottam Lal, respondent No. 4, in his place. It may be true that respondent No. 4 is a teacher who has been awarded State Award; but it cannot be lost sight of the fact that the suggestion of his name was made to the authorities for transferring him in the place of the petitioner at Rarah and there is nothing on the record to prove that the authorities concerned applied their mind to place respondent No. 4 there. The authorities acted on the dotted lines. The authorities acted on the dotted lines. Thus, though, in our opinion the order of transfer of the petitioner was not for any extraneous reasons or for collateral consideration with any oblique motive and also there was no abuse of power, as such, no interference can be made in the order but we are unable to approve the posting of respondent No. 4 at Rarah, and quash the same. However, it will be open to the authorities concerned to post respondent No. 4 at any place in the light of the observations made in this judgment. We may also make it clear that if the petitioner is required to be transferred in future on complaints, the authorities concerned shall ascertain the correctness of the same before transferring him. 14. The writ petition stands disposed of as indicated above. There shall be no order as to costs.Petition disposed of. *******