Judgment :- Bhat J. Accused in Sessions Case No. 98 of 1985 of the Sessions Court, Trivandrum, convicted under Ss.302 and 3241.P.C. and sentenced to undergo imprisonment for life and R.1. for three years respectively, the sentences having been directed to run concurrently, is the appellant herein. 2. Prosecution case can be summarised as follows: P. W.2 is the widow and P. W.o the son of now deceased Krishnan. Appellant is the son of P. W.2's elder brother. P.W.7 is the brother of the appellant. Their father had six cents of land in Athiyannoor desom. On his death appellant was in possession of the eastern three cents and P.W.7 the western three cents. P.W.7 borrowed money from Krishnan and mortgaged the western three cents to him. Krishnan constructed a but there and started residing there with his wife and children. Appellant resented this and wanted Krishnan to surrender the property to him which the latter was unwilling to do. This led to ill-feeling between them. 3. Krishnan wanted to extend his building and decided to construct a basement for the extension. On 5-3-1985 when the appellant and his wife were away from their house, with the help of labourers, P. W.3, Gopalan, Reghu and others he constructed abasement and the work was over by 2-15p.m. Labourers left the place.?. W.3 returned from his own house at 6 p.m. to collect wages and was chatting with Krishnan in the courtyard. P. W.2, P.W.6 and-younger son of P. W.2 were sitting in the veranda. P.W.2's mother was inside the house. At about o-30 p.m. appellant returned home and saw the newly constructed basement. Asking who constructed the basement, he stamped on a part of the basement and destroyed it inspite of the remonstrances of Krishnan. Appellant said (I will put an end to your desire for construction) and ran towards Krishnan, who was standing in the courtyard, and stabbed him repeatedly with M.O.1 knife. Krishnan received three stab injuries on his left arm when he tried to ward off. He jumped into the paddy field in front of the house. Appellant followed him and again stabbed him repeatedly. P. W.2 rushed to the place and tried to interfere asking the appellant to desist. Appellant stabbed her on her back. He again stabbed Krishnan on his abdomen and then ran away with the weapon. He jumped into the paddy field in front of the house. Appellant followed him and again stabbed him repeatedly. P. W.2 rushed to the place and tried to interfere asking the appellant to desist. Appellant stabbed her on her back. He again stabbed Krishnan on his abdomen and then ran away with the weapon. P. W.2 led Krishnan back to their courtyard and made him sit under an arecanut tree. Krishnan died. P. W.2 was taken to Medical College Hospital, Trivandrum, where the doctor P. W.8 admitted her at 1 A.M. (o-3-1985) and after treating her discharged her. 4. Viswanathan, a relation of Krishnan, who heard about the occurrence proceeded to the scene, went to the house of P.W.I and informed him about the occurrence and both of them came to the scene. P. W.I gathered details of the occurrence and went to Neyyattinkara police station and at 7-30a.m. gave Ext.P1 information on the basis of which S.I. of Police, P.W.11 registered a case against the appellant. P.W.12, C.I. of Police, took over investigation. He conducted inquest over the dead body, questioned P. Ws. 3 and 6 during inquest, seized bloodstained soil from the courtyard and paddy field and prepared Ext. P8 inquest report. By that time P. W.2 returned from the hospital and was questioned. Post-mortem was conducted by P.W.4. On 12-5-1985 at 8-15 p.m. P.W.12 arrested the appellant at Vazhimukku and recorded his statement. Appellant stated that he had hidden the knife among leaves of the coconut plant standing in about the middle of Sadasiva Panicker's compound near his house and will show it if taken there. Accordingly M.O.I was seized as pointed out by the appellant under Ext. P12 mahazar attested by P.W.S. Material objects were sent for chemical examination. After completing investigation P.W.12 laid final report. 5. Appellant when questioned by the Sessions Court denied that there was any enmity between him and Krishnan. He denied having asked Krishnan to surrender the land. He was not present at the scene, Seven days prior to the occurrence he had gone for work in a lime kiln near Thiruvalla Railway Station. When he left the house he had given Rs. 200/- to his wife and therefore he did not send her money or letters. On 10-5-1985 he returned home. His wife told him about Krishnan's death and asked him to go to Neyyattinkara police station. When he left the house he had given Rs. 200/- to his wife and therefore he did not send her money or letters. On 10-5-1985 he returned home. His wife told him about Krishnan's death and asked him to go to Neyyattinkara police station. Next day at about 6 a.m. when he was about to leave for the police station, police came to his house and arrested him and took him to the police station. He was not taken to any place other than to court. Krishnan had arrack business. Appellant had asked P. W.3 and others not to come there for drinking. Krishnan used to quarrel with others who came to drink. Appellant had married a Nair lady which was resented by his people who advised him to give up his wife and child. The Sessions Court however accepted the prosecution case as proved and convicted and sentenced the appellant as indicated above. 6. There is no doubt that on the evening of 5-3-1985 Krishnan sustained fatal injuries and succumbed to the same. P.W.4, who conducted autopsy over the body and issued Ext. P2 certificate, deposed that there were sixteen ante-mortem external injuries on the body. Injuries 1 and 2 were gaping incised injuries on the left upper arm. Injuries o,8 and 13 to 16 were incised injuries on the right palm, left side of the chest, abdomen, left hip, right side of chest and left shoulder blade. Injuries 7 and 12 were penetrating injuries on the right side of chest and abdomen. Injuries 3 to 5,9 and 11 were lacerated injuries on the left upper arm, left forearm, back of left forearm, right abdomen and front of sternum. Injury No. 10 was an abrasion on the left side of abdomen. Corresponding to penetrating injury No. 7 on the chest anterior margin of the left lung and the margin of the left ventricle were pierced. Corresponding to injury No. 12 peritoneum was pierced and the intestines protruded. The other vital organs were pale. Pleural cavity contained clotted blood. Left chamber of the heart was empty. P.W.4 deposed in chief examination that all the injuries could have been caused with a weapon like M.0.1, that each of injuries Nos.7 and 8 was necessarily fatal. Corresponding to injury No. 12 peritoneum was pierced and the intestines protruded. The other vital organs were pale. Pleural cavity contained clotted blood. Left chamber of the heart was empty. P.W.4 deposed in chief examination that all the injuries could have been caused with a weapon like M.0.1, that each of injuries Nos.7 and 8 was necessarily fatal. In cross-examination he deposed that the incised injuries were superficial, that lacerated injuries, injury Nos.9 and 11, could not be caused by sharp edged weapon, that chances are remote for lacerated injuries being caused by sharp edged weapon. In re-examination he stated that it was possible that all these injuries could be caused with the same weapon. 7. P.W.8, who examined and treated P.W.2 and issued Ext. P-4 certificate, deposed that P. W,2 had two lacerated wounds, one over the back of chest and the other on the anterior aspect of the left forearm and these injuries could be caused by stabbing with weapon like M.O.1. In cross-examination he asserted that the lacerated injuries could be caused by sharp edged weapon. 8. In proof of the guilt of the appellant prosecution relied on (a) mthe evidence regarding motive provided by P. Ws. 2, 6 and 7, (b) evidence regarding occurrence given byP.Ws.2,3 and o, (c) evidence regarding recovery of M.O.1 given by P.Ws.5 and 12 and the chemical examination certificate, and (d) medical evidence. 9. P. W.7 is the twin brother of the appellant. P. W.2 is his aunt. He deposed .that he and his brother had six cents of land which they orally divided into two plots of three cents. Appellant took eastern portion and put up a house and started residing there and the witness took the western portion. He gave his portion of land to Krishnan borrowing Rs. 700/- and Krishnan started residing there. Krishnan had executed promissory note for Rs. 700 in favour of the witness and the appellant. He deposed that on two or three occasions Krishnan tried to put up a basement after putting up the house. They are Nadars and the appellant had married a Nair lady. P. W.2 deposed that appellant asked Krishnan to release there cents of land to him which Krishnan refused to do. Krishnan put up a basement to extend the house and that was on the day of occurrence when the appellant was not present in his house. They are Nadars and the appellant had married a Nair lady. P. W.2 deposed that appellant asked Krishnan to release there cents of land to him which Krishnan refused to do. Krishnan put up a basement to extend the house and that was on the day of occurrence when the appellant was not present in his house. Krishnan had earlier attempted to put up a basement. But that "was objected to by the appellant. P. W.o also more or less corroborated this version. These facts find a place in the F.L statement given by P.W.I, though P.W.I did not speak to those facts specifically. We find no reason to disbelieve the above evidence which would show that the appellant resented Krishnan being put up in possession of three cents of land and Krishnan constructed a house and residing there and trying to extend the house. 10. P. Ws. 2,3 and 6 deposed to the occurrence. At that time P. Ws. 2 and 6 were sitting in the veranda. P.W.3 was talking to Krishnan in the courtyard. P. W.3 who was one of the labourers engaged in constructing the basement, finished the work by 2.15 p.m. and left the place. He returned at 6 p.m. to collect wages and was taking to Krishnan. According to this witness at about o-30 p.m. appellant came there, destroyed the basement and approached Krishnan saying that his desire for construction would be finished. Appellant stabbed Krishnan repeatedly. The stabs were attempted to be warded off by Krishnan, but he received stab injuries on his left hand. He jumped into the paddy field followed by the appellant who again repeatedly stabbed him on his back, neck and other parts of the body. When P. W.2 ran up to interfere appellant stabbed her on the back. Appellant again stabbed Krishnan on his abdomen and the intestine came out and he ran away with the weapon. This is the uniform version given by these three witnesses. 11. none of the eye witnesses or neighbours reported the matter to the police. P. W.I is the brother of Krishnan. He lives at Vellanad 20 kms. away from the scene. At about 5 a.m. on o-3-1985 Viswanathan, P. W. 1's sister's brother-in-law went to the house of P. W.1 and informed him about the occurrence. Both of them went to the scene. P. W.I is the brother of Krishnan. He lives at Vellanad 20 kms. away from the scene. At about 5 a.m. on o-3-1985 Viswanathan, P. W. 1's sister's brother-in-law went to the house of P. W.1 and informed him about the occurrence. Both of them went to the scene. P. W.1 talked to P. W.2, P. W.o and others and then went to the house of Krishnan's sister and then to the police station. Ext. P1 shows that the F.I. statement was given at 7-30 a.m. P.W.I deposed that he reached station at 9 or 9-30 a.m. He might have committed a mistake in mentioning the time. Ext. P1 gives essential facts of the occurrence and motive. P. W.2 deposed that she was first taken to Government Hospital, Neyyattinkara and since the doctor said that she should be taken to Medical College Hospital she was taken there. She was seen by P.W.8 at 1 a.m. P. W.8 deposed that he sent intimation to the Medical College Police Station. It is in evidence that P. W.1 reached her house even by 1 p.m. This will show that she did not remain in the hospital for long. Learned counsel for the appellant would argue that Ext. P1 is a delayed document. 12. The evidence would show that the only inmates of the house of Krishnan were his wife P. W.2 and two sons. P.W.2 was injured and was taken to the hospital. P. W.8 deposed that when he talked to her he found her words were not clear. P.W.6 is a young boy. He deposed that he was asked to go to the police but did not go to the police station. It was late in the evening. P.W.3 is only a labourer unconcerned with these affairs. After the occurrence he went home and came back when summoned by P. W. 12. By that time neighbours and others came. Relations who reached the scene instead of informing the police informed P.W.I. This was the reason for the delay in lodging the information. We do not think any adverse inference can be drawn from these circumstances. It is argued that name of the house and place given in Ext. P4 wound certificate are not correct. That may be because the words uttered by P. W.2 before P. W.8 were not clear as is seen from the evidence of p.w.8. 13. We do not think any adverse inference can be drawn from these circumstances. It is argued that name of the house and place given in Ext. P4 wound certificate are not correct. That may be because the words uttered by P. W.2 before P. W.8 were not clear as is seen from the evidence of p.w.8. 13. There is also the evidence of P. W.12 that information was received in the Neyyattinkara police station from Medical College police station about the admission of P.W.2 in the hospital and the latter was informed that a case had been registered at Neyyattinkara police station. That must be the reason for the Medical College police not to take any action. We find nothing suspicious in this state of affairs. 14. Learned counsel for the appellant argued that the evidence of P. Ws. 2 and 6 is interested and the conduct of the three eye witnesses is unnatural P. Ws. 2 and 6 are the widow and the young son of Krishnan. On that ground alone their evidence cannot be brushed aside. We do not agree that their conduct was so unnatural as to cast doubt on their evidence or veracity. Krishnan was attacked first in the courtyard and none interfered at that stage. All of the eye witnesses would have been shocked by the sudden attack on Krishnan. Krishnan jumped to the paddy field followed by the appellant and at that stage tried to interfere and was injured. P.W.6 is only a young boy aged 13 years. He also would have been stunned. The occurrence would not have lasted long to enable P.W.3 to collect his wits and take any action. P. Ws.3 and 6 were questioned during inquest and P.W.2 was questioned immediately after she returned from the hospital. We do not think these persons had any occasion to confabulate and introduce a false story. It also appears improbable and that a false story was cooked up by the relations of Krishnan to implicate an innocent person so as to allow the guilty person to escape. The argument that P.W.3 is only a chance witness also does not impress us. We find no infirmity in the testimony of these witnesses. 15. Learned counsel, for the appellant contended that the injuries on Krishnan and P.W.2 are not consistent with the prosecution version of the occurrence. The argument that P.W.3 is only a chance witness also does not impress us. We find no infirmity in the testimony of these witnesses. 15. Learned counsel, for the appellant contended that the injuries on Krishnan and P.W.2 are not consistent with the prosecution version of the occurrence. According to the eye witnesses only M.O.1 knife was used against the two injured persons. Krishnan had two penetrating stab injuries and six incised injuries, two incised gaping injuries, five lacerations and an abrasion. The penetrating and incised injuries could certainly have been caused by a weapon like M.O.I. The lacerated injuries are minor injuries. P.W.4 deposed in chief-examination that these injuries also could have been caused with a weapon like M.O.I. In cross-examination he expressed a doubt regarding two of the lacerated injuries, namely, injuries Nos.9 and 11. Once again in re-examination he stated that these injuries could have been caused with the same weapon. We have examined M.0.1 knife. The blade has two sharp edges except at the bottom. Below the blade is a thick ring like structure above the handle. Forceful contact with the handle in the course of stabbing could certainly cause lacerated injuries. The abrasion is too minor to call for comment. We do not agree that the medical evidence is inconsistent with the prosecution version of the injuries on Krishnan. P.W.2 had only two lacerations. It is the definite evidence of P. W.8 that these injuries could have been caused with a weapon like M.O.I and he was not even cross-examined in that regard. Forceful contact with the other parts of the knife could certainly explain these injuries. We do not agree that there is any irrecoconcilable inconsistency between medical evidence and ocular evidence. 16. P. W.12 deposed that he arrested the appellant at 8.15 p.m. on 12-5-1985 and recorded his statement. Appellant stated that he had hidden the knife underneath the leaves of a coconut plant situated in about the middle of Sadasiva Panicker's compound near his house and will show it if taken there. Next day appellant was taken there and he took M.0.1 from underneath the second leaf of a coconut plant and that was seized under Ext. P3. This evidence was fully corroborated by an independent witness, P. W.S. P.W.5 is not an immediate neighbour, but is a person of the locality. Nothing has been suggested against him by the prosecution. Next day appellant was taken there and he took M.0.1 from underneath the second leaf of a coconut plant and that was seized under Ext. P3. This evidence was fully corroborated by an independent witness, P. W.S. P.W.5 is not an immediate neighbour, but is a person of the locality. Nothing has been suggested against him by the prosecution. We find no reason to disbelieve this witness. Chemical examination showed that M.O.I had stains of human blood. M.O.I has been identified by the eye witnesses as the weapon used by the appellant. 17. Learned counsel for the appellant contended that M.O.I knife was recovered from an "open space" and relied on the decision of Anna Chandy, J. in State of Kerala v. Joseph (1963 KLT 992) to argue that an inference that appellant kept the knife at the place cannot be drawn. In that case second accused told the police about the location of hidden explosives and accompanied the police to a quarry and unearthed explosives from where they were kept. One of the charges related to the offence under S.5(3)(b) read with S.12 of the Indian Explosives Act. There was evidence to suggest that the hiding place of the explosives was known to the police before the arrest of the second accused. The attestors to the seizure mahazar were also disbelieved. Prior to the recovery the accused had refused to confess before the magistrate. In these circumstances, naturally-no inference against the accused could have been drawn on the basis of the recovery. However, relying on the decisions in Public Prosecutor v. Pakkiriswami (AIR 1929 Mad. 846) and Amrik Singh v. Emperor (AIR 1931 Lah. 50) Anna Chandy, J. took the view that "The circumstance that the quarry is an open space accessible to all and sundry also minimises the evidentiary value of the recovery nor is this a case in which the articles could be said to have been concealed". (emphasis supplied) The articles in question were not regarded as concealed because they were not really underground and it appears that only hands and legs had been used to spread sand to a height of 2 inches over the articles. It was held to be a case of articles being found in an open and unconcealed place; it was not regarded as a case of articles being concealed in an open space. It was held to be a case of articles being found in an open and unconcealed place; it was not regarded as a case of articles being concealed in an open space. The decision is not an authority for the position that no significance can be attached to recovery from place of concealment in an open space. With great respect we do not think the observation quoted above correctly reflects the legal position. 18. S.27 of the Evidence Act states that when any fact is deposed to as discovered in consequence of information received from a person accused of any offence, in the custody of a police officer, so much of such information, whether it amounts to confession or not, as relates distinctly to the fact thereby discovered, may be proved. The ban imposed by Ss.25 and 26 of the Evidence Act is to a Imited extent lifted for a limited purpose by S.27, subject of course to conditions imposed therein. See P.Kottaya v. Emperor (AIR 11947 PC 67), Udai Bhan v. State of UP. (AIR 1962 SC 1116), Delhi Administration v. Balakrishnan and others (AIR 1972 SC. 3) and Mohammed Inayat-ullah v., State of Maharashtra (AIR 1916 SC.453).in Aghnoo Nagesia v. State of Bihar (AIR 1966 SC. 119) there is an observation that S.27 is in the nature of a proviso and partially lifts the ban imposed by Ss.24, 25 and 26. The three ingredients of S.27 are (a) information given by the accused must lead to the fact which is the direct outcome of such information, (b) only such portion of the information given as is distinctly connected with the said recovery is admisible against the accused and (c) the discovery of the fact must relate to the commission of some offence. Apparently the provision is based on the view that if such a fact is discovered in consequence of the information given, some guarantee is afforded thereby that the information was true and accordingly can be safely allowed to be given in evidence. See Ramakishan Mithanlal Sharma v. State of Bombay (AIR 1955 SC. 104). 19. Apparently the provision is based on the view that if such a fact is discovered in consequence of the information given, some guarantee is afforded thereby that the information was true and accordingly can be safely allowed to be given in evidence. See Ramakishan Mithanlal Sharma v. State of Bombay (AIR 1955 SC. 104). 19. In Kottaya's case (AIR 1947 P.C.67) Privy Council observed: "It is fallacious to treat the "fact discovered" within the section as equivalent to the object produced; the fact discoverd embraces the place from which the object is produced and the knowledge Of the accused as to this, and the information given must relate distinctly to this fact. Information as to past user, or the past history, of the object produced is not related to its discovery in the setting in which it is discovered." (emphasis supplied) Dealing with the example of recovery of a knife concealed in the room of accused's house on the information supplied by him, Privy Council observed: "Information supplied does not lead to the discovery of a knife; knives were discovered many years ago. It leads to the discovery of the fact that a knife is concealed in the house of the informant to his knowledge, and if the knife is proved to have been used in the commission of the offence, the fact discovered is very relevant." (emphasis supplied) The law as explained in Kottaya's case (AIR 1947 P.C. 67) has been afffirmed by the Supreme Court in a catena of decisions. See Udai Bhan v. State of U.P. (AIR 1962 S.C.1116), JafferHusain Dastagir v. State of Maharashtra (AIR 1970 S.C.1934) and State of U.P. v.Jageshwar and others(AIR 1983 S.C. 349). See also Pohalya MotyaValvi v. State of Maharashtra (AIR 1979 S. C.1949), Mohammed Inayatullah v. State of Maharashtra (AIR 1976 S.C.483 and Mohanlal and another v. Ajitsingh & another (AIR 1978 SC. 1183). 20. The bald argument that revovery of the subject matter of the crime (as in the case of stolen articles in the case of theft or dead body in a murder case) or an incriminating object (weapon used in a crime, clothes of the deceased etc.) from an open space or place cannot lead to an infearence against the accused under any circumstances is not acceptable. In this connection it would be necessary to refer to some of the decisions placed before us. In this connection it would be necessary to refer to some of the decisions placed before us. In Public Prosecutor v. Pakkiriswami and another (AIR 1929 Madras 846) the accused indicated a tank from which stolen articles were recovered. Information and the discovery being the only evidence against him. The tank was not in in his possession nor in his exclusive control; it was accessible to the general public. The court thought that the accused might very well have received information about the location of the jewellery. Evidently accused in giving information did not state that he had kept the articles there. The court held that the evidence was not sufficient for conviction. Similar is the position regarding AmrikSingh v. Emperor (AIR 1931 Lahore 50). In ML Jamunia Partap Lohar v. Emperor (AIR 1936 Nagpur 200) ornaments of a girl buried in the field of accused's brother were recovered at the instance of the accused. His statement was also proved. The burial was half cubic feet deep. Accused herself dug up the soil in the open space accessible to anyone. The evidence admissible under S.27 of the Act was taken along with the other evidence and conviction upheld. The Division Bench of the Nagpur High Court observed: "The question is not so much whether the accused was in physical possession of the ornaments buried in the field, though, as a matter of fact, a person who buries treasure in a spot unknown to others is really in possession of it whether it is in a field or in his own house. The important point is rather that the circumstances and the conduct of the accused point clearly to her knowledge of the exact spot where the ornaments were, and in the absence of any explanation, the reasonable inference is that she put them there herself." 21. This aspect has been elaborately discussed by Munir, J. of the Lahore High Count in Sher Mohammed v. Emperor (46 Cr1.LJ. 407) which related to a case under Ss.302 and 2011.P.C. Accused took the police to the cave and pointed out the place where the body of the murdered person lay. This aspect has been elaborately discussed by Munir, J. of the Lahore High Count in Sher Mohammed v. Emperor (46 Cr1.LJ. 407) which related to a case under Ss.302 and 2011.P.C. Accused took the police to the cave and pointed out the place where the body of the murdered person lay. The learned judge observed: "In an ordinary case the hypotheses that are possible are (i) that the accused saw someone bury the article there; (ii) that someone told the accused that the article lay buried in that place; and (iii) that the accused himself alone or with others buried the article there. The third hypothesis is undoubtedly the most natural and prominent in such a case and if the other two hypotheses are excluded or are not reasonably possible, I do not see why the court should not hold the third hypothesis proved. In determining which of these three possible hypotheses is more probable and presents such a degree of certainty that the court like a reasonable man ought to act upon the assumption of its existence, the court shall have to consider a variety of circumstances. The court must have regard to the situation of the place where the article was buried, the accsed's relationship with the person suspected and the explanation, if any, given by the accused of his knowledge of the place the nature of the property and the topography of the place where the property is buried is of paramount importance. If the place from where the article is recovered is visible and accessible to the public and the article is not found buried underground, the hypothesis that the accused might merely have seen the article in the place where it lay without his having himself put it there, is reasonably possible. But where the article has been buried underground it is, in my humble opinion, incorect to attach any importance to the question whether the place is owned by the accused or someone else. A person who has stolen property may bury it in another man's land as safely as he may bury it in his own, unless the land is in such active possession and occupation of the person who owns it that it is impossible or difficult for the thief to bury it there without the knowledge of the owner. A person who has stolen property may bury it in another man's land as safely as he may bury it in his own, unless the land is in such active possession and occupation of the person who owns it that it is impossible or difficult for the thief to bury it there without the knowledge of the owner. If a man may be convicted where stolen property is dug out from a man's own field or an accessible portion of his house. do not see why the result should be different merely because the place where the property is buried is in the field of his neighbour or in a vacant space just outside his house, assuming always that he pointed out the place where the property lay buried, gives no explanation of his knowledge of the place, and in the evidence there is no foundation for the hypothesis that he might have seen someone against whom even at the risk of losing his freedom he does not wish to speak. I, therefore, venture to think that the stress which has been laid by the authorities on the question who owns the land as distinguished from the question in whose possession is the land from where stolen property is recovered, is an emphasis on an immaterial circumstance. Such cases do not, in my opinion, differ from those where property is recovered from a jungle, waste, river-bed, pond or cave." We appreciate the logic of the above reasoning, though it is unnecessary for us to say if we agree with every facet of the reasoning. 22. In Trimbak v. State of M.P. (AIR 1954 SC 39) the charge against the accused was under S.4111.P.C. The stolen jewellory was taken out by the accused from the field belonging to another and accessible to others. The accused gave no explanation for his knowledge of the hiding place. The court held that the field from which jewels were recovered was an open place and accessible to all and sundry and it was difficult to hold positively that the accused was in possession of the jewels and the fact of recovery was compatible with the accused merely obtaining knowledge about their whereabouts and hence the fact of discovery cannot be regarded as conclusive proof that the accused was in possesion of the jewels. It is important to note that the jewels were subject matter of the theft and the charge involved possession of stolen articles. What was held against was the collusiveness of the fact of recovery as proof against accused. The Supreme Court did not consider a case where possession was not the crux of the offence and whether in such a case the fact of recovery would be an incriminating circumstance against the accused. The reported judgment does not show that the jewels were concealed or hidden or buried. In Balbir Singh v. State of Punjab (AIR 1957 SC.216) the charge was under Ss.302 and 457 I.P.C. The statement of the accused was to the effect that he had buried the gold ear rings of the deceased near a pipal tree and they were actually recovered from the place pointed out by him. The Supreme Court agreed with the High Court in holding that the fact of recovery was a circumstance which connected the accused with the crime. 23. In In on the subject of Murugam alias Thannasi (AIR 1958 Mad.451) the accused took the police to a place in front of his house^ and pointed out the spot from where a pot with fermented wash was dug out. It was a wide open place. The court held that the circumstance incriminated the accused. Ramaswami, J. who decided the case observed that the accused had all the wide open space of the village to secrete the pot with the fermented wash apart from other imaginable places where such secretion could be made and the police might even spend weeks without being able to spot out this secret hiding place. Ordinarily exclusive possesion cannot be brought home to an accused if property is discovered in open places equally accessible to members of the public. But if the property is found to be so hidden away that no ordinary member of the public could know of its existence there, the fact that it is on that particular person's information and pointing out unaccompanied by any explanation of innocent knowledge the incriminating article was discovered would lead to the presump'tion that he was the person who secreted it there. In Vijayakumar and another v. State of Himachal Pradesh (1978 Crl.L.J.1619) a Division Bench of the Himachal Pradesh High Court took the view that concealed articles were obviously within the exclusive knowledge of the person who had secreted them. They were not found lying within the sight of everybody and therefore the fact they were concealed at a place which was open is not sufficient to discard the evidence of discovery as of no use. 24. In Mohammed Inayattullah's case (AIR 1976 SC 483) three drums stolen from a shop were recovered as pointed out by the accused. He did not tell the police that he had kept the drums there. They were recovered from the compound of a Travellers Bungalow. They were not lying concealed. The compound was not under the control of the accused and was accessible to all. The court held that the inference under S.114 illustration (a) could not be raised as the accused as well have acquired knowledge of the drums lying at the particular place. In Abdul Sattar v. Union Territory, Chandigarh (AIR 1986 SC 1438) the Supreme Court did not attach importance to recovery from public place very much accessible to local people. The judgment does not indicate if the article in question had been concealed and if so in that manner. The judgment also does not indicate that the accused told the police that he had kept the article at the particular place. 25. What then is the correct position of law? What S.27 renders admissible is "information" received from an accused person in police custody provided the information leads to "discovery of a fact"' whether or not, the information amounts to confession. Ordinarily in property offences the information may amount to confession. However, in there cases it may not amount to confession though it will constitute an incriminating circumstance or link in the chain. Discovery provides guarantee of the truth of the information given by the accused. If the evidence is trustworthy, the information can be acted upon either as material proof of the guilt of the accused or as an incriminating circumstance or link. Discovery involves not so much the discovery of an object, though that also is necessary; it involves discovery of the place from where the object is produced or found and the knowledge of the accused as to this. Discovery involves not so much the discovery of an object, though that also is necessary; it involves discovery of the place from where the object is produced or found and the knowledge of the accused as to this. If the accused had given information that he had placed, hidden, secreted or buried the object which has nexus with the crime at a particular place (or given to a particular person) and on the basis of the information, the object is found at the particular place (or from the particular person) the information itself can be accepted as proof that it was the accused who placed the object at the particular place or gave it to the particular person. If the information does not indicate that it was the accused who placed the object at the particular place or if that information given by the accused is not brought in evidence and the proved information is only that the object is at a particular place, what is the inference to be drawn? Accused in such cases undoubtedly has knowledge of the location of the object. Whether the further inference that he himself had placed the object at the particular place would depend upon the nature of the object, accessibility of the place where it is kept, whether it is concealed or not, manner of concealment, whether the accused has an explanation for his knowledge, nature o f the explanation, probability or otherwise of the accused concealing it at the place and other evidence and circumstances of the case. That the place of recovery is an open space or place or belongs to someone other than the accused, has not much relevance unless the object be found at a spot and in such manner that it is exposed to public gaze or sight of others. An'accused can conceal an object in his own house or land or in another person's property or in a public space or open space accessible to all. What is significant in such cases is that is is concealed. What is concealed in open space is nevertheless concealed. If it is found concealed, in the absence of other circumstances and reasonable explanation on the part of the accused, he must be taken to have concealed it there. 26. What is significant in such cases is that is is concealed. What is concealed in open space is nevertheless concealed. If it is found concealed, in the absence of other circumstances and reasonable explanation on the part of the accused, he must be taken to have concealed it there. 26. M.O.1 knife in this case was found in the compound of another person, possibly an open place; but it was concealed under coconut leaf. There is nothing to indicate that it was visible to public gaze or sight of others who would go to the compound. Accused gave information that he had concealed it there. The evidence, as we have indicated, is trustworthy and can be accepted. This circumstance adds to the weight of evidence against the appellant. 27. We find that the learned Sessions judge was justified in acting on the above evidence to hold that the appellant inflicted the injuries and caused death of Krishnan and caused simple hurt to P.W.2. 28. Learned counsel for the appellant would contend that offence in regard to the death of Krishnan could at best be one punishable under S.3261.P.C We are unable to agree with this argument. Two of the injuries on Krishnan were penetrating injuries affecting vital organs. Medical evidence shows that each of the injuries was necessarily fatal. Weapon use dis certainly a deadly weapon. These two injuries were inflicted on vital parts of the body. The evidence and circumstances of the case would justify the conclusion that these injuries were intended to be inflicted. The act of the appellant in that behalf would certainly attract "thirdly" of S.300 I.P.C. punishable under S.302 I.P.C. According to learned counsel for the appellant, facts of the case, would attract exception No. 4 to S.300 I.P.C. In order to attract this exception, the act must be committed without premeditation in a sudden fight in the heat of passion upon a sudden quarrel and without the offender having taken undue advantage or acted in a cruel or unusual manner. There was no sudden quarrel or sudden fight which could have given rise to heat of passion. Appellant had no justification to find fault with the construction of basement by Krishnan. Appellant has no case that Krishnan encroached into his land. He wielded the weapon repeatedly in order to cause so many injuries. We are unable to agree that exception No. 4 is attracted. Appellant had no justification to find fault with the construction of basement by Krishnan. Appellant has no case that Krishnan encroached into his land. He wielded the weapon repeatedly in order to cause so many injuries. We are unable to agree that exception No. 4 is attracted. Undoubtedly he committed an offence punishable under S.324 in causing simple hurt to P.W.2., We find no reason to interfere with the conviction or sentence entered against the appellant. The appeal is dismissed.