Judgment 1. IN view of the fact that this matter relates to contempt alleged to have been committed in respect of a learned Judge of this Court and the seriousness of the allegations and the resultant importance, the learned Acting Chief Justice thought that the matter should receive the anxious advertence of a larger Bench and by his order dated 1. 3. 88 the learned acting Chief Justice recalled the earlier order dated 21. 1. 88 where under the matter was directed to be heard by the regular criminal Bench of two Judges and constituted this larger Bench for hearing of the matter. If we may say with respect, the learned Acting Chief Justice, in his wisdom, adopted the right course, as, even though this matter could have been heard and disposed of by a Bench of two Judges under Section 18 of the Contempt of Courts Act, we ought not to forget, as pointed out by Gajendragadkar, C. J., speaking for the unanimous seven Judge Bench of the Supreme Court in Keshav Singh's case- Special Reference No. 1 of 1964 ( AIR 1965 SC 745 at 791), that the power to punish for contempt, large as it is, must always be exercised cautiously, wisely and with circumspection. Since the Constitution itself and the contempt of Courts Act, 1971 have entrusted us with these highly responsible and yet highly delicate task to decide about contempt of ourselves, and the type of contempt with which we would have to deal in this case is that of scandalising a learned Judge of this Court, a decision by a larger Bench would be more likely to inspire greater confidence. 2. AS would appear from the Rule issued, it is alleged that the contemner has committed contempt by writing a letter dated 5. 12. 87 to the Chief Justice of this Court and a letter dated 12. 1. 88 to the Chief Justice of India. In the first letter dated 5. 12. 2. AS would appear from the Rule issued, it is alleged that the contemner has committed contempt by writing a letter dated 5. 12. 87 to the Chief Justice of this Court and a letter dated 12. 1. 88 to the Chief Justice of India. In the first letter dated 5. 12. 87 addressed to the Chief Justice of this court, the contemner alleged that even though the suit filed against him by one Aditya Vikram Birla, in the Original Side of this Court, being No. 1056 of 1987, "was not maintainable by this Hon'ble Court and "it was not the jurisdiction of this hon'ble Court to entertain this suit" and "no cause of action took place at calcutta" as "plaintiff and defendant both reside in Bombay only", the learned judge nevertheless "acted to maintain", "had mot acted according to law and he had committed offence under Section 166 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860". The contemner further not only alleged that the learned Judge "had not acted according to law and he had committed offence under Section 166 of the Indian penal Code, 1860", but asserted further that "he had also not complied with the duties to favour Mr. Aditya V. Birla" and that "Mr. Aditya. V. Birla had influenced to the Hon'ble Justice to harass me". And the contemner concluded the letter to the Chief Justice with the prayer "to grant permission to get prosecution of the Hon'ble Justice under Section 166 of the Indian Penal Code of 1860 for the offence committed." In the second letter dated 12. 1. 88 addressed to the Chief Justice of India, the contemner has stated that though he had "written to the Hon'ble Chief justice of Calcutta High Court on 5th December, 1987 praying for the grant of permission under Section 166 of the Indian Penal Code of 1860 for the prosecution of the Hon'ble Justice, but till today I have not received replies and permission" and hence he prayed that "in view of law and justice" "to issue necessary directions so that I can get justice sooner". It may be noted that the contemner forwarded copies of his first letter dated 5. 12. It may be noted that the contemner forwarded copies of his first letter dated 5. 12. 87 addressed to the chief Justice of this Court, to the Chief Justice of the Bombay High Court and the Chief Justice of India and he also endorsed copies of his second letter addressed to the Chief Justice of India to the Chief Justice of this Court and also to the Registrar of the Supreme Court. 3. THE law of contempt of Court as was prevailing till the enactment of the present Act of 1971, was considered to be somewhat uncertain, undefined and, therefore, unsatisfactory. Even the expression "contempt of Court" was not defined in the preceding Act of 1952 or in any other Statute, even though the jurisdiction to punish for contempt, as rightly pointed out in the Statement of objects and Reasons accompanying the Bill for the present act of 1971 touches upon two important fundamental rights of the citizen, namely, the right to freedom of speech and the right to personal liberty. The present act had accordingly defined Contempt of Court, both Civil and Criminal, in appreciable details and "criminal Contempt" has been defined in Section 2 (c) of the Act as hereunder : "publication (whether by words, spoken or written, or by signs, or by visible representation this, or otherwise) of any matter, or the doing of any other act whatsoever which - (i) scandalises or tends to scandalise, or lowers or tends to lower the authority of any Court; (ii) prejudices or interferes or tends to interfere with the due course of any judicial proceeding; or (iii) interferes or tends to interfere with, or obstructs or tends to obstruct, the administration of justice in any other manner." 4. THESE provisions are virtually statutory adoption of the observations of lord Russel of Killowen in Queen vs. Gray (1900 - 2 Queen's Division Bench 36) as hereunder : - "Any act done or writing published calculated to bring a Court, or a judge of the Court into contempt, or to lower his authority, is a contempt of court. That is one class of contempt Further any act done or writing published calculated to obstruct or interfere with the due course of justice or the lawful process of the Courts is a contempt of Court. That is one class of contempt Further any act done or writing published calculated to obstruct or interfere with the due course of justice or the lawful process of the Courts is a contempt of Court. The former class belongs to the category which Lord Hardwicke, L. C, characterized as "scandalising a Court or a Judge' The case of 'queen vs. Gray (supra) also clearly manifested how groundless, if we may say so with respect, was the assumption made by Lord Morris the year before in the decision of the Privy Council in Mcleod vs. St aubyne (1899 Appeal Cases 549) to the effect that committal for contempt of court by scandalising the Court itself, had become obsolete in England, though exercise of such power would continue to be necessary in. places "consisting principally of coloured population". The leading English textual authorities and the English Law Reports during all these years since Lord Morris made such observation in 1899 have sadly disproved what the learned Law Lord almost took for granted for reasons best known to him, but not clearly understandable to us. Oswald In his treatise on Law of Contempt has expressed the view that it would be going a great deal too far to say that commitments for scandalising the Court have become obsolete in England and our Supreme Court in Perspective Publication vs. State of Maharashtra ( AIR 1971 SC 221 ), had also no hesitation in declaring (at 230) that "it will not be right to say that commitments for contempt scandalizing the Court have become obsolete". This has again been endorsed by a later decision of the Supreme Court in Rama Dayal vs. Stale of Madhya Pradesh ( AIR 1978 SC 921 at 927. 5. THE contemner in this case has not only admitted that he wrote the aforesaid two letters to the Chief Justice of this; Court and the Chief Justice of India with copies to Chief Justice of Bombay and the Registrar of the Supreme court, but in all the three Affidavits, filed one after another, he has made most strenuous endeavours to justify the writing of those letters. 6. IN his, first Affidavit filed on 26. 8. 6. IN his, first Affidavit filed on 26. 8. 88, in paragraph 2, he, after admitting those letters, has again asserted that the learned Judge of this Court in deciding the suit in question against him "did not act according to law under the high influences of money and power of Mr. Aditya V. Birla, the petitioner of the Suit No. 1056 of 1987", "has not acted according to law due to the influence of Mr. Aditya. V. Birla". In paragraph 3 again (wrongly numbered as paragraph 2), he has asserted that the learned Judge "admitted the suit and granted interim in; unction under the pressure of power and money of Mr. Aditya V. Birla who happens to be one of the biggest Industrialists in the country". In paragraph 4 (wrongly numbered as paragraph 3), he has again asserted that the learned Judge "acted contrary to law ignoring provisions of law with mala fide to protect the interest of the pllaintiff Mr. Aditya V. Birla who is involved in serious criminal charges in Bombay Courts". And in paragraph 5 (wrongly typed as paragraph 4. he has stated that Mr. Birla, plaintiff in the suit, "acted dishonestly in the filling of the Suit No. 1056 of 1987 at Calcutta high Court with the favour of the learned Judge and others. Hi this second Affidavit filed on 17. 1. 1989, in paragraph 1, it is asserted that the Hon’ble Chief Justice in bad faith has failed to perform duties towards hon'ble Office of the Chief Justice by ignoring and neglecting" in replying to the setters of the contemner and "is, therefore, responsible for the violation of article 51a of the Constitution of India"; in paragraph 2 it is asserted that 'dominance of crooks over the Judiciary is highhanded Criminal Conspiracy to finish all decencies of this Hon'ble office of the Supreme Court's Chief justice"; in paragrap) 3 it is asserted that "hon'ble High Court, Calcutta, has been causing wrongful losses in bad faithto me by entertaining false Suits No. 815/84 and 1056/87, only to carry out unlawful wishes and directions of the chairman of the Indian Rayon Industries Ltd., Mr. Aditya B. Biria"; in paragraph 5 it is asserted that "hon'ble High Court, Calcutta, has acted contrary to law by entertaining Suits No. 815/84 and 1056/87 by ignoring the jurisdiction. . . . Aditya B. Biria"; in paragraph 5 it is asserted that "hon'ble High Court, Calcutta, has acted contrary to law by entertaining Suits No. 815/84 and 1056/87 by ignoring the jurisdiction. . . . only to protect the cheating business of excise-evasion of the chairman of the Indian Rayon and Industries Ltd. and Mr. Aditya. V. Birla, though no cause of action has taken place within the jurisdiction of this hon'ble High Court, Calcutta": in paragraph 7 it is stated that the "hon'ble high Court, Calcutta is under duty to prosecute dishonest Judges involved in this high-handed Criminal Conspiracy of Mr. Aditya. V. Birla, the Chairman of the Indian Rayon and Indus ness Ltd. " and that : "this Hon'ble Bench may issue writ under the provisions of 'the Article 226 of the Constitution of India to maintain the integrity of the Judiciary, to prosecute or to impeach dishonest judges". 7. IN his third Affidavit filed on 14. 2. 89, in paragraph 2, it has been asserted by the contemner that " it is due to malpractices of this Hon'ble Court, proceedings of the Matter No. 898 of 1985 are kept secret" to him and his letters "have been ignored to reply to protect the cheating business of excise-evasions of Mr. Aditya. B. Birla, and in paragraph 5 it has been questioned as to "why registrar or others of this Hon'ble High Court involved in this Criminal conspiracy to cheat me under the provisions of Section 418 of Indian Penal code of 1860, should not be prosecuted" and why suitable and immediate proceedings could not be initiated against "the Registrar and others who have deliberately ignored the proceedings of the Matter No, 989/85 to protect (the cheating business of exercise-evasions and Contempt of Court of this Hon'ble high Court at Calcutta by the Indian Rayon Corporation Ltd. ?" 8. THERE are number of documents annexed to all the three Affidavits as annexures. Those annexed to the first Affidavit are not much relevant for our present purpose; but some of those annexed to the second and the Third affidavit maybe taken note of. THERE are number of documents annexed to all the three Affidavits as annexures. Those annexed to the first Affidavit are not much relevant for our present purpose; but some of those annexed to the second and the Third affidavit maybe taken note of. Annexure "a" to the second Affidavit their of the contemner the Chief Justice of India with copy to the India, where, are stating that the Chief justice of India is to take up matters pending before the Calcutta High Court and the Bombay Court, it is asserted that "it is necessary in' 'as interest of Judiciary to expose and prose; me Judges and Magistrates involved in Criminal Conspiracy with Aditya. V. Birla, "the chairman of the Indian Rayon and Industries Ltd. "; Annexure "3" is a letter dated 29. 11. 88 to the Chief Justice, Calcutta with copy to the Chief Justice of India, where the contemner has not only reiterated that the learned Judge, in respect of whom he is alleged in this Rule to have committed contempt, "had acted corruptly in the administration of Justice in Matter No. 1056 of 1987", but that the two other learned Judges, who initially issued the Rule for contempt in this case did so "acting in bad faith", and "to protect interest" of the learned Judge and also "to protect interests of the prominent cheater Mr. Aditya. V. Birla" and the contemner has questioned further as to why the said two learned Judges "should not be held responsible and prosecuted* under the provisions of sections 166, 217, 28, 219 and 418 of the. Indian Penal Code of 1860". In annexure "c" dated 9. 12. 88 addressed to Chief Justice, Calcutta High Court, with copies to Chief Justice of India and Chief Justice, Bombay, the contemner has alleged that the then Chief Justice of Calcutta High Court and also the other Judges "have acted illegally on the instructions of the corrupt and dishonest Prime Minister of India, who has lost all honors of the Hon'ble Chair of Prime Minister to protect the cheating charges of the super crook industrialist, Mr. Aditya. V. Birla". Aditya. V. Birla". He has stated further that if the Chief justice of Calcutta "is not Competent Authority to prosecute" the former Chief justice of Calcutta and the "judges involved" in the case against me who have acted in bad faith", then the Chief Justice, Calcutta "should send report in act ails to the proper authority", in Annexure "e" dated 20. 6. 88, the contemner has complained to the President of India about "the Nation suffering from the cruel terror of the corrupt and dishonest Prime Minister who is also involved in the Criminal Conspiracy under section 120b of the Indian penal Code of 1860 with the corrupt so-called Industrialists involved in serious acts of customs and excise-evasions" and has stated further that as a result Mr. Birla has not been prosecuted and Mr. Birla "has also involved" the Chief justice of Bombay who was then the Chief Justice of Calcutta "only to regularise the corrupt charges of excise-evasion in the Judiciary" and, therefore, the contemner prayed to the President to :grant permission to prosecute the Chief Justice of Bombay and Prime Minister of India. " In Annexure "b" to the Third Affidavit, being a copy of the letter dated 30. 1. 89 addressed to the Chief Justice of India, the Office of the Chief Justice of India has been charged with the failure "to preserve Independence of the judiciary by protecting the cheating business of excise-evasion of Mr. Aditya v. Birla*" "under the unlawful pressure of the Prune Minister of India" and "due to involvement in Criminal Conspiracy with Aditya. V. Birla*. The Chief Justice of India has also been charged with "not acting faithfully" and for "acting contrary to law" "under Tear" and "under pressure of money of Mr. Aditya. V. Birla and under the pressure of power of the Prime Minister of India" It has also been alleged that "due to unlawful relations with Mr. Aditya. V. Birla, Hon'ble president of India has also avoided to make reply" to the letter of the contemner and that "it is nothing but high-handed Criminal Conspiracy against" the contemner and "this great Nation by protecting cheating business of excise-evasions of Mr. Aditya. V. Birla. " 9. Aditya. V. Birla, Hon'ble president of India has also avoided to make reply" to the letter of the contemner and that "it is nothing but high-handed Criminal Conspiracy against" the contemner and "this great Nation by protecting cheating business of excise-evasions of Mr. Aditya. V. Birla. " 9. WE are fully alive to the fact that the present rule for contempt having been initiated on the basis of the two letters written by the contemner to the chief Justice of this Court and to the Chief Justice of India, dated 5. 12. 87 and 12. 1. 88 respectively, we must ascertain on the basis of those two letters alone as to whether any contempt has been committed by the contemner by scandalising the Court and our decision and order must be based on those two letters only and not on any other or further contempt, if any, disclosed in all these Affidavits and their Annexures. And we have given our most anxious and careful consideration to the said two letters extracted at the out-set and we have no manner of doubt that the allegations made in the letter as to the learned Judge not having acted according to law and in compliance with his duties to favour Mr. Aditya. V. Birla and to harass the contemner and that Mr. Birla had influenced the learned. Judge to do so, was scandalisation of Court of 'the gravest nature and. in that context, the request of the contemner in those letters for the grant of permission to get prosecution of the learned Judge under section 166 of the Penal Code "for the offence committed" only magnified that contempt. For, to say that a Judge is liable to be prosecuted for the commission of an offence under Section 166 of Penal Code is to say that the judge has knowingly disobeyed any direction of the law as to the way in which he is to conduct himself as a Judge, mending to cause, or knowing it to be likely that he would thereby cause injury to any person, is to charge the Judge with the grossest misbehaviour and thereby to shake the confidence of the people in his court and its administration of Justice. 10. BUT we have referred to the three Affidavits filed by the contemner and their Annexures for several reasons. Firstly, while the present Rule was issued on 1. 3. 10. BUT we have referred to the three Affidavits filed by the contemner and their Annexures for several reasons. Firstly, while the present Rule was issued on 1. 3. 88, we allowed the contemner to file as many Affidavits as he intended to do and to annex therewith; whatever documents he chose to do, and the three affidavits filed by him on 26. 8. 88, 17. 1. 89 and then on 14. 2. 89 would only demonstrate that the contemner was given widest possible opportunities of being heard in his defence, And secondly, even though we are fully satisfied from the contents of the two letters themselves, referred to in the Rule issued, that a contempt by scandalising the Court has been committed by the contemner beyond all reasonable doubt, the manner in which the contemner has sought to justify his action in the Affidavits and the Annexures noted hereinabove would leave no room for any doubt at all that the contemner committed the contempt as deliberately as one could. We are aware that the Law of Contempt of Court has evoked criticism to the effect that the same affects the fundamental right to freedom of speech and that of personal liberty. It is said that "there are many things that are wrong with the law of Contempt of Court. It is an arbitrary power. It involves the use of summary process rather than the ordinary procedure. A person can be found guilty of contempt even if he acted in good faith and did not intend to commit contempt. Truth cannot be pleaded as defence. Even the slightest criticism of Courts or comments non pending proceedings can technically be called contempt. It is designed to virtually eliminate all criticism of the judiciary. It is supposed to guard litigant before the Court, Judges presiding over Courts, the Judicial process. Courts as institution and the exclusive right of these institutions to deal with certain kinds of matters. In actual fact, the jurisdiction has turned out to be as much of an embarrassment as it purports to be a boon" (see, Contempt of Court and the Press - Rajeev Dhavan - 1982 -page 1/5. Courts as institution and the exclusive right of these institutions to deal with certain kinds of matters. In actual fact, the jurisdiction has turned out to be as much of an embarrassment as it purports to be a boon" (see, Contempt of Court and the Press - Rajeev Dhavan - 1982 -page 1/5. Whether these criticism are well-founded or not it a matter which need not detain us here, since as a result of a series of weighty pronouncements of our apex Court, the law on the point appears to be absolutely settled and even if the law, as the Critics say, has given the Courts "giant's power", all that we need see is that we do not use the same as giant. To borrow from Shakespeare, it may be good to have giant's power, but what may not be good is to use it as a giant. 11. AS already noted, the contemner here has taken the sole responsibility of writing these two letters and, be it noted that, whether or not under the law stated hereinafter, he can be allowed to do, so, he in fact, notwithstanding his long Affidavits and appreciably long argument for several hours was not in a position to substantiate any of the allegations made therein. No other attempt was make by him, save filing of the three Affidavits along with the annexures, to substantiate the facts alleged by him. 12. IN Pers-ptnice Publications Ltd. vs. State of Maharashtra (supra, AIR 1971 SC a. three Judge Bench of the Supreme Court endeavoured to for mulete tat 2-1;) the relevant law on the point, without, however, professing to make the same exhaustive and the same has been accepted by a later two-Judge Bench of the Supreme Court in Rama Dayal Markarha vs. State of Madhya Pradesh (supra, AIR 1978 SC 921 at 927) to be the law to be governed by. One such formula is that while the distinction must be made between mere libel or defamation of a Judge and what amounts to a Contempt of Court, the test in each case would be whether the impugned publication is a mere defamatory attack on the Judge or whether it is likely to interfere with the due course of Justice by the Court and it is in the latter case that it would be punishable as contempt. Alternatively, the test will be whether the wrong is done to the Judge personally or it is done to the public and the cause of administration of Justice also. Following the enunciation of law by B. K. Mukherjee, J., in the decision of the Supreme Court in Brahma Prakash Sharma ( AIR 1954 SC 10 ) it was reiterated that the publication of a disparaging statement in respect of a Judge will be an injury to the public or the cause of administration of Justice, if it tends to create an apprehension in the minds of the people regarding the integrity, ability or fairness of the Judge or to deter actual or prospective litigant from placing complete reliance upon that Judge's administration of justice or if it is likely to cause embarrassment in the mind of the Judge himself in the discharge of his judicial duties. Applying this test, as we must, we do not have any doubt that the allegations made in the two letters written by the contemner and referred to in the Rule, to the effect that the learned Judge had not "complied with his duties" "to favour Mr. Aditya. V. Birla" and "Mr. Aditya V. Birla had influenced: the learned Judge "to harass" the defendant who is the contemner here, and seeking grant of permission to prosecute the learned Judge under Section 166 of the Penal Code "for the offences committed" are "scurrilous, intimidator and malicious beyond condonable limits" and "the strong arm of the law must, in the name of public interest and public justice, strike a blow on him who challenges the supremacy of the Rule of law by fouling its source and stream". This is what Krishna Iyer, J., ruled in re S. Mulgaokar ( AIR 1978 SC 727 at 737-738) and this has been cited approval in a rather recent decision of the supreme Court in P. N. Duda vs. P. Shiv Shankar ( AIR 1988 SC 1208 at 1216) and it may be noted that both In re S. Mulgaokar (supra) and P. N. Duda (supra), the tests formulated in Perspective Publications Ltd. (supra), were accepted as the true tests. 13. 13. REFERENCE may also be made to the unanimous five-Judge Bench decision of the Supreme Court in C. K. Dapthary vs. O. P. Gupta ( AIR 1971 SC 1132 at 1144) where also it has been ruled that a scurrilous attack on a Judge in respect of a judgment or past conduct Ms "adverse effect on the due administration of justice" and "has the inevitable effect of undermining the confidence of the public in the Judiciary" and that "if confidence in the judiciary goes, the due administration of Justice definitely suffers". 14. AN impression has gained ground that in matters relating to Contempt of Court by scandalising the Court, truth or justification is no defence. In perspective Publications Ltd. (supra, at 230), the three-Judge Bench appears to have ruled that "in the law of Contempt, there are hardly any English or Indian cases in which such defence has been recognized". In the five-Judge bench decision in C. K. Dapthariy (supra, at 1148-1149) also, the exclusion of any such evidence was approved and upheld on the ground that "if evidence was to be allowed to justify allegations amounting to contempt of Court, it would tend to encourage disappointed litigants - and one party or the other to a case is always disappointed - to avenge their defeat by abusing the Judge." As is undeniable, the law relating to Contempt of Court affects. the fundamental right to freedom of speech guaranteed under Article 19 (l) (a) and that is why express provisions had to be made in Article 19 (2) saving laws "in relation to Contempt of Court", provided however, restrictions imposed by such laws pass the test of "reasonableness",, as expressly mentioned in that article 19 (2. In Maneka Gandhi ( AIR 1978 SC 597 . and in several post-Maneka decisions, the Supreme Court has discovered "reasonableness" as a brooding omnipresence in Article 14 of the Constitution and has ruled that at least the adjectival law, if not the substantive law also, must be "reasonable, right, just and fair" before a person may be deprived of his personal liberty under any such law and it is obvious that ;a sentence of imprisonment for contempt of Court would deprive a contemner of his personal liberty for the time being. The Contempt Act of 1971 now expressly provides in Section 17 (5)that the contemner has a right to "file affidavit in support of his defence and the Court may determine the matter of the charge either on the affidavits or after taking such further evidence as may be necessary", 1. for my part, would therefore have thought that in the context of the prevailing position in law and the provisions of Article 14 and Article 21 operating in their activist magnitude, the earlier rule excluding evidence in justification, would require serious re-thinking. But in the case at hand, the question would become purely academic, because, as we have already noted; we have, at no point of time, had any occasion, to shut out any Affidavit or evidence which the contemner intended to file or adduce in this case, and the contemner, before and during his long argument in this case, has repeatedly said that he has placed before us whatever he intended to place through his three Affidavits and. has had nothing more to add. Since we have, in fact excluded no evidence or other materials sought to be adduced by contemner, I do not think I need not peruse the question any further 15. THIS brings us to the question of sentence. We have reminded our solved that in a proceeding for contempt, the Court does not sentence the contemner with any spirit of revenge, and in ordinary cases, may regard a sentence of fine as good enough to vindicate its dignity and to meet the ends of justice. But there are cases and cases, and contempt of different variety, gravity and magnitude, and there are contemners and contemners. As already noted, in the case at hand, the contemner, in his desperate attempt to justify his conduct, has gone on hurling scurrilous and vituperative allegations against a learned Judge in all his three Affidavits filed one after another and, at no point of time, demonstrated, even remotely, any attitude of repentance, nor availed himself of any opportunity to retract or detract and apologize. He has not been able to show, even though we have afforded him all opportunities, that there was or could be any basis whatsoever for such scurrilous and reprehensible attacks against the Judge: of this Court. We have, therefore, no doubt at so ever that a substantive sentence is called for in this case. He has not been able to show, even though we have afforded him all opportunities, that there was or could be any basis whatsoever for such scurrilous and reprehensible attacks against the Judge: of this Court. We have, therefore, no doubt at so ever that a substantive sentence is called for in this case. But even then, as in a case like this, we impose punishment, more to vindicate the dignity of the Court of Justice than to punish the contemner, we have decided to sentence the contemner to tone month's simple imprisonment only and to pay a fine of Rs. 200/- only, in default, to suffer simple imprisonment for one month more. 16. MR. Saktinath Mukherjee, a Senior Advocate of this Court, was requested to appear in this case as amicus curiae, and we must record, which we hereby do, that we have derived considerable assistance from his very able and comprehensive submissions made by him with his usual fairness.