K. J. VAIDYA, J. ( 1 ) THIS appeal presents a very peculiar and paradoxical picture wherein though on one hand this Court anhesitatingly has reached a conclusion that the impugned judgment and order of acquittal per se is a case of Rushed-up acquittal and hence being patently unjudicial and illegal deserves an obvious order of remand and yet on the other hand having regard to the facts and circumstances of the case enlisted hereunder at this stage this Court has a feeling that it would not be expedient in the larger interest of justice to remand the case as the same will be more of a prosecution rather than the prosecution of the accused. However but for the only plus point in this appeal viz. that it has provided an opportunity to express a word or two of advice to the erring trial Court and so defaulting other Courts to conduct and manage themselves with some sense of responsibility while trying criminal cases whole exercise of hearing this appeal and delivering the judgment would have been an exercise in futility as the ultimate result of this appeal is going to be dropping the proceedings against the accused. With utmost respect to such defaulting Courts it has got to be stated that such Rushed-up acquittal in clear disregard of ordinary judicial prudence is a matter of grave concern to anybody. The High Court in its appellate jurisdiction would surely quash and set aside such manifestly unjust orders as and when it comes across the same (but at the same time) it requires to be red-signalled that the further accountability of the trial Court for such an unfortunate and irresponsible orders and consequential result thereto cannot come to an end thereby. ( 2 ) TO start with this acquittal appeal arises out of a judgment and order dated 22/10/1980 rendered in Criminal Case No. 114 of 1979 passed by the learned J. M. F. C. Jasdan wherein Sypoi Alambhai Jamalbhai the respondent-accused herein who was charged for offence punishable under Sec. 408 I P. C. come to be discharged at the very threshold of the trial for the alleged non-prosecution. ( 3 ) IN brief it is the prosecution case that in the year 1977 the accused who was serving as a Secretary of the Moti Lakhavad Seva Sahkari Mandali committed a temporary misappropriation of Rs. ( 3 ) IN brief it is the prosecution case that in the year 1977 the accused who was serving as a Secretary of the Moti Lakhavad Seva Sahkari Mandali committed a temporary misappropriation of Rs. 5 339 an amount which he received from various members of the society towards repayment of loan on different dates. It was alleged by the prosecution that though the accused issued receipts towards the said recovery of loans he did not place corresponding entries regarding the same in Rojmel account maintained by the Society. As result one Mr. S. D. Joshi Assistant Co-operative Officer from the office of the District Registrars Co-operative Society Rajkot filed complaint against the accused before the P. S. I. Vichhia Police Station. After an investigation was over on 30/04/1979 the accused came to be chargesheeted to stand trial for the aforesaid offence. ( 4 ) THE trial Court took cognizance of the case when chargesheet was filed on 30/04/1979 Thereafter for one reason or the other the proceedings went on being adjourned merrily from time to time and ultimately on 22/10/1980 at the very threshold of the trial before any witness could be examined the trial came to be terminated for non-prosecution by an order dated 22/10/1980 discharging the accused. ( 5 ) MR. D. K. Trivedi learned Addl. P. P. appearing for the State has submitted that the impugned order of acquittal passed by the trial Court is patently unjudicial and illegal and has resulted into a serious failure of justice. Ho further submitted that the trial Court ought not to have disposed of the case with such an undue haste more parti- cularly when charge against the accused was already framed and the trial Court had earlier ordered to issue summons on an application dated 16/10/1980 given by the learned A. P. P. ( 6 ) TO make good aforesaid submissions the learned Addl. P. P. has carefully taken me through the Rojkam proceedings of the case. It appears from the said record that the chargesheet was filed on 30/04/1979 and the case came to be disposed of on 22/10/1980 In between aforesaid two dates the trial came to be adjourned for 27 times. Further in between the period of filing of the chargesheet on 30/04/1979 and the framing of the charge on 25/03/1980 the trial was adjourned for 18 times. Further in between the period of filing of the chargesheet on 30/04/1979 and the framing of the charge on 25/03/1980 the trial was adjourned for 18 times. During this period for 11 times the trial was adjourned on the ground that the Court time was over. There is nothing on the record to show as to in which other cases the Court was so busy that the Court time was over and the instant old case of the year 1977 could not be proceeded with. After the charge was framed on 25/03/1980 the case was adjourned for 9 times till 2 20/10/1980 when accused came to be discharged for non- prosecution. During this period on three occasions once again the case could not be proceeded with as the Court time was over. For the first time the case was fixed up for recording the evidence on 2/08/1980 Thereafter in between the said dates 2/08/1980 till 22/10/1980 the trial was thrice adjourned on account of witnesses not being present before the Court for recording their evidence. On 22/10/1980 as neither the witnesses nor learned A. P. P. was present the case came to be disposed of by the trial Court. Mr. Trivedi submitted that as per the Rojkam from the date when the chargesheet came to be filed and till the time case came to be disposed of on 22/10/1980 the trial was adjourned from one date to another for about 27 times and so far as the examination of the witnesses was concerned the case came to be adjourned only thrice. Mr. Trivedi submits that it is not his endeavour to defend an inaction if any on the part of the prosecuting agency for not keeping the prosecution witnesses present before the trial Court on due dates but at the same time out of the total 27 adjournments 85 far as the examination of witnesses before the Court was concerned the case was adjourned only on three occasions. These facts tempt me to raise following obvious questions which contain obviously answers in them. Can such a comparatively shorter period be treated as an inordinate delay in keeping the prosecution witnesses present before the Court and on that count the prosecuting agency be branded as callous ? These facts tempt me to raise following obvious questions which contain obviously answers in them. Can such a comparatively shorter period be treated as an inordinate delay in keeping the prosecution witnesses present before the Court and on that count the prosecuting agency be branded as callous ? Should not have the Court under the circumstances exercised its coercive powers to issue in the event of necessity and in the interest of justice bailable or non-bailable warrant for securing the present of the witnesses ? Can a wrong committed by a prosecuting agency be utilized or justified by the trial Court for committing another wrong by acquitting the accused ? Can once the charge is framed against the accused he be let off for the alleged non-prosecution where the Court itself which was duty bound to compel and secure presence of witnesses also did nothing at all on its part in order to do justice ? Mr. Trivedi under the circumstances is right in making the grievance that such an unjust illegal and rushed-up acquittal by the trial Court has resulted into denial of fair deal fair trial to the prosecution. ( 7 ) ON going through the Rojkam Proceedings I do not feel any difficulty in accepting the aforesaid submissions made by the learned Addl. P. P. Having regard to the fact that the offence was of an year 1977 trial Court ought to have given top-most priority to this case in the interest of prosecution accused and for ultimate ends of justice. Even charge could have been framed much earlier had the Court taken little bit initiative and insisted upon for the expeditious proceeding. Such callous delays and dozing proceedings in the criminal trial to say the least is nothing but wandering away from the path of justice. Such a tardy trial proceeding corrodes the very faith and foundation of justice. It is true that neither law provides for any time bound trial schedule nor it is practicable to fix time bound trial as it depends upon the very many factors particularly Criminal Court in the Metropolitan cities like Ahmedabad Vadodara Rajkot Surat etc. Such a tardy trial proceeding corrodes the very faith and foundation of justice. It is true that neither law provides for any time bound trial schedule nor it is practicable to fix time bound trial as it depends upon the very many factors particularly Criminal Court in the Metropolitan cities like Ahmedabad Vadodara Rajkot Surat etc. and in many other headquarters towns of the districts having regard to the number of criminal cases and inadequate number of Magistrates and its ministerial staff there is a tremendous workload pressure on trial Courts and therefore to the said extent the unavoidable delays in the course of the proceedings are sometimes understandable. But that does not mean that the trial Court should allow itself to be bogged down under the pressure of the work losing the interest initiative and control over the Court proceedings. The Rojkam proceed- ings therefore must resent the awareness initiative and interest of the trial Court showing how each and every case is controlled at very many stages like (i) adjourning the cases; (ii) controlling the process serving agencies (iii) insisting upon keeping the prosecution witnesses present by issuing bailable and/or non-bailable warrants and/or resorting to remedy under Sec. 350 of the Code of Criminal Procedure etc. The Rojkam proceedings must speak about an hour to hour judicial activism. The Rojkam proceedings must speak about an hour to hour judicial activism. It must also reflect the reasonableness of the Court in attending to the cases on the basis of the following considerations till the gravity and seriousness of the offence; and/or (number of the accused in each case; and/or (iii) number of prosecution witnesses; and/or (iv) type and number of document to be proved at the trial; and/or (v) how old is the offence; and/or (vi) how many other cases are pending before the Court alongwith the trial of the particular case; and/or (vii) bow many cases under social beneficial legislations like (a) Minimum Wages Act (b) Factories Act (c) Provident- Fund Act (d) Bonus Act and similar other legislations wherein the evidence mostly consists of complainant only and yet such cases are conveniently got adjourned and prolonged by vested interest (viii) maintenance proceed- ing under Sec. 125 of the Code of Criminal Procedure should be attended to and disposed of on emergency basis minimizing inconveni- ence and harassment of ladies as far as possible (ix) Further the Rojkam must reflect how best the Court has activated itself in taking interest and initiative alerting the prosecution agency making it work It should not be forgotten that primarily it is the duty and responsi- bility of the Court to do justice and with the said object in mind if the trial Court feels that the prosecuting agency is not discharging its duty in the desired way then it should not feel helpless and reluctant in straightening up the matter by bringing to the notice of either the District Superintendent of Police and/or the District Magistrate under whom the prosecuting agency of the Taluka and/or District in fanction- ing. Unless there is some sort of liaison at the administrative level of the Court as well as that of the Office of the District Superintendent of Police and District Magistrate it is not possible to control the menace of lethargic and irresponsible prosecuting agencies. Neither the prosecuting agency nor the Police agency entrusted with the service of the process can ever be permitted to have an illegal upper-hand over the powers and duties of the trial Court. Neither the prosecuting agency nor the Police agency entrusted with the service of the process can ever be permitted to have an illegal upper-hand over the powers and duties of the trial Court. If the trial Court neglects and fails to tackle the defaulting and erring agencies not only that particular case would suffer but these agencies will get out of the control and would be tempted to play foul and cool in other cases as well ultimately defeating the case of justice affecting the loss the faith of people clamoring and urging for the justice as their desire for justice will simply remain a cry in the wilderness. Judicial prudence warrants that for doing ultimate justice keeping the prosecu- tion witnesses before the Court for the purpose of examination is an absolute necessity and for that both the Court and prosecuting agency has got to share the responsibility. The Court must realise the hard facts of life that it has to depend upon a human-agency for securing presence of the witnesses before the Court. Such agency works is its own way with some time yes some time its some time buts and so on so forth coming with number of cases. It is too much to expect this agency to be as quick and as responsive as one would have with the push batton electronic device. Therefore the trial Court must tackle the situation with patience without losing any interest and/or initiative. It must see that the prosecuting agency is kept under control it keeps the witnesses presence before the Court and the things are handled in such a way that the cause of justice ultimately does not lose its way and accused get out of the clutches or law on the ground of non- prosecution. Default committed by the prosecution agency cannot be permitted to be taken as material to clean-wash the crime committed by the accused. What in fact in the instance case we find is that the crime is clean-washed for no fault of society not as much for the fault of the prosecution as it was for want of trial. ( 8 ) THE result of the foregoing conclusion is that the order of acquittal is illegal and hence deserves to be quashed. However the consequential order of remand is just not passed in the larger interest of justice. ( 8 ) THE result of the foregoing conclusion is that the order of acquittal is illegal and hence deserves to be quashed. However the consequential order of remand is just not passed in the larger interest of justice. 19 it not rightly observed that sometime justice and life are larger than law ? Doing justice is not merely recording either an order of acquittal or conviction or remanding the case for re-trial. Justice is a word which has a larger connotation and has to be under- stood in its proper perspective and spirit in background of facts ant circumstances of each case. Ordinarily this is a case wherein the order of remand would have natural and legal consequence of the impugned illegal order. However at the same time whether to remand the case for re-trial would be doing justice or not is a question which requires to be considered and while considering the same this Court at this stage can not be oblivious to the facts and circumstances enlisted here under (i) that the alleged offense has taken place in the year 1977 and the order of remand which has sought to be passed is in the year 1989 and/or (ii) that this is a case where the accused is of about the age of 72 years and/or (iii) that the offense alleged is an offense under Sec. 408 of IPC for temporary misappropriation of Rs. 5 339 which amount has been subsequently paid by the accused and/or (iv) that too but for an avoidable and unfortunate baste committed by the trial Court the question of remand would not have been arisen and/or (v) whether the order of remand in aforesaid facts of the case would be an order for the prosecution or persecution and/or (vi) whether it will be fair to the accused who is of about 72 years of age and was taken on a judicial anvil all these years has to further undergo trial for no fault of him and/or (vii) whether in overall public interest it would be just advisable to remand the case for re-trial. The answers to all these is obviously further trial is undesirable. The answers to all these is obviously further trial is undesirable. Thus having regard to the facts and circumstances of the case though I do find that the order of acquittal is as wrong as it could be I would not like to disturb the same and accordingly in exercise of the suo motu inherent powers under Sec. 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure I hereby order the case proceedings to be dropped against the accused. Had this Court an opportunity of hearing this matter soon after the admission the remand would have been an obvious order. It appears to me that in types of the cases like the present one and/or appeal for enhancement of sentence and/or such other and similar matters it is desirable that early fixed date of final hearing is given and the same is disposed of. It is distressing to note that such sort of cheap and easy tendency of disposing of the criminal cases is increasing day by day and it is a time to cry halt. ( 9 ) IN the result the impugned judgment and order of the acquit- tal though declared illegal; erroneous and unjust no order of remand is made as proceedings against the accused are ordered to he dropped. Hence the appeal stands dismissed accordingly. (KMV) Appeal dismissed. .