K. J. VAIDYA, J. ( 1 ) THE above Special Criminal Application arises out of the judgment and order dated 13/05/1981 rendered in Criminal Appeal No. 84 of 1982 by the learned Sessions Judge Valsad (herein- after for short referred to as the learned Judge) whereby he allowed the said Appeal filed by Shri Mulchand Lakhamsinh Shah (for short referred to as opponent) quashing and setting aside the order dated 6/02/1982 passed by the District Supply Officer Valsad (for short referred to as D. S. O. Valsad) confiscating 74 tins of pamoline edible oil (for short referred to as M. M. oil tins ). ( 2 ) BRIEFLY speaking on the secret tip off on 13/05/1981 the Chief Supply Inspector Valsad alongwith Deputy Mamlatdar Supply Branch Pardi raided a cabin No. 5 of one Shivbhalsinh Rajbahadur- sing and seized 74 oil tins of the ownership of the opponent. ( 3 ) AFTER necessary inquiry the Chief Supply Inspector submitted a report on 16/11/1981 alongwith relevant papers to the Collector Valsad for taking appropriate action against the opponent under the provisions of the Essential Commodity Act 1955 (for short referred to as the said Act ). Thereafter it appears that the said proceedings came to be transferred to the D. S. O. Valsad and he on going through the relevant material feeling satisfied that the opponent had commit-ted breach of Sec. 3 of the said Act and certain provisions made under the Gujarat Essential Commodities (Licensing and Stock Declaration) Order 1981 thought it proper to confiscate the same to the State. In this view of the matter as warranted under Sec. 6-B of the said Act he issued a show cause notice dated 2/12/1981 to the opponent which is produced at page 41 of the record of the case. the reading of this notice shows that (a) that the same was given in writing informing the opponent the grounds on which it was proposed to confiscate the M. M. oil tins; (b) that the same also gave in opportunity to opponent of making a representation in writing on or before 14/12/1981 against the proposed grounds of confiscation; and (c) that it further discloses that the opponent was also even an opportunity of being heard on 14/12/1981 at 11 hours in Collector Office. The record further shows that pursuant to the aforesaid show cause notice one Mr. The record further shows that pursuant to the aforesaid show cause notice one Mr. R. S. Kapadia the learned Advocate had appeared on 14/12/1981 before D. S. O. Valsad and filed Vakalatnama on behalf of the opponent and submitted an application for adjourning the case to some future date. The said adjournment application is found at page 45 of the record wherein on behalf of the opponent it has been submitted that he (the opponent desires to make a written representation against the proposed confisca- tion of M. M. oil tins and also wants to argue his case through his Advocate. It is further stated in the said application that as the marriage of the opponent was fixed on 21/12/1981 due to the same he could not instruct his Advocate in time for filing the written representation. Under the circumstances it was prayed that the case may be adjourned on any date in January. This application for adjournment was granted by the D. S. O. Valsad and the case was adjourned to 18/01/1982 for submitting a representation in writing and also for hearing the opponent. Thereafter the opponent had submitted his written representation dated 11/01/1982 to the D. S. O. Valsad. On 18/01/1982 the learned Advocate Mr. Kapadia appeared on behalf of the opponent before D. S. O. Valsad and made submissions against the proposed order of confiscation of M. M. oil tins to the State It may be re-called at this stage that earlier when the application for adjournment on 14/12/1982 was submitted it was specifically mentioned therein that the opponent desired to be heard through his Advocate. Accordingly after taking on record the representation in writing and oral submissions made by opponent through his learned Advocate Mr. Kapadia the D. S. O. Valsad by a judgment and order dated 6/02/1982 was pleased to order the confiscation of M. M. oil list to the State. Accordingly after taking on record the representation in writing and oral submissions made by opponent through his learned Advocate Mr. Kapadia the D. S. O. Valsad by a judgment and order dated 6/02/1982 was pleased to order the confiscation of M. M. oil list to the State. ( 4 ) FEELING aggrieved and dissatisfied by the impugned order of confiscation of M. M. oil tins to the State the opponent preferred an appeal being Criminal Appeal No. 14 of 1982 under the provision contained in Sec. 6-C of the said Act before the learned Sessions Judge Valsad at Navsari which ultimately came to be allowed by a judgment and order dated 13/05/1982 quashing and setting aside the impugned order of confiscation of M. M. oil tins passed by the D. S. O. Valsad with a further direction to the said D. S. O. to comply with the provision of Sec. 6-C (2) of the said Act in relation to M. M. oil tins. ( 5 ) FEELING aggrieved and dissatisfied by the impugned judgment and order passed by the learned Judge the State of Gujarat had initially preferred Criminal Revision Application No. 397 of 1982 which thereafter with the permission of this Court was converted into the above Special Criminal Application No. 1479 of 1982. ( 6 ) MR. D. K. Trivedi the learned Addl. P. P. for the petitioners State has made following two submissions: (1) That the impugned judgment and order is patently illegal inasmuch as the learned Judge has committed a serious error apparent on the facts of the record by holding that the provision contained in Sec. 6-B (1) (c) of the said Act has not been complied with. Submits Mr. Trivedi that this finding of the learned Judge is not only legally wrong but is contrary to the evidence on record. Submits Mr. Trivedi that this finding of the learned Judge is not only legally wrong but is contrary to the evidence on record. (2) That in the alternative assuming without admitting that the learned Judge was right in holding that the provision contained in Sec. 6-B (1) (c) of the said Act was not duly complied with then it was the duty of the learned Judge to remand the matter to the D. S. O. Valsad with a specific direction to comply with the said Sec. 6-B (1) (c) of the said Act by giving the opponent an opportunity of being heard but under no circumstances the learned Judge was justified in directing D. S. O. Valsad to act in accordance with Sec. 6-C (2) of the said Act in relation to M. M. oil tins. ( 7 ) AS against the above Mr. S. N. Shelat the learned Counsel appearing for the opponent in the first place has made faint efforts to support the impugned judgment and order passed by the learned Judge. However he also in the alternative submitted that if this Court was to come to the conclusion that the provision contained in Sec. 6-B (1) (c) of the said Act is duly complied with then in that case since the learned Judge had decided a matter piecemeal that is to say. only on legal submissions without dealing with the factual aspect of the case the case deserved to be remanded with a direction to the learned Judge to dispose of the same on merit after furnishing opponent an opportunity of being heard on the question of fact. ( 8 ) MR. Trivedi in order to substantiate his aforesaid contentions has first of all taken me through the relevant paragraph No. 7 of the impugned judgment and then to the judgment of the D. S. O. Valsad and the file pertaining to the case. Reading through all this what surfaces is that an illegality of not giving reasonable opportunity of being heard in the matter to the opponent and thereby Sec. 6-B (1) (c) of the said Act remained not complied with which has been attributed to the D. S. O. Valsad does not find any place anywhere. Reading through all this what surfaces is that an illegality of not giving reasonable opportunity of being heard in the matter to the opponent and thereby Sec. 6-B (1) (c) of the said Act remained not complied with which has been attributed to the D. S. O. Valsad does not find any place anywhere. As a matter of fact on the contrary the history of proceedings set out in foregoing paragraphs 2 and 3 clearly shows that all the three mandatory require- ments as contained in Sec. 6-B (1) (a) (b) (c) of the said Act is duly complied with. We have already seen that the opponent had appeared through his learned Advocate Mr. Kapadia before D. S. O. Valsad and had expressed his desire to be heard through his said learned Advocate. Further in fact the D. S. O. Valsad had heard the learned Advocate Mr. Kapadia on 18th January 1982 and it was thereafter only that the impugned order confiscating M. M. oil tins to the State came to be passed. In this view of the matter the learned Judge seems to be patently wrong in holding that the provision contained in Sec. 6-B (1) (c) of the said Act has not been complied with. Rather it is indeed a matter of a surprise as to on what material the learned Judge could arrive at such a conclusion. There is not a word to suggest in the judgment as to how and in what manner and basis the said Sec. 6-B (1) (c) of the said Act has not been complied with. When this aspect was pointed out to Mr. Shelat he had no answer to further support the impugned judgment and order passed by the learned Judge. In substance when opponent himself had desired to be heard through the learned Advocate and when the learned Advocate in fact was heard by the D. S. O. Valsad it clearly means that opponent was heard and the provision contained in Sec. 6-B (1) (c) of the Act has been complied with. ( 9 ) IN this view of the matter I have no difficulty in holding that the said finding of the learned Judge viz. Sec. 6-B (1) (c) of the Act has not been complied with is patently erroneous being contrary to the evidence on the record and hence the same deserves to be set aside. ( 9 ) IN this view of the matter I have no difficulty in holding that the said finding of the learned Judge viz. Sec. 6-B (1) (c) of the Act has not been complied with is patently erroneous being contrary to the evidence on the record and hence the same deserves to be set aside. ( 10 ) THIS takes me to the second and alternative submission of Mr. Trivedi. Mr. Trivedi is perfectly right when he submits that if the learned Judge felt that the opponent was not given an opportunity of being heard as per the provisions contained in Sec. 6-B (1) (c) of the said Act then in that case there was no alternative left for him but to remand the case to the D. S. O. Valsad with a direction to give a reasonable opportunity of being heard to the opponent but under no circumstances the learned Judge could have directed the D. S. O. straightway to comply with the provision contained in Sec. 6-B (1) (c) of the said Act. I agree. ( 11 ) NOW let me advert to the second submission of Mr. Shelat viz. that as the learned Judge has refrained from touching the factual aspect of the case the appeal must be remanded to him to consider the same on merits. In this regard Mr. Shelat specially invited my attention to the relevant observation made by the learned Judge at bottom of para 7 of his judgment which reads to quote the same consequently it is not necessary for me to enter into the factual aspects of this case. Mr. Trivedi learned Addl. P. P. on this point had frankly concede that he was not in position to straightway reply to this part of the argument of Mr. Shelat and hence the matter deserves to be remanded. ( 12 ) HOWEVER with due respect to the learned Judge it has got to be stated that he ought not to have rest contended (may be inad- vertently) by just stopping at deciding two legal submissions leaving other submissions on factual aspects untouched. All subordinate Courts having appellate jurisdiction are supposed to know that they are duty bound to hear appreciate and decide the whole controversy at largo between the parties and every question of fact and law that has been submitted for consideration to be determined in their favour. All subordinate Courts having appellate jurisdiction are supposed to know that they are duty bound to hear appreciate and decide the whole controversy at largo between the parties and every question of fact and law that has been submitted for consideration to be determined in their favour. Not only that but all those points should also be reflected finding place in the judgments. It is only when the concerned litigating parties before the Court specifically and in unmistakable terms in writing does not press any particular point or points that the Courts are at liberty not to take into consider the same. Further all appellate Courts are expected to keep before their mental-eye the consequences of a lop- sided and a piecemeal judgments like the present one which unwittingly carries the germs of off-shooting multiplicity of proceedings causing great hardship embarrassment and inconvenience to the litigating public and confine waste of precious public time and money. Such casual approach of piecemeal judgment does come in the ways of the fresh litigations as the same gets obstr-ucted and delayed when the matters are remained for re-hearing. Therefore a stock of the situation which requires to be taken from this case is that a little haste of beating the clock and calendar behind results into unnecessary protraction of the proceedings. This should never happen. If in the instant case had the learned Judge been little discreet while disposing of the appeal by considering the submissions of the opponent on factual as well as legal aspects it would not have been necessary to remand the case after seven years and that too to the worst predicament of all concerned. Thus examining the problem from all angles it appears to me that in future care requires to be taken by all concerned by not resorting to such short cut methods in order to serve the case of justice in still better way. ( 13 ) IN the result the above Special Criminal Application is partly allowed. The impugned judgment and order passed by the learned Judge is quashed and set aside. The case is remanded to the learned Judge with a clear direction to him that the opponent be heard regarding his submissions on tee question of the factual aspect only and to decide the same on merits on or before November 1989 Rule made absolute to the aforesaid extent. (KMV) Rule made absolute. The case is remanded to the learned Judge with a clear direction to him that the opponent be heard regarding his submissions on tee question of the factual aspect only and to decide the same on merits on or before November 1989 Rule made absolute to the aforesaid extent. (KMV) Rule made absolute. .