S. B. MAJMUDAR, J. ( 1 ) THE petitioner-Corporation has brought in challenge in this petition under Art. 226 of the Constitution the action of respondent No. 1 herein making 11 Reference under the Industrial Dispute Act for adjudication of industrial disputes to the Labour Court Bhavnagar in References Nos. 218 227 and 228 to 251 of 1989 as well as the notices issued on 15-6-1989 19 and 20-6-1989 issued by the first respondent calling upon the petitioner to show cause as to why references should not he made of the industrial disputes referred to in these notices. These disputes relate to the retrenchment of the concerned employees. ( 2 ) THE learned Counsel for the petitioner-Corporation has raised the following contentions in support of this petition : (1) Earlier the first respondent had already decided to reject the request of the union to refer the concerned disputes for adjudication and thereafter he changed his opinion and made the references without hearing the petition-Corporation. Therefore the References are null and void. (2) That the References are made to the Labour Court for adjudications of these disputes but really speaking the retrenchment disputes should have been referred to the Industrial Tribunal rather than Labour Court. (3) In any view of the matter these proceeding3 cannot go on in view of the fact that the petitioner-Corporation is declared to be a relief undertaking under the provisions of the Bombay Relief undertakings (Special Provisions) Act 1955 and pursuant to which a Notification has been issued by the State of Gujarat in exercise of the powers conferred by sub-clause (iv) of clause (a) of subsec. (1) of Sec. 4 of the said Act. (4) The specified authority has already granted permission to retrench these concerned employees as per Sec. 25n (1) of the Industrial Disputes Act and that the Unions request to get it reviewed has also stood rejected as per the provisions of Sec. 25n (6) of the Industrial Disputes Act and consequently the References raising same disputes cannot survive as the said decision is final under Sec. 25n (5) of the Act. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ( 3 ) SO far as the first contention is concerned it is now well-settled that decision to refer or not to refer an industrial dispute is purely an administrative act that the only requirement of Sec. 10 (1) of the Industrial Disputes Act is that there must be some material before the Government which will enable the appropriate Government to form an opinion that an industrial dispute exists or is apprehended As this is an administrative fraction even though earlier a view is taken that there is no need to refer the dispute if the said dispute lingers on it can again be referred and there is no prohibition for the appropriate Government in making such a reference once again. If any decision were needed to support this conclusion it is furnished by the decision of the Supreme Court in M/s. Avon Services Production Agencies (P) Ltd. v Industrial Tribunal Haryana and Ors. AIR 1979 SC 170 . A similar question was examined by the Supreme Court in that decision speaking through D. A Desai J. and it was held that the Government does Dot lack the power to make the reference in respect of the same industrial dispute which it ones declined to refer. Nor is it necessary that the Government must have tome fresh material made available to it subsequent to its refusal to make a reference for the formation Of fresh opinion for making the reference. It is also observed therein that this is an administrative function of the Government as the expression is understood in contra-distinction to judicial or quasijudicial function. Merely because the Government rejects a request for a reference or declines to make a reference it cannot be said that the industrial dispute has ceased to exist nor could it be said to be a review of any judicial or quasi-Judicial order or determination. Merely because the Government rejects a request for a reference or declines to make a reference it cannot be said that the industrial dispute has ceased to exist nor could it be said to be a review of any judicial or quasi-Judicial order or determination. The industrial dispute may nonetheless continue to remain in existence and if at a subsequent stage the appropriate Government is satisfied that in the interest of industrial peace and for promoting industrial harmony it is desirable to make a reference the appropriate Government does not lack power to do so under Sec 10 for is it precluded from making the reference on the only ground that on an earlier occasion it had declined to make the reference. The expression at any time in Sec. 10 (1) will clearly negative the contention that once the Government declines to make a reference the power to make a reference under Sec. 10 (1) in respect of the same dispute gets exhausted. This authority is a complete answer to the first contention canvassed by the learned Counsel for the petitioner. No need to hear the petitioner-Corporation also would arise as it is purely an administrative function as contradistinguished from judicial or quasi judicial function. The first contention is therefore rejected. ( 4 ) SO far as the second contention is concerned the first proviso to Sec. 10 (1) of the Industrial Disputes Act become relevant for deciding the same. The first proviso to Sec. 10 (1) provides that where the dispute relates to any matter specified in the Third Schedule and is not likely to affect more than one hundred workmen the appropriate Government may if it so thinks fit make the reference to a Labour Court under clause (c ). Therefore even assuming that the matter is referred to in the Third Schedule the reference can be made to a Labour Court for resolving that dispute if it is not likely to effect more than one hundred workmen. On the facts of the present case therefore the requirements of this proviso are complied with and that is the reason why the dispute is referred to the Labour Court for adjudication. Consequently the second contention also has no substance and is rejected. .