JUDGMENT 1. This appeal arises out of the judgment Sub-Judge, First Class, Kullu, in case No.187/71 and 186/71 decided on 1-12-1973 thereby dismissing the objections of the appellant for setting aside the award given by the Arbitrator in the disputes between the parties. 2. The facts, in brief, are that the appellant executed contracts for felling-rolling, logging and loading of timber of Timber Extraction Division, Kullu. These agreements were executed on 26-12-1970. There arose disputes between the parties regarding the amount due for the execution of the works in question. Consequently, Shri B. S. Parmar, who was Conservator of Forests in the Department of Forests, Government of Himachal Pradesh, was appointed as the Arbitrator with the consent of the parties on 8-1-1972. The Arbitrator proceeded with the matter. He was to determine as to how much work was done by the appellant and what payment was due to him. The arbitrator was to decide the matter after giving the parties an opportunity for placing their cases. The award was submitted on 23-2-1973. The appellant was awarded Rs. 2307.40 for 1660 cft. of logs that were washed away in the flood and thus loss at the rate of Rs. 1.39 per cft. for felling, logging and rolling etc. The appellant was further allowed Rs. 1676.22 for the felling and logging charges of 3991 cft. of logs that were lying in the forests at the rate of Rs. 0.42 per cft. and Rs. 12242.16, the cost of 29148 cft. of logs buried in the debries. The appellant did not agree with the award and filed objections thereto on 28-3-1973 and raised number of objections. Out of them, the principal objection was that his witnesses Karama Durje and one Mohinder Singh Block Officer, who was in charge of the forest, were not examined. The second objection pertained to the behaviour of the Arbitrator in siding with the department and accepting their courtesies. 3. On the pleadings of the parties, the following issues were framed: " 1. Whether the award dated 23-2-1973 by Shri B. S. Parmar, Arbitrator, is vitiated by misconduct as alleged in the application? OPP 2. Relief." 3. After the trial of the case, the objections of the appellant were dismissed. This is how the matter has come in this Court. 4. Whether the award dated 23-2-1973 by Shri B. S. Parmar, Arbitrator, is vitiated by misconduct as alleged in the application? OPP 2. Relief." 3. After the trial of the case, the objections of the appellant were dismissed. This is how the matter has come in this Court. 4. Shri Lokender Thakur, vide Shri M. G. Chitkara, learned counsel appearing for the appellant, has reiterated those very objections against the award that had once been raised before the Court at Kullu. Before proceeding further to examine the same, it is necessary to quote the provisions of S. 30 of the Arbitration Act : " 30. Grounds for setting aside award, An award shall not be set aside except on one or more of the following grounds namely : (a) that an arbitrator or umpire has misconducted himself or the proceedings; (b) that an award has been made after the issue of an order by the Court superseding the arbitration or after arbitration proceedings have become invalid under S. 35: (c) that an award has been improperly procured or is otherwise invalid." 5. A perusal of this provision indicates that the award can be set aside only if the matter comes within the parameters of this Section. It is well known that the Arbitrator, unless specifically directed either by the Court or the agreement to make a speaking award, he has every authority to give a non-speaking award. Unless it is shown to be perverse or erroneous on the face of the record, it cannot be set aside. It is not open to the court to reassess the evidence to find out if the Arbitrator has committed any error making it to be perverse or erroneous. The Court has also no jurisdiction to set aside the same on the adequacy of evidence nor does it sit in appeal over the conclusions of the Arbitrator by a process of re-examining and re-appreciating the evidence considered by the Arbitrator. Misconduct is otherwise a broad term and if thus comprehended, includes every error that may be due to some honest mistake but u/S. 30 of the Arbitration Act, it has a definite and a well defined meaning covering legal misconduct and personal misconduct as to the proceedings causing miscarriage of justice by arbitrariness or violation of essentials applicable in dealing with the matter. Referring to the twin objections of the learned counsel for the appellant, I see no substance in any of them for the simple reason that these allegations are not only too vague but also an afterthought. Allegations have to be precise and meaningful. The arbitrator was selected by the parties mutually. They were heard by him. Relevant witnesses were examined in the matter. The Arbitrator has appeared as a witness in this case and he has categorically denied that Karama Dorje was produced by the appellant and he refused to examine him; rather whosoever was produced by the appellant and the other party was examined by him. The award was given by him on the basis of the record produced by both the parties as well as the evidence adduced by them. He further states that the appellant, though filed number of applications, for the summoning of record, he allowed only that application which was relevant for the summoning of the record. He visited the spot from the point of his suitability. The appellant has not crossexamined him. Therefore, in case the appellant had any grievance of any kind, he should have asked those questions from the Arbitrator. Having failed to do so, it is too late to allow the appellant to levy charges of misconduct against the Arbitrator. 6. The Court below has examined this matter at length and in details. I see no justification to differ with its reasonings and conclusions, it is a non-speaking award and in view of the evidence on the record of the case and the submissions of the learned counsel for the parties. There is no reason to interfere with the judgment of the trial court. The Arbitrator has not committed any misconduct within the meaning of S.30 of the Arbitration Act and the objections of the appellant against the award are thoroughly inapt, baseless, vague, casual and devoid of any merit. The same are accordingly rejected. 7. No other point or submission was raised by any of the learned counsel for the parties. 8. The result of the aforesaid discussion is that there is no merit in this appeal and the same is accordingly dismissed leaving the parties to bear their own costs. Appeal dismissed.