ORDER Dr. G.F. Couto, J. - In this revision application the petitioners challenge the Order dated 7th December, 1988, whereby the Executive Magistrate, Canacona, dismissed their application dated 16th November, 1988 and ordered that inquiry shall proceed under Section 138 Criminal Procedure Code. 2. The case of the petitioners is that the learned Magistrate could not have proceeded under section 138 Cr.P.C. without having held an inquiry as provided in section 137(1). This inquiry was not held and therefore, the impugned order is vitiated. Mr. Usgaokar, the learned Senior Advocate appearing for the petitioners, has further submitted that in an inquiry under section 138 the petitioners will be precluded from leading any kind of evidence as to establish that the alleged public way was not existing in view of the provision of section 137(3), Cr.P.C. 3. Mr. Dias, the learned Senior Advocate appearing for the respondent No. 1, submits that the Court has to bear in mind the particular facts and circumstances of this case, where proceedings under section 133 had been instituted and the learned Magistrate bad passed some orders which were challenged by the petitioners in this Court by filing a Writ petition. The said Writ Petition was finally disposed of as the parties bad arrived at a compromise. In terms of the said compromise arrived at on 26th September, 1988, the parties had agreed that the inquiry be conducted as per law and the matter be finally disposed by the concerned Magistrates. In other words, the clause inserted in that connection means that the final inquiry under section 138 was to be held and the matter disposed of. In these circumstances, according to Mr. Dias, it is too late in the day for the petitioners to come with the present application. That apart, the learned counsel submitted that the inquiry envisaged under section 137(1) is a summary inquiry and it appears from the order dated 18th July, 1988 passed by the Executive Magistrate, Canacon a that such inquiry was held. 4. Mr. Bhobe, the learned Public Prosecutor concurs with the view taken by Mr. Dias and in addition, submits that the preliminary inquiry as provided in Sub-section (1) of section 137 had been held by the concerned Magistrate and in the circumstances there is no reason whatsoever for this Court to interfere. 5. 4. Mr. Bhobe, the learned Public Prosecutor concurs with the view taken by Mr. Dias and in addition, submits that the preliminary inquiry as provided in Sub-section (1) of section 137 had been held by the concerned Magistrate and in the circumstances there is no reason whatsoever for this Court to interfere. 5. Section 137 Cr.P.C. provides that where an order is made under section 133 for the purpose of preventing obstruction, nuisance or danger to the public in the use of any way, river, channel or place, the Magistrate shall, on the appearance before him of the person against whom the order was made, question him as to whether he denies the existence of any public right in respect of the way, river, channel or place and if he does so, the Magistrate shall, before proceeding under section 138 inquire into the matter. It is clear from the bare reading of the above provision of law that in case an order under section 133 Cr.P.C. is made, the first duty imposed on the Magistrate is to secure the presence of the person against whom such order was made and to inquire whether or not he denied the existence of alleged public right in respect of the way, river, channel or place and then, in case there is such denial, the Magistrate has to hold an inquiry into the matter before proceeding under section 138. Sub-section (2) lays down that if in such inquiry the Magistrate finds that there is any reliable evidence in support of such denial, he shall stay the proceedings until the matter of the existence of such right has been decided by a competent Court and if he finds that there is no such evidence, he shall proceed as laid down in section 138. There is no doubt whatsoever that the inquiry spoken of in sub-sections (1) and (2) of section 137 has merely to be a summary inquiry in order to satisfy the Magistrate whether or not reliable evidence in support of the denial has been adduced. Such inquiry is not definitely an inquiry to determine with finality whether or not the alleged right exists. 6. Such inquiry is not definitely an inquiry to determine with finality whether or not the alleged right exists. 6. Applying now the law as above, to the facts of this case, it is pertinent to note that in his judgment dated 18th July, 1988, the learned Executive Magistrate, Canacona had dealt with the objections raised by the present petitioners as regards the proceedings under section 133 and had also dealt with the contention raised by the present petitioners that unless inquiry under section 137 (1) is finalised the Magistrate cannot hold the inquiry under section 138, Cr.P.C. He observed as under: "It is clear in the present proceedings that the written statements were filed by the opponents denying the existence of public way but reliable evidence in support of denial has not been put forth by the opponent, and this Court having not satisfied with the evidence for denial has decided to proceed with the inquiry as per provision under section 138 of Cr.P.C." (Emphasis supplied) The above observation made by the learned Magistrate discloses that he has applied his mind to the facts and circumstances of the case and bearing in mind the provisions of subsections (1) and (2) of section 137 had arrived at the finding that the evidence adduced by the petitioners in support of their denial was not satisfactory. It was in these circumstances that he decided to proceed under the provision of section 138, Cr.P.C. 7. This being so, it is rather difficult to accept the submission of Mr. Usgaokar that he acted in violation of the provisions of section 137, Cr.P.C. This revision application therefore, has no substance and is summarily dismissed.