Judgment : DAVID ANNOUSSAMY, J.: 1. This is a petition filed by the nephew of the detenu under Art.226 of the Constitution of India for quashing the order of detention passed against the detenu on 3rd March, 1988 by the Joint Secretary to Government of India, Ministry of Finance, Department of Revenue, New Delhi, in exercise of the powers conferred by Sec.3(1) of the Conservation of Foreign Exchange and Prevention of Smuggling Activities Act, 1974, with a views to preventing the detenu from dealing in smuggled goods otherwise than by engaging transporting or concealing or keeping smuggled goods. 2. The facts which activated the Government to pass the order of detention are summarily as follows: On 8.7.1987, one Shri Radar Sahib was apprehended by Madurai Police Officers. On examination, he was found to be in possession of 8 jackets containing gold bars, 80 in total, which were seized by the Assistant Collector of Customs, C.I.D., Madurai. Upon interrogation, Shri Kader Sahib gave information regarding his associates, viz., one Govindarajan, Ramesh, Balachandran and the detenu. The detenu also gave a statement, as per which he admitted that 80 gold bars seized from Shri Kader Sahib on 8.7.1987 were sent to him by Govindarajan of Madras as per prior arrangement. He has also admitted that he also received 60 gold bars from Govindarajan through the said Kader Sahib. 3. The order of detention is challenged on three grounds. Firstly, it is said that the representation of the detenu was not considered with necessary diligence. Taking the details from the counter of the respondent in paragraph 8, learned counsel for the petitioner pointed out that on 22.6.1988, a telex message was given to Tiruchi Customs Officer calling for parawise remarks on the representation of the detenu, and the remarks called for were sent only on 8.7.1988 after a delay of 16 days. Learned counsel would contend that the Supreme Court has held that a delay of nine days in submitting parawise remarks vitiated the order of detention Raj Kishore Prasad v. State of Bihar Raj Kishore Prasad v. State of Bihar, A.I.R. 1983 S.C. 320 and that this Court in an identical casein W.P.No.9390of 1987 has held that the delay of 14 days in sending the parawisc remarks would vitiate the detention order. The second ground urged by learned Counsel for the petitioner is that in his representation, he has asked for three documents, viz., he has asked for three documents, viz., (a) the particulars regarding the search in a lodge at Courtalam, where the detenu is said to have stayed at the time of occurrence on 8.7.1987; (b) the sanction order for prosecution launched under the Customs Act, particularly for the reason that the original complaint filed did not include the name of the detenu as one of the accused; and (c) the statement recorded from Vilas Sait and relied upon in the grounds, which statement would reveal that Vilas Sait was previously involved in certain Customs offence and that certain seizures were made from him on 4.8.1985; that the detaining authority did not give these documents to the detenu till it rejected the representation itself on 15.7.1988; and that only one of the documents, viz., the sanction order for prosecution, was given. Learned counsel for the petitioner would contend that the fact of non-supply of the documents applied for would vitiate the order of detention. The third ground raised by learned counsel for the petitioner is that there was a serious difference between the English version of the order of detention on which the subjective satisfaction of the detaining authority was arrived at and the Tamil version which was served on the detenu and which served the basis for the detenu for making the representation. The difference is this: In the English version, it is stated that the detenu was being detained because he was found engaged in dealing in smuggled goods otherwise than by engaging in, transporting or concealing or keeping smuggled goods; but the Tamil version would say that the detenu, besides dealing in smuggled goods otherwise than by transporting, concealing and keeping smuggled goods, was in addition engaged in trading in smuggled goods. 4. Learned counsel appearing for the respondent would content that the delay in considering the representation should not be a reason for setting aside the order of detention. There is no hard and fast rule in that respect, and in this particular case, the time taken was necessary for providing the Central Government with the parawise remarks and the translation of the representation. 5. There is no hard and fast rule in that respect, and in this particular case, the time taken was necessary for providing the Central Government with the parawise remarks and the translation of the representation. 5. No doubt, this Court, while dealing with detention orders in respect of COFEPOSA Act has to take into accounts all the factors, but, in this case, it has to be noted that 15 days of delay, which according to the respondent, would not be considerable, has not been explained at all. This absence of explanation constrains us to consider that the representation was not dealt with by the officers concerned with the diligence as it should be in matters of this nature. 6. As far as the second ground is concerned, that is to say, the non-supply of all the documents applied for, learned Counsel for the respondent would say that the detenu is not entitled to all the documents and only such documents as are relevant would be supplied to the detenu. This stand appears to be not acceptable. A person, whose liberty is deprived by an order of detention passed without his being asked to show cause, has been given a very precious right to make a representation, and for making such a representation, he may need some documents which were not considered by the detaining authority and consequently not appended to the order of detention. He is the sole judge of the relevancy of the documents, because he alone knows what kind of representation he is going to make on the basis of the documents. No doubt, all the documents need not be supplied. Some of the documents may be withheld for security or other reasons of State, in which case it will be open to the Government to state, in respect of the documents that are not supplied, summarily the reasons for non-supply and if these reasons are acceptable the non-supply of the documents would not vitiate the order of detention. But, in the case, the reply given to the detenu belatedly does not disclose any reason why the other documents are not supplied. It merely slated that the request for one of the documents had been acceded to. But, in the case, the reply given to the detenu belatedly does not disclose any reason why the other documents are not supplied. It merely slated that the request for one of the documents had been acceded to. Therefore, in the absence of any reason disclosed in the letter sent to the detenu, was are compelled to conclude that there was no valid reason for the respondent not supplying the documents, and the failure to supply documents vitiates the order. 7. As far as the third ground is concerned learned Counsel for the respondent placed heavy reliance on a decision of the Supreme Court in A.Alangarasamy v. State of Tamil Nadu A.Alangarasamy v. State of Tamil Nadu, A.I.R. 1987 S.C. 1725 in which the order of this Court holding that the variation between the Tamil and English version of the order of detention of the detenuwould not vitiate the order under the circumstances of the case, has been upheld. When orders and documents are supplied in different languages, some variations arc bound to occur here and there, and an order of detention cannot be set aside merely because of the existence of small variation. But, in this case, the difference between the two versions is that in the Tamil version, there is an imputation which is in addition to the version found in the English version. Further the detenu in his representation, has pointed out that in respect of the addition found in the Tamil version, there was no material whatsoever in the grounds of detention. While so, the representation should have been considered in that light and the authority dealing with the representation should have adverted to the fact whether this variation was substantial or not, in view of the details contained in the grounds of detention. We consider that the mention of the detenu being engaged in trading in the smuggled goods in Tamil version, which is not contained in the English version, makes a vital difference. As pointed out earlier, the English version formed the basis of the subjective satisfaction of the detaining authority in passing the order, and the Tamil version alone gives the materials which are available to the detenu to make his representation against the order of detention when he seeks such an order to be set aside. As pointed out earlier, the English version formed the basis of the subjective satisfaction of the detaining authority in passing the order, and the Tamil version alone gives the materials which are available to the detenu to make his representation against the order of detention when he seeks such an order to be set aside. There should be near conformity between the two versions, in material particulars and the difference found in this case is substantial. Further, the difference has been brought to the notice of the detaining authority to have adverted its mind to that aspect of the question. Nothing in the counter filed by the respondent throws light on such an exercise. On the contrary, the counter would disclose that the variation is due only to an inadvertent mistake. If it is so, the detaining authority should have immediately brought it to the notice of the detenu, so that he can ignore the portion added in Tamil and submit a fresh representation on the basis of the order so corrected by the detaining authority. This exercise was not done, so that was have to conclude that proper opportunity has not been given to the detenu to make an effective representation in this case. 8. It was pointed out by learned counsel for the respondent that though the detenu has been in detention for a little over 11 months, the fact of the order of detention being set aside would cause prejudice to the Government, in as much as it would not be possible for the Government to pass an order of for feature of property under the Smugglers and Foreign Exchange Manipulators (Forfeiture of Property) Act, 1976, since as per the proviso to Sec.2(2) of the Act, no such order can be passed when an order of detention has been set aside by a Court. In the first place, this cannot be a reason for us to refrain from setting aside the order of detention if it is found to be violative of the important provisions of the Constitution of India and the laws made there under. Secondly, this may perhaps be an occasion for the competent authority to reconsider the very provisions of the above said Act. In fact, as per that Act, a person convicted as well as a person detained may be subject to forfeiture of property. Secondly, this may perhaps be an occasion for the competent authority to reconsider the very provisions of the above said Act. In fact, as per that Act, a person convicted as well as a person detained may be subject to forfeiture of property. Conviction is based on facts which have been proved, and, therefore, there will be ample justification for forfeiture of property. An order of detention is based on prognosis of the possible activities of the concerned person, and for such prognosis, one would wonder whether the forfeiture of property can be justified. Further, orders of detention, even in cases of persons who are ultimately convicted and who are real smugglers, happen to be set aside because for one reason or other, the procedural safeguards provided in law have not been followed. The fact of having added Clause (b) to Sub-sec.(2) of Sec.2 in the Act is acting in a way detrimental to the Government, and therefore, the opportunity of allowing that provision to remain in the statute book needs probably reconsideration. At any rate, as pointed out earlier, that provision cannot have any influence in the order we are called upon to make while dealing with habeas corpus petition. 9. In the result, the writ petition is allowed, and the order of detention is set aside.