SWAMI, J. ( 1 ) AT the stage of preliminary hearing notice was ordered to the respondents. Accordingly, learned counsel Sri Radhesh Prabhu has entered appearance on behalf of the respondents and the statement of objections is also filed. As the petition turns upon a short point rule is issued and it is heard for final disposal. ( 2 ) IN this petition under Article 226 of the constitution, the petitioner has sought for the following reliefs: to a) declare by the issue of an appropriate writ, order or direction as the case may be, declaring the view entertained by the Disciplinary authority in proceeding with the enquiry proceedings against the petitioner pursuant to the liberty reserved by this Hon'ble Court without reinstating the petitioner in service and granting him all consequential benefits flowing from the success of the petitioner in the writ petition as illegal, arbitrary and void, with a further declaration that the respondents would not get authority and power to proceed with the petitioner in the enquiry proceedings until and unless he is reinstated in service with all consequential benefits; b) issue a writ in the nature of mandamus or order or direction as the case may be, directing the respondents not to proceed with the enquiry proceedings against the petitioner until and unless he is reinstated in service with all consequential benefits flowing from the quashing of the order of dismissal passed against him; and c) pass such other orders just and expedient in the circumstances of the case including the award of costs in the interests of justice and equity. ( 3 ) THE petitioner has been compelled to approach this Court, because of the reply given by the first respondent-Bank as per annexure-M. Having regard to the contentions urged on both sides, the following points arise for consideration: 1) Whether the petitioner fs entitled to have a direction issued to the respondents to reinstate him and to pay back wages? 2) Whether the aforesaid relief is barred by resjudicata? 3) Whether the granting of the aforesaid relief covered by point No. 1 amounts to review of the order of this Court in w. A. 567/85? points 1 to 3 ( 4 ) AS all the three points are interconnected, therefore, it is convenient to deal all of them together. Accordingly, all the three points are considered together. 3) Whether the granting of the aforesaid relief covered by point No. 1 amounts to review of the order of this Court in w. A. 567/85? points 1 to 3 ( 4 ) AS all the three points are interconnected, therefore, it is convenient to deal all of them together. Accordingly, all the three points are considered together. ( 5 ) THE facts necessary for the purpose of deciding the aforesaid points, are not in dispute and the same are as follows: (a) The petitioner was an officer- employee in the first respondent-Bank. There was a disciplinary proceeding initiated against him which ended in an order of dismissal passed on 31-12-1976. During the period of inquiry and till the date of dismissal the petitioner was in service and he was never kept under suspension. Aggrieved by the order of dismissal the petitioner preferred an appeal before the Appellate authority which also ended against him. Therefore, the petitioner approached this court in W. P. 10165/77 to have the order of dismissal of the disciplinary authority and also that of the appellate authority, quashed and further to have him reinstated into the bank with all consequential benefits. The writ petition was allowed. The relevant portion of the order passed in W. P. 10165/77 on 1-2-1985 was as follows:"rule extracted above except making provision for having a representative has not specified designation of a person who could represent a delinquent official. By restricting petitioner to have representative of the cadre of an officer colleague and not providing sufficient time to avail of assistance of an officer colleague, petitioner has been undoubtedly denied the reasonable opportunity of getting defended. An enquiry held without providing sufficient opportunity to nominate his representative is vitiated on account of non-compliance of principles of natural justice. On behalf of respondents, it is vehemently urged that petitioner has cross-examined witnesses and examined his own witnesses and irregularity, if any, in not permitting the petitioner to have a representative of his choice or not providing sufficient time has not caused any prejudice hence, there is no good ground to interfere. Faced with the situation there was no other alternative except to proceed with the enquiry under protest; he might have cross-examined and also examined defence witnesses, but his plea that representative would have done better and got him exonerated cannot be brushed aside so lightly. Faced with the situation there was no other alternative except to proceed with the enquiry under protest; he might have cross-examined and also examined defence witnesses, but his plea that representative would have done better and got him exonerated cannot be brushed aside so lightly. As per rule extracted he is not only entitled to appear by himself but also appoint a representative. It is not unlikely that refusal had caused serious prejudice. Hence, both on the ground of denial of opportunity to defend his case through Sadashiva Shetty and also on the ground that sufficient time was not provided to make alternative arrangement after B. V. Bhat expressed his disinclination to defend him vitiated the impugned order of punishment". Pursuant to second show cause notice issued by disciplinary authority apart from pleading innocence he has pleaded for lenient view in case of acceptance of enquiry report. The relevant portion of consideration by Disciplinary authority reads thus:-"he has submitted his written submission dated 30-12-1976 wherein I find that he has reiterated his earlier stand and attacked the findings of the Enquiry officer. I have very carefully considered his written submissions and in my view, there is no substance. ""likewise appellate authority has not considered whether finding based on material placed could be sustained or otherwise. None of the contentions urged by petitioner are considered. There is no application of mind. Non-consideration of representation or explanation offered by petitioner pursuant to second show cause notice in the proper perspective vitiate impugned order. Finding on these two aspects is sufficient to invalidate impugned order and it is unnecessary to examine merit or demerit of other contentions urged. Accordingly, Writ Petition succeeds, impugned orders are quashed reserving liberty to respondents to proceed with enquiry from the stage at which infirmity has occurred if they so desire. Rule made absolute. " ( 6 ) THE respondents-1 and 2 herein being' aggrieved by the aforesaid order passed in the writ petition went up in appeal in W. A. 567/85. The Division Bench by its order dated 30-8-1988 disposed of the appeal in the following terms:"4. As has come in the earlier part of the judgment, the learned single Judge has also expressed his opinion with regard to the point that proper opportunity of defending the case has not been given to the respondent. The Division Bench by its order dated 30-8-1988 disposed of the appeal in the following terms:"4. As has come in the earlier part of the judgment, the learned single Judge has also expressed his opinion with regard to the point that proper opportunity of defending the case has not been given to the respondent. In our view, in the wake of the finding which we have recorded above, it is not necessary to go into this aspect of the matter. Even the learned single Judge could have avoided to give a finding on this issue as the matter should have been remitted to the disciplinary authority for deciding the whole case a fresh in accordance with law. In this view of the matter, we would prefer not to express any opinion on this aspect of the matter as the same also has to be considered by the disciplinary authority, and the finding recorded by the learned single Judge in this regard is set aside. 5. At this stage, it may be observed that m. Patil appearing for the respondent is agreed to the proposed order which Mr. Radhesh Prabhu, learned counsel for the appellants, though vehemently advanced his arguments on the first point decided against the Bank by the learned single judge, has not been able to convince that we should not adopt this course. 6. For the reasons recorded above we modify the order of the learned single judge to this extent that the finding on point No. 1 is set aside and the matter is remitted to the disciplinary authority for deciding the whole case in accordance with law in the light of the representation made by the respondent - delinquent and the observations made by us in the judgment. In the circumstances of the case, we make no order as to costs. " ( 7 ) THE case of the petitioner is that, as a result of remitting the disciplinary proceeding to the stage at which it was pending on the date he filed the reply to the show cause notice issued pursuant to the finding submitted by the Inquiry Officer, further proceeding can be proceeded with oniy on reinstating the petitioner and on payment of backwages. The contention of the petitioner is that such a relief flows out of the order passed in the writ petition. The contention of the petitioner is that such a relief flows out of the order passed in the writ petition. On the contrary, it is contended on behalf of the respondents that there wan no specific direction issued for reinstatement of the petitioner and payment of backwages, therefore the petitioner is not entitled to seek such a relief. Such a relief it is contended, must be deemed to have been refused as not arising out of the order. Even otherwise granting of such a relief would amount to review of the decision of the division Bench, that the petitioner cannot demand reinstatement as a condition precc dent for proceeding with the disciplinary proceeding. ( 8 ) IT appears to me that the Bank is not well advised in taking up this stand in the facts and circumstances of this case, and in view of she le^ai position that flows out of the order passed by this Court. The employment under a nationalised bank is not a matter of contract. Though an employment undes a nationalised bank which stands in the portion of a Siate ior all purposes, to start with may be a contract. When once a person enter;, the ernpioymeni it becomes a matter of status and ;i is governed bv the Rules ana regulations. In Roshar, Lan Tandon v Union of India and Others, ( AIR 1967 SC 1889 ) the law o. i the point is stated thus:"the legal position of a Government servant is more on of status than of contract. The hall-mark of status is the attachment to a legal relationship of rights and duties imposed by the public law and not by mere agreement of the parties. . . . . But it is obvious that the relationship between the Government and its servant is not like an ordinary contract of service between a master and servant. The legal relationship is something entirely different, something in the nature of status It is much more than a purer contractual relationship voluntarily entered into between the parties. The du?> es of status are fixed by the law, and in the enforcement of these duties society has an interest. In the language of jurisprudence status is a condition of membership of a group of which powers and duties are exclusively determined by law and not by agreement between the parties concerned. The du?> es of status are fixed by the law, and in the enforcement of these duties society has an interest. In the language of jurisprudence status is a condition of membership of a group of which powers and duties are exclusively determined by law and not by agreement between the parties concerned. "therefore once the order of dismissal passed as a result of a disciplinary proceeding is quashed and the matter is remitted to the disciplinary authority to start from the stage of icceipt of the explanation, the order of. dismissal which had put an end to the status of the petitioner as an officer-employee of the Bank disappears and the status of an employee, automatically gets restored. This court when allowed the writ petition with the reliefs contained therein regarding the consequential benefits, though the order did not state in express terms that the consequential benefits also were granted, but such a direction flowed from granting main relief itself. The order oi a Court should not be read as a statute. It , ->houid be read and construed in the fight o! ihe facts of the case and the relieis sought for. The necessary consequence of the order allowing the writ petition and quashing the impugned order, was that the. tiatus of the petitioner as an officer of the Bank stood reinstated, because on the i'-idtc the order of dismissal was passed ar:d during the pendency of the inquiry proceedings, the petitioner was not kept under suspension. He continued to be in service as a full fledged employee of the bank and was paid full pay and allowances. If upto the date of dismissal an employee was continued in service, as a consequence of quashing the order of dismissal such employee would, in law, be entitled to be reinstated. Such a direction in the facts and circumstances of the case flows as a matter of course. The contention that it is not permissible for the court to grant reinstatement and backwapes is only stated to be rejected. It is not an inflexible rule. It may be so where the employment is under a contract; it does not apply to a case where the service is a matter of status and is not a matter of contract and it is governed by the Rules and Regulations. It is not an inflexible rule. It may be so where the employment is under a contract; it does not apply to a case where the service is a matter of status and is not a matter of contract and it is governed by the Rules and Regulations. ( 9 ) HOWEVER the learned counsel for tlu: respondents has placed reliance on paras 17 and 18 of the Judgment of the Supreme court in 'flic Managing Director, U. f warehousing Corporation and Others v VIjay narayan Vajpayee, (AIR 1980 S. C. 84 (1 ). In that case the Supreme Court observed thus:"further contention of the learned counsel for the appellants is that even if the dismissal of the respondent was wrongful, the High Court could only quash the same, but it could not in ihc exercise of its certiorari jurisdiction under article 226 of ihe Constitution give the further direction lhat the employee should be reinstated in service with lull back wages. Il is maintained that in giving (his further direction the High Court had overleaped the bounds of its jurisdiction. 18. There aopears to be force in this contention, li must be remembered that in the exercise of its certioiari jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution, the high Court acts only in a supervisory capacity and not as an appellate tribunal. It does not review the evidence upon which the inferior tribunal proposed to base its conclusion, it simply demolishes the order which it considers to be without jurisdiction or manifestly erroneous, but does not, as a rule, substitute its own view for those of the inferior tribunal. In other words, the offending order or the impugned illegal proceeding is quashed and put out of the way as one which should not be used to the detriment of the writ petitioner. Thus in matters of employment, while exercising supervisory jurisdiction under Article 226 of the constitution, over the orders and quasi judicial proceeding of an administrative authority - not being a proceeding under the industrial/labour lav. Thus in matters of employment, while exercising supervisory jurisdiction under Article 226 of the constitution, over the orders and quasi judicial proceeding of an administrative authority - not being a proceeding under the industrial/labour lav. before an industrial/labour Tribunal - culminating in dismissal of the employee, the High court should ordinarily, in the event of the dismissal being found illegal, s-mp!y quash the same and should not further give a positive direction for payment to the employee fell backwages (although as a consequence of ihc an'nilment of the dismissal, the position as it obtained immediately before the dismissal is rcston fii, such peculiar powers can properly be exercised in a case where the impugned adjudication or award has been given by industrial Tribunal or Labour Court. Tlie instant case is not one under industrial/labour L aw. Hie respondent- empioyee never raised any Industrie dispute, nor invoked the jurisdiction of the labour Conn or the Industrial Tribunal. He directly moved ihc High Court for ihe exercise of its special jurisdiction under article 226 of ihc Constitution for challenging the order of dismissal primarily on the grounii that it was violative of the principles of natural justice which required that his public employ nent should not be terminated without giving him a due opportunity to defend himself a. td to rebut the charges against him. Further more whether a workman or employee of a statutory authority should be reinstatement in public employment with or without full backwages, is a question of fact depending on evidence to be produced before the Tribunal. If after the termination of his employment the workman/employee was gainfully employed elsewhere that is one of the important factor to be considered in determining whether or not the reinstatement should be with full backwages and with continuity of employment. For these two fold reasons, we are of opinion that the High court was in error in directing payment to the employee full backwages. " ( 10 ) IT is relevant to notice in this regard that this C'ourt allowed the writ petition in which the consequential relief of reinstatement was sought for. It must be deemed to have been granted having regard to the context in which the reliefs were prayed for, and the order allowing the writ petition was passed. This Court did not consider the matter tor the first time as the first authority. It must be deemed to have been granted having regard to the context in which the reliefs were prayed for, and the order allowing the writ petition was passed. This Court did not consider the matter tor the first time as the first authority. What was challenged in the Writ Petition was the validity of the disciplinary proceeding and the orders passed therein. Once those orders were quashed automatically, the status of the petitioner as an employee of the bank stood restored and the service continued without break. Therefore, the consequential relief of reinstatement must be deemed to have been ordered. Therefore the decision in U. P. Warehousing corporation's case cannot be held to support the case of the Bank. Even on a close scruliny of the decision it is relevant to notice that the aforesaid underlined portion does support the case of the petitioner. The petitioner has challenged the disciplinary proceeding which has resulted in the dismissal of the petitioner from service. ( 11 ) THE contention that the relief of reinstatement and backwages must be deemed to have been refused as there was no specific direction issued in this regard, is also not based upon proper reading of the order of this Court. As already pointed out the order of the Court should not be read as a statute. It should be read in the context in which it is passed. The order allowing the writ petition did amount to granting the relief of reinstatement and payment of back- wages, because in the absence of an order of dismissal the petitioner should have been continued in service and should have been entitled to payment of wages, because he was not kept under suspension during the course of inquiry and was continued in service till the date of dismissal. ( 12 ) THE contention that the relief prayed for by the petitioner if granted would amount to review of the order of the Division Bench cannot also be accepted. It is already pointed out that on a proper and reasonable reading of the order allowing the writ petition, reinstatement and backwages must be deemed to have been granted. The Bank has refused to reinstate the petitioner into service and pay the backwages on the ground that there is no specific direction issued by this Court. It is already pointed out that on a proper and reasonable reading of the order allowing the writ petition, reinstatement and backwages must be deemed to have been granted. The Bank has refused to reinstate the petitioner into service and pay the backwages on the ground that there is no specific direction issued by this Court. Therefore the question of reviewing the order passed in W. A. 567/85 which affirmed the order of the learned single judge except to the extent it modified the order regarding the conditional remand made by the single Judge, does not arise. The writ petition is only to enforce those directions which have been already issued in w. P. 10165/77. Even otherwise it is also not possible to hold, and it cannot also be held that a relief which has not been specifically refused, and which as a matter of course flows out of the relief granted by the Court, cannot be held to have been refused, on the ground lhat it is not expressly granted, therefore, it must be deemed to have been refused and therefore the provisions of Section 11 of the CPC are attracted. ( 13 ) NO doubt the Rule of Resjudicata affects the jurisdiction of a Court. But while applying the Rule of Resjudicata, the Court has to take care to see that the application of the said rule is not stretched to such an extent or applied in such a manner, that the party who is entitled to the relief and such relief is deemed to have been granted, is deprived of the same. In the instant case, if the contention of the respondents that there was no specific direction issued regarding reinstatement and payment of backwages; therefore it must be deemed to have been refused is accepted it would amount to even denying the relief that already stands granted in the writ petition, which the Bank, on not reading the order correctly, has refused to grant the same to the petitioner. Thus I am of the view that the contention of the Respondent based on the Rule of Resjudicata is not well founded. It is misconceived. It is accordingly rejected. ( 14 ) FOR the reasons stated above all the three points raised for determination are answered against the respondents. Thus I am of the view that the contention of the Respondent based on the Rule of Resjudicata is not well founded. It is misconceived. It is accordingly rejected. ( 14 ) FOR the reasons stated above all the three points raised for determination are answered against the respondents. ( 15 ) THERE is one more contention urged on behalf of the respondents that the petitioner cannot make it a contention precedent that he should be reinstated and back wages must be paid before proceeding with the enquiry. This contention is also not well founded. On the quashing of the order of dismissal it becomes the boundcn duty of the respondents to reinstate the petitioner back into service and restore the position which he enjoyed on the date the order of dismissal was passed. Bank has refused to reinstate the petitioner and pay him the backwages. It wants to proceed with the enquiry without reinstating the petitioner and without paying him the backwages which cannot be held to be permissible. Because on the quashing of the order of dismissal the petitioner continues to be in service. He gets reinstated into the Bank service and continuity of the service is also available to him. That being the legal consequence the bank cannot refuse to reinstate him and it cannot without reinstating insist upon proceeding with the enquiry. ( 16 ) THE contention of the Bank is that the petitioner is not entitled to backwages, because, after the order of dismissal, the petitioner was gainfully employed. This has been specifically denied by the petitioner. If only the Bank had furnished the details about the employment undertaken by the petitioner during this period, the plea of employment under another would have led to an issue. The plea raised by the Bank is as follows:"it is reliably learnt that the petitioner has been gainfully employed ever since the earlier order of dismissal. The petitioner is not entitled to any relief of reinstatement or back wages. "this is a vague statement. It does not give particulars of employment. There cannot be an employment without an employer and the Bank being such a mighty organisation, is not expected to make such a vague statement. Instead of putting vague plea it should have held an enquiry and ascertained necessary particulars of employment, and raised a proper plea based upon such enquiry. It does not give particulars of employment. There cannot be an employment without an employer and the Bank being such a mighty organisation, is not expected to make such a vague statement. Instead of putting vague plea it should have held an enquiry and ascertained necessary particulars of employment, and raised a proper plea based upon such enquiry. The petitioner has denied that he was employed ever since the order of dismissal was passed. That being so, as the Bank has specifically invited the Court to record a finding in this regard, the Court has no option but to record a finding that it is not proved that the petitioner was gainfully employed after the order of dismissal was passed. Therefore the Bank cannot refuse to pay the backwages. ( 17 ) FOR the reasons stated above, writ petition is allowed in the following terms: 1) Respondents are directed to reinstate the petitioner and pay the backwages and then proceed with the enquiry as directed by this Court in W. P. 10165 of 1977 and W. A. 567/1985. Compliance in one month from the date of receipt of this order. 2) In the light of the stand taken by the bank, the petitioner is entitled to costs also. Accordingly, the respondent shall pay the costs. Advocate's fee Rs. 1,000. 00. Writ petitions allowed with costs. --- *** --- .