K. K. VERMA, J. ( 1 ) SENSING a conflict between Jagdish Chandra v. Sara Bai, 1984 MPRCJ (Note) 105, dated 13-3-1984 of Muley, J. and 'phool Chandra Garg v. Ram Narain' in C. M. A. No. 85 of 1974, (G) decided by. Rampal Singh, J. , on 28-6-1985, on the interpretation of sub-s. (6) of S. 12 of the M. P. Accommodation Control Act, 1961 (Act 41 of 1961) - hereinafter 'the Act'-, the learned single Judge, Dr. T. N. Singh, J. , stated the following question for decision by a larger Bench. "whether it is obligatory on the Court passing the decree for eviction to make an order for determination of "standard rent" in accordance with the provisions of S. 7/10 of the M. P. Accommodation Control Act before passing an order of compensation payable to the landlord and before landlord's obtaining possession of the concerned premises, or the order for compensation may be passed on the basis of agreed or contractual rent, according to the terms of the tenancy between the parties?" ( 2 ) FOR a focal adjustment and then to find the focal point of the reference and the required answer-thereto, we have to bear in mind that the order of reference contains no admitted/proved facts and circumstances of the case. The order which refers to a conflict between Jagdish Chandra's case, 1984 MPRCJ (Note) 105 and Phool Chandra's case (C. M. A. No. 85 of 1974, decided on 28-6-85), does not mention the ratio decidendi of those judgments. Hence the order of reference and the question stated therein call for an answer not merely to the stated question, but to the stated question seen in the context of any discoverable conflict between the two rulings on the interpretation of the provisions of sub-s. (6) of S. 12 of the Act, and expect us to resolve the predicated conflict in the rulings. ( 3 ) WE shall be construing the provisions of sub-s. (6) of S. 12 in the context of other parts of the Act; for this, we have the following authority of Reserve Bank of India v. Peerless General Finance and Investment Co. (1987)1 SCC 424 at p. 450, Chinnappa Reddy, J. said :"interpretation must depend on the text and the context. They are the bases of interpretation. One may well say if the text is the texture, context is what gives colour. (1987)1 SCC 424 at p. 450, Chinnappa Reddy, J. said :"interpretation must depend on the text and the context. They are the bases of interpretation. One may well say if the text is the texture, context is what gives colour. Neither can be ignored. Both are important. That interpretation is best which makes the textual interpretation match the contextual. A statute is best interpreted when we know why it was enacted". ( 4 ) THE other authority is State of West Bengal v. Union of India, AIR 1963 SC 1241 at p. 1265, Sinha C. J. , said :"the Court must ascertain the intention. of the Legislature by directing its attention not merely to the clauses to be construed but to the entire statute; it must compare the clause with the other parts of the law, and the setting in which the clause to be interpreted occurs. " ( 5 ) CHAPTER III (Control of Eviction of Tenants) of the Act contains Ss. 12 to 23. The material portions of sub-section (1) and of clause (f) thereof and the provisions of sub-section (6) of S. 12, are as follows :"12. Restriction on eviction of tenants : (1) Notwithstanding anything to the contrary contained in any other law or contract, no suit shall be filed in any Civil Court against a tenant for his eviction from any accommodation except on one or more of the following grounds only, namely : x x x x x x (f) that the accommodation let for nonresidential purposes is required bona fide by the landlord for the purpose of continuing or starting his business or that of any of his major sons or unmarried daughters if he is the owner thereof or for any person for whose benefit the accommodation is held and that the landlord or such person has no other reasonably suitable non-residential accommodation of his own in his occupation in the city or town concerned; x x x x x x (6) Where an order for the eviction of a tenant is made on the ground specified in Cl. (f) of sub-sec. (f) of sub-sec. (1), the landlord shall not be entitled to obtain possession thereof- (a) before the expiration of a period of two months from the date of the order; and (b) if the accommodation is situated in cities of Gwalior (including Lashkar and Morar), Indore, Ujjain, Ratlam, Bhopal, Jabalpur, Raipur, or Durg or such other towns or cities specified by the State Government by a notification in that behalf, unless the landlord pays to the tenant such amount by way of compensation as may be equal to- (i) double the amount of "the annual standard rent" of the accommodation in the following cases namely : (a) where the accommodation has, for a period of ten complete years immediately preceding the date on which the landlord files a suit for possession thereof, been used for business purposes or far any other purpose, along with such purposes, by the tenant who is being evicted; (b) where during the aforesaid period of ten years, the tenant carrying on any business in the accommodation has left it and the tenant immediately succeeding has acquired the business of his predecessor either through transfer or inheritance; (ii) the amount of the annual standard rent in other cases. "( 6 ) THE provisions of sub-s. (1) of S. 13 have a nexus with the provisions of sub-s. (1) and Cl. (f) and, therefore, also with sub-s. (6) of S. 12. ( 7 ) S. 13 (1) runs as follows :"13. Then tenant can get benefit of protection against eviction- (1) On a suit or proceeding being instituted by the landlord on any of the grounds referred to in S. 12, the tenant shall, within one month of the service of the writ of summons on him or within such further time as the Court may, on an application made to it, allow in this behalf, deposit in the Court to pay to the landlord an amount calculated at the rate of rent at which it was paid for the period for which the tenant may have made default including the period subsequent thereto up to the end of the month previous to that in which the deposit or payment is made; and shall thereafter continue to deposit or pay, month by month, by the 15th of each succeeding month a sum equivalent to the rent at that rate. " ( 8 ) THE definition clause of the Act is in S. 2. The relevant definitions are as follows : 2. Definitions. In this Act, unless the context otherwise requires,-x x x x x x (c) "lawful increase" means an increase in rent permitted under the provisions of this Act; x x x x x x (f) "rent Controlling Authority" means an officer appointed under S. 23; (g) "repealed Act" means the Madhya Pradesh Accommodation Control Act, 1955 (1955) repealed under S. 51; (h) "standard rent" in relation to any accommodation means standard rent referred to in S. 7 or where the standard rent has been increased under S. 8, such increased rent; x x x x x x ( 9 ) CHAPTER 11 of the Act (Provisions Regarding Rent) contains Ss. 4 to 10. ( 10 ) SECTION 7 says :"7. 4 to 10. ( 10 ) SECTION 7 says :"7. Standard rent.- "standard rent" in relation to any accommodation means- (i) where reasonable annual rent or fair rent has been fixed by a competent authority under the repealed Act or prior to the commencement of the repealed Act, as the case may be, by a competent authority under the enactment for the time being in force, such reasonable annual rent or fair rent; (2) (i) where the accommodation was let out on or before the Ist day of January, 1948, and the reasonable annual rent or fair rent has not been so fixed, the rent of that accommodation as shown in the Municipal Assessment Register or as was realised on the Ist day of January, 1948, whichever is less; or (ii) where the accommodation was not let out on or before the Ist day of January, 1948, the rent of that accommodation as shown in the Municipal Assessment Register or as could be realised on the Ist day of January, 1948, whichever is less : increased- (a) in case of a residential accommodation and accommodation used for educational purposes, by thirty-five per cent of such rent; (h) in the case of other accommodation by seventy per cent of such rent; (and) (c) in case the benefit is not liable to pay the municipal tax there has been any increase in municipal tax subsequent to Ist day of January, 1948 (by an amount equal to such increase) : provided that the increase specified in paragraphs (a) and (b) shall be permissible only if the accommodation has been kept in good and tenantable repairs; (3) in case of accommodation not falling under Cl. (1) or (2) above,- (a) if the accommodation is separately assessed to municipal assessment the annual rent according to such assessment plus fifteen per cent thereon; (b) if only a part of the accommodation is so assessed, the proportionate amount of the annual rent for the whole accommodation according to such assessment plus fifteen per cent thereon; (c) if the accommodation is not so assessed.- (i) the annual rent calculated with reference to the rent agreed upon between the landlord and the tenant when such accommodation is first let out, and if it has not been so let out, to such amount for which it could be let out immediately after its construction was completed; or (ii) the annual rent calculated on the basis of annual payment of an amount equal to 63/4 per cent per annum of the aggregate amount of the actual cost of construction and the market price of the land comprised in the accommodation on the date of the commencement of the construction; whichever is less. " ( 11 ) SECTION 10 says :"10. Rent Controlling Authority to fix standard rent, etc.- (1) The Rent Controlling Authority shall, on an application made to it in this behalf, either by the landlord or by the tenant, in the prescribed manner, fix in respect of any accommodation- (i) the standard rent in accordance with the provisions of S. 7; or (ii) the increase, if any, referred to in S. 8. (2) In fixing the standard rent of any accommodation or the lawful increase thereof, the Rent Controlling Authority shall fix an amount which appears to it to be reasonable having regard to the provisions of S. 7 or S. 8 and the circumstances of the case. (3) In fixing the standard rent of any accommodation part of which has been lawfully sub-let, the Rent Controlling Authority may also fix the standard rent of the part sub-let. (4) Where for any reason it is not possible to determine the standard rent of any accommodation on the principles set forth under s. 7, the Rent Controlling Authority may fix such rent as would be reasonable having regard to the situation, locality and condition of the accommodation and the amenities provided therein and where there are similar or nearly similar accommodations in the locality, having regard also to the standard rent payable in respect of such accommodations. (5) The standard rent shall be fixed for a tenancy of twelve months : provided that where the tenancy is from month to month or for any period less than a month, the standard rent for such tenancy shall bear the same proportion to the annual standard rent as the period of tenancy bears to twelve months. (6) In fixing the standard rent of any accommodation under this section the Rent Controlling Authority shall fix the standard rent thereof in an unfurnished state and may also determine an additional charge to be payable on account of any furniture supplied by the landlord and it shall be lawful for the landlord to recover such additional charge from the tenant. (7) In fixing the standard rent of any accommodation under this section, the Rent Controlling Authority shall specify a date from which the standard rent so fixed shall be deemed to have effect. Provided that in no case the date so specified shall be earlier than thirty days prior to the date of the filing of the application for the fixation of the standard rent". ( 12 ) NOW the rulings in the order of reference. Jagdish Chandra v. Sarabai, 1984 MPRCJ (Notes) 105 is a judgment in second appeal by a tenant. There the agreed rent was Rs. 125/- per month. The sum of Rs. 125/- was accepted by the Court below for fixing the amount of compensation (Rs. 1,500/-) payable under sub-clause (ii) of Cl. (b) of subs. (6) of S. 12. ( 13 ) IN the High Court the tenant's plea about the quantum of the compensation was that it could be paid on the basis of the standard rent which had not been fixed in the case. The tenant relied on 'bhailal v. Shadilal', 1982 MPRCJ 147 for his submission that the landlord could obtain possession of the accommodation only after an enquiry by the executing Court to fix the quantum of compensation based on standard rent. ( 14 ) MULEY, J. , repelled the tenant's plea. The tenant relied on 'bhailal v. Shadilal', 1982 MPRCJ 147 for his submission that the landlord could obtain possession of the accommodation only after an enquiry by the executing Court to fix the quantum of compensation based on standard rent. ( 14 ) MULEY, J. , repelled the tenant's plea. The note reported the dictum of Muley, J. , as follows :"so far as the point raised by the learned counsel for the appellant that unless and until standard rent is fixed the respondent-landlord cannot obtain possession as also the fact that an enquiry has to be made in an execution petition, I am unable to agree with this submission because there is no dispute about the agreement and in absence of any fixation of standard rent as such this shall be deemed to be the standard rent for which no enquiry was as such is contemplated. Therefore, this submission that the decree cannot be executed till the standard rent is fixed to decide the quantum of compensation cannot be accepted and is thus rejected. " ( 15 ) CIVIL Miscellaneous Second Appeal No. 85 of 1974 : Phool Chandra Garg v. Ram Narain, decided by Rampal Singh, J. , on 28-6-1985 was preferred by a landlord in the following circumstances. The suit (filed in 1967) was for eviction of the tenant from a shop, carrying a contractual rent of Rs. 22/- p. m. on the ground under S. 12 (1) (f ). The suit was decreed on 19-2-1970. It appears that there had been an unsuccessful appeal therefrom. The appellate decree incorporated the provisions of Cls. (a) and (b) (i), and added the rider that the executing Court was to determine the annual standard rent of the accommodation. The decree entitled the landlord to adjust the amount of the compensation towards the costs of the suit and the appeal and the amount of mesne profits awarded to him. ( 16 ) THE landlord filed an execution application on 6-9-1971. He averred therein that he was quantifying the compensation payable to the tenant on the basis of the contractual rent of Rs. 22/ -. He further claimed adjustment of the compensation so quantified towards the amount payable to him under the decree in his favour. ( 16 ) THE landlord filed an execution application on 6-9-1971. He averred therein that he was quantifying the compensation payable to the tenant on the basis of the contractual rent of Rs. 22/ -. He further claimed adjustment of the compensation so quantified towards the amount payable to him under the decree in his favour. ( 17 ) ON 19-11-1971 the tenant, who had not pleaded in the written statement that the accommodation had any standard rent, filed an objection in the executing Court in respect of the quantification of the compensation, but he did not say therein what was the standard rent of the accommodation. The executing Court made an enquiry and on 26-2-74 fixed the standard rent of the accommodation at the rate of Rs. 50/- per month. The tenant preferred a miscellaneous appeal to the District Court for enhancement of the compensation at the rate of Rs. 100/- per month. The landlord filed a cross-objection that the standard rent should have been quantified at the rate of Rs. 25/- per month. The District Court dismissed the cross-objection and allowed the tenant's appeal in part by increasing the compensation to Rs. 80/- per month. ( 18 ) THE landlord preferred a second miscellaneous civil appeal praying that the compensation be quantified on the basis of the contractual rent namely Rs. 22/- per month. The tenant filed a cross-objection praying that the compensation be further increased and fixed at the rate of Rs. 100/ - per month. ( 19 ) RAMPAL Singh, J. , allowed the appeal in part, by scaling down the quantification rate of Rs. 70/- per month. ( 20 ) SHRI B. S. Agarwal, Advocate, for the landlord, had submitted before Rampal Singh, J. , that the compensation should have been quantified on the basis of the undisputed contractual rent of Rs. 22/- per month, for fixing the standard rent. Ram Pal Singh, J. , repelled the submission as follows :"4. . To my mind both are different. Agreed rent is the contract between the parties, and the contractual amount of rent cannot be considered to be the standard rent. Sub-sec. 22/- per month, for fixing the standard rent. Ram Pal Singh, J. , repelled the submission as follows :"4. . To my mind both are different. Agreed rent is the contract between the parties, and the contractual amount of rent cannot be considered to be the standard rent. Sub-sec. (4) of S. LO of the Act provides that where for any reason it is not possible to determine the standard rent of any accommodation on the principles set forth in S. 7, the Rent Controlling Authority may fix such rent as would be reasonable having regard to the situation, locality and condition of the accommodation and amenities provided therein and where there are similar or nearly similar accommodations in the locality, having regard also to the standard rent payable in respect of such accommodations. S. 10 further provides that the standard rent shall be fixed-for a tenancy of twelve months, etc. Thus, the contention of Shri Agrawal cannot be accepted on the face of the situation stated herein above. When the legislature requires under S. 12 (6) of the Act to pay as compensation the double amount of annual standard rent, it can never mean the contractual amount of rent. It is, thus, clear that the standard rent has to be decided by the Rent Controlling Authority. But, in this case, this work was specifically assigned to the executing Court, and the executing Court has done well in fixing the amount of Rs. 50/- as the standard monthly rent. " ( 21 ) ONE thing more, no case law is referred to in the judgment of Ram Pal Singh, J. , indicating that Jadish Chandra's case 1984 MPRC J (Note) 105 was not brought to his notice. ( 22 ) IN Bhailal's case 1982 MPRCJ 147 reliance was placed on S. A. No. 242/67 (G), Ghanshyamdas v. Gyasobai, decided by K. I. Pandey, J. , on 12-2-1968 and on Civil Revn. No. 866/ 76 (G) Firm Chitarmal Ramdayal v. Laxmandas, decided by J. P. Bajpai, J. , on 25-11-1978. These cases had taken a view opposite to the view taken by Muley, J. , in Jagdish Chandra's case 1984 MPRCJ (Note) 105. ( 23 ) IN Ghanshyam Das's case the second appeal (S. A. 242/67) from the first appellate decree, affirming the trial Court's decree for eviction against the tenant under Cl. (f) of sub-sec. These cases had taken a view opposite to the view taken by Muley, J. , in Jagdish Chandra's case 1984 MPRCJ (Note) 105. ( 23 ) IN Ghanshyam Das's case the second appeal (S. A. 242/67) from the first appellate decree, affirming the trial Court's decree for eviction against the tenant under Cl. (f) of sub-sec. (1) of S. 12 of the Act was dismissed, but the Court's direction for payment of compensation on the basis of the agreed monthly rent of Rs. 13/- was set aside by K. L. Pandey, J. , observing as follows:". . . . the matter was not properly investigated by the Court of first instance and, in this respect, the Courts below have not acted upon any evidence. " then the following directions were given in the second appeal. ". . . before the decree for ejectment is executed, the executing Court itself shall speedily determine after giving to the parties an opportunity to adduce evidence, the compensation payable to the defendant under S. 12 (6) (b) of the Act and the plaintiff shall not be entitled to obtain possession of the accommodation before paying the compensation so determined. " ( 24 ) THE provisions of sub-s. (6) of S. 12 of the Act and other provisions of the Act were, however, not examined at all for taking the aforementioned view. ( 25 ) THE material facts in Civil Revn. No. 866 of 1978 (Firm Chitarmal Ramdayal v. haxmandas), were as follows : a decree for eviction was passed against the applicant Firm Chhtarmal Ramdayal under Cl. (f) of sub-s. (1) of S. 12 in C. S. No. 51-A/69 in which it was undisputed that at the date of the suit as 'determined' or 'fixed' annual standard rent of the suit accommodation existed. The matter went in first appeal and then in second appeal to High Court where in S. A. No. 341 of 1973, (by the judgment dated 28-8-1978 passed by J. P. Bajpai, J.), the grant of relief eviction was maintained but the lower Court's direction that the compensation be paid at the agreed rate of rent was set aside and it was directed that the compensation shall be paid at the rate of the double of amount of the annual standard rent which may be determined by the executing Court. These directions were based on the following observations at para 7 of the judgment. "7. The third ground raised on behalf of the appellant, however, deserves to be allowed because the direction given by the Courts below regarding payment of compensation equal to double the amount of annual agreed rent is in clear contravention of the specific provisions of sub-sec. (6) of S. 12 of the Act. The requirement of the said section is that the compensation should be double the amount of the annual standard rent. It is true, as stated by both the parties, that no annual standard rent has been fixed in respect of the suit accommodation. Under these circumstances, it would be necessary for the executing court to determine the amount of compensation and for doing so, it will be necessary to calculate the amount of the annual standard rent on the lines of S. 7 read with S. 10 of the Act. I would clarify that while doing so, the executing Court will not be fixing the annual standard rent of the suit accommodation, as is being done by the Rent Controlling Authority. This proceeding by the executing Court will be purely confined to the determination of the amount of compensation. The stage of payment of compensation arises after the passing of the decree for eviction and, therefore, the same will have to be done by the executing Court. This position was not disputed by either side. " ( 26 ) IN the light of the aforesaid decree, the applicant made an application, before the executing Court. The tenant filed an objection petition contesting the executing Court's jurisdiction to determine the standard rent, contending that the Rent Controlling Authority had the exclusive jurisdiction in the matter. The objection petition was rejected by the executing Court which fixed the case for recording of the evidence for making an enquiry on the subject of standard rent. The tenant filed a revision petition (Civil Revn. No. 866 of 1978) which was rejected by J. P. Bajpai, J. , overruling the aforementioned pleas. It was also observed that the applicant could not be allowed to ask the aforementioned point in view of the directions given in the decree passed in second appeal. ( 27 ) THUS, in these two cases also the provisions of sub-s. (6) of S. 12 and other provisions of the Act remained unexamined. It was also observed that the applicant could not be allowed to ask the aforementioned point in view of the directions given in the decree passed in second appeal. ( 27 ) THUS, in these two cases also the provisions of sub-s. (6) of S. 12 and other provisions of the Act remained unexamined. ( 28 ) BHAILAL's case 1982 MPRCJ 147 was tenants revision against the order of the executing Court rejecting their objection that it had no jurisdiction to make an enquiry to determine the standard rent of the accommodation for quantifying compensation in a decree under S. 12 (1) (0 of the Act. It was urged that the execution proceeding should be stayed and the tenants or the landlord be asked to get the standard rent determined by the Rent Controlling Authority and then the compensation should be computed. Navkar, J. , repelled the contention, saying that on the passing of a decree for eviction, the tenants had no right left to move, and the landlord was not obliged to go to, the Rent Controlling Authority for fixation of the standard rent. ( 29 ) NAVKAR, J. , did not consider the provisions of Chapter II or Chapter III of the Act to find out whether the executing Court itself had any obligation to make an inquiry and determine the standard rent of the accommodation for the purpose of payment of compensation to the tenant (under S. 12 (6) ). Instead, Navkar, J. , without citing any other authority, except the unreported authorities in Ghanshyam Das case (S. A. No. 242/67), (S. A. No. 341/73) and Firm Chhitarmal's cases (C. R. No. 866, 78) ended the judgment as follows :"further, I may mention that from 1955 till date, the consistent view of this Court is that it is the Executing Court which should decide the amount of compensation. " ( 30 ) THE note of Jagadish Chandra v. Sarabai, 1984 MPRCJ (Note) 105 contains no examination of the provisions of Chap. III or Chapter II of the Act for the proposition that where the Rent Controlling Authority has not fixed standard rent of the suit accommodation, but there is an agreed rent, the agreed rent shall be deemed to be the standard rent. III or Chapter II of the Act for the proposition that where the Rent Controlling Authority has not fixed standard rent of the suit accommodation, but there is an agreed rent, the agreed rent shall be deemed to be the standard rent. ( 31 ) THE question referred to us also posits the non-existence of Rent Controlling Authority's order fixing the standard rent of the accommodation and the undisputed agreed rent. ( 32 ) NOW, we come to sub-s. (6) of S. 12. It relates to the execution of an eviction decree, passed under Cl. (f) of sub-s. (1) of S. 12. That is the reason why the said provisions do not even mention the Court which passed the decree. What is more, the point is that the provisions of sub-s. (6) of S. 12 are significantly silent about any obligation or duty of the executing Court to make an inquiry and record evidence either suo motu or on an application by the decree-holder or a judgment-debtor "for fixing" or "determining" the standard rent of the suit accommodation and then to pass an order for the payment of compensation to the judgment-debtor in accordance with item (i) or item (ii) of Cl. (b) of sub-s. (6) of S. 12 of the Act. In order to bring into sharp focus the silence of the legislature on the aforementioned subject that we have underscored the fact that the rulings discussed above did not construe the provisions of sub-s. (6) of S. 12. ( 33 ) NOW, we propose to examine the provisions of sub-s. (6) of S. 12 in the light of Cl. (f) of sub-s. (1) of S. 12 and of sub-s. (1) of S. 13. ( 34 ) THE provisions of Cl. (f) of sub-s. (1) of S. 12 do not even mention the subject of the rent of the suit accommodation, let alone its "standard rent". ( 35 ) THE provisions of sub-s. (1) of S. 13 do not mention the subject of the "standard rent" of the suit accommodation. ( 34 ) THE provisions of Cl. (f) of sub-s. (1) of S. 12 do not even mention the subject of the rent of the suit accommodation, let alone its "standard rent". ( 35 ) THE provisions of sub-s. (1) of S. 13 do not mention the subject of the "standard rent" of the suit accommodation. These provisions cast a statutory obligation on the defendant-tenant to pay to the plaintiff-landlord or deposit in Court (within one month of the service of accommodation) "an amount calculated at the rate of rent at which it was paid for the period which the tenant may have made default including the period subsequent thereto up to the end of the month previous to that in which the deposit or payment is made and shall thereafter continue to deposit or pay, month by month, by the 15 of each succeeding month a sum equivalent to the rent at that rate". (Empashsis supplied ). ( 36 ) THE provisions of sub-s. (6) of S. 12 do not contain any legislative mandate that where standard rent has not been fixed by the Rent Controlling Authority, the executing Court shall make an enquiry (in pursuance of a direction in the eviction decree or suo motu or on an application made by the decree-holder or judgment-debtor) for "determining" or "fixing" the amount of the annual standard rent of the suit accommodation under the Act. ( 37 ) AT the stage, the legal effect of Ss. 5, 6, 7 and 10 calls for consideration. ( 38 ) SECTION 5 (1) says that no tenant shall be liable to pay notwithstanding any agreement to the contrary to his landlord any amount in excess of the standard rent of the accommodation. ( 39 ) SECTION 5 (2) says that any agreement for the payment of rent in excess of the standard rent shall be construed as if it were an amount for the payment of standard rent only. ( 40 ) SUB-SECTION (1) of S. 6 says that subject to the provisions of this Act, no person shall claim or receive any rent in excess of the standard rent, notwithstanding any agreement to the contrary. ( 41 ) SECTION 7 defines the standard rent of any accommodation. ( 40 ) SUB-SECTION (1) of S. 6 says that subject to the provisions of this Act, no person shall claim or receive any rent in excess of the standard rent, notwithstanding any agreement to the contrary. ( 41 ) SECTION 7 defines the standard rent of any accommodation. ( 42 ) SECTION 10 lays down the procedure and the principles for fixation of the standard rent of any accommodation within the provisions of S. 7, or the increase, if any, under S. 8. ( 43 ) THE provisions of Ss. 5, 6, 7 and 10 of the Act are almost similar, respectively to the provisions of Ss. 4, 5, 6 and 9 of the Delhi Rent Control Act, 1988 (No. 59 of 1958 ). ( 44 ) IN M. M. Chawala v. J. S. Sethi, 1969 Rent CJ 913, the Supreme Court considered the effect of Ss. 4, 5 and 9 along with some others of Delhi Rent Control Act, 1958. At para 8 of the judgment, their Lordships of the Supreme Court observed as follows:"counsel says that by virtue of the provisions of Ss. 4 and 5 recovery of rent by a landlord in excess of the standard rent is prohibited. But in our judgment the prohibition in Ss. 4 and 5 operates only after the standard rent of premises is determined and not till then. So long as the standard rent is not determined by the Controller, the tenant must pay the contractual rent; after the standard rent is determined the landlord becomes disentitled to recover an amount in excess of the standard rent from the date on which the determination operates. "their Lordships continued at para 9 :"we are unable to agree that standard rent of a given tenant is by virtue of S. 6 of the Act a fixed quantity, and the liability, for payment of a tenant is circumscribed thereby even if the standard rent is not fixed by order of the Controller. Under the scheme of the Act standard rent of a given tenement is that amount only which the Controller determines. Until the standard rent is fixed by the Controller the contract between the landlord and the tenant determines the liability of the tenant to pay rent. That is clear from the terms of S. 9 of the Act. Under the scheme of the Act standard rent of a given tenement is that amount only which the Controller determines. Until the standard rent is fixed by the Controller the contract between the landlord and the tenant determines the liability of the tenant to pay rent. That is clear from the terms of S. 9 of the Act. That section clearly indicates that the Controller alone has the power to fix the standard rent in our view, the prohibition against recovery of rent in excess of the standard rent applies only from the date on which the standard rent is determined by order of the Controller and not before that date. " ( 45 ) THE aforementioned interpretation and the legal consequences flowing therefrom become applicable for the interpretation of the provisions of Chapter II of the M. P. Accommodation Control Act, 1961. Thus, if the Rent Controlling Authority has not fixed the standard rent of an accommodation under Chapter II on the application of a tenant or his landlord in lieu of the rent agreed upon between them, it is the amount of the agreed rent which is payable by the tenant. This is so because standard rent of a given accommodation is not a fixed quantity by virtue of the provisions of S. 7 themselves. This is the reason why the provisions of sub-s. (1) of S. 13 speak of "an amount calculated at the rate of rent at which it was paid for the period for which there had bean default before the suit and then during the pendency of the suit". In M. M. Chawala's cage 1969 Rent CJ 913, the Supreme Court rejected the tenant's contention that the expression "dispute as to the amount of rent payable by the tenant" in sub-s. (3) of S. 15 of the Delhi Rent Control Act, 1958, meant a dispute raised by the tenant as to the standard rent payable. Their Lordships said :"we are unable to agree. The dispute, referred to in S. 15 (3), is the dispute about contractual rent payable ". The aforementioned interpretation and the legal consequences flowing therefrom are clearly applicable to the same expression used in sub-s. (2) of S. 13 of the M. P. Accommodation Control Act which runs as follows :" (2) If in any suit or proceeding referred to in sub-sec. The aforementioned interpretation and the legal consequences flowing therefrom are clearly applicable to the same expression used in sub-s. (2) of S. 13 of the M. P. Accommodation Control Act which runs as follows :" (2) If in any suit or proceeding referred to in sub-sec. (1), there is any dispute as to the amount of rent payable by the tenant, the Court shall fix a reasonable provisional rent in relation to the accommodation to be deposited or paid in accordance with the provisions of sub-sec. (1) till the decision of the suit or appeal. " ( 46 ) IT is, therefore, equally clear that the use of the definite article "the" before the words "annual standard rent" and also before the word "accommodation" in the expression the annual standard rent of the accommodation in item (i) of Cl. (b) of sub-s. (6) of S. 12 and the similar use of the definite article "the" before the words "annual standard rent" in the expression "the amount of the annual standard rent" in item (ii) (ibid.) has to be interpreted as the standard rent of the accommodation so fixed by the Rent Controlling Authority in Chapter II of the Act. Hence, no legislative mandate for any enquiry (by the executing Court) under S. 12 (6) (b ). ( 47 ) SO, here also where the annual standard rent has not been fixed at the time a decree for eviction granted under sub-s. (6) of S. 12 is sought to be executed, the amount of the agreed rent will be taken to be basis for computing the amount of compensation payable to the judgment-debtor-tenant under Cl. (b) of sub-s. (6) of S. 12. If any other interpretation is adopted the tenant will have to go without any compensation in a case where no standard rent has been fixed by the Rent Controlling Authority under Chapter II of the Act. Surely, such a legislative intent could not be spelled out. The reason is that it is proper to assume that law-makers enact laws which the society considers as honest, fair and equitable and that justice and reason constitute the great general legislative intent in every piece of legislation. [see, Buddan Singh v. Babi Bux, AIR 1970 SC 1880 (para 9)]. Surely, such a legislative intent could not be spelled out. The reason is that it is proper to assume that law-makers enact laws which the society considers as honest, fair and equitable and that justice and reason constitute the great general legislative intent in every piece of legislation. [see, Buddan Singh v. Babi Bux, AIR 1970 SC 1880 (para 9)]. ( 48 ) THE dictum in M. M. Chawala's case 1969 Ren CJ 913 (SC) squarely applies for the interpretation of the concept of the standard rent in the Madhya Pradesh Accommodation Control Act, 1961. The result is that if the tenant or his landlord had not got the standard rent of the accommodation fixed by the Rent Controlling Authority under the Act, the amount of the agreed rent is to be taken to be the basis for computing the compensation payable to a tenant under Cl. (b) of sub-s. (6) of S. 12. Clearly, no enquiry by the executing Court is, therefore, called for into what is the undisputed fact, that is, the amount of the agreed rent. ( 49 ) WE shall now turn and have a look at the matter from another angle namely, the object of the Madhya Pradesh Accommodation Control Act, 1961, and more significantly the object behind the provisions of subs. (6) of S. 12. ( 50 ) CLAUSE (a) of sub-s. (6) of S. 12 stays the hands of the successful landlord from executing the decree for eviction under Cl. (f) of sub-s. (1) of S. 12 for a period of two months from the date of the decree. The object is to provide some time to the tenant to vacate the accommodation and to look for an alternative accommodation. Significantly, there is no provisions for extension of that time at the instance of the tenant. The legislative intent is clear the defeated tenant shall not prolong the agony of the successful landlord beyond two months from the decree. Conversely stated, the legislature has given the successful landlord that his expectations of re-entry into the accommodation shall be fulfilled just after the expiration of the aforementioned period of two months, subject of course to the payment of compensation to the tenant, if the latter has the requisite entitlement for the same. . . Conversely stated, the legislature has given the successful landlord that his expectations of re-entry into the accommodation shall be fulfilled just after the expiration of the aforementioned period of two months, subject of course to the payment of compensation to the tenant, if the latter has the requisite entitlement for the same. . . ( 51 ) THE legislature having enacted so many legislative safeguards and checks in the Act in favour of the tenant in eviction suits under Chapter II, must also have been cognizant of the facts of life of eviction suits and the execution proceedings initiated by successful landlords. It has all along been notorious that the tenants have been known to resort to all kinds of ploys to delay the trial and stretch the executing proceedings. The tenants make frequent forays with alacrity before the Courts exercising powers of revision, and not a few to the High Court by filing petitions under Art. 227. This apart, at the end of the line there is the statutory right of first appeal and in most of cases the tenants go in for the second appeal as well. ( 52 ) ALL the aforementioned factors and considerations must have gone into in the formation of the legislative object behind the provisions of sub-s. (6) of S. 12 of the Act. Most assuredly, the legislature could not have desired any object that the defeated tenant, with an eviction decree against him, should still be allowed to get away with the acceptance of his specious and dilatory plea in the execution proceeding that notwithstanding his aforementioned default he was still entitled to get an enquiry opened up before the executing Court for fixation of the standard rent of the accommodation in accordance with the provision of Ss. 7 and 10 - an enquiry, surely no easy or smooth or short-termed exercise in a judicial adjudication. More so, when the defeated tenant is there to prolong such a hearing and ready and willing to continue the fight into superior Courts with his plaint, namely; the quantification of the compensation, and to obtain orders for stay of the eviction order in respect of the suit accommodation and to retain it for years, even for a decade or more after the passing of the eviction decree against him. To wit, in the present case, the litigation has seen 17 years of which 14 years have been taken up by the matter of "fixation or determination of the standard rent of the accommodation" by the executing Court for the purposes of payment of compensation to the tenant. In Phool Chandra Garg's case, the litigation went on and on for 18 years. The dispute, arising out of the direction to the executing Court to fix the standard rent in accordance with the provisions of Chapter II of the Act, lasted about 18 years. ( 53 ) IT is plain that the legislature could not have intended such consequences out of the working of the provisions of sub-s. (6) of S. 12 so frustrating to landlords with eviction decrees in their favour as is apparent from Cl. 2 of the "statement of Objects and Reasons". "2. The Bill while retaining the salient features of the existing law has been grafted on the lines of the Delhi Rent Control Act, 1958, so as to provide a speedy remedy to both, the landlord and the tenant, and to make its provisions more effective to achieve the objects in view. "so, from this angle also the conclusion reached by us at paragraph 48 stands reinforced. ( 54 ) HENCE, in our view -and we say with utmost respect - the decisions in Phool Chandra Garg's case (C. M. A. No. 85/1974 (G)) decided by Ram Pal Singh, J. , on 28-61985, in Ghanshyamdas's case (S. A. No. 242/ 67) decided by K. L. Pandey, J. , on 12-21968, (S. A. No. 341 of 1973) (G) decided by J. P. Bajpai, J. , on 28-8-1978 and in (Civil Revision No. 866/1976) (G) decided by J. P. Bajpai, J. , on 25-11-1978 in Firm Chhitarmal Ramdayal's case have not laid down the right law. On the other hand, the decision of Muley, J. , in Jagdish Chandra v. Sarabai, 1984 MPRCJ (Note) 105 had laid down the law on the right lines. ( 55 ) THE question referred to us is answered as follows :"where the Rent Controlling Authority has not fixed or determined the standard rent of the suit accommodation on an application of the tenant or the landlord but there is an agreed rent, and if in such a case the landlord has obtained a decree for eviction against his tenant under Cl. (f) of sub-s. (1) of S. 12 of the M. P. Accommodation Control Act, 1961 (Act No. 41 of 1961), the amount of the agreed rent may be adopted by the landlord-decree-holder as the basis for quantifying the compensation, payable to the tenant-judgment-debtor entitled to receive the payment by virtue of the provisions of Cl. (b) of sub-s. (6) of S. 12 of the Act (No. 41 of 1961 ). And, that in such a case, there is no legislative mandate or requirement of law obliging the executing Court to hold an inquiry with a view to fixing or determining the amount equal to the standard rent of the suit accommodation in accordance with the provisions of Ss. 7 and 10 of the Act (No. 41 of 1961 ). "the papers be placed before the learned single Judge. Order accordingly. .