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1989 DIGILAW 137 (DEL)

AMAR NATH GOEL v. MAYUR SYNTAX LIMITED

1989-03-16

Y.K.SABHARWAL

body1989
Y. K. Sabharwal,j. ( 1 ) ON 14/06/1982 the plaintiff as usual wasworking in the factory premises of his employer, defendant company, leastrealising that, for him and few others, it was a bad day. On this fateful daya portion of the office building collapsed resulting in death of three personsand grave and serious injuries to various persons. The plaintiff sustainedgrave and serious inkjuries. On the same day he was admitted in Friendsmedical Centre, a private nursing home of Delhi and remained there forover a month and half. He was discharged from the said Nursing Home on 3/08/1982. He was, however, advised to undergo treatment of physiotherapy as well as electric stimulation. Plaintiff took the sa treatmentbetween 26/08/1982 and 22/09/1982 but says that therewas no improvement inspile of the continuous treatment prescribed bydifferent doctors Ultimately the plaintiff resumed his duties as Stores andpurchase Manager with defendant on 1/10/1982. He says that he wasin considerable run down state of heath but joned duties apprehending thatthe defendant may ease him out of his job if he remained away from workvery much longer and also because he got fed up with his immobility andhoped that with resumption of work his condition might improve bothphysically and mentally. He bad worked with the defendant upto 23/11/1982. Plaintiff says that on 24/11/1982 the van of the defendantdid not turn up to pick up the plaintiff. However in the evening the plaintiffwas informed by the Assistant Production Manager of the factory that themanaging Director wanted to see him before he could proceed any furtherin his job. Plaintiff says that he made several attempts to meet the Managingdirector but did not get the appointment In the meantime he says that hewas receiving periodic assurances from the Works Manager to the effect thatthe Managing Director was considering the possibility of assigning him anew job which would be more confortable. The plaintiff was not given anyassignment. He states that for the first time, on receipt of letter dated 14/03/1984 be learnt that his services had been terminated Plaintiff furthersays that he has failed to find any gainful employement since he started hissearch for it soon after he received the letter dated 14/03/1984 fromthe defendant company. According to plaintiff the physical handicapdissuades any employer to offer him employment, i Plaintiff says that thedefendant company dishonestly, maliciously and wrongfully eased theplaintiff out of its employment. According to plaintiff the physical handicapdissuades any employer to offer him employment, i Plaintiff says that thedefendant company dishonestly, maliciously and wrongfully eased theplaintiff out of its employment. Plaintiff says in the plaint that he has alawful and valid claim of Rs. 17 lakhs as damaged as worked out in theplaint but restricts his claim only to Rs. 4 lakhs because of inability to paycourt fees on the amount of Rs. 17 lakhs. The claim of the Plaintiff is fordamages for wrongful and malacious removal from service, general damagesfor anxiety, shock etc, reimbursement of medical bills, income at Rs. 3000. 00per month till the age of 58 years and other benefits etc. ( 2 ) DEFENDANT admits the collapse of the wall of the factory buildingfacing the North West which bounded the Railing Department, cementgodown and stores. It admits that three persons died and few includingthe plaintiff sustained grave and serious injuries. Defendant also admits thatplaintiff was admited in the Nursing Home on 14/06/1982 and wasdischarged on 3/08/1982. Defendant has pleaded that the entire factorypremises was duly constructed fully in accordance with National Buildingcode. JJ says that entire construction was sound and stable but due tounseen vis major circumstances which were beyond human control and canamply be described as act of God were solely responsible for the collapseof the wall. The unforeseen circumstances, according to defendant, is thatthe wall was struck by lightening which led to the collapse. It is also pleadedthat the services of the plaintiff were terminated in accordance with theterms and conditions on which he had been appointed and that on or aboutnovember 22/23rd 1982 the plaintiff was informed that his services were nolonger required by the defendant. ( 3 ) THE dispute between the parties is with regard to nature of injuriessuffered by the plaintiff, cause of the accident, amount of damages and thefactum and validity of termination of the services of the plaintiff. Plaintiffsays that defendant is absolutely liable for the collapse of its factory building. The collapse, according to the plaintiff, resulted because of baddesigning, sub standard material used therein and on account of poorworkmanship. He also says that the defendant did not exercise due care andattention in constructing a part of the factory building which collapsed. Plaintiff claims to have suffered permanent disability of his left leg. ( 4 ) BEFORE framing of issues statement of Mr. He also says that the defendant did not exercise due care andattention in constructing a part of the factory building which collapsed. Plaintiff claims to have suffered permanent disability of his left leg. ( 4 ) BEFORE framing of issues statement of Mr. K. G. Maheshwaricompany Secretary of the defendant was recorded. Mr. Maheswari admitsthat no letter of termination was issued to the plaintiff. He further statesthat in Para 11 of the written statement it has been mentioned that plaintiffwas informed on or about 22nd/ 23/11/1982 by Mr. Satish Kumar,assistant Production Manager of the defendant about termination of hisservices but he is not aware if there is any record with the defendant to showthat Mr. Satish Kumar did inform the plaintiff as stated in the written statement. On ! 5/05/1986 the following issues were framed : 1. Whether the collapse of the factory or part thereof resulting ininjuries to the plaintiff was an Act of God absolving the defen-dant of its liabilities. 2. Did the defendant terminate the services of the plaintiff andif so when and was that as per the terms of the employment ? 3. If the above issues are held against the defendant to whatamount of damages (not exceeding Rs. 4 lacs) is the plaintiffentitled ? 4. Did the defendant spend Rs. 17, 6961- as medical expenses onthe plaintiff and if so to what effect ? 5. Relief". issue No. 15. In order to prove the plea of act of God the defendant is tosublish that the circumstances which led to the collapse of the wall werethe which could not be foreseen and contemplated. The defendant has alsoestablish that it had taken all reasonable care while constructing theof the building which collapsed. ( 6 ) AN act of God is an operation of natural forces so unexpectedthat no human foresight or skill could reasonably be expected to anticipateit (Winfield on Tort ). ( 7 ) THE burden to prove that collapse was no account of the act ofgod is on the defendant. Let me now summarise the evidence of the defendant. Mr. R. K. Saxena, DW-1 who was the Development Executive of thedefendant only stated that he has received the report that the wall hadcollapsed due to lightening. The witness had not noticed any sound andlightening on the collapsed sturcture an his knowledge was based on whatwas told to him by others. ( 8 ) SIMILARLY, Mr. Mr. R. K. Saxena, DW-1 who was the Development Executive of thedefendant only stated that he has received the report that the wall hadcollapsed due to lightening. The witness had not noticed any sound andlightening on the collapsed sturcture an his knowledge was based on whatwas told to him by others. ( 8 ) SIMILARLY, Mr. P. S. Shekawat, DW-2 Works Manager of the defendant also stated that he did not see any lightening effect on the buildingand was not aware if the lightening in fact had struck the building structureor not. ( 9 ) MR. Chandru, DW-4 claims to be a farmer having agricultural andnear the factory premises of the defendant and made a bald statement thatdue to big thunder storm and lightening the factory premises and buildingof the defendant collapsed while he was working in his fields. He pleadedthat he could not say on which place exactly the lightening had struck. ( 10 ) MR. P. K. Jain, PW-6 who was the Managing Director of thedefendant company at the relevant time war present in his office in thefactory premises does not even state that he was informed that the wall hadcollapsed on acount of lightening striking it. ( 11 ) DW-7 Siddarth Jasubhai is an architect. He was a partner in thefirm of Enigneers which had prepared the design of the building. The buildingwas constructed under the supervision of architects and engineers of thesaid firm. The services of M/s Siddarth Jasubhai were engaged to find outthe cause of the collapse of the wall. On 16/06/1982, on visit to thefactory premises, be found the North West wall had collapsed and part ofthe structure which was connected with the said wall had also been highlydamaged. He visited the factory premises on 16th and 17/06/1982 tocarry out full investigation to find out the causes of the collapse of the walland to work out the extent of damage to the structure as also for its stabilityso that there was no accident in future. Ex. PW-7/1 is the report submittedby him. ( 12 ) THE report Ex. DW-7/1 states that the wall facing the Northwest side of the spinning Mill Mayur Syntax Ltd which bounded therailing department, cement godown and store collapsed between 4 and4. 30 P. M. on 146. Ex. PW-7/1 is the report submittedby him. ( 12 ) THE report Ex. DW-7/1 states that the wall facing the Northwest side of the spinning Mill Mayur Syntax Ltd which bounded therailing department, cement godown and store collapsed between 4 and4. 30 P. M. on 146. 82 Extensive damage resulted to the huge structureseparating the roof of the railing department, cement godown and the storesection which was behind the wall resulting in killing of three lives andseveral injured. Approximately 215 feet of wall out of 232 feet came downsuddenly. The wall which came down was 12 feet high at one end and28 feet high at the other end. Certain photographs of the collapsed wall werealso taken. The report states that certain eye witnesses bad informedmr. Jasubhai that lightening accompanied by loud noise had struck thewall at point marked a on the drawings. The nature of the constructionof the wall has been given in the report. It is stated to be a masonary wallconstructed in cement mortar I : 6. The report rules out the collapse of thewall on account of the severe wind, for the primary reason that the otherstructure of the building and none of the other factories in the Industrialestate did not suffer any damage and by process of elimination of the othercauses, comes to the conclusion, that lightening must have bit the wall resulting in its collapse. ( 13 ) DW-7 admitted in his cross examination that collapsed wall wasnot shown in the original designs sent to the defendant and stated that thewall must have been constructed after the project was complete. The witnessadmitted that had the wall not collapsed the damage would not have beentaken place. It was further stated by the witness that no part of thebuilding for which his firm bad prepared the design and which was constructed under their supervision got damaged because of lightening. The wallupto the height of I I feet 6 inch had been constructed in accordance withthe design prepared by the firm of which DW-7 was a partner. The wallover and above 14 feet 6 inches was constructed laier on and the later addedportion had collapsed. The witness could not give risk factor against lightening in respect of small and medium size factories, workshop and laboratories. The wallover and above 14 feet 6 inches was constructed laier on and the later addedportion had collapsed. The witness could not give risk factor against lightening in respect of small and medium size factories, workshop and laboratories. However, it was admitted that the risk factor, in so far as masonary wallwhich had collapsed, was normally cent per cent because mason is nonconductor of electricity while the risk factor against lightening fur hugestructure like the factory premises of the defendant was around 10%. It wasalso admitted that no safeguard against lightening in so far as wall whichhad collapsed was provided. ( 14 ) THE report Ex. DW-7/1 loses all its significance in view of oraltestimony of its author Mr. Jasubhai (DW-7 ). That apart even completereport was admittedly not filed by the defendant. The report was accompanied with the cost of reconstruction as well as cost of construction when thewall was constructed as also the sketches and photographs. All these documents were part of the report Ex. DW-7/1. None were filed. Why thesedocuments were not filed ? I cannot say. Reason must be known to thedefendant. There are no reasons on record. In respect of velocity of windjasubhai had obtained a print out from the matrological department whichhad given to the defendant. This print out was also not filed by thedefendants. ( 15 ) THE only evidence in support of the plea of act of God is thereport Ex. DW7/1, and the oral testimony of Jasubhai, DW-7. The defendant did not produce any witness from matrological department. Learnedcounsel for the parties had REFERRED TO to National Building Code. The sobmission on behalf of the plaintiff was that it was obligatory for the defendantto provide proper safeguard against lightening. On the other hand thesubmission on behalf of the defendant was that it was not obligatory, inabsence of any evidence on the type of the construction I cannot place anyreliance on National Building Code. The sobmission on behalf of the plaintiff was that it was obligatory for the defendantto provide proper safeguard against lightening. On the other hand thesubmission on behalf of the defendant was that it was not obligatory, inabsence of any evidence on the type of the construction I cannot place anyreliance on National Building Code. The further argument of learnedcounsel for the defendant that no reliance should be placed on the oraltestimony of defendants own witness Jasubhai is without any substancethere is nothing on the record to suggest that because of an apprehensionthat his firm may not be sued by the defendant Jasubhai had given a falsestatement to the effect that the plans of the collapsed wall were not designedby his firm or that it was not constructed under the supervision of his firmor that therisk factor against lightening of the said wall was cent per cent. There is no evidence to warrant the acceptance of this contention by learnedcounsel. ( 16 ) LEARNED counsel for the defendant contended that the collapsedwall was designed and constructed under the supervision of the firm ofarchitects of which Jasubhai was a partner and that Jasubhai had deliberatelymade a false statement. I do not agree. There is no evidence on record tosupport this contention. It was open to the defendant to produce evidencein the nature of the plans etc. to show that the collapsed wall was part of thedesigns prepared by the firm of Jasubhai or constructed under the supervisionof the said firm. No such evidence was produced. If the oral testimony ofjasubhai is to be discarded, as contended on behalf of the defendant, thenthe report Ex. DW-7/1 has also to be discarded. If that be so, there will beno evidence on record in support of the plea of the defendant that lighteninghad struck the wall. It is not possible to place reliance on the report andignore oral testimony of its author. ( 17 ) THE heavy burden on the shoulders of the defendant to establishplea of act of God cannot be said to have been discharged only by sayingthat other parts of the building did not collapse. It is not proved on recordas to what was the nature of construction of the other part of the buildingwhich had not collapsed. The design of the portion which had not collapsedhad been prepared by M/s. Sizeon Consulting Engineers of which Jasubhaiwas a partner. It is not proved on recordas to what was the nature of construction of the other part of the buildingwhich had not collapsed. The design of the portion which had not collapsedhad been prepared by M/s. Sizeon Consulting Engineers of which Jasubhaiwas a partner. This construction was supervised by said firm of Engineersand had only l0/o risk factor against lightening. Who had prepared thedesign of the collapsed wall ? When was it constructed ? What precautionswere taken ? There is no evidence, clearly the defendant has failed toproduce material and best evidence. Admittedly the collapse of the wall hadresulted in serious and grave injuries to the plaintiff and the defendant canonly be absolved of its liability of damages on proof of its plea of vis major or Act of God. ( 18 ) FOR the reasons aforesaid I cannot accept the evidence led bythe defendant to prove the plea of Act of God. There is no independent evidence to establish the said plea. The evidence is of interestedpersons. It is too scanty. It was the duty of the defendant to maintain walland building in proper condition. They had to ensure that it is notdangerous. They did nothing. The defendant has failed in dischargingburden of this issue. Accordingly, issue No. 1 is answered in favour of theplaintiff and against the defendant. Issue No. 2 ( 19 ) THE terms and conditions of plaintiff s employment are containedin letter of appointment dated 20/04/1982 Ex. P-3. Plaintiff was appoined as Store Purchase Manager in the defendant company with effect from26. 5. 82 on a consolidated salary ofrs. 2500. 00 plus Rs. 500. 00hra. Rs. 3. 000. 00 all inclusive. Clause 3 of letter of appointment Ex. P-3 providesthat during probationary period Plaintiff s services could be terminated bygiving 24 hours notice or salary in lieu thereof without assigning any reasonby the management. The defendant relies upon on the said clause 3. Thequestion, however, is whether 24 hours notice or salary in lieu thereof interms of the said clause was given to the plaintiff. Admittedly no letter oftermination was issued to the plaintiff. The case of the defendant is thatplaintiff was informed on or about 22nd/ 23/11/1982 that his services were no longer required. Mr. Maheshwari, the Company Secretaryof the defendant stated that, Mr. Satish Kumar, an Assistant Productionmanager of the defendant company at the relevant time. Admittedly no letter oftermination was issued to the plaintiff. The case of the defendant is thatplaintiff was informed on or about 22nd/ 23/11/1982 that his services were no longer required. Mr. Maheshwari, the Company Secretaryof the defendant stated that, Mr. Satish Kumar, an Assistant Productionmanager of the defendant company at the relevant time. had informed theplaintiff about termination of his services. Mr. Satish Kumar, DW-3 doesnot state that he informed the plaintiff about termination of his services. Mr. Satish Kumar says that he does not know why plaintiff had stopped comingto the factory. There is no other evidence on record to show that notice ascontemplated by clause 3 of Ex. P-3 was given to the plaintiff. ( 20 ) LEARNED counsel for the defendant, in the alternative contendedthat the plaintiff was informed about the termination of his services onreceipt of letter dated 14th/ 16/03/1984 (Ex. 2-3 ). The case of theplaintiff as set out in the plaint is that he had joined duties on 1/10/1982 and was working normally upto 2 3/11/1982. On 2 4/11/1982 he got ready to be picked up by the factory Van to take himfrom his residence at Ghaziabad to the factory premises but the Van did notturn up on that day. That very day in the evening he was informed by theassistant Production Manager at his residence that he was required by themanaging Director of the company to see him before he could proceed anyfurther with his job The plaintiff made several unsuccessful attempts tomeet the Managing Director. In the meantime plaintiff was receiving assurances from Works Manager of the factory that the Managing Directorwas considering the possibility of assigning him a new job but nothinghappened. On 4. 2. 84 the plaintiff learnt from the office of the Deputylabour Commissioner. Ghaziabad that defendant had already terminatedbis services. The plaintiff thereupon addressed a letter dated 29. 2. 84 (Ex. P-2) protesting against the action of the defendants. In reply to letter Ex. P-2plaintiff received letter dated 14/ 16/03/1984 (P-3) from the defendant. In letter Ex. P-3 reference has been made to clause 3 of the appointmentletter dated 20. 4. 82 (Ex. P-l ). This letter Ex. P-3 states that according to thesaid clause 3 plaintiff s services have been terminated. Alongwith letterex. P-3 a copy of letter dated 30/01/1984 (P. 4) sent by defendant tothe Regional Conciliation Officer was enclosed. In letter Ex. P-3 reference has been made to clause 3 of the appointmentletter dated 20. 4. 82 (Ex. P-l ). This letter Ex. P-3 states that according to thesaid clause 3 plaintiff s services have been terminated. Alongwith letterex. P-3 a copy of letter dated 30/01/1984 (P. 4) sent by defendant tothe Regional Conciliation Officer was enclosed. ( 21 ) LEARNED counsel for the defendant relying upon clause 3 of theletter of appointment Ex. P-l and letter Ex. P-3 contended that, in any case,services of the plaintiff stood terminated on receipt of letter Ex. P-3 even ifit is held that notice of termination was not given to the plaintiff on 22nd/ 23/11/1982. The termination on receipt of letter dated 14th/1 6/03/1984, it is contended, is in accordance with the contract of employment of the plaintiff. The contention that services of the plaintiff stoodterminated on receipt of letter Ex. P-3, in my opinion, is well founded. Ithas not been shown as to how the termination on receipt of letter dated14th/ 16/03/1984 (Ex. P-3) is not in accordance with the terms ofemployment. In fact, learned counsel for the plaintiff did not seriously contest that plaintiff s services stood terminated on receipt of letter Ex. P-3. However, there is no evidence on record as to date of despatch or date ofreceipt of this letter though admittedly this letter was received by plaintiff. Ordinarily, in India a letter is received by the addressee within a day or twoof its despatch but in the facts and circumstances of this case I will assumethat this letter was received by the plaintiff in the month of March 1984. Itfollows that his services stood terminated with effect from 1/04/1984. Accordingly, I hold that services of the plaintiff stood terminated in themonth of March 1984 and termination was as per terms of employment. Issue No. 2 is answered accordingly. Issue No. 3 ( 22 ) THE break up of damages claimed by the plaintiff in the plaint isas under :- (1) Damages for wrongful and malicious removal from service Rs. 2,50,000-00 (2) General damages for anxiety shock etc. Rs. 1,50,coo-00 (3) Compensatory damages for medical expenses etc. Rs. 6,000-00 (4) Reimbursement of medical bill as REFERRED TO to in paia 26. Rs. 2,473-50 (5) Special damages for permanent disability. (a) Income Rs. 3. 000. 2,50,000-00 (2) General damages for anxiety shock etc. Rs. 1,50,coo-00 (3) Compensatory damages for medical expenses etc. Rs. 6,000-00 (4) Reimbursement of medical bill as REFERRED TO to in paia 26. Rs. 2,473-50 (5) Special damages for permanent disability. (a) Income Rs. 3. 000. 00 p. m. for 18years 9 months (the prospective periodof time the plaintiff was likely to workupto the age of 58 years reckonedfrom 31. 10 82 when he last drew hissalary ). Rs. 6,75,000-00 (b) Expected annual growth income for18 years 9 months aforesaid Rs. 350. 00 p. m. (subject to the maximum growth upto Rs. 3. 000. 00 ). Rs. 5,11,200-00 (c) Would have been benefits arising from perquisites, annual leave etc. Rs. 2,37,214-00 (d) Losing benefits like provident fund,gratuity etc. Rs. 1,50. 000-00rs. 19,81,887-00lessiallowance for uncertainties affecting thencome of the plaintiff during the said 18 yearsmonths. (-) Rs. 2,50,000-00net amount claimed by the plaintiff. Rs. 17,31,887-50 ( 23 ) THE plaintiff has restricted its claim to Rs. 4 lakhs. As would beseen from the above break up the plaintiff has claimed general as well asspecial damages. Unlike general damages the special damages are to beclaimed specifically and proved strictly. I have held above that the services ofthe plaintiff stood terminated with effect from 1/04/1984. The plaintiffhad beea paid his salaly only upto October 1982. He is deemed to be in serviceupto March 1984 and is entitled to all service benefits including salary forthis period. The salary of the plaintiff was Rs. 3000. 00p. m. . He is thus entitledio recover from defendant Rs. 51,000. 00 as salary of 17 months i. e. fromnovember 1982 to March 1984. This amount will fall under the head ofspecial damages. The plaintiff has claimed this salary and has successfullyproved his claim of salary for these 17 months. ( 24 ) BESIDES salary plaintiff has also claimed (1) expected annualgrowth income; (2) would have been benefits arising from perquisites,annual leave etc. and (3) loosing benefits like provident fund, gratuity etc. The defendant, on the other hand, says that from out of salary for theperiod November 198 2/03/1984 a sum of Rs. 2337-50 plus Rs. 5063. 00i. e. Rs. 7400. 00should be deducted on account of income tax which wouldhave been deducted at source. and (3) loosing benefits like provident fund, gratuity etc. The defendant, on the other hand, says that from out of salary for theperiod November 198 2/03/1984 a sum of Rs. 2337-50 plus Rs. 5063. 00i. e. Rs. 7400. 00should be deducted on account of income tax which wouldhave been deducted at source. In support of the contention that the amountof income tax is liable to be deducted from the amount of damages, learnedcounsel has relied upon British Transport Commission v. Gourley 1956 (1)Appeal Cases 189 where the House of Lords held that in assessingdamages for loss of personal earnings in cases of personal injury the taxwhich the plaintiff would have to pay had he continued to receive thoseearnings must be taken into account. In this Judgment Lord Keith ofavonholm gave a dissenting opinion. Learned counsel for the plaintiff hasrelied upon judgment of Supreme Court of Cannada in Ontario v. Jennings1957 D. L. R. Page 644 for the proposition that there should be no deductionfrom the amount awarded for lost earnings on the assumption that plaintiffwould have had io pay income tax on the earnings whether or not lump sumjudgment is subject to tax. The lump sum is uncertain enough as it is. Toassess another uncertainty-the incidence of income tax-would be an unduepreference for the case of the defendant or his insurance compay I am inclined to agree with the reasons given in the judgment of Supreme Court ofcannada and with the opinion of Lord Keith. I adopt the said reasons andwish to add no more except that the plaintiff would have received the amountof salary month by month between the period November 1982 and March1984 of which he was deprived and will be entitled to receive it now afterlapse of many years. I may also add that it is not the case of defendant thatthe amount of compensation will be payable by them to the income-taxdepartment Furthermore, this amount of Rs. 7400-50 will be set off againstplaintiff s claim for benefit like increments annual leave etc. The defendant is not entitled for any deduction as claimed by it. ( 25 ) PLAINTIFF has the further claimed reimbursement of medical bill forperiod 19/08/1980 to 11/10/1982 which was duly passed by defendant for payment of Rs. 2473-50 to the plaintiff. Payment was actually notmade. The fact is established by testimony plaintiff PW-4. There is noevidence to the contrary. The defendant is not entitled for any deduction as claimed by it. ( 25 ) PLAINTIFF has the further claimed reimbursement of medical bill forperiod 19/08/1980 to 11/10/1982 which was duly passed by defendant for payment of Rs. 2473-50 to the plaintiff. Payment was actually notmade. The fact is established by testimony plaintiff PW-4. There is noevidence to the contrary. Counsel for the defendant has not questionedplaintiff s right to receive this amount. ( 26 ) BEFORE determining the amount of general damages to which theplaintiff may be entitled, let me first analyse evidence on nature of injuriessustained by the plaintiff and its effect on him. Admittedly the plaintiff hassuffered serious injuries as has been admitted by P. K. Jain, DW-6. There isalso no dispute that the plaintiff remained in a Nursing riome for nearlyseven weeks from 14 6. 82. to 3/08/1982. The plaintiff had sustainedgrave injuries to both his legs. the spinal cord, his face and mouth in addilion to multiple injuries in other parts of his body. He suffered fractures atthe ankle area of both his legs, multiple fractures of bones of his back andserious injuries to his jaws and teeth resulting in one of the front teethpushed out of his muscles piercing his chin and destabilisation of quite a fewof his teeths. The injuries to his face necessitated 23 stiches. Both his legs (from foot to the knee) were kept in plaster for six weeks and for that periodhe had to constantly to lie on his back without the permission of eventurning his side for brief spells. The functioning of plaintiff s leg wasseriously impaired. He was disabled to walk in normal manner with theefficacy and facility which he enjoyed before the accident. Inspite of thesustained and prolonged treatment the state of plaintiff s health did notimprove. The plaintiff needs the help of a stick in his right hand andattendant on his left side to enable him to walk. His right leg too hasdeveloped continual afflication in the nature of periodic swelling and unbearable pain after the stain of walking even at short distance. There was noimprovement in the condition of plaintiff s left foot drop inspite of treatmentof various doctors. The aforesaid are the nature of injuries given by theplaintiff in his evidence. There is no cross examination of the plaintiff onthe nature of injuries suffered by him and the said injuries are deemed to beadmitted. There was noimprovement in the condition of plaintiff s left foot drop inspite of treatmentof various doctors. The aforesaid are the nature of injuries given by theplaintiff in his evidence. There is no cross examination of the plaintiff onthe nature of injuries suffered by him and the said injuries are deemed to beadmitted. ( 27 ) THE plaintiff had also examined three doctors. PW-2 Dr. Arya isvir Arya is a physiotherapist and has been attending to the plaintiff. Dr. Arya has deposed that due to deficiency in muscle power in regard to ankledorsal flexors, it will not be possible for the plaintiff to lift his ankle and assuch he will not be in a position to walk normally and there is no chance ofhis getting totally fit or improving on the muscle power. ( 28 ) PW-3 Dr. (Mrs.) J. S. Khurana is a Radiologist and has provedthe three X-ray reports Exs. PW3/1 to Ex. PW3/3. The X-ray reports givethe nature of the multiple fractures in dorsel spine and both the anklessuffered by the plaintiff. The witness has not been cross examined at all. ( 29 ) THE third doctor examined by the plaintiff is Dr. P. R. Kucheria,pw-6. PW. 6dr. Kucheriais the Chief Surgeon of Friends Medical Centre. He has given details of the injuries suffered by the plaintiff. Dr. Kucheria hasdeposed that plaintiff was found to have developed complete foot drop of theleft foot due to injury to the lateral popleteal nerve and that he was able towalk with great difficulty only a few steps and that too with the help ofwalking aid frame. Dr. Kucheria has opined that the foot drop of theplaintiff has become permanent and on account of injuries particularlyinjuries at his spine the plaintiff has lost his physical functional efficiency andis not fit to cope with even ordinary physical exertion and has become aninvalid person for remaining years of his life. He has also opined that theplaintiff will not be able to work rest of his life as a normal man and willneed walking aids like stick or cruches to walk. He has further opined thateven a short walk with the help of such aids will always mean a greatphysical strain for him. He has also opined that theplaintiff will not be able to work rest of his life as a normal man and willneed walking aids like stick or cruches to walk. He has further opined thateven a short walk with the help of such aids will always mean a greatphysical strain for him. The witness has further deposed that managementof the defendant company was informed at the time of discharge of theplaintiff about the gravity of the injuries suffered by him on account of saidaccident and the prognosis of these injuries in terms of his permanentphysical disability. Dr. Kucheria says that footdrop means that footmoves in two directions-downwards which is called planti flexon, and upwardwhich is called dorsi flexon. It is explained that when a particular person iscapable to move his foot upward it is described as footdrop. The causes offootdrop have also been given. The opinion of the doctor is that plaintiff sfootdrop has become permanent and is not curable. ( 30 ) LEARNED counsel for the defendant criticised the evidence ofdr. Kucheria and firstly submitted that the doctor did not produce the recordabout the minor accident which the plaintiff had after the accident in question. It was explained that the said record was destroyed when thenursing Home was shifted. There is no suggestion to Dr. Kucheria thatbecause of any minor accident the injury has become permanent and as suchi do not find any substance in the submission of learned counsel in thisregard. ( 31 ) COUNSEL for defendant then submitted that the plaintiff had denied about the minor accidents after the accident in question whereas thedoctor stated that the plaintiff had reported about minor accidentswhich he had after the accident of 14/06/1982. These are trifflingmatters and are of no consequence. ( 32 ) LASTLY, learned counsel for the defendant argued that in examination-in-chief Dr. Kucheria deposed that he had examined the witness whenthe examination-in-chief was given on affidavit dated 16/10/1982although in cross examination he stated that he had examined the witnessfor the last time in the year 19^5. Such minor discrepancies cannot be ofany effect particularly when the defendant has not been able to extractanything of substance in the cross examination. ( 33 ) DOCTORS are not shown to be interested witnesses. I attach greatimportance to the evidence and reports of the doctors. Such minor discrepancies cannot be ofany effect particularly when the defendant has not been able to extractanything of substance in the cross examination. ( 33 ) DOCTORS are not shown to be interested witnesses. I attach greatimportance to the evidence and reports of the doctors. This evidence givesquite an accurate idea of the nature of injuries the plaintiff sustained, bissufferings and the effect on his future life. The evidence remains unconiroverted. The defendant has not examined any doctor. It was open to thedefendant to move an application for getting the plaintiff examined by somedoctor. No such application was made. The plaintiff has established thathe has suffered permanent disability of his left foot and will not be able towalk normally without the aid of cruches. ( 34 ) FROM the evidence on record it stands established that theplaintiff will not be able to walk as a normal person. He will not be able totake the workload in the manner he was doing before the accident. He willalways need an attendant. From the testimony of DW-6 Mr. P. K. Jain themanaging Director of the defendant company at the relevant time it standsestablished that the plaintiff lost his job with defendant as a result of effecton his efficiency after the accident. Mr. Jain stated that "because of theinjury the plaintiff was not able to take the workload. The plaintiff wasstore-incherge. The store work is little heavy. The plaintiff wanted somelighter job. I was also interested in giving some lighter job to the plaintiffbut no such job was available. Accordingly, the services of the plaintiffwere terminated. " ( 35 ) FROM the above statement of Mr. Jain it is evident that theplaintiff lost the job because of the injuries suffered by him in the accident. ( 36 ) THE plaintiff has claimed special and general damages amountingto Rs. 4 lakhs. I have held above that the plaintiff is entitled to Rs. 51. 000. 00as Special damages. The plaintiff has also established his claim ofrs. 2473-50. This leaves a balance of Rs. 3,46,520-50p. The plaintiff hasclaimed future salary as special damages. The services of the plaintiff stoodvalidly terminated with effect from 1/04/1984. He is not entitled to anysalary from 1/04/1984. The question as to what amount the plaintiff isentitled as damages for loss of future earnings has, however, to beconsidered while assessing general damages. 2473-50. This leaves a balance of Rs. 3,46,520-50p. The plaintiff hasclaimed future salary as special damages. The services of the plaintiff stoodvalidly terminated with effect from 1/04/1984. He is not entitled to anysalary from 1/04/1984. The question as to what amount the plaintiff isentitled as damages for loss of future earnings has, however, to beconsidered while assessing general damages. He is also entitled to compensation for both past and future, pain and suffering. ( 37 ) THE determination of amount of general damages is mostly adifficult question. The sum to be awarded is always dependent upon all thedetailed circumstances of the case. "no one knows what is right sum ofdamages in any particular case and not two cases are alike (Singleton L. J. in Waldon v. War Office 1956 (1) W. L. R. 51 ). ( 38 ) WHAT amount should I award to the plaintiff on account ofphysical pain and mental anguish and future loss of earning ? Beforedetermining the amount let me summarise the findings which emerge fromthe aforesaid discussion and analysis evidence. (1) The plaintiff was employed with defendant on a salary ofrs. 3,000. 00 p. m. at the time of accident. (2) The accident wasnot because of an Act God. (3) Defendant had not exercised due care and attention inconstructing collapsed portion of the building. (4) Plaintiff sustained grave and serious injuries as a result of thecollapse of the wall of the building. (5) Plaintiff is permanently disabled. (6) Plaintiff suffered physical pain and mental anguish as a resultof the injuries. (7) There has been loss of future earnings of the plaintiff. ( 39 ) MONEY cannot renew a shattered human frame still the law hassaid that this is a head of damages for which monetary compensation canbe awarded and court must do the best it can and award what is fair andreasonable compensation. Future loss cannot be easily calculated because ofmany imponderables which enter into the assessment. The court mustestimate the period of future disability and plaintiff s probable future rate ofearning by arriving at a lump sum and this must then be discounted to allowfor the fact that he receives a lump sum forthwith inspite of paymentsspread over a period of time and for normal vicissitudes of life and contengencies such as the possibility that his working life might have been curtailedlater by some happenings. It is not possible to calculate the pecuniaryloss to a high degree of exactness and damages for future loss ofearning have often been awarded in one lump sum together with damagesfor mental pain and suffering. I will conclude by what Diplock L. J. has saidabout the standard which the law applies on award of damages, namely, "ifit is not wholly extinctive and incommunical ie, is based, apart from painand suffering upon the degree of deprivation-that is, the extent to which the 208 victim is unable to do those things which, but for the injury, he would have been able to do". (Feltcher v. autocar and Transporters Ltd. 1968 (2) queen s Bench Division 322 at page 340 ). ( 40 ) THE plaintiff who at the time of accident was 39 years of age is a graduate in Commerce from Delhi University and has Diploma in Material management from Delhi Institute of Management and Services. He was drawing Rs. 3,000/- per month as his salary inclusive of house rent allowance from the defendant He lost his job because of the injuries suffered in the accident. The Managing Director of defendant has said that because of the injury the plaintiff was not able to take the workload. He says that the plaintiff was Store Incharge and Store work is little heavy. He also says that light job was not available and, therefore, the service of the plaintiff were terminated. The plaintiff has failed to find any gainful employment since he started his search for it soon after receipt of letter Ex. P-3 There is neither any cross examination on this aspect nor any other evidence to the contrary. Assuming that total loss of earning cannot be attributed to the injuries but the substantial part of it does. The plaintiff has long career ahead of him and a family of three daughters and a son besides wife to support. Bearing in mind all the relevant heads of damages and circumstances of the case and inflationary trend of prices a sum of Rs. 2, 46, 500/-, in my opinion, is just, fair and reasonable compensation besides Rs. 53,478-50 as special damages total Rs. 2. 99,978-50p. 1 will round off the figure and award Rs. 3 lakh as damages. ( 41 ) FOR the reasons stated above I pass a decree for Rs. 2, 46, 500/-, in my opinion, is just, fair and reasonable compensation besides Rs. 53,478-50 as special damages total Rs. 2. 99,978-50p. 1 will round off the figure and award Rs. 3 lakh as damages. ( 41 ) FOR the reasons stated above I pass a decree for Rs. 3 lakhs in favour of the plaintiff and against the defendant with proportionate costs. in case the decretal amount is not paid within two months it will carry interest at 12% p. a. from date of decree till payment.