JUDGMENT Bhawani Singh, J.—This appeal arises out of the judgment of District Judge, Una, in Hindu Marriage Petition No. 27 of 1985 decided on 23-4-1986. By this judgment, a petition by the respondent under section 13 (1-A) (ii) of the Hindu Marriage Act, 1955 (hereinafter referred to as "the Act") has been granted and a decree for dissolution of marriage by way of divorce has been passed in favour of the respondent-wife. The appellant has a grievance against this decision. Therefore, the same has been assailed by this appeal. 2. The brief facts are that the marriage between the parties took place somewhere in June, 1977 in village Bhadsali in District Una according to prevalent rites and ceremonies. The respondent remained with the petitioner for a short duration of 10 to 15 days and then left to live with her parents and thereafter there was no cohabitation between them. There is no issue out of this wedlock. 3. The respondent instituted a petition seeking dissolution of marriage on the ground of misrepresentation caused to her for the purpose of marriage On the other hand, a petition was also filed by the appellant under section 9 of the Hindu Marriage Act seeking restitution of conjugal rights. The petition moved by the wife was dismissed on 30-4-1983 whereas the other moved by the appellant was allowed and an order for restitution of conjugal rights was granted in favour of the appellant. 4. Through a petition under section 13 (1-A) (ii) of the Act, the respondent alleged that after the passing of the decree for restitution of conjugal rights in favour of the appellant, there has not been cohabitation between the parties for more than the statutory period nor there was any intention to resume the same. This petition was opposed by the appellant who pleaded that he took steps to resume cohabitation between the parties and it was the respondent who has intentionally disobeyed the decree for restitution of conjugal rights. It was thus pleaded that the petition deserved dismissal as the respondent was herself responsible for disobeying the same and could not take advantage of her own wrong as enjoined by section 23 (1) (a) of the Act. These submissions of the appellant were repelled by the District Judge and the prayer of the respondent was thus allowed compelling the appellant to move this Court by way of this appeal. 5. These submissions of the appellant were repelled by the District Judge and the prayer of the respondent was thus allowed compelling the appellant to move this Court by way of this appeal. 5. It has been contended by Miss. Kamlesh Sharma, learned Counsel for the appellant, that the decision of the District Judge under appeal is absolutely wrong and deserves to be set-aside. Elaborating her submissions, it has been urged that the respondent could not take benefit of her own wrong by not complying with the decree of restitution of conjugal rights granted by the Court in favour of the appellant although number of serious efforts were made by the appellant to resume cohabitation between the parties. 6. I am not impressed by these submissions as the argument being set-up by the appellant is squarely covered by the decision of the Supreme Court in AIR 1977 SC 2218, Dharmendra Kumar v. Usha Kumar, wherein A.C. Gupta, J., speaking for the Court, said in paras 3 and 4 as under : "3. Section 13 (1-A) (ii) of the Hindu Marriage Act, 1955 allows either party to a marriage to present a petition for the dissolution of the marriage by a decree of divorce on the ground that there has been no restitution of conjugal rights as between the parties to the marriage for the period specified in the provision after the passing of the decree for restitution of conjugal rights. Sub-section (1-A) was introduced in section 13 by section 2 of the Hindu Marriage (Amendment) Act, 1964 (44 of 1964). Section 13 as it stood before the 1964 amendment permitted only the spouse who had obtained the decree for restitution of conjugal rights to apply for relief by way of divorce ; the party against whom the decree was passed was not given that right. The grounds for granting relief under section 13 including sub-section (1-A) however continue to be subject to the provisions of section 23 of the Act. We have quoted about the part of section 23 relevant for the present purpose. It is ^contended by the appellant that the allegation made in his written statement that the conduct of the petitioner in not responding to his invitations to live with him meant that she was trying to take advantage of her own wrong for the purpose of relief under section 13 (1-A) (ii). It is ^contended by the appellant that the allegation made in his written statement that the conduct of the petitioner in not responding to his invitations to live with him meant that she was trying to take advantage of her own wrong for the purpose of relief under section 13 (1-A) (ii). On the admitted facts, the petitioner was undoubtedly entitled to ask for a decree of divorce. Would the allegation, if true, that she did not respond to her husbands invitation to come and live with him disentitle her to the relief? We do not find it possible to hold that it would. In Ram Kalis case, ILR (1971) 1 Delhi 6, (supra) a Full Bench of the Delhi High Court held that mere non-compliance with the decree for restitution does not constitute a wrong within the meaning of section 23 (1) (a). Relying on and explaining this decision in the later case of Gajna Devi v. Purshotam Giri, AIR 1977 Delhi 178, (supra) a learned Judge of the same High Court observed : (at p. 182 para 12). "Section 23 existed in the statute book prior to the insertion of section 13 (1-A).........Had Parliament intended that a party which is guilty of a matrimonial offence and against which a decree for judicial separation or restitution of conjugal rights had been passed, was in view of section 23 of the Act, not entitled to obtain divorce then it would have inserted an exception to section 13 (1-A) and with such exception, the provision of section 13 (1-A) would practically become redundant as the guilty party could never reap benefit of obtaining divorce, while the innocent party was entitled to obtain it even under the statute as it was before the amendment. Section 23 of the Act, therefore, cannot be construed so as to make the effect of amendment of the law by insertion of section 13 (1-A) nugatory. Section 23 of the Act, therefore, cannot be construed so as to make the effect of amendment of the law by insertion of section 13 (1-A) nugatory. ..........the expression "petitioner is not in any way taking advantage of his or her own wrong" occurring in clause (a) of section 23 (1) of the Act does not apply to taking advantage of the statutory right to obtain dissolution of marriage which has been conferred on him by section 13 (1-A).........In such a case, a party is not taking advantage of his own wrong, but of the legal right following upon of the passing of the decree and the failure of the parties to comply with the decree......" In our opinion the law has been stated correctly in Ram Kali v. Gopal Das, supra, and Gajna Devi v. Purshotam Giri, AIR 1977 Delhi 178 (supra). Therefore, it would not be very reasonable to think that the relief which is available to the spouse against whom a decree for restitution has been passed, should be denied to the one who does not insist on compliance with the decree passed in his or her favour. In order to be a wrong within the meaning of section 23 (1) (a), the conduct alleged has to be something more than a mere disinclination to agree to an offer of reunion, it must be misconduct serious enough to justify denial of the relief to which the husband or the wife is otherwise entitled. 4. Sin the case before us the only allegation made in the written statement is that the petitioner refused to receive or reply to the letters written by the appellant and did not respond to his other attempts to make her agree to live with him. This allegation, even if true, does not amount to misconduct grave enough to disentitle the petitioner to the relief she has asked for. The appeal is therefore dismissed but without any order as to costs." 7. The same view has been taken in AIR 1984 SC 1562, Smt. Saroj Rani v. Sudarshan Kumar Chadha, AIR 1977 P&H 167 (Full Bench), Smt. Bimla Devi d/o Bakhtawar Singh v. Singh Raj s/o Dasondhi Ram and AIR 1978 Guj 74, Anil Jayantilal Vyas v. Sudhaben. 8. In view of these decisions, setting at rest the point raised by the appellant, I see no substance in the submissions of the appellant. 9. 8. In view of these decisions, setting at rest the point raised by the appellant, I see no substance in the submissions of the appellant. 9. The result, therefore, is that there is no merit in this appeal and the same is accordingly dismissed. I leave the parties to bear their own costs, Appeal dismissed.