K. S. BHATT, J. ( 1 ) 1. Compensation was awarded under the provisions of the Motor Vehicles Act, in favour of the claimants, towards the injuries suffered in an accident caused by a lorry, owned by one Pitambaraswamy. The amounts awarded were in excess of the liability of the insurance Company. Hence, the claimants took out execution against pitambaraswamy towards the balance; in this, his immovable properties were attached. ( 2 ) THE petitioner in these revision petitions is the father of Pitambaraswamy. Petitioner filed the applications under Order 21 rule 58 of the Code of Civil Procedure to recall the order of attachment, claiming the properties to be his absolute properties, asserting that his son had no means to acquire the properties. The Motor Accident Claims tribunal to which the execution case had been transferred, negatived the claim of the petitioner; consequently, the applications were rejected, after considering the respective evidence adduced by the parties. Hence these revision petitions. ( 3 ) THE short question is, whether these revision petitions are maintainable, in view of order 21 r. 58 (4) of the Code of Civil Procedure? ( 4 ) ACCORDING to Sri Sadashivappa, the learned counsel for the petitioner, the orders are made hi the course of executing an award under the provisions of the Motor vehicles Act and therefore any such order cannot be treated as a decree. The learned counsel referred to the definitions of the words 'decree' and 'order' in the Code of civil Procedure; further, Section 96 of the code was referred to urge that, a first appeal would lie only against a decree passed by a court exercising original jurisdiction only and therefore, the order of an executing court cannot be subjected to an appeal. The provisions of Order 21. r. 58 (4) were, contended, as governing any order made in the course of a decree of the Civil Court only. Alternatively, the learned counsel argued that, the present case falls under Order 21 r. 58 (5), because the lower Court has failed to 'entertain' the petitioner's applications. ( 5 ) THERE is now, no doubt, that the tribunal constituted under Motor Vehicles act is a Civil Court, which is subordinate to the High Court (Vide; Mrs. Noreen R. Srikanataiah v Dasarath Ramaiah - ILR 1985 (1) Kar. 572 ). ( 5 ) THERE is now, no doubt, that the tribunal constituted under Motor Vehicles act is a Civil Court, which is subordinate to the High Court (Vide; Mrs. Noreen R. Srikanataiah v Dasarath Ramaiah - ILR 1985 (1) Kar. 572 ). It is not the case of the petitioner, that the Award is inexecutable by recourse to the provisions of the Code of civil Procedure. In the course of such an execution case, the petitioner has invoked order 21 r. 58. If so, can it be said that any of the clauses of Order 21 r. 28 CPC would not govern the said proceedings ? ( 6 ) ONE of the major amendments made to the Code of Civil Procedure in the year 1976, pertains to Rules 58 to 63 of Order 21. To prevent protraction of litigation, it was thought desirable to have all questions settled finally in Execution proceedings itself, instead of the earlier procedure of a separate suit under Order 21 r. 63. Therefore, Rule 58 of Order 21, now, provides for all questions including questions relating to right, title or interest in the property attached, to be decided by the executing Court. Sub-rule (4) which is relevant here, reads:-"where any claim or objection has been adjudicated upon under this rule, the order made thereon shall have the same force and be subject to the same conditions as to appeal or otherwise as if it were a decree". This sub-rule, in effect, creates a legal fiction. It deems the 'order' as a decree by injecting into the 'order' all the force of a decree; such an order is subjected to the same conditions as to appeal or otherwise as if it were a decree. The Parliament, has, in specific terms declared the status of such an order, as a decree and the language of this provision does not permit the boggling down of the imagination while treating the order as a decree, in any manner. All the consequences and incidents of treating the 'order' as a 'decree' should flow out of this status conferred on it under Order 21 r. 58 (4) of the code of Civil Procedure. ( 7 ) SRI Sadashivappa is not right in contending that, by the orders under revision, petitioner's applications were not entertained and therefore his case falls under sub- rule (5 ). ( 7 ) SRI Sadashivappa is not right in contending that, by the orders under revision, petitioner's applications were not entertained and therefore his case falls under sub- rule (5 ). Sub-rule (5) is attracted only when the court refuses to entertain an application filed under sub-rule (1), and such a refusal is by virtue of the proviso to the said sub-rule. The proviso empowers the Court, not to entertain an application under Order 28 r. 58 (l) under two circumstances, viz. ," (A) where before the claim is preferred or objection is made, the property attached has already been sold; or (b) where the Court considers that the claim or objection was designedly or unnecessarily delayed". When the claim or objection is decreed on its merits, sub-rule (5) will not be applicable. The said sub-rule governs a situation, when the application is rejected only under the aforesaid two specified circumstances. ( 8 ) THE contention of the learned counsel, based on the definitions of the words 'decree' and 'order' and the language of section 96 of the Code of Civil Procedure, cannot be accepted. To give full effect to the language of sub-rule (4) of Order 21 r. 58, it is necessary to hold that the order adjudicating the claim under Order 21 rule 58 as appealable. If a particular 'order' though deemed a 'decree', is not appealable for any other reason (either because of a specific bar against appeal, or any other mode of challenging the 'order is provided elsewhere) then, only, the remedy of appeal will not be available. The word 'otherwise' in sub-rule (4), has to be understood as applicable only to such a situation. ( 9 ) THE fact that the execution is of an 'award' by itself cannot derogate the impact of Order 21 rule 58 (4 ). The Motor Vehicles act does not provide for any exclusive machinery to enforce the Awards. The provisions of the Code of Civil Procedure are attracted, since the Awards are of the Civil courts (though referred as Tribunals' ). It is a known principle that, when jurisdiction is conferred on the ordinary court, without more, all the ordinary incidents of the procedure of that Court are to attach to the proceedings. In National Sewing Thread Co. Ltd, chidambaram v James Chadwck and Bros. It is a known principle that, when jurisdiction is conferred on the ordinary court, without more, all the ordinary incidents of the procedure of that Court are to attach to the proceedings. In National Sewing Thread Co. Ltd, chidambaram v James Chadwck and Bros. Ltd. ( AIR 1953 SC 357 ), the question was whether Letters Patent Appeal lay against an order of a learned single Judge of the High court, in a proceeding arising out of Trade marks Act. The Supreme Court answered the question in affirmative, the principle applied was:"when a question is stated to be referred to an established Court without more, it in my opinion, imports that the. ordinary incidents of the procedure of that Court are to attach, and also that any general right of appeal from its decision likewise attaches". When the power of executing the Award is vested in the Civil Court, all its procedure, including the forum of appeal in respect of any order, will be applicable. Assuming that the Civil Court functioned bearing the nomenclature of a 'tribunal', the procedural law invoked being Order 21 of the Code of civil Procedure, its provisions cannot be applied in parts. The consequences and incidents of its provisions are to be given full effect. ( 10 ) NO doubt, the decision of this Court in sidramappa Rachappa v Shankaralingappa [1978 (2) Kar. LJ. 429], arises out of an execution proceedings in respect of a Civil court's decree. But its ratio will be applicable, once it is concluded that, the forum executing the Award functions as a civil Court, under the Code of Civil procedure. ( 11 ) THE doubts cast by Sri Sadashivappa as to the nature of the appeal and Court fee payable thereon, should not deter the Court from giving effect to the legislative intention behind Order 21 r. 58. The rights and liabilities are sought to be agitated and questions regarding the title to the immovable property is being raised and solved; the question raised, here, essentially is a civil dispute; the question has no statutory flavour at all. Therefore, the parties are to be treated on par with any other litigant wherein, similar purely civil disputes are involved. The rights and liabilities are sought to be agitated and questions regarding the title to the immovable property is being raised and solved; the question raised, here, essentially is a civil dispute; the question has no statutory flavour at all. Therefore, the parties are to be treated on par with any other litigant wherein, similar purely civil disputes are involved. The nature of the appeal cannot be different, from an appeal wherein, a similar question would arise, in case the proceedings arise under order 21 R. 58 CPC out of an execution of a decree of the Civil Court made in the exercise of its ordinary jurisdiction. The ratio of the decision in Subbanna v Seethamma [1970 (2) Mys. L. J. 560] also is to the same effect. For the reasons stated above, these revision petitions fail and are rejected as not maintainable. --- *** --- .