JUDGMENT - ASHOK AGARWAL, J.:---Being aggrieved by the order of the Hon'ble Minsiter debarring the petitioners from the grant of book makers licence for a period of three years, the petitioners have preferred the present petition. 2. The petitioners are a firm engaged in the business of book makers since over 30 years. On the 4th December, 1986 an incident took place which resulted in the passing of the impugned order. On that day which happened to be a race day at the Royal Western India Turf Club, Bombay, the second respondent herein, one Shri Agarwal who was employed with the petitioners for about 20 years and was engaged as a runner was found coming out of the stall of the petitioners. He was arrested by the police and his statement came to be recorded at the Police Station. The said statement revealed that Shri Agarwal was not authorised to occupy the stall of the certain notings which indicated that certain illegal betting were being accepted. On the 11th December, 1986 the Senior Inspector of Police, C.I.D. addressed his communication to the Secretary of the second respondent bringing to his notice the aforesaid facts for the purpose of taking necessary action. The stewards of the second respondent initiated proceedings both against the petitioners as also Shri Agarwal. So far as Shri Agarwal was concerned, he was warned off. The petitioners consequently dismissed him from service. So far as the petitioners are concerned, they were held vicariously liable in regard to the acceptance of illegal bets and were fined Rs. 10,000/-. The petitioner paid the said fine and suffered the said penalty. They, however, continued their business of book makers for the year June 1986 to June 1987. 3. Since the petitioner were required to renew their licence year to year, they applied to the second respondent for the renewal of the licence for the period June 1987 to June 1988. The racing season at Pune commenced on the 8th July, 1987. The petitioners could not engage themselves as book makers in that season as their licence had not been renewed by the second respondent. On the 15th July ,1987 they enquired with the second respondent who by its communication dated the 17th July, 1987 regretted their inability to grant the licence. No reasons were assigned for the refusal. The petitioners could not engage themselves as book makers in that season as their licence had not been renewed by the second respondent. On the 15th July ,1987 they enquired with the second respondent who by its communication dated the 17th July, 1987 regretted their inability to grant the licence. No reasons were assigned for the refusal. The petitioners were, therefore, constrained to file in this Court, Writ Petition No. 2441 of 1987, wherein an order was passed on the 7th August, 1987 issuing rule and granting interim reliefs in terms of prayer Clause (c) of that petition. In pursuance of the grant of the said prayer, the petitioners were granted licence. The first respondent challenged the aforesaid order by preferring Appeal No. 1050 of 1987 but the same was summarily dismissed by the Appeal Bench on the 7th September, 1987. Before the expiry of the said licence the petitioners some time at the end of March 1988 applied to the second respondent for renewal. However, on the 14th June 1988, the Home Department of the first respondent issued a notice to the petitioners calling upon them to show cause as to why they should not be granted book makers' licence for a period of three years commencing from the racing season of 1988-89. The charges levelled against the petitioners were the very same which were the subject matter of the charge enquired into by the second respondent viz. the finding of Shri Agarwal in the stall of the petitioners and on the recording of his statement it was revealed that he was in possession of certain notings which indicated the acceptance of illegal betting. The petitioners by their reply dated the 27th June, 1988 showed cause and, inter alia, submitted that there was no jurisdiction on the part of the Government to reopen the matter which were concluded by the findings of the second respondent, the Turf Club and to expose the petitioners to double jeopardy. They further contended that the said show cause notice, which was based entirely on the uncorroborative statement of Shri Agarwal, which statement was taken under coercion by the police, was not justifiable. They requested the first respondent to keep Shri Agarwal present at the time of the personal hearing so as to give them an opportunity to cross-examine him. They also denied the allegations contained in the show cause notice. 4. They requested the first respondent to keep Shri Agarwal present at the time of the personal hearing so as to give them an opportunity to cross-examine him. They also denied the allegations contained in the show cause notice. 4. On the 27th July, 1988 Hon'ble Minister of State for Home gave a hearing to the petitioners. On the 26th August, 1988 the Assistant Secretary to the Government of Maharashtra, Home Department informed the petitioners the decision of the first respondent debarring the petitioners from receiving the book makers licence for 1988-89 and for two more racing seasons i.e. 1989-90 and 1990-91. Taking exception to the aforesaid, the petitioners filed the present petition on the 8th September, 1988. By order dated the 12th September, 1988 rule was issued in this petition and the petitioners were permitted to operate as book makers on an ad-hoc licence which was directed to be granted by the second respondent and approved by the first respondent. The petitioners were thus able to continue their business of book makers till the disposal of this petition. 5. Mr. Dada, the learned Counsel appearing in support of the petition submitted that the only material that was available with the first respondent was the prior statement of Shri Agarwal recorded by the police at the Police Station on the 4th December, 1986. The said Agarwal was not offered for cross-examination despite a specific request being made in that behalf. According to him, reliance on that solitary statement without examining him in the presence of the Minister and the petitioners and without affording an opportunity of cross-examining him infringed the principles of natural justice. Consequently, the penalty imposed depriving the petitioners of their right to carry on their business of book makers was liable to be quashed. According to him, no reliance could have been placed on the statement of Shri Agarwal especially when he had not been examined in the inquiry before the Minister. For ought one knows he might have been coerced by the police to make the statement. Till such time that the said statement was not tested by cross-examination, no reliance could be placed for holding the petitioners guilty and inflicting serious punishment entailing loss of business for a period of three long years. For ought one knows he might have been coerced by the police to make the statement. Till such time that the said statement was not tested by cross-examination, no reliance could be placed for holding the petitioners guilty and inflicting serious punishment entailing loss of business for a period of three long years. He further submitted that it one peruses the order dated 26th August, 1988 which was communicated to the petitioners, the same would show that it was passed by the Assistant Secretary (Home). He pointed out that the petitioners were given a hearing by the Minister whereas the decision was taken by the Assistant Secretary. According to him, he who hears must decide. Hence, the impugned order passed by the Assistant Secretary is liable to be quashed. 6. Mr. Dada further submitted that the petitioners had already been subjected to an inquiry and a penalty at the hands of the second respondent which inquiry was initiated at the instance of the first respondent. The second inquiry conducted by the first respondent had put the petitioners in a double jeopardy. Subjecting the petitioners to double jeopardy was not meeting out fair justice and fair play to the petitioners. Mr. Dada finally submitted that the petitioners had been found guilty vicariously for the acts of their employee Shri Agarwal. Shri Agarwal had been warned off and the petitioners had dismissed him from their service. The punishment debarring the petitioners from holding a licence for three years was unconsciously harsh in comparison to the trivility of the charges found against the petitioners. The petitioners have already suffered the penalty of fine and have already been deprived of their business during the Pune racing season in July 1987. Hence, the impugned penalty was liable to be struck down. 7. In my judgement, having regard to all the facts and circumstances of the case, it will have to be held that the impugned proceedings conducted against the petitioners lack the observance of the principles of natural justice. A bare perusal of the show cause notice dated the 14th June, 1988 would show that the entire proceedings were based on the solitary statement of Shri Agarwal which was recorded by the police at the Police Station on the 4th December, 1988. A bare perusal of the show cause notice dated the 14th June, 1988 would show that the entire proceedings were based on the solitary statement of Shri Agarwal which was recorded by the police at the Police Station on the 4th December, 1988. In reply to the show cause notice, the petitioners had specifically called upon the first respondent to keep the said Agarwal present for being cross-examined. No such thing was done. In the case of (Union of India v. T.R. Varma)1, reported in A.I.R. 1957 S.C. Page 882, on which reliance was placed by Mr. Dada, it was observed :--- "Now it is no doubt true that the evidence of the respondent and his witnesses was not taken in the mode prescribed in the Evidence Act; but that Act has no application to enquiries conducted by tribunals, even though they may be judicial in character. The law requires that such tribunals should observe rules if natural justice in the conduct of the enquiry and if they do so, their decision is not liable to be impeached on the ground that the procedure followed was not in accordance with that, which obtains in a Court of law. "Stating it broadly and without intending it to be exhaustive, it may be observed that rules of natural justice require that a party should have the opportunity of adducing all relevant evidence on which he relies, that the evidence of the opponent should be taken in his presence, and that he should be given the opportunity of cross-examining the witnesses examined by that party and that no materials should be relied on against him without his being given an opportunity of explaining them. "If these rules are satisfied, the enquiry is not open to attack on the ground that the procedure laid down in the Evidence Act for taking evidence was not strictly followed." 8. "If these rules are satisfied, the enquiry is not open to attack on the ground that the procedure laid down in the Evidence Act for taking evidence was not strictly followed." 8. In the case of (U.P. Warehousing Corporation v. Vijay Narayan)2, reported in A.I.R. 1980 S.C. Page 840 it was observed that :--- "The rules of natural justice in the circumstances of the case, required that the respondent should be given a reasonable opportunity to deny his guilt, to defend himself and to establish his innocence which means and includes an opportunity to cross-examine the witnesses relied upon by the appellant-Corporation and an opportunity to lead evidence in defence of the charge as also a show cause notice for the proposed punishment". In view of the aforesaid observations, I am inclined to hold that the impugned departmental proceedings lack the observance of the principles of natural justice. When the petitioners had specifically claimed that they should be given an opportunity to cross examine the sole witness whose statement was being used to condemn them, the principles of natural justice required that the said opportunity should have been given to them. 9. By the impugned order, the petitioners were found guilty of two irregularities, viz. : (a) They permitted Shri B.R. Agarwal, their Runner, to sit in the box allotted to them and infringed condition No. (8) of the Conditions regarding grant of Bookmaker's Licence incorporated in Condition No. 3 of the Licence to Race granted to the Turf Club, according to which each book maker shall have with him in his box, not more than 3 Assistants whose names are registered with the Turf Club, as per their Rules; (b) They permitted Shri B.R. Agarwal to accept coded bets not recorded by them in the betting books as required by Condition No. (7) of the Conditions regarding grant of book maker's licence incorporated in Condition No. 3 of the Licence to Race granted to the Turf Club, and infringed the said Condition No. (7) and also evaded payment of large amounts of betting tax to Government. For the irregularity (a) reliance was placed on a police report dated the 11th December, 1986. This report is signed by the Senior Inspector of Police who was admittedly not present at the time of the incident dated the 4th December, 1988. For the irregularity (a) reliance was placed on a police report dated the 11th December, 1986. This report is signed by the Senior Inspector of Police who was admittedly not present at the time of the incident dated the 4th December, 1988. That report in term makes a reference to the statement of Shri Agarwal recorded on that day. The said report and the statement of Shri Agarwal, in my view, without anything more would not justify the finding that the irregularity (a) has been brought home against the petitioners. The report of the Senior Inspector was not based on first hand information. This is not to suggest that hear-se evidence has to be excluded totally from the purview of domestic enquiries. However, in the absence of the Senior Inspector of Police and Shri Agarwal being examined and offered for cross-examination, it would be impermissible to hold the said charge proved as this would be in contravention of the principles of natural justice. When the petitioners submitted, before the Minister that the statement of Shri Agarwal had been procured under coercion, the impugned order observed :--- "Certain documents were found in his possession and when questioned, he made certain statement which was recorded by the police, on the basis of which the irregularities committed were listed. There was thus no coercion on the part of the police as alleged by the firm." I fail to see how on the material namely the documents found with Shri Agarwal such an inference can be drawn. In the absence of Shri Agarwal being offered for cross-examination, it would be impermissible to place reliance on his statement for arriving at the finding of guilt against the petitioners. 10. The impugned order can be assailed on the further ground that it has taken into account material of which the petitioners has no notice. The impugned order in para 9 recites:--- "When asked, Shri Agarwal could not tender his duty card for his presence in the stall vide statement dated the 4th December, 1986 of Shri B.A.M. Brako, Sub-Inspector of Police." If one peruses the show cause notice served upon the petitioners, it would be clear that this material which was taken into account was not furnished to the petitioners and the petitioners had no notice of it. The impugned order thus suffers from the lack of observance of principles of natural justice on this account also. 11. On the issue of subjecting the petitioners to double jeopardy, the Minister in para 12 observed :--- "Government is now to consider the suitability of the applicant for grant of a fresh licence, having regard to the past antecedents and conduct of the applicant. There is, therefore, no question of re-opening any issue decided by the Turf Club of imposing any punishment, not to speak of any double punishment." However, in the operative part of the order, the petitioners have been deprived of the grant of a book makers licence for three racing seasons. Hence it will have to be held that the impugned order does not merely consider the case of the petitioners for suitability for the grant of a licence but visits upon the petitioners the penalty of debarring them from the grant of licence for three racing seasons. In view of the foregoing reasons, it will have to be held that the impugned order cannot be sustained. 12. In regard to the second contention raised by Mr. Dada viz. that the hearing to the show cause notice was given by the Minister of State (Home) whereas the impugned order was passed by the Assistant Secretary (Home). Mr. Saraf, the learned Counsel appearing on behalf of the respondents produced before me the original file pertaining to the proceedings before the Minister. The same shows that the Minister has passed his judgment and order on the 8th August, 1988. Thereafter the Assistant Secretary has, on the 26th August, 1988, communicated the said order to the petitioners. While doing so, what he has done is whenever the Minister had stated that he was satisfied, the Assistant Secretary stated that the Government is satisfied. Apart from changing the tense in the order which the Assistant Secretary communicated to the petitioners, there has been no change. In the circumstances, I am inclined to hold that though the impugned order that was served upon the petitioners is signed by the Assistant Secretary, the said order is nothing else but the order passed by the Minister. In the circumstances the reliance of Mr. Dada on the case of (G. Nageswara Rao v. A.P.S.R.T. Corporation)3, reported in A.I.R. 1959 S.C. Page 308 can have no application. In the circumstances the reliance of Mr. Dada on the case of (G. Nageswara Rao v. A.P.S.R.T. Corporation)3, reported in A.I.R. 1959 S.C. Page 308 can have no application. In that case it was observed :--- "The procedure prescribed by the Rules impose a duty on the Secretary to hear and the Chief Minister to decide. This divided responsibility is destructive of the concept of judicial hearing. Such a procedure defeats the object of personal hearing. Personal hearing enables the authority concerned to watch the demeanour of the witnesses and clear-up his doubts during the course of arguments, and the party appearing to persuade the authority by reasoned argument to accept his point of view. If one person hears and another decides, then personal hearing becomes an empty formality." In view of my finding that the impugned order has been passed by none else but the Minister himself, who heard the petitioners, it cannot be held that the observations in the aforesaid case are applicable to the present case. These observations, however, no doubt support the first contention of Mr. Dada, viz. that it was incumbent upon the first respondent in the facts and circumstances of this case to examine the sole witness Shri Agarwal, which would have enabled the Minister to watch his demeanour in order to decide whether implicit faith can be placed on his testimony. For the reasons aforestated, the second contention of Mr. Dada deserves to be negatived. 13. As regards the third contention of Mr. Dada, viz. that the petitioners have been put to double jeopardy, it has to be noted that as far as the issue of licences to book makers is concerned, the licencing authority is the second respondent. It is no doubt true that the said function has to be performed by the second respondent with the sanction of the first respondent. Once the Senior Inspector of Police who is none else but personnel of the first respondent in the Home Department forwarded his report to the second respondent for the purpose of taking necessary action, it will have to be held that the action initiated by the second respondent was at the instance of the first respondent. Second respondent who are the licencing authority held departmental proceedings both against the petitioners and their employee Shri Agarwal and awarded the respective punishments against each of them. Second respondent who are the licencing authority held departmental proceedings both against the petitioners and their employee Shri Agarwal and awarded the respective punishments against each of them. If the second respondent had done so at the instance the first respondent, it is difficult to see how the first respondent can be permitted to initiate fresh departmental proceedings in respect of the same cause of action. The issuance of the impugned show cause notice and the proceedings in relation thereto cannot be held to be fair justice and fair play being meted out to the petitioners. Right of equality guaranteed under Article 14 is no longer restricted to mere equal treatment before laws. There can be no doubt that it is a founding faith of the Constitution. It is indeed the pillar on which rests securely the foundation of our domestic republic. And, therefore, it must not be subjected to a narrow, pedantic or lexicographic approach. No attempt should be made to truncate its all-embracing scope an meaning, for to do so would be to violate its activist magnitude. Equality is a dynamic concept with many aspects and dimensions and it cannot be imprisoned within traditional and doctrinaire limits. From a positivistic point of view, equality is antithetic to arbitrariness. In fact equality and arbitrariness are sworn enemies; one belongs to the rule of law in a republic, while the other, to the whim and caprice of an absolute monarch. Where an act is arbitrary, it is implicit in it that it is unequal both according to political logic and constitutional law and is therefore violative of Article 14. Article 14 strikes at arbitrariness in State action and ensures fairness and equality of treatment. The principle of reasonableness, which legally as well as philosophically, is an essential element of equality or non-arbitrariness pervades Article 14 like a brooding omnipresence and the procedure contemplated by Article 21 must answer the test of reasonableness in order to be in conformity with Article 14. It must be 'right and just and fair' and not arbitrary, fanciful or oppressive; otherwise, it would be no procedure at all and the requirement of Article 21 would not be satisfied. (Maneka Gandhi v. Union of India)4, A.I.R. 1978 S.C. Page 597. 14. It must be 'right and just and fair' and not arbitrary, fanciful or oppressive; otherwise, it would be no procedure at all and the requirement of Article 21 would not be satisfied. (Maneka Gandhi v. Union of India)4, A.I.R. 1978 S.C. Page 597. 14. It has been observed in the case of (Ramana v. I.A. Authority of India)5, A.I.R. 1979 S.C. Page 1628 that :--- "Today the Government, in a welfare State is the regulator and dispenser of social services and provider of a large number of benefits, including jobs contracts, licences, quotas, mineral rights etc. The Government pours forth wealth, money, benefits, services, contracts, quotas and licences. The valuables dispensed by Government take many forms, but they all share one characteristic. They are steadily taking the place of traditional forms of wealth. These valuables which derive from relationships to Government are of many kinds. They comprise social security benefits, cash grants for political sufferers and the whole scheme of State and local welfare. Then again, thousands of people are employed in the State and the Central Government and local authorities. Licences are required before one can engage in many kinds of businesses or work. The power of giving licences means power to withhold them and this gives control to the Government or to the agents of Government on the lives of many people. Many individuals and many more businesses enjoy largess in the form of Government contracts. These contracts often resemble subsidies. It is virtually set up primarily to do business with Government. Government owns and controls hundreds of acres of public land valuable for mining and other purposes. These resources are available for utilisation by private corporations and individuals by way of lease or licence. All these mean growth in the Government largess and with the increasing magnitude and range of governmental functions as we move closer to a welfare state more and more of our wealth consists of these new forms. Some of these forms of wealth may be in the nature of legal rights but the large majority of them are in the nature of privileges. But on that account, can it be said that they do not enjoy any legal protection? Can they be regarded as gratuity furnished by the State so that the State may withhold, grant or revoke it at its pleasure? But on that account, can it be said that they do not enjoy any legal protection? Can they be regarded as gratuity furnished by the State so that the State may withhold, grant or revoke it at its pleasure? Is the position of the Government in this respect the same as that of a private giver? We do not think so. The law has not been slow to recognise the importance of this new kind of wealth and the need to protect individual interest in it and with that end in view, it has developed new forms of protection. Some interests in Government largess, formerly regarded as privileges, have been recognised as rights while others have been given legal protection not only by forging procedural safeguards but also confining/structuring and checking Government discretion in the matter of grant of such largess." In view of the aforesaid, I am inclined to hold that the impugned show cause notice and the proceedings held in pursuance thereof are not justified. 15. In regard to the last contention of Mr. Dada that the punishment in the instant case is unconscionably harsh, he relied upon the case of (R. v. Barnsley Metropolitan Borough Council)6, reported in (1976)3 All England Reports Page 452, wherein it was held that, the Court can interfere by certiorari if the punishment is altogether excessive and out of proportion to the occasion. However in view of my findings on the first and the third contention raised by Mr. Dada, I do not propose to give any finding on the present issue. 16. Mr. Saraf, the learned Counsel appearing on behalf of the first respondent made a gallant effort to support the order of the Minister by contending that the petitioners had been held guilty by the stewards of the second respondent after proper hearing was afforded to them. The petitioners suffered the penalty imposed by the second respondent without a murmur. Though an appeal is provided, they did not choose to prefer the same. They had virtually accepted the finding of guilt recorded by the stewards. If the first respondent had relied upon the very material which was before the second respondent, no grievance can be made by the petitioners as they were estopped by their conduct. Though an appeal is provided, they did not choose to prefer the same. They had virtually accepted the finding of guilt recorded by the stewards. If the first respondent had relied upon the very material which was before the second respondent, no grievance can be made by the petitioners as they were estopped by their conduct. Placing reliance on the case of (State of Haryana v. Rattan Singh)7, reported in A.I.R. 1977 S.C. Page 1512, he submitted that strict rules of Evidence Act were not applicable to domestic enquiries. The statement of Shri Agarwal which was recorded on the very day of the incident was before the Minister. The impugned order also shows that the statement dated the 4th December, 1986 of Shri B.A.M. Brako, Sub-Inspector of Police as also the report of the Senior Inspector C.I.D. dated the 11th December, 1986 was also before the Minister. If after considering the said record as also all the facts and circumstances of he case, if the Minister arrived at his finding of guilt against the petitioners, no fault could be found there with. It has been held in the aforesaid decision :--- "In a domestic enquiry the strict and sophisticated rules of evidence under the Evidence Act may not apply. All materials which are logically probative for a prudent mind are permissible. There is no allergy to hear-say evidence provided it has reasonable nexus and credibility. The departmental authorities and administrative tribunals must be careful in evaluating such material and should not glibly swallow what is strictly speaking not relevant under the Evidence Act. "The sufficiency of evidence in proof of the finding by a domestic tribunal is beyond scrutiny. Absence of any evidence in support of a finding is certainly available for the Court to look into because it amounts to an error of law apparent on the record. "Where a bus conductor of a State Transport undertaking was charge sheeted for not collecting fares from certain passengers and on his guilt being established there was simple termination of his services because of his long services and young age, it could not be said that merely because statements of passengers were not recorded by the Inspector of the flying squad, the order that followed was invalid. The evidence of the Inspector was some evidence which had relevance to the charge against the bus conductor : order of simple termination of services was valid." In my judgment, there is no merit in the contentions raised by Mr. Saraf. This is not a case of sufficiency or otherwise of the material for arriving at a finding of guilt. The present case in a case of no evidence. Moreover if the enquiry stands vitiated on the ground of non compliance of the principles of natural justice no amount of evidence can be pressed in service in support of the impugned finding of guilt. Similarly, the mere fact that the petitioners did not file any appeal against the punishment awarded by the second respondent that cannot be held by any stretch of imagination, to amount to a plea of guilt. An appeal may not have been filed for various reasons. The petitioners may not have found it worth while in view of the penalty imposed. However, it cannot be held that their inaction of not filing the appeal amounts to the acceptance of guilt as contended by Mr. Saraf. The petitioners therefore, cannot be estopped from challenging the impugned show cause notice and the consequent order passed by the Minister. 18. Mr. Saraf further placed reliance on the decision of (Rajiv Ranjan Sharan v. State of Bihar)8, reported in A.I.R. 1986 Patna Page 317, wherein it was observed :--- "A Court of law cannot direct the grant of a licence to a particular person. Neither can the Court by an interim order sanctify the carrying on of an activity for which a licence is a legal prerequisite in the instant case the exhibition of films through V.C.R. in hotels and public places during the pendency of an application for such licence. "No citizen has a fundamental or inherent right to carry on an activity which requires a licence under the valid provisions of a statute. The very concept of licensing power in the State implies a discretion to grant or refuse a licence. It cannot be said that if the statutory requisites are satisfied by a person then that person would be entitled to a licence and the same cannot be refused. The very concept of licensing power in the State implies a discretion to grant or refuse a licence. It cannot be said that if the statutory requisites are satisfied by a person then that person would be entitled to a licence and the same cannot be refused. If refusal is barred to the licensing authority then the very character of a licence would be abrogated and it would then become a vested right of the applicant. Therefore, for the Court to mandate the grant of a licence to a particular person would be flouting the intention of the legislature which assumes discretion in the licensing power and would be a usurpation of the function of the licensing authority. The mere pendency of an application for a licence does not give any right or claim to the applicant to carry on such activity even before the grant." Placing reliance on the aforesaid case, Mr. Saraf submitted that to grant or to refuse a licence was the function of the Government. There was no fundamental right vested in anybody to receive a licence. This was a discretion vested exclusively in Government. The Government after taking into account all the material placed before it arrived at its conclusion that the petitioners were not entitled to receive a licence. This decision of the Government was not liable to be interfered with in a writ petition. 19. In my view, the aforesaid contention of Mr. Saraf is devoid of any merit. This is not a case of a grant or a refusal of a licence. This is a case of renewal of licence. The petitioners who have been holding this licence for about 0 years have been held not entitled to the renewal thereof. Not only this, but they have been debarred from holding a licence for three racing seasons. This is therefore, not a case of a refusal of a fresh licence but a case where a penalty of far reaching consequences have been visited upon the petitioners. If such a penalty is imposed without following the principles of natural justice, surely, this Court cannot be powerless to issue an appropriate writ to quash such a decision of the first respondent. The licencing authority is not the first respondent but the second respondent. It is no doubt true that the second respondent has to obtain the sanction of the Government viz. the first respondent. The licencing authority is not the first respondent but the second respondent. It is no doubt true that the second respondent has to obtain the sanction of the Government viz. the first respondent. If the first respondent after detecting certain irregularities directed the second respondent to take necessary action against the petitioner and his employee and the second respondent accordingly did hold an enquiry and did impose a punishment which in its judgment was adequate in the circumstances of the case, I fail to see how the second respondent can be permitted to hold a fresh enquiry in respect of the very same cause of action in respect of which it has directed the second respondent to hold an enquiry. 20. Mr. Saraf, on placing reliance on Condition 3(3) of the Conditions of Licence, submitted that it was open to the Government at any time without assigning any reasons require the second respondent to suspend or cancel the licence of the petitioners. The said Condition 3(3) reads as under :--- "3(3). Government may at any time, without assigning any reasons require the Licenses to suspend or cancel the licence/permit of any or all the book makers : If a licence/permit granted to any book-maker is suspended or cancelled by the Licensees, the Licensees shall send a written intimation thereof to the Government within seven days from the date of such suspension or cancellation. If the Government so directs the Licensees shall within the time fixed by the Government revoke any such suspension or cancellation." According to Mr. Saraf, the Government had by the impugned order exercised the aforesaid power contained in the Conditions of Licence. In my view, the impugned order cannot be sustained on the aforesaid condition for the simple reason that the impugned order does not call upon the second respondent to suspend or cancel a licence of the petitioners which is subsisting but it debars the petitioners from being granted a licence of three racing seasons. 21. Mr. Saraf finally relied upon an unreported judgement of this Court in Appeal No. 124 of 1988 in Writ Petition No. 59 of 1988 decided by Lentin Mrs. Sujata Manohar, JJ., on the 3rd February, 1988. According to Mr. Saraf, on facts which are practically identical to the facts of the present case, this Court had refused to interfere in writ jurisdiction. 22. Sujata Manohar, JJ., on the 3rd February, 1988. According to Mr. Saraf, on facts which are practically identical to the facts of the present case, this Court had refused to interfere in writ jurisdiction. 22. In my view, the observations contained in the aforesaid decision can have no application to the present case. In that case, there was controversy whether hearing was given by the Minister to the petitioners therein, and it was found on the material placed in that case that adequate hearing was given. It has been observed in the aforesaid decision that every matters must depend on its own facts and its own merits. Hence, the observations contained in the aforesaid decision cannot advance the submissions of Mr. Saraf. 23. In view of the foregoing reasons, I am inclined to hold that the impugned show cause notice as also the impugned order debarring the petitioners from holding a book makers licence for three years cannot be sustained and is liable to be quashed. In the result, the petition succeeds. The show cause notice dated the 14th June, 1988 and the impugned order dated the 26th August, 1988 are quashed and set aside and it is directed that the respondents shall not refuse to the petitioners the book makers licence on the ground of the incident dated the 4th December, 1986 in respect of which the impugned show cause notice and the impugned order was passed. Rule absolute in the above terms. In the facts and circumstances of this case, there shall be no order as to costs. Rule made absolute. -----