JUDGMENT 1. 1. An order under sub-sec. (8) of Section 34 of the Rajasthan Co-operative Societies Act, 1965 (for short 'the Act') read with rule 35 (2) and 36 (2) of the Raj. Co-operative Society Rule., (for short 'the Rules') has been made by the Registrar under its order dated 16.1.1988. It has been held by the Registrar that the petitioner was disqualified to be a member of the Committee of Bindakheda Gram Sewa Sahkari Samiti Ltd. (for short 'the Primary Society) and, therefore, he could not be a delegate of the Primary Society in the Jhalawar Kendriya Sahakari Bank Ltd. (for short the Central Society'). The petitioner has challenged the aforesaid order of the Registrar, Co-operative Society inter alia on the grounds that the Assistant Registrar who was competent to sanction the petitioner to be a member of the Committee of the Primary Society despite the fact that the petitioner was carrying on business of kind carried on by the society had sanctioned and as such he was not disqualified (2) that the disqualification, if any was in respect of being a member of the Committee of the Primary Society and not in respect of being it member of the Committee of Central Society (3) that the Registrar has taken a decision at the behest of Shri Hanuman Prabhakar, Co-operative Minister (Respondent No. 3) and thus the order suffers from malafides (4) that the nature of the dispute was such, which could have been decided under Section 75 of the Act and not under Section 34 (8) of the Act. 2. It may be stated at the very outset that the learned counsel for the petitioner has not disputed that the petitioner as a member of the Primary Society also carried on business of kind carried on by that Primary Society and therefore, without the general or special sanction of the Registrar he could not be a member of the Committee of the Primary Society. The contention of learned counsel for the petitioner is that the powers under Rule 36(2) of the Rules to give general or special sanction to be a member of the committee of the primary society to such of the member who carries on business of the kind carried on has been conferred on the Assistant Registrar, Co-operative Society and the said Assistant Registrar under its order dated 31st Dec., 1985 (Annexure-3) had given his permission. A look at the notification No. F. 4 (7) Co-op. 1/65 dated 8th Feb., 1974. issued by the Govt. of Rajasthan (Co-operative Department) will show that the Asstt. Registrar/Addl. Registrar/T.A. to Registrar, had been conferred the powers of Registrar under the Act and the Rules so far as they relate to primary societies. There is no dispute that the society is a primary society. Therefore as stated earlier, without the general or special sanction of the Assistant Registrar. the petitioner could not become a member of the committee of the primary society. It may be stated that the petitioner earlier had also been a member of the committee of the primary society since the year 1981 and was also the Chairman of the committee of the primary society. Fresh elections of the members of the primary society took place in the year 1986, the petitioner was elected as Chairman on 20th October, 1986. The election process should have been started some time earlier and we may take it that it started some time in the month of September, 1986. The order under the later part of sub-rule (2) of R. 36 is dated 31st Dec., 1986 when the election process for the electron to the new office bearers of the committee of the primary society had not even started. The question as to whether the order dated 31.12.1985 of the Assistant Registrar under rule 36(2) (later part) can be said to be an order even for the purposes of elections which took place in October, 1986. A reading of Annexure-3 dated 31.12.1985 will show that permission was sought by the petitioner to remain the member of the committee of the primary society. A reading of Annexure-3 dated 31.12.1985 will show that permission was sought by the petitioner to remain the member of the committee of the primary society. The words used are : " Jh lqtku flag iq= vksadkj yky xqtj-------------------ds }kjk [kkn cht vkfn dk dk;Z djrs gq, fcUn[ksMk xzke lsok lgdkjh lfefr fy0 ds lapkyd eaMy esa cus jgus vuqefr jktLFkku lgdkjh laLFkk fu;e 1966 ds fu;e 36 ( 2 ) ds rgr pkgh x;h gSA " 3. Thus it is clear that the permission was sought to remain a member of the committee of the primary society and the petitioner became member of the committee and perhaps a Chairman as stated earlier some time in the year 1981. Apart from the fact that the Registrar in the impugned order has made some adverse comments about the genuineness of the order dated 31.12.85 in as much as in his opinion no order was found in the file maintained in the office of the Assistant Registrar no copy of the application allegedly filed by the petitioner before the Assistant Registrar was available, the original application was Clio not available we may state that the sanction of the Registrar can either be general or special, it can only he in respect of the elections of the managing committee of the primary society which took place in the year 1981 and without that unction even earlier the petitioner would have become disqualified under Section 34 (8) of the Act read with rules 35, 36 to continue to be a member of the committee of the primary society. If the petitioner wanted to seek re-election in the year 1986 to the committee of the primary society in our opinion he should have sought fresh sanction of the Registrar under sub-rule (2) of rule 36 of the rules and in our opinion the sanction of the Registrar (Annexure-3) dated 31.12.1985 can only be said to be a special sanction and not a general sanction, even if it may be assumed for the disposal of the writ petition that the said sanction is a genuine sanction of the Assistant Registrar. Therefore, there can be no dispute that in the aforesaid circumstances the petitioner was not only eligible (sic) to be a member of the committee of the primary society on 20.10.86 but he could not be elected as a member, his election was not proper. 4. Therefore, there can be no dispute that in the aforesaid circumstances the petitioner was not only eligible (sic) to be a member of the committee of the primary society on 20.10.86 but he could not be elected as a member, his election was not proper. 4. It may be stated that the respondent No. 4 Birdilal had filed a complaint in which two grievances had been raised by him. The first was that the petitioner was disqualified to be a member of the committee of the primary society and the second was that he was disqualified to be a member of the managing committee of the Central Society. It has been contended by the learned counsel for the petitioner that it was such a dispute which could only be raised under section 75 of the Act and not under section 34(8) of the Act. It is contended by learned counsel for the petitioner that it is a dispute in respect of election either as a member of the committee of the primary society or as a member of the committee of the central society and therefore, could only have been raised under section 75 of the Act and in no other manner, it was not so raised and the impugned order of the Registrar Co-operative society could not be made under sub-sec. (2) of Section 34 of the Act and is without jurisdiction. 5. Before a dispute even if the complaint filed by Birdilal is treated as having raised disputes can come within the purview of Section 75 of the Act and can be referred to the Registrar for arbitration, the parties must be such which are mentioned under sub-sec. (1) of Section 75 of the Act and the dispute should be touching the constitution. management or business of the Co-operative society. So far as the primary society is concerned, there can be no dispute that Birdilal respondent No. 4 was not a member of that society and even Mr. Tiwari could not satisfy us that the dispute in respect of the petitioner being a member of the primary society could have been raised by Birdilal under section 75 of the Act. So far as the primary society is concerned, there can be no dispute that Birdilal respondent No. 4 was not a member of that society and even Mr. Tiwari could not satisfy us that the dispute in respect of the petitioner being a member of the primary society could have been raised by Birdilal under section 75 of the Act. But his contention is that so far as the dispute in respect of the petitioner being a member of the central society is concerned it can be said to he a dispute failing under Section 75(l) between the parties mentioned therein because Birdilal was also a member of central society. Under sub-sec. (2) of Section 75 and moreso its clause (c) any dispute arising in connection with the election of any officer of the society, is a dispute touching the constitution, management or the business of a co-operative society. Therefore, so far as the jurisdiction of the Registrar in respect of the complaint or the dispute whatever it is discussed filed by Birdilal in respect of the petitioner being a member of the primary society is concerned, the dispute could not have been raised under section 75 of the Act and could not have been decided under that section and could only have been decided tinder sub-sec. (8) of Section 34 of the Act by the Registrar. 6. The dispute under Section 75 of the Act, could have been raised within a period of 30 days as provided under section 76 of the Act and the Registrar could either decide himself or could have transferred it for disposal to any other person who is an officer of the Govt. and has powers in that behalf. Admittedly the dispute was not raised within 30 days and was raised much thereafter and raised under sub-sec. (8) of section 34 of the Act. Section 34 deals with disqualification of membership etc. of committee and under its sub-sec. (8) if any, question as to whether a member of the committee shall or has become subject to any of the disqualifications mentioned under Section 34 of the Act arises it shall be decided by the Registrar. There can be hardly any dispute that no proper mode of raising a question as to whether it member of the committee has become subject to any disqualifications mentioned under the Act/Rules has been prescribed. There can be hardly any dispute that no proper mode of raising a question as to whether it member of the committee has become subject to any disqualifications mentioned under the Act/Rules has been prescribed. Therefore, if the Registrar is informed in any manner whatsoever that a member of the committee has become subject to any disqualification under the Act or the Rules it is the bounded duty of the Registrar to decide the dispute. Section 34 of the Act is a special provision and Section 35 of the Act is a general provision and it is well known that the special provision shall prevail over the general provision, therefore, if Birdilal informed by an application to the Registrar that the petitioner could not be a member of the committee of the primary society, the Registrar was bound to decide the dispute was bound to decide the question and, therefore, it cannot be said that the Registrar had no jurisdiction to decide the question as to whether the petitioner was disqualified to be a member of the committee of the central society because it is also a question in respect of the disqualification of the membership of the committee and in our opinion the Registrar had the jurisdiction and could decide it. It can, therefore, be not said that the only remedy was to raise a dispute under section 75 and the question of disqualification of the petitioner to be a member of the committee of the primary society as well as of the central society could not have been decided by the Registrar under Section 34 (8) of the Act. We may state that the different provisions for appeal are made against an order under section 34 as well as an award under section 75 of the Act. Against the award made by the Registrar under section 75 of the Act, an appeal will lie to the Tribunal constituted by the State Govt. Under Section 124 (1) (g) of the Act, an appeal shall lie against a decision under sub-sec. (5) of Section 34. We may state that sub-section (5) is a misprint and infact it should be a decision tinder sub-sec. (8) made by the Registrar. The petitioner himself on earlier occasion in respect of some complaint/dispute had filed a revision under Section 128 of the Act and the Govt. (5) of Section 34. We may state that sub-section (5) is a misprint and infact it should be a decision tinder sub-sec. (8) made by the Registrar. The petitioner himself on earlier occasion in respect of some complaint/dispute had filed a revision under Section 128 of the Act and the Govt. had set aside the order of the Registrar and remanded the case to him for fresh decision. No doubt the petitioner appears to have taken objection before the Registrar that the dispute is one under section 75 of the Act and not under section 34 (8) of the Act. but if the petitioner thought that the decision of the Registrar was under section 75 and not under section 34 (8) he could have preferred the appeal before the Tribunal and not a revision or appeal before the Govt. either under section 128 or 124 of the Act. 7. The contention of learned counsel for the petitioner is that he was the member of the committee of the central society as an individual, even if he incurred the disqualification for being member of the primary society he could not have been disqualified from being member of the committee of the central society. There is no dispute between the parties that the primary society was a member of the central society and so far as the petitioner is concerned he was only a delegate of the primary society representing it on the central society. There is also no dispute that primary society is not carrying on business of kind carried on by central society. Under sub-rule (2) of Rule 36 a member of a society who carried on business of the kind carried on by his society, shall not be eligible to be a member of the committee of that society without the general or special sanction of the Registrar. The aforesaid sub-section will immediately attract the disqualification so far as the petitioner was a member of the committee of the primary society. But the question is as to whether the petitioner will also incur a disqualification in respect of being a member of the committee of central society ? The aforesaid sub-section will immediately attract the disqualification so far as the petitioner was a member of the committee of the primary society. But the question is as to whether the petitioner will also incur a disqualification in respect of being a member of the committee of central society ? Rule 35 of the Rules deal with disqualification for representation and sub-rule (1)(a) is that no society shall elect any member as its delegate, who suffers from any of the disqualifications laid down in rule 36 to represent the society in another society or to the committee of another society. Under sub-rule (2)(a) a delegate of a society sitting on the committee of another society or representing it in another society shall cease to hold his office if he suffers from any of the disqualifications laid down under rule 36. There can be no dispute that the petitioner was only a delegate of the primary society sitting on the committee of the central society. The primary society which is a member of the central society has to act through its delegate. In the instant case as appears from resolution dated 15th of April, 1987 the petitioner who was the Chairman of the Primary Society was appointed as a delegate of the primary society in central society. It may be stated at this stage that power is vested in the committee of primary society to send its delegate and we have already said earlier that the petitioner could not be a member of the committee of the primary society what to say of its being a chairman which is also an office, he could not have any office in the committee. Therefore, if though any member of the primary society could have been nominated/elected/appointed as a delegate to represent it in the central society by its committee, but the committee should have been properly constituted and so far as the petitioner is concerned as stated earlier he could not be its member, he was disqualified even when he was elected and therefore, he was appointed as a delegate not an ordinary member but as Chairman of the committee of the primary society. If, that be so, his nomination/election/appointment as a delegate to represent it on the central society was ab-initio void. 8. If, that be so, his nomination/election/appointment as a delegate to represent it on the central society was ab-initio void. 8. Even if for the sake of arguments it may be assumed, though not accepted, that the petitioner was also an ordinary member of the society and an ordinary member could have been nominated/elected/appointed as its delegate to represent it on the central society the question is as to whether because the petitioner was disqualified to be a member of the committee of the primary society, he was also disqualified to be a member of the committee of the Central Society ? The contention of learned counsel for the petitioner is that it was the primary society which was the member of the central society and only if the primary society would have carried on the business of kind carried on by the Central Society the question of disqualification to be a member of the Committee of Central society would have arisen. In support of his contention the learned counsel for the petitioner has placed reliance on Jacob Narru v. State of Punjab and ors. 1976(April) Cooperative Law Journal 70 . In the aforesaid case the petitioner was an office-bearer of Bullowal Co-operative Agricultural Service Society. which society was defaulter regarding payment of loan due to the bank. He had contested the election to the office of the Committee of the Central Co-operative Bank Ltd. as representative. Although it was held that he could not be a member of the Bullowal Co-operative Agricultural Service Society having incurred disqualifications under rule 25(g) of the Punjab Co-Op. Societies Rules, 1963 but had not incurred the disqualification so far as the Central Co-operative Bank is concerned. The Court while placing reliance on its earlier decision said "if it member of the committee is an individual, as in the case of the primary societies, then the disqualifications can be incurred by the members in their individual capacity, but if a Primary Society is a member of the Central society, in the present case, the disqualification must pertain to the member as such that is, the Primary Society and a delegate of the Society is not there in his individual capacity but only as a representative. The Court placed reliance on the case of Parma Nand v. The State of Punjab and Others, 1973 Current Law Journal 90 wherein the court said that when the petitioner was seeking election of the Central Society as a nominee of the Primary Society he could not be debarred from seeking the election on the basis of some assumed disqualification which did not apply to the case of society. It was held that the Returning Officer was not well advised to reject the nomination papers of the petitioner. It is not known as to whether in the Punjab Co-operative Societies Rules, 1963 there was any analogous provision like Rule 35(l) (a) and (2). We have already made a reference to the aforesaid rules in the earlier part of this order and at the cost of repetition, it may be stated that no primary society can elect any member as its delegate who suffers from any of the disqualifications laid down under Rule 36 to represent another society and even if a member has been elected as a delegate to represent a society in another society, he will cease to hold his office if he suffers any of the disqualifications laid down under rule 36. We have also referred to sub-rule (2) of rule 36 and have said that so far as the petitioner is concerned he was nominated as a Director of the primary society and not as an ordinary member, though an ordinary member could also be nominated. He being disqualified to be a member of the committee of the primary society could not have been so nominated. Sub-rule (2) of rule 35 clearly lays down that a delegate of a society sitting on the committee of another society or representing it in another society shall cease to hold his office as such if he suffers from any of the disqualifications laid down under rule 36. A conjoint reading of rule 35(l) and (2) as well as rule 36 will show that even a member who suffers from the disqualification as aforesaid, cannot be elected as a delegate to represent the society in another society. A conjoint reading of rule 35(l) and (2) as well as rule 36 will show that even a member who suffers from the disqualification as aforesaid, cannot be elected as a delegate to represent the society in another society. Any other interpretation will lead to illogical conclusions because though one cannot be a member of the committee of the primary society as a result of disqualification as aforesaid but he will continue to be a member of the committee of the another society (in this case the Central society). In the case of Gangappa Nagappa Danannavar and another v. The Malaprabha Co-operative Sugar Factory and another ILR 1979(2) Karnataka 1461 :(1979) 1 Karnataka Law Journal 431 , Section 29-C(a) of Karnataka Co-operative societies Act. 1959 came up for consideration and that rule provides that no person shall be eligible for being elected or appointed or continue to any co-operative society in respect of any dues from him either as borrower or as surety. Its proviso provided that a member of the committee who has ceased to hold office as such under this clause hall not be eligible for a period of one year from the date on which he ceased to hold office for re-election or appointment as a member of the committee of such co-operative society or of election or appointment to the Committee of any other Co-operative Society. It appears to us that rule 29-C of the Karnatka Co-operative Society Rules is similar to rule 28 of the rules and 28 of the rules provides that no member of a Co-operative society who is in arrears to the society in respect of any loan taken by him, for such period as is specified in its bye-laws or in case for a period exceeding three months, shall be appointed to represent the society in any other co-operative Society and to vote on its behalf in such other co-operative society. Sub-rule (2) of Rule 28 of the Rules provides that where a member of a co-operative society so appointed falls in arrears to the society for the period pacified in sib-rule(1) subsequent to his appointment, he shall cease to he a representative of the society as from the end of the period. Sub-rule (2) of Rule 28 of the Rules provides that where a member of a co-operative society so appointed falls in arrears to the society for the period pacified in sib-rule(1) subsequent to his appointment, he shall cease to he a representative of the society as from the end of the period. Construing rule 29-C of the Karnataka Co-operative Societies Rules in the aforesaid case of Gangappa Nagappa the Court said that the inevitable conclusion would be that the statutory disqualification under Section 29(1) extends not only to the specified society in respect of which the disqualification order has been passed by the Registrar, but also the disqualification would extend to election or appointment to the committee of any other Co-operative Society. 9. Under Section 23 (2) (a) of the Act a co-operative society which is a member of another co-operative society may subject to any rules made under this Act, appoint one of its members, to vote on its behalf in the affairs of that other society. Even under the bye-laws of the society, bye-law No. 12 (1) (16) provides that it is the Managing Committee of the Primary Society, which shall appoint a member to represent it and to vote in other co-operative society. The above bye- law No. 12 was amended and before the amendment as aforesaid in the bye-law on 9-12-86 there was a provision in the by---laws that it will be the Chairman of the primary-society, who shall represent it in the Central Society. The petitioner was nominated/appointed to represent the petitioner society in the Central Co-operative Society under resolution dated 15th April, 1987 i. e. after the aforesaid amendment in the bye-laws. Thus the petitioner was a delegate of the primary society appointed to represent it in the Central Society. A reference to rule 35 has already been made in the earlier part of this order and at the cost of (sic) it may be stated that the society could elect any member as its delegate, as laid down under rule 36 to represent any other society. A reference to rule 35 has already been made in the earlier part of this order and at the cost of (sic) it may be stated that the society could elect any member as its delegate, as laid down under rule 36 to represent any other society. We have already said earlier that the petitioner was nominated/appointed/elected as a delegate to represent the primary society, not in the capacity of an ordinary member but in the capacity of being the Chairman by the managing committee of the primary society of which the petitioner himself was the Chairman and he could not have been the Chairman being disqualified in view of the undisputed position that he carried on the business of kind carried on by the primary society. Under sub-rule (2) of Rule 35 a delegate of a society sitting on the committee of another society representing it in another society shall cease to hold his office, if he suffers from any of the disqualifications laid down under rule 36. Therefore. if a delegate which the petitioner was of the primary society and represented it in the central society suffers from any of the disqualifications laid down under rule 36, including disqualification in sub-rule (2) then he shall cease to hold office. The disqualification to be a member of the committee of the primary society by extension will also be for being a delegate to represent the primary society. Thus, we are of the opinion that the petitioner not only was and became disqualified to be a member of the primary society but even ceased to hold this office in the central society as a delegate of the primary society. It cannot be said that though the petitioner could not be a member of the primary society but could still be a member of the central society in the capacity of its delegate and could represent it. 10. Thus we find no error apparrent in the face of the record in the order of Registrar, Co-operative society. 11. In passing we will deal with the preliminary objection raised by Mr. Mathur that an appeal lies before the State Govt. and writ jurisdiction should not be invoked. We may state that this petition was presented in this Court during the employee's strike though this Court functioned to some extent, there was no work in the various offices of the Govt. Mathur that an appeal lies before the State Govt. and writ jurisdiction should not be invoked. We may state that this petition was presented in this Court during the employee's strike though this Court functioned to some extent, there was no work in the various offices of the Govt. including the Secretariat. The Co-operative Minister was also arrayed as a respondent making allegations of malafides against him we have not called upon the Minister-concerned to show cause as we did not think it necessary in view of the fact that we find no merit in the writ petition. But for these two facts, perhaps the objection of Mr. Mathur that an alternative remedy should have been availed would have been prevailed, we need not go into other questions in this case in view of our conclusion as aforesaid that the petitioner was disqualified and the Registrar has jurisdiction under section 34 (8) of the Act to hold that he was disqualified. 12. Before parting with this case, we may observe that the Govt. should make an amendment or correct the mistake which has crept in Section 124 (1) (g) of the Act. Under it a decision under sub-sec. (5) of Section 34 has been made appealable. No decision is given under sub-sec. (5) and it is only given under sub-sec. (8) by the Registrar. To us it appears to be a drafting mistake but to make the matters clear, the Govt. is advised to make necessary amendments. 13. In conclusion, we find no merit in the writ petition. 14. Dismissed with no order as to costs.Petition dismissed. *******