JUDGMENT R.M. Sahai, J. - Secretaries of different Societies, who are members of U. P. Primary Agricultural Co-operative Credit Societies Centralised Services, have challenged their suspension in consequence of First Information Reports lodged against them f; r embezzlement and have raised common questions of law touching upon not only absence of power of suspension by the authority who passed the order, legality of initiation of disciplinary proceedings during pendency of investigation and trial but also absence of certification of the regulations under Industrial Employment (Standing Orders) Act, 1946 or grant of any exemption under Section 13(b) etc. 2. Since factual controversy is none, the relevant facts necessary for adjudication of the legal issues shall be adverted to as and when they are taken up. Initial attack was on jurisdiction to suspend and continue disciplinary proceedings during pendency of criminal proceedings and it was urged that since both proceedings were, "grounded upon the same set of facts", they could not be continued, as held by Hon'ble Supreme Court in Kusheshwar v. M/s Bharat Coking Coal Ltd., AIR 1988 SC 2118 . The submission was advanced on complete misapprehension of the decision rendered by the Hon'ble Court which despite request to, "settle the law in a straight jacket formula as judicial opinion appeared to be conflicting" did not "propose to hazard such a step as that would create greater hardship and individual situations may not be met and thereby injustice is likely to ensue". What was held by Hon'ble Court was, "while there could be no legal for simultaneous proceedings being taken, yet there may be cases where it would be appropriate to defer disciplinary proceedings awaiting disposal of the criminal case, in the latter class of cases it would be open to the delinquent employee to seek such an order of stay or injunction from the Court Whether in the facts and circumstances of a particular case there should or should not be such simultaneity of a proceedings would then receive judicial consideration and the Court will decide in the given circumstances of a particular case as to whether the disciplinary proceedings should be interdicted, pending criminal trial. On the facts, however, the Hon'ble Court upheld the order of trial court directing stay of disciplinary "proceedings as criminal auction and the disciplinary proceedings were grounded on same set of facts". On the facts, however, the Hon'ble Court upheld the order of trial court directing stay of disciplinary "proceedings as criminal auction and the disciplinary proceedings were grounded on same set of facts". The submission, therefore, that no disciplinary proceedings should be initiated as a matter of law during pendency of criminal proceedings is devoid of any substance. Even on facts the claim of petitioners cannot be accepted. May be that embezzlement detected in each case may have resulted in the two proceedings namely, filing of First Information Report under Section 409, I.P.C. and initiation of disciplinary proceedings under Centralised Service rules or regulations made thereunder. But does that alone entitle petitioners to claim stay of proceedings. No, because the cause of action for one is criminal breach of trust in respect of property entrusted to petitioners in their capacity as a public servant, whereas the occasion to initiate disciplinary proceedings was satisfaction of the disciplinary authority that proceedings contemplated were such that if proved they would result in dismissal or removal or reduction in rank. They may have arisen from same complaints or ever same set of facts but they were routed through the appropriate authorities in accordance with rules. Therefore, the circumstances in such matters do not warrant any interference and that also in equity jurisdiction. Physical assault on a superior officer by an employee in an industrial unit may not amount to misconduct and the officer discipline may stand restored by sending the accused to face trial but corruption or embezzlement of funds in Government offices or public departments is a crime against society which calls for tough and hard dealing. Suspension results in temporary prevention or interruption from functioning so long the cloud cost on employees conduct is not cleared. But the danger of permitting such an employee to continue and run the risk of perpetration of similar activities which led to his suspension and destroying the office culture by encouraging others can be very grave and serious. Arbitrary action of disciplinary authority or mala fide apart this Court should be reluctant to interfere with suspension of employee for embezzlement and corruption. Arbitrary action of disciplinary authority or mala fide apart this Court should be reluctant to interfere with suspension of employee for embezzlement and corruption. Apart from it sub-para (iii) of sub-clause (f) of Regulation 59 framed under Rule 30 of U. P. Agricultural Credit Society Centralised Rules (.hereinafter referred to, as Rules) empowers the authorities specified therein to suspend an employee if a complaint against him for any criminal offence was pending under police investigation for which he has been arrested. 3. Next attack on validity of suspension orders was lack of power in member-secretary of the District Administrative Committee, an executive authority under Rule 7(4) of the Act to pass the order as under Rule 13 of the aforesaid rule it was the District Committee which was the appointing authority of the members of the district and was entrusted with duty and responsibility of exercising control and supervision over members of the district. The submission was attempted to be supported by referring to Regulation 59(e) and (f j framed under the Rules in 1978. It was also submitted that even if Secretary of the District Committee who is District Assistant Registrar, possessed such power then the order could be passed under Rule 14(v) of the Rules only with prior concurrence of Assistant Registrar who is defined under Rule 2(e) to mean a person appointed as Assistant Registrar under sub-section (2) of Section 3 of the Act. And since no concurrence of such authority was obtained the order was void. The learned counsel submitted that a perusal of the orders indicated that the power was exercised both as Assistant and District Registrar which was illegal as the rule having contemplated two different authorities, one passing the order and the other concurring to it, the opposite party-could not have exercised both the powers himself. Reference was made to notification No. 3328 issued by State Government on 5th July, 1969 in exercise of power under sub-section(2) of Section 3 of U. P. Co-operative Societies Act, 1965 and it was submitted that the powers of the Registrar which could be exercised have been specified in clause (4) of the notification which does not specify the power of suspension, the order passed by opposite-party was invalid. It was also submitted that the order could not be treated as an order of Committee, as the Committee could function in the manner provided in the rules for which the minimum quorum was three. The learned counsel urged that regulation have not been certified under Industrial Employment (Standing Orders) Act not they have been granted any exemption, therefore, no action could be taken under it. Constitution of the District Administrative Committee in the District of Bahraich was also challenged because it resulted in setting at naught check and balances under Act and Rules. Attention was drawn to explanation and the order passed granting bail and it was urged that they left no room for doubt that the suspension order was arbitrary. 4. U. P. Agriculture Co-operative Credit Societies Centralised Service Rules, 1976 have been framed by State Government in exercise of power under Section 122-A of U. P. Co-operative Societies Act. Rule 7 of Part (III) specifies executive authorities. One of such authorities is District Administrative Committee comprising under sub-rule (4) of Rule 7 of Chairman/Administrator of the District Co-operative Bank as ex-officio Chairman and District Assistant Registrar, as Member-Secretary with four other members. Powers and duties of this Committee are provided by Rule 13. Relevant part of it is extracted below : "13. Powers and duties of the District Administrative Committee. - (1) The District Committee shall be the Appointing Authority of the members of the Centralised Service in the District and shall also have the following duties and responsibilities : (i) To exercise control and supervision over the members of the Centralised Service in the District.'' Rule 14 specifies powers and duties of the member secretary of the District Committee. Apart from various duties, one of the powers conferred on him is power to suspend any member of the Centralised service. Clause (v) of the rule which empowers suspension is extracted below : "14. Powers and duties of the Member-Secretary of the District Committee. - Subject to the control and supervision of the Chairman of the District Committee, the Member-Secretary of the District Committee shall - (i) to (iv) ................ Clause (v) of the rule which empowers suspension is extracted below : "14. Powers and duties of the Member-Secretary of the District Committee. - Subject to the control and supervision of the Chairman of the District Committee, the Member-Secretary of the District Committee shall - (i) to (iv) ................ (v) have power of suspending a member of the Centralised Service with the prior concurrence Assistant Registrar ; Apart from the power of suspension under Rule 14 (v) empowering member-secretary to suspend, power of suspension has been conferred on Committee and officer authorised is well, under regulations framed under Rule 30 relevant part of which is extracted below : "30. Misc. - (I) Subject to the provisions of these rules, the authority shall frame regulations with the prior approval of the Registrar, Co-operative Societies, U. P., for the members of the Centralised Service on their service matters which may, inter alia, include : (i) Method of promotion, appointment, probation, confirmation and termination; (ii) Service records, seniority, revision, retrenchment and resignation; (iii) Pay scales, allowances, increments, joining time, leave, efficiency bar, etc. ; (iv) Conduct and discipline, penalties, disciplinary proceedings and appeals ; (v) Provident fund, gratuity, and advance. Regulations were framed under this rule in 1978, clause 59 of the regulations deals with disciplinary proceedings. Its Clauses 1(a), (e) and (f) which are relevant are extracted below : "59. (1) (a) The disciplinary proceedings against a member shall be conducted by the enquiry officer referred to in clause (b) below with due observance of the principles of natural justice for which it shall be necessary that; (b) .................. (c) Disciplinary proceedings shall be taken by the District Committee against the member either suo motu or on a report made to this effect by an Inspecting authority or the Chairman of the society under whose control the member is working or may have worked. (d) ............. (e) ................. (f) A member other than one referred to in clause (c) above may be placed under suspension by the District Committee or any other officer authorised for the purpose in the following circumstances- (i) When the said authority is satisfied that a prima facie case exists, which is likely to result in the removal, dismissal or reduction in rank of the member. (ii) When an enquiry into his conduct is immediately contemplated or is pending and his further continuance on his post is considered detrimental to the interest of the society or the authority, (iii) When a complaint against him of any criminal offence is under police investigation for which he has been arrested or he is undergoing trial in a Court of law for an offence under the Indian Penal Code, U. P. Co-operative Societies Act, 1966 or any other Act or charges have been proved against him by a Criminal Court." 5. Member, in Rule 2 (f) and regulation 2(i), means a person appointed or absorbed in a post included in the Centralised service. Since petitioners are in Centralised Service they are members within meaning of these rules and regulations, who could be suspended by the authorities mentioned there. The rules and regulations contemplate suspension of a member of Centralised services both under Rule 14(v) of the Rules and Regulations 59(f). The former that is, power to suspend under Rule 14(v) is a general power of suspension which can be exercised by member-secretary with prior concurrence of Assistant Registrar whereas the power conferred under Regulation 59(f) is specific in the circumstances mentioned therein. Since in all these cases the power was exercised after filing of First Information Report when criminal offence against petitioners was under police investigation, the order was squarely within fore-corners of sub-clause (iii) of clause (f) of Regulation 59. To get over this difficulty it was submitted th3t the power under this clause could be invoked only if the petitioners had been arrested. But since they surrendered and were bailed out the prerequisite for exercise of power namely, arrest was not satisfied. Fallacy in the argument lies in not comprehending scope of the provisions relating to surrender and bail provided in Criminal Procedure Code in respect of penal offence. The offence of criminal breach of trust is non-bailable and. therefore, right from me moment an FIR is lodged and the police initiates investigation the person accused is under jeopardy of being arrested. This may be effected by the police and the accused may be bailed out or he may appear under Section 437 of Criminal Procedure Code and place himself in the custody of Court. therefore, right from me moment an FIR is lodged and the police initiates investigation the person accused is under jeopardy of being arrested. This may be effected by the police and the accused may be bailed out or he may appear under Section 437 of Criminal Procedure Code and place himself in the custody of Court. Section 437 means placing of the person accused or suspect of commission of any offence in the custody of Court for being enlarged on bail. It is, in effect, national detention or arrest of a pea-son accused. Therefore, the petitioners who surrendered before the Court and were thereafter enlarged on bail should be deemed to have been covered in sub-clause (3) of Clause (f) of Regulation 59. And the suspension order passed against them did not suffer from any error of law. 6. Even otherwise the suspension orders do not suffer from any error of law of jurisdiction. Rule 14(v) is a general power of suspension. It may be exercised by the Member-secretary of the Committee for any reason. But the power to suspend under regulations framed under Rule 30 is specific. It could be exercised in the circumstances mentioned therein and in no other situation. Therefore, where disciplinary proceedings are contemplated or any other reason mentioned therein the power of suspension has to be exercised under Regulation 59(e) either by the Committee or the person authorised. Since member-secretary is authorised o suspend a member of the Centralised service he could have exercised this power. Such suspensions are different than suspension contemplated in Rule 14(v) It was, however, urged that the regulations framed under Rule 30 being subject to rules and Rule 14(v) having specifically provided that any order of suspension passed by member-secretary must satisfy it, the order could be upheld only if prior concurrence of Assistant Registrar was established. Assuming it to be so, it may be examined if the submission has any substance. Section 3 of the U. P. C o-operative Societies Act empowers State Government to appoint a person to be Registrar of the Co-operative Societies for the State. Sub-section (2) further empowers State Government for the purposes of the Act to appoint other persons to assist the Registrar and by general or special order confer on any such person all or any of the powers of the Registrar. Sub-section (2) further empowers State Government for the purposes of the Act to appoint other persons to assist the Registrar and by general or special order confer on any such person all or any of the powers of the Registrar. What would be the designation of such persons who are appointed to assists the Registrar and how they shall be known is clear from Rules 2(d)(c) and (f) which defines Additional Registrar, Assistant Registrar, District Assistant Registrar and Assistant Registrar in-charge. They are extracted below : Rule 2 : (d) Additional Registrar means an officer appointed as Additional Registrar of Co-operative Societies, under sub-section (2) of Section 3 ; (e) `Assistant Registrar means a person appointed as Assistant Registrar under sub-section (2) of Section 3 and `District Assistant Registrar' means an Assistant Registrar appointed to hold charge of Co-operative Activities of a District; (f) `Assistant Registrar In-charge' means the Assistant Registrar appointed to hold charge of co-operative activities within a Division. From perusal of these definitions it is clear that the two authorities who can be appointed to assist the Registrar under Section 3(2) are Additional and Assistant Registrar. The District Assistant Registrar or Assistant Registrar In-charge are Assistant Registrar but they are designated as such when they are entrusted with charge of co-operative of a district or within a division. They are not contemplated as different authorities. The language used in the rule does give rise to such apprehension. But to make it workable it has to be construed to mean that where member secretary is the District Assistant Registrar who too is Assistant Registrar then he can exercise the power himself. But if apart from the District Assistant Registrar there is another Assistant Registrar in the district then his concurrence may be necessary. The opposite parties who have passed the impugned order have taken care of doing so in both the capacities, that is as member-secretary and Assistant Registrar. That is further clear from the counter-affidavit. It is averred that the District Assistant Registrar was in fact Assistant Registrar, Co-operative Society prior to his posting in the District of Bahraich. But when he was posted there he by virtue of being District Assistant Registrar became secretary of the Committee. That has not been controverted in the rejoinder affidavit. That is further clear from the counter-affidavit. It is averred that the District Assistant Registrar was in fact Assistant Registrar, Co-operative Society prior to his posting in the District of Bahraich. But when he was posted there he by virtue of being District Assistant Registrar became secretary of the Committee. That has not been controverted in the rejoinder affidavit. Thus the suspension order was neither invalid nor it was passed by an officer who was not authorised to exercise the power. Nor is there any merit in the submission that rules and regulations having not been certified under Industrial Employment (Standing Orders) Act, 1946, the order of suspension was without jurisdiction. Sub-clause (3) of clause (sic) of the order provides that it shall apply to an industrial establishment which under clause (e) of clause (2) means an industrial establishment as defined in clause (ii) of Section 2 of the Payment of Wages Act or a factory as defined in clause (m) Section 2 of Factories Act or a railway as defined in clause (4) Section 2 of Indian Railways Act, 1850 or the establishment of a person who for the purposes fulfilling a contract with the owner of any Industrial establishment, employs workmen. No foundation has been laid in the petitioner that the Agricultural Co-operative Credit Societies could be an industrial establishment within the Industrial Employment Order. And rightly because a Co-operative Society cannot be described as an industrial establishment. Further, the submission appears to be academic as petitioners are secretaries of the Society whose nature of duties is supervisory and they cannot be termed as workmen. 7. For reasons stated above all these petitions fail and are dismissed, and the interim orders are discharged. 8. Pronounced today by the bench consisting of Hon'ble Mr. Justice U.C. Srivastava and Hon'ble Justice G.B. Singh. 9. Soon after the judgment was pronounced, learned counsel made oral request for grant of certificate of fitness for filing leave to appeal before the Supreme Court of India. For this purpose papers of this case may be listed before the bench concerned as and when it is available.