K. J. VAIDYA, J. ( 1 ) THIS acquittal appeal arises out of the judgment and order dated 30th April 1580 rendered in Criminal Case No. 737 of 1979 passed by the learned J. M. F. C. Mahuva wherein three accused persons namely: (i) Doshi Talakchand Durlabhdas; (ii) Doshi Jethalal Durlabhdas and (iii) Doshi Himatlal Gulabchand who came to be tried for offences punishable under Sec. 352 504 506 of I. P. C. were acquitted. . . . . . . . . . . . . ( 2 ) MR. D. K. Trivedi learned Addl. P. P. for the State submitted that the Impugned order of equities is illegal being contrary to the acceptable and reliable evidence of two prosecution witnesses namely (i) P. W. 1 Mohmadhussein Fidahussein Ex. 15 and (ii) P. W. 2 Taherali Gulamali Ex. 16. In order to make good the aforesaid submission the learned Addl. P. P. has taken me through the evidence of the said two prosecution witnesses as well as reasons for acquittal given by the trial Court in its judgment. ( 3 ) HAVING carefully gone through the entire material on the record of the case I am satisfied to hold that the view by the trial Court in reaching the ultimate conclusion of acquittal is absolutely legal and proper and warrants no interference at all particularly in view of the strained relations between the complainant and the accused it is not advisable to blindly accept an uncorroborated testimony of the prosecution witnesses as a gospel truth. Taking the allegations in the complaint as will as in the evidence before the Court against the accused on its face value that at its best remains at the stage of may be true and/or may not be true in absences of any corroboration forthcoming from an independent source. Under such circumstances the accused would be reasonably entitled to the benefit of doubt which the trial Court has rightly given. Under such circumstances the accused would be reasonably entitled to the benefit of doubt which the trial Court has rightly given. Further I cannot afford to be oblivious to the fact that the appeal I am dealing with is an acquittal appeal and that having regard to the facts and circumstances of the case as discussed hereinabove I need not disregard the Rule of judicial prudence which it on going through the evidence on record if the other view of convicting the accused was possible then even the High Court should not lightly interfere with such finding of acquittal unless it is proved to be perverse. So far as the powers of the High Court in acquittal appeals are concerned the position regarding the same by now is well defined crystallized and settled by plethora of judgments by the Honble Supreme Court and to quote one such out of many is a case of Awadesh and Anr. So far as the powers of the High Court in acquittal appeals are concerned the position regarding the same by now is well defined crystallized and settled by plethora of judgments by the Honble Supreme Court and to quote one such out of many is a case of Awadesh and Anr. v. State of Madhya Pradesh reported in AIR 1988 SC 1158 the guiding principle underlying the same is reproduced as under:although the powers of the High Court to reassess the evidence and reach its Own Conclusion are as extensive as in an appeal against the order of conviction yet as a rule of prudence the High Court should always give proper right and consideration to matters e. g. (i) the view of the trial under as to the credibility of the witnesses (ii) the presumption of innocence in favor of the schussed a presumption certainly not weakened by the fact that be has been acquitted at the trial; (iii) the right of the accused to the benefit of any doubt and (iv) the slowness of an appellate Court in disturbing a finding of fact arrived at by a Judge who had the advocate of seeing the witnesses If on appraisal of the evidence and on considering relevant attending circumstances it is found that two views are possible one as held by the trial Court for equitation the accused ant the other for convicting the accused in such a situation the rule of prudence should guilt the High Court not to disturb the order of acquittal made by the trial Court unless the conclusion of the trial Court drawn on the evidence on record are found to be unreasonable perverse or unsuitable the High Court should not interfere with the order of acquittal in trial instant case the High Court did not hold that the view taken by the the Court was not a possible view but repressed the evidence and tusk a different view and it explained the infirmities of the prosecution pointed out by the Section Judge. the High Court could be said to have disregarded the rule of Judicial prudence in converting the order of acquittal to conviction ( 4 ) FURTHER since I am in general agreement with the order of acquittal passed by the trial Court I do not deem it necessary once again either to re-narrate the evidence of the prosecution witnesses or re-state appreciation of evidence and reasons for acquittal given by the trial Court. Had any of the parties appearing before me urged any new point which had not been dealt with and discussed by the trial Court then in that case this Court would have been duty bound to appropriately deal and discuss the same in this judgment. That is not the case here. Suffice it to say that I am in general and complete agreement with the appreciation of evidence and reasons for the acquittal given by the trial Court and no case is made out by the learned Addl. P. P. to disturb the judgment and order of acquittal recorded by the trial Court. ( 5 ) AS a matter of fact this practice of being brief and precise does find support from a decision reported in the case of The State of Karnataka v. Hemareddy AIR 1981 SC 1417 . The relevant paragraph 6 of which is reproduced as under:we are taken through the judgment of the learned judges of the High Court We are satisfied that the learned judges were justified in coming to the conclusion on the evidence that Hemareddy alias Vamareddy is guilty under Sec. 467 IPC read with Sec. 114 IPC and that Pyatal Bhimakka is guilty under Sec. 467 IPC. Since we agree with the learned Judges of the High Court on the question of fact in so far as it relates to A. 2 in full and as regards Hemareddy alias Vamareddy (A. 2) in respect of his Conviction under Sec. 467 read with Sec. 114 it is unnecessary for us to refer to the evidence relied upon by the learned Judges for coming to the conclusion that Hemareddy alias Vamareddy is guilty under Sec. 467 read with Sec. 114 IPC and that Pyatal Bhimakka is guilty under Sec. 461 IPC. This Court has observed in Girija Nandini Devi v. Bigendra Narain Choudry 1967 (1) SCR 93 : (AIR 1967 SC 11 (6) that it is not the duty of the appellate Court when it agrees with the view of the trial Court on the evidence to repeat the notation of the evidence or to reiterate the reasons given by the Court the decision of which is under appeal will ordinarily suffice. ( 6 ) AS a matter of fact I feel that delivering a brief judgment wherever it is possible is a dire need of an hour. It helps in quick disposals of appeals which in turn reduces the backload and pressure of the work on the Court. Further such brief judgment in appeal against the order of acquittal or conviction do not in any way prejudice either of the parties desiring to challenge the same before any highest forum. When the appeal itself is in nature of a continuous proceeding then judgment and order passed by the High Court merges with the rest of the record of the case. Thus it would be in the fitness of things for any appellate Court not to unnecessarily burden its judgment by re-stating and repeating the material which is otherwise available in the record. When day after day Courts are being crushed down under a severe burden of the backload and ever increasing spate of litigation and further when the plight of citizens clamoring for justice is becoming unbearable I feel it would be in the greater public interest to meet with such exigencies by resorting to brief and precise judgment. The time so saved in giving brief judgment can be so well spent in attending to and disposing of other matters. Further before the galloping decease of delay get out of the control let the Courts (to best of its capacity) which are occasionally attributed of delay in disposing of the cases all the appellate stage get rid of the same by being brief in judgment to improve the situation and to silent the well meaning critics. This can be done as stated earlier when the appellate Court is in central agreement with the appreciation of evidence and the reasons given in support of its judgment and order does not unnecessarily further burden its appellate judgment. This can be done as stated earlier when the appellate Court is in central agreement with the appreciation of evidence and the reasons given in support of its judgment and order does not unnecessarily further burden its appellate judgment. However if any new point is urged before the appellate Court which is neither dealt nor discussed with by the subordinate Court and further when the facts and circumstances of the case warrant any fresh elaborate guidelines to be given to the trial Court and in a case where it is felt that the guidelines so laid down by the higher and superior Courts are being ignored by the trial Court in that case those guidelines be once again re-emphasized and streamlined in order to correct the erring subordinate Courts the appellate Court may in larger interest of justice to interfere and be little more elaborate in its judgment. ( 7 ) IN the result the impugned judgment and order of acquittal passed by the trial Court is confirmed and the appeal against acquittal filed by the State is dismissed. Order accordingly. .