Judgement JUDGMENT:- This appeal is directed against the judgment dated 24-6-80 passed by Judicial Officer, District Council Court, Aizawl in Civil Appeal No. 5 of 1980. The appeal has been filed under paragraph 3 of Assam High Court (Jurisdiction over District Council Courts) Order, 1954, for short the order. By the impugned judgment the learned lower appellate Court affirmed the judgment dated 23-2-80 of the trial Court, namely, Subordinate District Council Court. Aizawl in Case No. Misc. 41 of 1979. Under Schedule VI to the Constitution, the District Council Courts are constituted for trial of disputes where both parties are trible. As this is a second appeal, before entering into the merits of the case I may discuss the powers of this court in such appeal. Paragraph 3 of the Order runs as follows :- "An appeal against a final order or decision of District Council Courts in a civil suit where the valuation of the suit is Rs. 1000/- or more shall lie to the High Court." I am not concerned with the two provisos to the said paragraph in the present appeal. Paragraph 6 of the said order runs as follows :- "High Court may, on application or otherwise, call for the proceedings of any civil or criminal case decided by or pending in any Court in the Autonomous District constituted under the provisions of sub-paragraphs (1) and (2) of paragraph 4 of the Sixth Schedule to the Constitution (hereinafter called the Court of the District Council) and pass such orders as it may deem fit." 2. The above paragraph 6 along with Rule 36 of the Civil Rules for the Administration of Justice and Police of another district came up for consideration before a Full Bench of this Court. The said Rule 36 runs as follows:- "High Court or Deputy Commissioner may, by application or otherwise, call for the proceedings of any case decided by any officer subordinate to him and pass such orders as he may deem fit." "The Deputy Commissioner shall be a Court of appeal from a decision of an Assistant. The High Court shall be a Court of appeal from an original decision of the Deputy Commissioner if the value of the suit is Rs. 500/- or over or if the suit involves a question of tribal rights or customs, of right to, or possession of immovable property." 3. Mr. The High Court shall be a Court of appeal from an original decision of the Deputy Commissioner if the value of the suit is Rs. 500/- or over or if the suit involves a question of tribal rights or customs, of right to, or possession of immovable property." 3. Mr. Sarnia Barua relying on the aforesaid decision of the Full Bench in Ka India Marry Kharkonger v. Ka Theirit Lyngdoh, Assam LR (1969) Assam 92 urged that though the present appeal is a Second Appeal this Court can treat it as a First Appeal and enter into the facts of the case and reassess or re-appreciate the evidence on record. The Full Bench of this Court in the aforesaid decision held that High Court may exercise the same power under Rule 36 as in the case of first appeal. In other words it was held that in a revision petition filed under the aforesaid Order and the Rule the revision has to be disposed of as an appeal. Following the above decision and considering the language of paragraph 3 of the Order I accept the contention of Mr. Sarma Barua and hold that in a Second Appeal filed under the said Order High Court may treat it as a First Appeal and can enter into the facts of the case for the purpose of re-appreciation of evidence on record. 4. Regarding the case in hand, the facts are as follows: That on 31-10-77 there was an agreement between the parties regarding construction of a house on the land of the present appellant and taking of loan of Rs. 3,000/- by the present appellant from the respondent. I shall quote presently the said agreement. It may be mentioned that the proceedings were conducted in the local and tribal language and the translation was done by the Subordinate District Council Court and as such this Court experience some difficulties. However, Mr. Sarma Barua, learned counsel for the appellant rendered necessary assistance. It may be stated here that according to Sarma Barua the word ough in the local language means contract. The present suit was initiated on a petition filed by the respondent before the Magistrate Subordinate District Council Court and the said petition is available at pages 1 and 2 of the paper book. Though the English translation of the agreement is available at page 3 Mr. The present suit was initiated on a petition filed by the respondent before the Magistrate Subordinate District Council Court and the said petition is available at pages 1 and 2 of the paper book. Though the English translation of the agreement is available at page 3 Mr. Sarnia Barua rightly pointed out that the said agreement has been better translated into English in the judgment of the lower appellate Court and is available at page 12 of the paper book. The said agreement runs as follows:- "I. Mrs. Zokhumi is allowed to build a house within the house site pass of Mr. Pachhunga. 2. The plot and area will be as directed by Mr. Pachhunga, and she must not extend it by herself. 3. In that house, Mrs. Zokhumi and her family live. And it is agreed that Mr. Pachhunga will give the expenditure incurred of the house as the P.W.D. scheduled rates 10% below to Mrs. Zokhumi on or before 20-12-77. 4. If Mr. Pachhunga do not settle his debt in the agreed time Mrs. Zokhumi will buy the plot as per the Govt. rates." 5. From the above agreement it appears that the appellant allowed the respondent to construct a house on a plot of land belonging to the appellant to be demarcated by the appellant. It was also agreed that the appellant would pay the expenditure incurred by the respondent for construction of the house as per schedule of the P.W.D. minus 10% and the said amount was to be paid to respondent on or before 20-12-77. It was further agreed that in case of default of the appellant to pay the amount the respondent would get a right to buy the plot of land at the price in terms of rates prescribed by the Government. The agreement was executed on 31-10-77. As stated above though the proceeding was initiated on a petition filed by the present respondent I do not find that the respondent deposed before the Court. However, the appellant gave his evidence before the learned trial Court. 6. It was also alleged that the appellant also borrowed a sum of Rs. 3,000/- from the respondent and the said amount was also a part of the present dispute. It is stated that this amount was borrowed long before the agreement in question. However, the appellant gave his evidence before the learned trial Court. 6. It was also alleged that the appellant also borrowed a sum of Rs. 3,000/- from the respondent and the said amount was also a part of the present dispute. It is stated that this amount was borrowed long before the agreement in question. As the Code of Civil Procedure is not applicable in this area and the dispute is settled according to customary law and procedure I need not examine whether the suit is bad for misjoinder of causes of action and Mr. Sarma Baruah has also not rightly pleaded his point. 7. The learned trial Court came to the finding that the total costs of construction after deducting 10% was Rs. 21,915/- and to this sum the Court added the sum of Rs. 3,000/-. The Court valued the land at Rs. 42,022/-. Accordingly, the learned trial Court directed the present appellant to pay a sum of Rs. 24,920/- within the time fixed by the Court and in default it was directed that the respondent would be entitled to buy the whole land covered by L.S.C. No. 150 of 1972 on payment of Rs. 42,022/-. This order was upheld by the learned lower appellate Court. Incidentally it may be mentioned that original dispute arose as the respondent was not allowed to rent out the building to a third party. 8. According to Mr. Sarma Barua both the learned Courts below passed the order beyond the agreement and I find considerable force. By the agreement respondent was allowed only right to construct the house on the land and to occupy it. Of course respondent was also allowed to buy the land. Reading the agreement as a whole it is clear that right to buy the land was in respect of the area on which the house stands. The agreement did not give right to the present respondent to buy the entire area. 9. After considering the entire evidence on record I modify the impugned judgment as follows:- The appellant is allowed one years time from today to pay a sum of Rs. 21,915/- and also Rs. 3,000/- to the respondent. If the amount is paid the house would belong to the appellant and respondent shall have no right to occupy the house. 9. After considering the entire evidence on record I modify the impugned judgment as follows:- The appellant is allowed one years time from today to pay a sum of Rs. 21,915/- and also Rs. 3,000/- to the respondent. If the amount is paid the house would belong to the appellant and respondent shall have no right to occupy the house. Of course it is made clear that this order shall not bar the respondent to occupy the house as a tenant under the appellant provided the appellant agrees and the rent shall be paid in terms of the agreement. In the event of refusal by the respondent to accept the amount or her where about is not known the appellant shall deposit the amount before the learned Subordinate District Council Court at Aizawl within the aforesaid period. In the event of failure of the appellant to pay the amount within the aforesaid time the respondent shall have right to purchase so much of the land on which the house is situated on payment of the value of the land amounting to Rs. 42,022/- and such payment shall be made after one year of the aforesaid period of one year given to the appellant. It is absolutely made clear that the land allowed to be purchased by the respondent is, in respect of the area covered by the plinth area of the house constructed by the respondent including the passage if there is any separate passage. If there is no separate passage the respondent shall be allowed by the appellant or any other person claiming under him to use the common passage, if any or a separate passage over the land of the appellant. The remaining area of the land covered by L.S.C. No. 150/80 shall remain vested with the appellant. If the amount is not paid by the respondent within the aforesaid period the land shall be returned back to the appellant. In the event the respondent purchases the land and as the holding was constructed by her she may use the building in any manner she likes and she may also rent it out. The appeal is allowed to the extent indicated above. No costs. Appeal allowed.