Jamnadass v. Rajendra Kumar — 1989 DIGILAW 127 (RAJ)

S.C. AGRAWAL. J. —, This second appeal is by the landlord in a suit for eviction from a shop situated at Tripolia Bazar in Jaipur City. The premises were let out by the appellant to the respondent, Rajendra Kumar, on 22nd October, 1960 for a period of one year on a monthly rent of Rs. 33/-. The respondent is carrying on business in sale of books and stationery in the name of M/s. Rajasthan Prakashan in the said premises The appellant is a qualified engineer. He was earlier employed with Kamani Engineering Corporation. Some time in 1967 he left the service and started business of sale of electrical goods and machines. For that purpose he took on rent two shops on Motilal Atal Road, at Jaipur on a monthly rent of Rs. 425/-. On-"2nd August, 1968 he filed the suit, giving rise to this appeal, for eviction of the respondent. The appellant sought eviction of the respondent on two grounds, namely, (i) default in payment of rent and: (ii) reasonable and bonafide personal necessity of the appellant. The ground of default in payment of rent was later not pursued by the appellant and the only ground on which he is now seeking eviction of the respondent is reasonable and bonafide personal necessity. The case of the appellant, as set out in the plaint, in this regard was that since no shop of the appellant was vacant he had to take on the shops at Motilal Atal Road but the said shops were not suitable for carrying on the business in electric goods and moreover the rent for the said shops was Rs. 425/- per month whereas he is getting only Rs. 33/- per month for the premises in possession of the respondent. The appellant also submitted that the suit premises are more suitable for carrying on the business in electric goods and that the appellant wanted to shift his business to the suit premises and, therefore, he requires the premises reasonably and bonafide for his own use. During the pendency of the suit, the appellant left the shops which were taken on Motilal Atal Road and took on rent a shop at Johari Bazar on a monthly rent of Rs. During the pendency of the suit, the appellant left the shops which were taken on Motilal Atal Road and took on rent a shop at Johari Bazar on a monthly rent of Rs. 90/- and shifted his business to the said shop at Johari Bazar and now he is carrying on his business in electrical goods at Johari Bazar in the name of Deepak Engineering Works. 2. The respondent contested the suit and filed written statement. The said written statement was amended by the respondent in 1971 and the amended written statement dated 7th October, 1971 was filed. The appellant filed a replication dated 30th October, 1971 to the said amended written statement. Further amended written statement was filed on 25th October, 1975. 3. The respondent in his written statement, has denied that the appellant was carrying on business in electrical goods and stated that the appellant does not understand the said business and has no experience of the same and that he has filed the suit with a view to put undue pressure on him and to increase the rent. The respondent also submitted that the suit premises are not suitable for carrying on business in electrical goods and that moreover after the filing of the suit, the appellant has taken on rent a shop in Johari Bazar which is in main market in the city and the said shop is about.,the same size as the suit premises and that in that shop the business of the appellant is being run quite properly, and that the appellant would not suffer any hardship if the suit premises are not made available to him and that on the other hand, the respondent, would suffer considerable loss if he is required to vacate the premises. The respondent also submitted in the written statement that one shop belonging to the appellant was let out to Star Trading Company and that the appellant had also given a notice for eviction to the tenant of the said shop but instead of filing a suit against the tenant the appellant had sold the said shop to the wife of the tenant which shows that the appellant did not need the suit premises for his business and does not need the game even now. 4. 4. Six issues were framed by the trial Court out of which the issues which are relevant for the purpose of this appeal are issue No. 3 relating to reasonable and bonafide personal necessity and issue No. 6 relating to comparative hardship. The Addl. Civil Judge, Jaipur City, Jaipur, by his judgment and decree dated 13th April, 1978, decided both these issues against the appellant and dismissed the suit. The appellant filed an appeal which was dismissed by the Addl. District & Sessions Judge No. 5, Jaipur City, Jaipur by his judgment and decree dated 19th December, 1981. Hence this second appeal. 5. I have heard Shri R.M. Lodha, the learned counsel for the appellant in support of this appeal and Shri S.M. Mehta the learned counsel for the respondent. 6. During the course of hearing of this appeal Shri Mehta filed an application to bring on record certain subsequent events namely, that a partition has taken place between the appellant and his family members on 25th September, 1985 and as a result thereof half of the suit premises has fallen in the share of the appellant and the other half has fallen in the share of his son, Ashok Kumar. It has also been stated that during the pendency of the appeal, the appellant has got vacant possession of one shop and Kotha situated at Gopal-ji-Ka-Rasta, Jaipur from Shri Girraj Prasad, on the ground of bonafide and personal necessity of his son Rajendra Kumar and that the said suit has been decreed by this Court in second appeal on 30th April, 1988. It has also been submitted in the said application that a shop belonging to the appellant situated in Johari Bazar which had been let out to Shri Abdul Waheed, Tailor, has also been sold to Shri Om Prakashji and Vijay Prakashji. The respondent has also stated in his application that his father, Shri Jhunni Lal has expired on 2nd December, 1978 and since the respondent is the only son he has become the sole proprietor of the firm M/s. Rajasthan Prakashan and he is looking after the entire business of the said firm. The appellant has submitted a reply to the said application wherein, the fact of oral partition dated 25th September, 1985 has not been disputed. The appellant has submitted a reply to the said application wherein, the fact of oral partition dated 25th September, 1985 has not been disputed. It has also not been disputed that a decree regarding one shop and Kotha in Gopa!ji-Ka Rasta has been passed by this Court but it has. been stated that the same is with regard to the need of Rajendra Kumar, the son of the appellant, and that he would start his jewellery business in the same and that eviction has been sought for that purpose. As regards the shop in Johari Bazar it has been stated that on partition the said shop came to the share of Rajendra Kumar, the son of the appellant, and he has sold the said shop in April, 1986 since the frontage of the said shop is 4 only and it was not suitable for his business. The appellant has also stated that the rent for shop in Johari Bazar which was taken by the appellant in 1970 on a monthly rent of Rs. 90/- has been increased to Rs. 175/- per month. 7. Shri Mehta has urged that the concurrent findings have been recorded by both the courts below on the grounds of reasonable and bonafide personal necessity and comparative hardship against the appellant and that the said find-ings do not suffer from any legal error or infirmity which may justify interference in second appeal. 8. It is no doubt true that findings on Issue No. 3 relating to reasonable and bonafide personal necessity as well as on Issue No. 6 relating comparative hardship are findings of fact and this Court in second appeal would interfere with the said findings only if they are vitiated by an error of law or if they are perverse, based on no evidence or they are such as no reasonable man could reach. (see-Mattulal Vs. Radhe Lal (1)). Such a finding could also be Open to challenge in second appeal if important and relevant evidence has been ignored while arriving at the findings. (See: Damadilal Vs. Parashram (2)). Shri Lodha, the learned counsel for the appellant, has submitted that in the present case the findings recorded by the Addl. District Judge on Issues Nos. 3 and 6 are not sustainable inasmuch as in arriving at the said findings the Addl. (See: Damadilal Vs. Parashram (2)). Shri Lodha, the learned counsel for the appellant, has submitted that in the present case the findings recorded by the Addl. District Judge on Issues Nos. 3 and 6 are not sustainable inasmuch as in arriving at the said findings the Addl. District Judge has not applied the correct legal tests and has overlooked material parts of the evidence having a bearing on those questions. It is, therefore, necessary to examine as to whether the Addl. District Judge has applied the correct legal tests for arriving at his conclusions with regard to Issue Nos. 3 and 6 and for that purpose it will be necessary to consider the proper tests which are applicable. 9. Section 13(1) (h) of the Rajasthan Premises (Control of Rent & Eviction) Act, 1950 (hereinafter referred to as the Act) makes provision for eviction of a tenant on the ground of reasonable and bonafide personal necessity of the landlord and it provides as under:— "13(1) Eviction of tenants.- Notwithstanding anything contained in any law or contract, no court shall pass any decree, or make any order, in favour of a landlord, whether in execution of a decree or otherwise, evicting the tenant so long as he is ready and willing to pay rent therefore to the full extent allowable by this Act, unless it is satisfied — xxxxxxxxxx (h) that the premises are required reasonable and bonafide by the landlord— (i) for the use or occupation of himself or his family, or (ii) for the use of occupation of any person for whose benefit the premises are held, or (iii) for a public purpose, or (iv) for philanthropic use". . 10. Similar provisions are contained in The Rent Control Legislation of other States and have come up for consideration before the Supreme Court. In Phirose Bamanji Desai Vs. Chandrakant N. Patel (3), the Supreme Court, while interpreting the provisions of Section 13(1) (g) of the Bombay Rents Hotel and Lodging House Rents (Control) Act, 1947 has observed that the word "requires" means that there must be an clement of need before the landlord can be said to require premises for his own use and occupation and that it is not enough that the landlord should merely desire to use and occupy the premises. Similarly in Mattulal V. Radhelal (supra), the Supreme Court, while dealing with the provisions of the Madhya Pradesh Accommodation Control Act, 1961 has held that the word "require" signified that mere desire on the part of the landlord is not enough but there should be an element of need and the landlord must show that he genuinely requires the non-residential accommodation for the purpose of starting or continuing his own business. In Bega Begum Vs. Abdul Ahad Khan (4) the Supreme Court has, while interpreting the provisions of the Jammu and Kashmir Houses and Shops Rent Control Act, 1966, reiterated the observation in Phiroze Bamanji Desai Vs. Chandrakant N. Patel(supra) and has laid down that the main test should be whether it was necessary for the landlord to need the premises for his use or occupation and that while the distinction between desire and need should doubtless be kept in mind but not so as to make even a genuine need as nothing but a desire and further that connotation of the term "need" or "requirement" should not be artificially extended nor its language so unduly stretched or strained as to make it impossible or extremely difficult for the landlord to get a decree for eviction for such a course would defeat the very purpose of the enactment which affords the facility of eviction of the tenant to the landlord on certain specified grounds. In this context reference may also be made to the decision of this Court in Govind Ram Vs. Abdul Wahab(5) wherein it has been held:— "For, while on the one hand, the requirement of reasonable and bona-fide personal necessity, does not merely mean a mere wish or desire on the part of the landlord to go into occupation of his own property whenever it suits his, sweet-will to pleasure to do so, on the other hand, it does not also mean that the plaintiff must establish absolute or dire necessity, as the learned Judge below puts it, for the occupation of the property in dispute for his own or his family purposes. What he has to prove is that he has a present reasonable need for occupying the property in connection with which the suit has been brought and that his need is not motivated by any extraneous considerations of greed or any other similar factor." In cases where the landlord is in occupation of rented premises and wants to shift to his own premises. Courts have taken the view that the need of the landlord in such cases must be regarded as bonafide. In this connection reference may be made to the decision of the Division Bench of this Court in Seth Lal Chand vs. Seth Radha Ballabh (6) where while dealing with the question whether the premises were required bonafide, this Court has observed :- "It is enough to say that the plaintiff is a business man and, in order to carry on his business has a number of shops in his possession on rent*. In the circumstances, if he wants this shop, which he has purchased for his personal use, and probably intends to give up one of the rented shops, he requires the shop, in our opinion, for bonafide use of himself and members of his family." Similarly in Heera Lal vs. Pannalal (7) it has been held that when the plaintiff is admittedly occupying a shop on rent for his business, his requirement for his own shop cannot be said to be unreasonable and malafide. In this context reference may also be made to the decision of the Supreme Court in M. Padama-nabha Setty vs. K.P. Papiah Setty (8). In that case the Supreme Court was interpolating the expression "to the possession of which the landlord—is entitled" in section 8 (3)(a)(ii) of the Mysore House Rent and Accommodation Control Act, 1951 and the question was whether it would cover case where landlord is in possession of another building as a tenant. The Supreme Court held that a tenants right to stay in the premises cannot be equated to an entitlement of the possession of the premises. The Supreme Court made a distinction between an absolute right of possession and a right to remain in possession till one of the conditions for eviction prescribed in law is satisfied and over which he has no control. The Supreme Court made a distinction between an absolute right of possession and a right to remain in possession till one of the conditions for eviction prescribed in law is satisfied and over which he has no control. The Supreme Court has observed:— "The landlord may require the premises for repairs or reconstruction or the neighbours may complain that the tenant is guilty of nuisance or annoyance or the landlord may think that the tenant has committed some acts of wasteas are likely to impair materially the value or_ utility of the house, and if any of these conditions is proved, he is liable to be evicted." 11. In Janutha Fancy Store vs. Chandrashekhara (9) decided by the Mysore High Court it has been observed that the landlord is not bound to continue his business in a rented premises with all the uncertainties of tenure and if he chooses to trace in the building of his own he is entitled to do so provided he makes out that the building is required reasonably for his bonafide use. 12. The need of the landlord has been held to be reasonable and genuine in cases where the rent that he is paying for the rented premises in his occupation is higher than the rent which he is receiving for the premises let out to the tenant (See; Babu Ram Vs. Narayan Pass (10), Shri Hukam Rai Vs. Chhail Bihari Lal (11) and R.G. Vakil vs. Ravindra Nath Bannerjee (12). 13. In view of the decisions referred to above it can be said that in order to seek eviction of a tenant on the ground of reasonable and bonafide personal necessity under Section 13(1) (g) of the Act a landlord has to show that ;— (i) he genuinely needs the premises for his personal use, and that; (ii) no other suitable accommodation is available to him. While judging the suitability of the accommodation it would be relevant to consider the fact that the landlord is living or carrying on his business in" rented premises and that the amount of rent for the premises in his occupation is higher than the rent received by him from the tenant. It is not necessary for the landlord to establish a dire necessity for the premises. 14. The Addl. It is not necessary for the landlord to establish a dire necessity for the premises. 14. The Addl. District Judge has summed up the legal position as under:-"To get the premises vacated on the ground mentioned in clause 13(1) (h) it has to be proved that premises are required reasonably and bonafide and burden to prove all these three things is on the plaintiff. There must be an element of need as opposed to mere wish or desire. It must be backed by extreme want or destitution. Landlord should, in fact, be in need and his desire should not be fanciful. Facts should be proved from which irresistible inference can be drawn that plaintiff has a pressing necessity. A mere assertion that landlord requires the premises is not enough. At the same time elements of must have need not be an absolute or direct necessity. Reasonable means that which is rational, just, not excessive, Bonafide means honest and not actuated by bad faith, or oblique motive. Occupation of tenanted premises by landlord at higher rent alone or by itself is not sufficient and landlord is not entitled to eject tenant from the premises unless the premises occupied by him are shown to be unsuitable, inadequate or insufficient. Where plaintiff proves that his necessity is both genuine and reasonable; that premises were required for suggesting his income as the income so far received was not sufficient for him to make the two ends meet, there would be no question of mere desire but it would be a case of real requirement and genuine deed." 15. In the aforesaid observations the Addl. District Judge, while emphasising that there must be an element of need as opposed to mere wish or desire has, observed that it must be "backed by extreme want or destitution." Again he has gone to observe that "facts should be proved from which irresistible inference can be drawn that plaintiff has a pressing necessity." In my view, the Addl. District Judge was not right in placing the qualifications, namely, extreme want or destitution" and "pressing necessity" while dealing with the reasonableness of the need of the landlord. The said qualifications do not appear to be justified from the decisions of the Supreme Court and this Court. It, therefore, appears that in judging the reasonableness of the need of the appellant, the Addl. The said qualifications do not appear to be justified from the decisions of the Supreme Court and this Court. It, therefore, appears that in judging the reasonableness of the need of the appellant, the Addl. District Judge has applied a more stringent standard than that is applicable and the findings that have been recorded by the Addl. District Judge by applying this standard cannot be held to be conclusive in second appeal. It is, therefore, necessary to examine as to whether on the basis of the tests which are applicable, the appellant has established that he requires the suit premises reasonable and bonafide for his personal use, namely, for the purpose of carrying on his business in electrical goods. 16. In this connection it may be mentioned that Shri Mehta has urged that in the plaint, the appellant had set up the case that he was carrying on his business in rented shops at Motilal Atal Road and was paying a monthly rent of Rs. 425/- and that the place where those shops are situated is not suitable for the business and that he wants to shift his business in the suit premises. It has been urged by Shri Mehta that the said need, as pleaded in the plaint, ceased to exist during the pendency of the suit when the appellant shifted his business from Motilal Atal Road to Johari Bazar by taking another shop on rent there and that there is no pleading by the appellant in the plaint that the shop in Johari Bazar, where he is now carrying on business in electrical goods is not suitable for the said business and that the rent which is being paid by the appellant for the said shop is much more than the rent that is being received by him from the respondent for the suit premises. It is no doubt true that plea raised in the plaint is with regard to the unsuitability of the shops at Motilal Atal Road for the purpose of carrying on business in electrical goods and the appellant did not amend the plaint after he shifted his business to Johari Bazar during the pendency of the suit. It, however, appeared that after the appellant had shifted his business from Motilal Atal Road to Johari Bazar, the respondent had amended his written statement and had filed the amended written statement dated 7th October, 1971. It, however, appeared that after the appellant had shifted his business from Motilal Atal Road to Johari Bazar, the respondent had amended his written statement and had filed the amended written statement dated 7th October, 1971. In para 3 of the said amended written statement the respondent had pleaded that the appellant has no reasonable and bonafide necessity of the suit premises because after the filing of the suit he has vacated the shops at Motilal Atal Road and has joined service. In reply to the said written statement dated 7th October, 1971, the appellant filed his replication dated 30th October, 1971 wherein he stated that since no shop was available with the appellant he took the show-room at a Motilal Atal Road on a monthly rent for Rs. 425/- for the purpose of starting the business in electrical goods but since the said rent was excessive and it was felt that the disposal of the suit may be prolonged the appellant left the shops at Motilal Atal Road when the shop on a monthly rent of Rs. 90/- became available in Johari Bazar and he shifted his business in that shop and that the appellant is carrying on the business in the shop at Johari Bazar till the suit premises are available. There-after the statement of the appellant, Jamna Das, was recorded on 3rd November, 1973 wherein he stated that the shop in Johari Bazar wherein he is carrying on his business at present has much less accommodation and that from the point of view of location, Tripolia Bazar (wherein the suit premises is situate) is more suitable because other agents of Phillips are also in that market. During the course of cross-examination the appellant stated that in Tripolia Bazar there are two dealers of Phillips namely, Ganga Bux Radha Mohan and Radha Ballabh and that apart from them there are other dealers in electrical goods, viz, Ashakumar Suraj Bux and other small dealers. The appellant also stated that compared to the suit premises the shop in Johari Bazar is smaller by 2-3 feet because a passage has been taken out of the said shop. This would show that after the appellant had shifted his business from Motilal Atal Road to Johari Bazar he submitted the replication and his statement was also recorded thereafter and he was cross-examined by the respondent on the same. This would show that after the appellant had shifted his business from Motilal Atal Road to Johari Bazar he submitted the replication and his statement was also recorded thereafter and he was cross-examined by the respondent on the same. It cannot, therefore, be said that the appellant has not raised the plea about the unsuitability of the rented premises in his occupation in Johari Bazar and compared to the suit premises in Tripolia Bazar. 17. With regard to the reasonableness of the need of the appellant for the suit premises it may be stated that the appellant is a qualified engineer and he was earlier employed with Kabani Engineering Works and that he had left the said service one year prior to the filing of the present suit and had started his own business in electrical goods by taking on rent the show-room at Motilal Atal Road on a monthly rent of Rs. 425/- and during the pendency of the suit he shifted the said business to a rented shop in J6hari Bazar. It cannot, therefore, be disputed that the appellant needs the suit premises for running his business in electrical goods which, he is, at present running in the rented shop at Johari Bazar. The question which arises for consideration is whether the said need of the appellant can be said to be reasonable and genuine. In this regard the case of the appellant is (1) the space available in the rented shop at Johari Bazar is less as compared to the suit premises and; (ii) Tripolia Bazar, where the suit premises is situate, is more suitable for the business because other dealers in goods of Phillips Company are there, and (iii) the rent which is being paid by the appellant for the rented shop at Johari Bazar is higher than the rent which is being received by the appellant from the respondent. 18. As regards the respective sizes of the rented shop at Johari Bazar and the suit premises, the appellant has placed on record the plan (Ex.7) of the rented shop at Johari Bazar and the plan (Ex. 9) in respect of the suit premises. With regard to the dimensions of the suit premises there is no dispute between the parties. 18. As regards the respective sizes of the rented shop at Johari Bazar and the suit premises, the appellant has placed on record the plan (Ex.7) of the rented shop at Johari Bazar and the plan (Ex. 9) in respect of the suit premises. With regard to the dimensions of the suit premises there is no dispute between the parties. The width of the suit premises (including the Walls) is 12 and from inside it is 106" and the depth(inclusive of the Verandah in the front which has been covered) is 40. According to the plan (Ex. 7) the width of the rented shop at Johari Bazar (after excluding the 26" wide passage constructed by the landlord for the purpose of going to his house situated behind the shop) is 73" which is reduced to 69" in the interior portion and the depth (inclusive of the Verandah in the front) is 363". During the course of the hearing of this appeal Shri Mehta, the learned counsel for the respondent, filed a plan of the shop situated at Johari Bazar and according to the said plan also the depth of the shop is 363% the total width of the shop is 106" which included the passage of 26" and after excluding the passage the partition wall of the passage the. width of the shop from inside is about 7. There is thus not much difference between the dimensions of the rented shop at Johari Bazar which have been given in the plan (Ex. 7) by the appellant and the plan which has been submitted by Shri Mehta, during the course of hearing of the appeal and this would show that the width of the rented shop at Johari Bazar, which is in possession of the appellant is less by about 3 feet as compared to the suit premises and the depth of the shop at Johari Bazar is also less by 39" as compared to the suit premises. It can therefore, be said that compared to the suit premises the accommodation that is available to the appellant in the rented shop at Johari Bazar is less by about 30%. It can therefore, be said that compared to the suit premises the accommodation that is available to the appellant in the rented shop at Johari Bazar is less by about 30%. Appellant Jumna Das, in his statement as P.W. 1 (recorded on 10th October, 1977) has stated that on account of insufficient space in the rented shop at Johari Bazar he has not been able to expand his business and he has not been able to take agencies for other products like television etc. It has been urged by Shri Lodha, the learned counsel for the appellant, that apart from the fact that the floor area of the suit premises is more than that of the rented shop at Johari Bazar the appellant, on obtaining the possession of the suit premises, will be able to make modifications in the same by making a mazarine floor so as to make further space available which he cannot do in the rented shop at Johari Bazar. Both the courts below have ignored this difference in accommodation between the suit premises and the rented shop at Johari Bazar as of little significance. The Addl. District Judge has observed that at the time of the filing of the suit, the appellant had taken two show-rooms on Motilal Atal Road and during the pendency of the suit he vacated one show-room at Motilal Atal Road and thereafter he shifted to Johari Bazar which shows that the appellant has been shifting from larger to smaller accommodation from time to time and that shortage of the accommodation did not stand in the way of the appellant carrying on his business. It is true that earlier the appellant had at his disposal larger accommodation at Motilal Atal Road and he shifted to smaller accommodation in Johari Bazar. According to the appellant this was done on. account of the fact that the rent which he was paying for the premises on Motilal Atal Road was much higher than the rent of the shop situated at Johari Bazar and, therefore, he shifted to smaller accommodation at Johari Bazar. This does not, however, mean that the appellant does not need more accommodation for properly carrying on his business. Taking into consideration the fact that the appellant wants to expand his business by taking agencies of other products, including T. Vs. This does not, however, mean that the appellant does not need more accommodation for properly carrying on his business. Taking into consideration the fact that the appellant wants to expand his business by taking agencies of other products, including T. Vs. (which require more space) it cannot be said that the requirement of the appellant for the suit premises where more space would be available to him is not genuine or reasonable. 19. As regards better suitability of Tripolia Bazar for the purpose of carrying on the business in electrical goods, it may be stated that from the evidence it appears that the appellant is carrying on wholesale and retail business and there are shops dealing in electrical goods both in Johari Bazar as well as in Tripolia Bazar. It has come in evidence that in Tripolia Bazar two other dealers of Philips Company, namely, Gangabux Ratan Lal and Radha Ballabh and sons, have their business and in addition there are other shops of electrical goods which shows that Tripolia Bazar is a market for electrical goods. The appellant wants to shift his business to Tripolia Bazar where other dealers of the goods of Philips Co., have their shops. The courts below have held that Johari Bazar is nequally suitable for carrying on business in electrical goods because there are a number of shops of electrical goods in Johari Bazar and the side lanes and that the appellant had maximum sale of the products of Philips Co. In the year 1975. In my view, the fact that the appellant was able to have maximum sale of the products of Philips Co. at his shop at Johari Bazar does not mean that the need of the appellant to shift his business to Tripolia Bazar, where the other two dealers of goods of Philips Co. are having their shops, is not genuine. The appellant feels that he would be in a position to further increase his sales if he shifts his business to Tripolia Bazar where the other two dealers of Philips goods are also having their shops. It cannot be said that the appellant is not justified in proceeding on that basis. 20. As regards the rent it may be stated that the suit premises were let out by the appellant on a monthly rent of Rs. 33/-. It cannot be said that the appellant is not justified in proceeding on that basis. 20. As regards the rent it may be stated that the suit premises were let out by the appellant on a monthly rent of Rs. 33/-. It has, however, been pointed out that the appellant has filed a suit for fixation of standard rent for the suit premises wherein he has claimed that the rent should be Rs. 82.50/-. In that suit Rs. 66/- has been provisionally fixed as the standard rent by the Court. As against this the appellant was paying Rs. 90/- per month as rent for the shop in Johari Bazar. From the reply filed on behalf of the appellant to the application submitted by the respondent in this Court under Section 151 C.P.C. it appears that the said rent was first increased to Rs, 127.50/- and thereafter to Rs. 175/- per month and that now the appellant is paying a monthly rent of Rs. 175/- per month. This would show that while the appellant is receiving Rs. 66/- as rent for the suit premises he is paying Rs. 175/- as rent for the rented premises in Johari Bazar. Even if the appellant succeeds in this suit for fixation for standard rent he would get a rent of Rs. 82.50/- per month only for the suit premises and it would be less than half of the rent that is being paid by the appellant as rent for the rented premises. It cannot, therefore, be ignored that the appellant is paying much more rent than the rent which is received by him from the respondent and the space which is available to him in the rented shop is also less than the space available in the suit premises. 21. Taking into consideration the aforesaid facts and circumstances of the case, I am of the opinion that the appellant has succeeded in establishing that the suit premises are required reasonably by him for the purpose of carrying on his business and the courts below have erred in taking a contrary view. 22. I may now examine the question as to whether need of the appellant can be said to be bonafide. 22. I may now examine the question as to whether need of the appellant can be said to be bonafide. In Narain Chand Mehta vs. Krishna Kumar (13), This Court has held that once the court on consideration of all the facts and circumstances of the case, comes to the conclusion that the plaintiffs necessity for the suit premises is reasonable one than that inference would, by and large, also lead to the conclusion that the necessity of the plaintiffs was bonafide unless oblique motives like that of enhancement of rent or otherwise of harassing the tenant have been made out. Since, I am of the opinion that the necessity of the appellant for the suit premises is reasonable normally his need must be held to be bonafide unless it can be shown that the appellant is seeking the eviction of the respondent with an oblique motive. In the written statement the respondent has pleaded that the appellant has filed a suit for eviction with a view to increase the rent. No evidence has been adduced by the respondent in Support of this plea. The respondent has, however, adduced evidence to show that the appellant wants to sell the shop of the respondent and some talks had taken place in this regard and that the said talks have failed. No such plea was raised by the respondent in the written statement. The respondent had examined his father Jhunni Lal DW 10, and Hukam Chand DW 9. Jhunni Lal DW 10, in his statement dated 1st February, 1978, has stated that talk with regard to the sale and purchase of the suit premises were held a number of times through brokers as well as personally and that the brokers were Hukam Chand and Jambu Kumar Jain and that he was willing to offer 50-60 thousand rupees whereas the appellant was demanding rupees i lac and thereafter talks did not succeed. During the course of cross-examination he has stated that the said talk took place about two months back and that earlier to that a demand of rupees seventy to seventy five thousand had been made and at that time talks were made through Jambu Kumar Jain. During the course of cross-examination he has stated that the said talk took place about two months back and that earlier to that a demand of rupees seventy to seventy five thousand had been made and at that time talks were made through Jambu Kumar Jain. Hukam Chand D W. 9, whose statement was recorded on 31st January, 1978, has however, stated that the talk with regard to sale and purchase of the shop had taken place about 1-1/2 years back and that he had talked with the respondent. According to him the talk was with Rajendra Kumar, the son of the appellant. But in cross-examination he did not give the date and the year when the talk took place. Jambu Kumar Jain DW. 3 has stated that the son of the appellant had told him that he wanted to sell the shop and he had demanded Rs. 40,000/-and that he had told him that a difference of rupees twenty to thirty thousand is there between a vacant shop and a rented shop. According to him the said talks were held 5 to 7 years back. He has also stated that the appellants son had himself not come to him for this purpose and that broker Sohan Lal Sethi had come to him. The appellant has denied that he had any talk with regard to sale of the shop with Hukam Chand broker or any other person. No such case was put to Rajendra Kumar, PW 14. the son of the appellant during the course of cross-examination. Moreover, there is discrepancy between the evidence of the witnesses with regard to the time when the talks took place and the person with whom the talks were held. In my view not such value can be attached to this evidence. 23. It has also been submitted on behalf of the respondent that the appellant has sold a shop in Tripolia Bazar during the pendency of the suit. The appellant has stated that the said shop had been let out and it was sold to the wife of the tenant in 1969-70 because it was not possible to evict the tenant. In these circumstances, the sale of the shop by the appellant in Tripolia Bazar would not mean that the need of the appellant for the suit premises is not bonafide and that this suit has been filed with an oblique motive. In these circumstances, the sale of the shop by the appellant in Tripolia Bazar would not mean that the need of the appellant for the suit premises is not bonafide and that this suit has been filed with an oblique motive. In my view, therefore, since the respondent has failed to prove that the appellant has filed the suit with an oblique motive and it must be held that the need of the appellant for the suit premises is bonafide. The findings recorded by the courts below on Issue No. 3 cannot, therefore, be sustained and it must be held that the appellant has succeeded in establishing that the suit premises are required by him reasonable and bonafide for the purpose of carrying on business in electrical goods. 24. I may now take up the question with regard to comparative hardship. In this regard it may be mentioned that in Bhaichand Ratanshi vs. Laxmishankar Tribhovan (14) the Supreme Court has laid down the following tests for the purpose of comparative hardship :— "One of the most important factors in considering the question of greater hardship is whether other reasonable accommodation is available to the landlord or the tenant. The court would have to put in the scale other circumstances which would tilt the balance of hardship on either side, including financial means available to them for securing alternative accommodation either by purchase or by hiring one, the nature and extent of the business or other requirement of residential accommodation, as the case maybe. It must, however, be observed that the existence of alternative accommodation on both sides is an important but not a decisive factor." 25. In this context it may be mentioned that the suit premises were taken on rent by the respondent in 1958. In addition to the suit premises, the respondent has one other shop adjacent to it which was taken on rent in 1950 and the respondent and his father had been carrying on business in the name of Rajasthan Prakashan in both the shops. The other shop has been taken on rent by Shri Jhunni Lal, the father of the respondent. The business which is being carried on in these shops is for sale of library books, text books, registers, stationary-goods sport goods etc. They also publish books. The other shop has been taken on rent by Shri Jhunni Lal, the father of the respondent. The business which is being carried on in these shops is for sale of library books, text books, registers, stationary-goods sport goods etc. They also publish books. According to the respondent Rajendra Kumar, D.W. 1, the total sales in the respondents shop during the period 1st April, 1973 to 31st March, 1974 were Rs. 7,30,000/- out of which the sales of books were for Rs. 7,00,000/- and the sales of stationary were for Rs. 32,000/-. During the course of cross-examination he has admitted that his father had a press in the name of Rajkamal and that he is also running a press in the name of Modern Printers in the Haveli of Raja Udai Singh. Jhunni Lal D.W. 10, the father of the respondent, has stated that in the Haveli of Raja Udai Singh he has also godown. At first he denied that he had taken any other property on rent in the said Haveli or in the house of Smt. Kamla Devi but later on he admitted that he has taken one godown on rent from her and ultimately he admitted that he has taken four godowns. This shows that apart from the two shops, namely, suit premises and the shop adjacent to it the respondent and his father are having four godowns and a printing press. On the other hand, the appellant has no other alternative accommodation of his own for carrying on his business and he is carrying on his business in rented premises at Johari Bazar. It has been urged by Shri Mehta that the business of the respondent is such that it cannot be carried on in one shop only and that for the purpose of display of various books which are sold by the respondent two shops are required. It has also been urged by Shri Mehta that it is not possible for the respondent to carry on his business in two shops at two different places and moreover after the death of his father, the respondent is the only person who looks after the business and if the business is located at two different places proper supervision would not be possible. The courts below have decided the issue of comparative hardship against the appellant and in favour of the respondent on the basis of the expanded business of the respondent and also for the reason that the financial status of the appellant is better than that of the respondent. In this connection the Addl. District Judge has observed that the appellant has his own twelve shops and also has one big house and that all his sons are settled. From the memorandum of Family Settlement dated 24th February, 1986 filed by the respondent in this Court, it appears that the shops belong to the joint family of the appellant and the appellants family consists of himself, his wife and his four sons. According to the partition evidenced by the said settlement half share in the suit premises and a share in the residential house and full share in another house has been allotted to the appellant. As regards the 12 shops which are owned by the appellants family it has been submitted on his behalf that all of them are in possession of the tenants, since long and as the rents are low the rental income from the said shops is not very much and therefore, only because the appellants family owns 12 shops would not mean that the financial condition of the appellant is better than the respondent who admittedly has a flourishing business having a turnover of more than Rs. 7 lacs in 1973-74 and is also having a printing press. Taking into consider-ation the comparative needs of both the parties and the accommodation that is available with the respondent and the fact that the respondent has one more shop in which he can conveniently run his business, I am of the opinion that the hardship that would be caused to the appellant if the premises are not vacated, would be greater as compared to the hardship that would be caused to the respondent if the premises are vacated. In my view, therefore, the finding recorded by the courts below on issue No. 6 cannot be sustained. 26. Since the findings recorded on Issue Nos. 3 and 6 by the Addl. District Judge cannot be upheld, the appellant is entitled to succeed. 27. In my view, therefore, the finding recorded by the courts below on issue No. 6 cannot be sustained. 26. Since the findings recorded on Issue Nos. 3 and 6 by the Addl. District Judge cannot be upheld, the appellant is entitled to succeed. 27. Shri Mehta has urged that in view of the Memorandum of Family Settlement dated 24th February, 1986 the appellant has only half share in the suit premises and the other half share in the premises has been allotted to his son Ashok Kumar and that the appellant alone cannot maintain the suit for eviction. In my view there is no merit in this connection. On the date of the filing of the suit, the appellant was a co-sharer in the suit premises alongwith the other members of the family. During the pendency of the proceedings a partition has taken place in the family and now the appellant is a co-sharer to the extent of half share in the suit premises. The partition has, therefore, not made much difference since the appellant continues to be a co-sharer in the suit property. The said partition does not have the effect that the proceedings are no longer maintainable by the appellant. The said contention is, therefore, rejected. 28. No other contention has been urged by Shri Mehta. 29. The appeal is, therefore, allowed, the judgment and decree of the Addl. District Judge No. 5, Jaipur City, Jaipur, dated 19th December, 1981 in Civil Appeal No. 81/78, and the judgment and decree of the Addl. Civil Judge, Jaipur City, Jaipur dated 3lst April, 1978 in Suit No. 210/78 are set aside and the decree for eviction from the suit premises is passed in favour of the appellant. The respondent is, however, given three months time to vacate the premises.