JUDGMENT K.C. Agrawal, J. - This appeal under Order XLIII, Rule 1 (r) of the Code of Civil Procedure has been preferred by the defendants-appellants against the order of the Court below granting injunction to the plaintiff-respondents Sanjay Kumar restraining the defendants-appellants (here-in-after referred to as the decree-bolder) from executing the decree obtained in suit No. 75 of 1965, which was subsequently affirmed by the High Court in second appeal No. 1414 of 1974. 2. The facts, briefly stated, are these. It is alleged that the predecessors in interest of the defendants-appellants (decree-holders) had purchased the house situated towards the east of the disputed land under the sale deeds in the years 1860 and 1876 respectively. The disputed land sold to their predecessors, was in possession of their predecessors and thereafter the defendants. They claimed that the constructions made by the judgment-debtors were illegal and that the Sahan could not be used by the judgment-debtors. 3. Suit No. 186 of 1985 was filed by the judgment-debtors. 4. The Trial Court decreed the decree-holders' and dismissed the one filed by the judgment-debtors. The decree of the Trial Court is as under: - "The suit of the plaintiff No 75 of 1965 regarding relief A for removal of the slabs and chhajja in suit and for possession of the land after removal of these constructions is decreed with costs of the suit. The suit regarding relief B is also decreed to the extent only that the defendants are restrained from opening windows or doors in the northern wall of the defendants towards the sahan in dispute. The suit is dismissed for rest of the other prayers except stated above. The suit No. 186 of 65 is dismissed with costs to the defendants of the suit. 5. These decisions were reversed by the lower appellate Court. This led to the filing of two second appeals in this Court, which were second Appeal No. 1414 of 1974 and Second Appeal arose out of suit No. 1415 of 1974. Second Appeal No. 1414 of 1974 arose out of suit No. 75 of 1965; whereas the other Second Appeal No. 1415 of 1974 was against the judgment and decree passed in suit No. 186 of 1965. 6. Both these appeals were allowed. Second Appeal No. 1414 of 1974 arose out of suit No. 75 of 1965; whereas the other Second Appeal No. 1415 of 1974 was against the judgment and decree passed in suit No. 186 of 1965. 6. Both these appeals were allowed. There was a cross-objection also filed by the judgment-debtors in Second Appeal No. 1415 of 1974, but as it is not necessary to make a mention of the same, I refrain from doing so. The second appeals, were allowed by the High Court on 18-11-1985, as a result whereof the demolition of constructions, as prayed by the decree-holders, was decreed; whereas suit No. 186 of 1965 filed by the judgment-debtors was dismissed. The High Court allowed the appeals in the following terms: - "Appellants' Suit No. 75 of 1965 shall stand decreed for the demolition of the constructions, as prayed. In the result both the appeals are allowed While Suit No. 75 of 1965 shall stand decreed as above, Suit No. 186 of 1965 filed by the respondents shall stand dismissed with costs throughout." 7. During the pendency of the suit Panna Lal died on 15-8-1971, thereupon the decree-holders Gopi Chand and Laxmi Chand in Suit No. 75 of 1965 moved substitution application alleging that he was survived by Mahavir Prasad, who was his real sister's son and his (Mahabir Prasad) four sisters. The judgment-debtors asserted that Panna Lal had executed a registered will on 6-6-1966 and bequeathed all his properties and rights in favour of Smt. Premwati wife of Mahavir Prasad, aforesaid. The Court accepted her version and only she was substituted in place of Panna Lal in both the suits. She contested the suit on the pleas, which had been raised earlier by Panna Lal. 8. After a long drawn litigation, second appeals, as stated above, were decided in favour of the decree-holders on 18-11-1985. Against the aforesaid judgment Smt. Premwati filed two special leave petitions in the Supreme Court, which were special leave petitions Nos. 16151 and 16152 of 1985. Both the special leave petitions were dismissed on 27-1-1986. After the judgment of the High Court, Smt. Premwati filed an application for correction of the decree, which was subsequently allowed partly on 13-8-1987. 9. Against the aforesaid judgment Smt. Premwati filed two special leave petitions in the Supreme Court, which were special leave petitions Nos. 16151 and 16152 of 1985. Both the special leave petitions were dismissed on 27-1-1986. After the judgment of the High Court, Smt. Premwati filed an application for correction of the decree, which was subsequently allowed partly on 13-8-1987. 9. Sanjay Kumar, the plaintiff-respondent, thereafter filed Suit No. 535 of 1987 claiming himself to be the owner of a portion of property regarding which the decree had been passed by the High Court in October, 1987. He claimed cancellation of the decree of the High Court passed in Suit No. 75 of 1965 and also for declaration that the decree passed in the Second Appeal No. 1414 of 1974 (Gopi Chand and anr. v. Smt. Premwati & anr.) was not binding on him. He also claimed permanent injunction restraining the decree-holder from making of any construction in the lane and from interfering in his actual possession under the cover of the decree. 10. The basis of the suit filed by him was that Panna Lal executed a will in his favour on 3-8-70, as a result whereof the registered will dated 6-6-86, which was in favour of Smt. Premwati stood modified and that the property described in Schedule B of the plaint, shown by letters H B C H E F G in the map attached with the plaint, belonged to him. He claimed that Smt. Premwati knew about the exaction of the will in his favour On 3-8-1970, but concealed this fact from the Court illegally and collusively. 11. Sanjay Kumar moved an application for ad interim injunction in the suit. The effect of which was that the decree-holders were restrained from executing the decree passed in the litigation aforesaid. 12. On 18-2-1988 the Trial Court granted injunction. The operative portion of which is as follows: - "Prarthana pair 5-Ga vaste antirim nishedagya doran vad ees ashya ke sath svikar kiya jata hai ki prativadigan prarthanapatra ke ant main varnit sampati mad "Ba" main vadi ke kabge main kisi prakar ka hastakshep nahin karengein aur Sadan kee Paschimi Uttari tatha Purvi char diwari ko bitmar nahain karengein, Jise sanlagan nakshe main akshar A, B, C, D, E, F, se darshit kiya gaya hai. Use bhi nain hatayainge aur na todenge aur nali ke upar gaye huai raste ko nahin hatayeinge, uprokt sabhi karyvali moolvad sankhya 75/65, Gopi Chander aadi banam Pannalal aadi nagar munsif Saharanpur ke Nayayalaya main parit kee gai degree evam uski ijiya Sankhya 7911985, Gopi Chander aadi banam Pannalal aadi kee karyavahi main prativadigan uprokt sabhi karya karne se nishidh kiya jata hai." 13. Against the judgment of the Trial Court the present appeal has been filed in this Court. 14. The Trial Court granted the injunction by accepting that the will executed in favour of the plaintiff on 3-8-1970 had the result of modifying the earlier registered will and as Sanjay Kumar had not been impleaded as a party in suit No. 75 of 1965, the decree passed in that suit was invalid. Upon that finding of title, the conclusion arrived at by the Trial Court was that if the decree was executed and the constructions etc. were demolished, the plaintiff Sanjay Kumar would suffer irreparably and, therefore, balance of convenience required allowing of the injunction application moved by him. 15. The injunction application was contested by the decree holders on the ground that the alleged will dated 3-8-1970 filed by the plaintiff Sanjay Kumar was forged and had been manufactured with a view to deprive the decree-holders of their decree. It was claimed that Panna Lal had signed the earlier will, the execution of which was not being denied even by Sanjay Kumar in 'Hindi' whereas the will relied upon by him in support of his title purports to have been signed by the deceased in 'Urdu'. The assertion that Smt. Premwati had colluded with the decree-holders, that is, Gopi Chand and Laxmi Chand, was asserted to be false. The interest shown by Smt. Premwati in the litigation was proved, according to the decree-holders, from the fact that immediately after the Trial Court's decree was set aside by the lower appellate Court, she applied for execution of the decree passed in Suit No. 186 of 1965 and after losing from the High Court she went upto the Supreme Court by means of special leave petition. According to the decree-holders the will, alleged to have been executed by Panna Lal was manufactured and forged. According to the decree-holders the will, alleged to have been executed by Panna Lal was manufactured and forged. The decree-holders pleaded that the registered will dated 6-6-1966 could not be cancelled or modified by an unregistered will dated 3-8-1970 and if Panna Lal desired to change the earlier will, he should have, under the circumstances, executed another registered will. The fact that the subsequent will was not registered, according to the decree-holders, demonstrated that it was manufactured by Sanjay Kumar. 16. In support of this appeal learned Counsel for the appellants asserted that the Trial Court gave a complete go-bye to all the principles, which have to be taken into consideration while deciding an application for injunction. The Trial Court without holding that Sanjay Kumar had a prima facie case in his favour. This finding does not take into account the relevant facts and circumstances and counsel urged that there was absolutely no justification for the Trial Court to hold the same. He contended that the judgment of the Trial Court is perverse. 17. There is a lot of substance in the appellants' contention that if injunctions are granted by a Court, as it was done in the present case, the confidence of the people in the judicial system would be lost. After a long drawn battle of twenty years that the decree had been passed and as a result of the injunction granted all efforts, money and time consumed in its decision have gone a waste. I do not wish to say anything in the judgment, which might effect the decision of the suit in favour or against the either party. But I do consider it necessary to reverse the judgment of the court below by observing that the judgment indicates that the Civil Judge does not have any idea, as what is required to be seen while judging the question of prima facie case. After all the plaintiff Sanjay Kumar was seeking to stop the decree-holders from doing something; and to stop them before the matter had ever been tried. The plaintiff was asserting that the defendants had obtained a collusive decree by approaching the Judgment-debtors and having brought them not to contest the suit on the lines which they should have. Sri K.M.Dayal, Counsel for the plaintiff-respondent Sanjay Kumar, urged that he had been impleaded as a party in two suits Nos. The plaintiff was asserting that the defendants had obtained a collusive decree by approaching the Judgment-debtors and having brought them not to contest the suit on the lines which they should have. Sri K.M.Dayal, Counsel for the plaintiff-respondent Sanjay Kumar, urged that he had been impleaded as a party in two suits Nos. 75/65and 186/65, the decree was not binding on him and that this fact itself was sufficient to establish that it was collusive. I am not prepared to accept his submission. The court committed an error, to my mind, by overlooking the relevant facts and by taking into consideration irrelevant ones. The Court below wrongly and erroneously found that the plaintiff Sanjay Kumar had a prima facie case, a case which had good chances of winning at the trial. Sanjay Kumar, according to Sri K.M. Dayal, became major very recently and, therefore, it can be presumed that he was about two years of age at the time when the will was executed. He was not related to Panna Lal and it is not prima facie understandable as to why he would have executed second will in 1970 superseding the first one. The litigation was fought tooth and nail in between the parties and only Smt. Premwati but other judgment-debtors had a common interest against the decree-holders. The allegation of collusion in between the decree-holders and Smt. premwati does not bear the scrutiny. While examining the question of prima facie case the court has to satisfy that the claim was not frivolous, vexatious, in other words that there is a serious question to be tried. The Court below erred in finding a prima facie case to be in favour of Sanjay Kumar and restraining the decree-holders from executing the decree obtained after twenty years of serious litigation. 18. In The National Textile Corporation (U.P.) Ltd. v. Swadeshi Cotton Mills Co. Ltd. & ors., 1987 All. L.J. 1266 a Division Bench of this Court held:- "As a general rule, for determining whether to grant a temporary injunction or a restraining order, it is necessary for the Court to weigh the equities and balance, the relative position of the parties with respect to convenience, hardship and injury. Ltd. & ors., 1987 All. L.J. 1266 a Division Bench of this Court held:- "As a general rule, for determining whether to grant a temporary injunction or a restraining order, it is necessary for the Court to weigh the equities and balance, the relative position of the parties with respect to convenience, hardship and injury. So on an application for temporary injunction, the Court in the exercise of its discretionary power, will consider what is commonly described as the balance of convenience, that is to say, it would consider whether the greater injury would be done by granting the injunction than would result from the refusal thereof. The temporary injunction would usually be denied in a doubtful case where granting of it would cause greater detriment to the defendant. Also if a person seeks equitable relief of obtaining temporary injunction, he must come with clean hands. A wrong conduct of the plaintiff within the particular matter or transaction with respect to which he seeks injunctive relief precludes him from obtaining such relief." 19. Sri K.M.Dayal urged that the present was a case covered by Order XXI, Rule 29 of the Code of Civil Procedure. Order XXI, Rule 29 of the Code confers discretion on a Court to stay execution of the decree and that the discretion having been exercised by the court below in favour of the plaintiff, this Court should not set aside the same in the appeal. It may be undeniable that the power conferred by Order XXI, Rule 29 of the Code is discretionary, but the same has to be exercised judicially and not mechanically as a matter of course. The Court is required to consider that the party, who has obtained a lawful decree, is not deprived of the fruits thereof except for good and cogent reasons. The power under Order XXI, Rule 29 should be exercised in exceptional cases and that too where interest of justice requires. The fundamental consideration should be that the decree has been obtained by a party and that it should not be deprived of its fruits unless for very good reasons. The Court below by the order passed has infructuated the decree. The Court has no discretion to perpetuate injustice by legalising the unlawful and illegal obstruction against the execution of a decree. 20. The Court below by the order passed has infructuated the decree. The Court has no discretion to perpetuate injustice by legalising the unlawful and illegal obstruction against the execution of a decree. 20. Section 41 (b) of the Specific Reliefs Act says that the Courts of equitable jurisdiction lack power to restrain the Court by injunction from performing its duty which the law requires it to be performed. The present, to me, does not appear to be a case of fraud or collusion on the part of Smt. Premwati, the judgment debtor, and others. The Court below committed an abuse of discretion by directing the decree holders not to execute the decree. In case the suit is ultimately decreed, the plaintiff would have the right to claim damages from the decree holders. 21. In the result, the appeal succeeds and is allowed with costs throughout and the judgment of the Court below dated 18-2-1988 is set aside.