JUDGMENT M. S. Mukherjee, J—This is a second revenue revision petition directed against the order dated 6-9-1988, passed by the Commissioner, Simla Division in revenue revision No. 2/1988, titled as Sh. Chet Ram v. State of H. P By virtue of the impugned order, the learned Commissioner rejected the revision on the ground that the order of the Revenue Officers below i. e. Assistant Collector I Grade/Collector, Rampur do not suffer from any infirmity and the petitioner could not point out any material illegality or irregularity in it. 2. Briefly stated, the case of the petitioner is that the petitioner encroached upon Government land comprised in Khasra No. 4043/4043/ 2938/1778/1 situated in Village Parali, Tehsil Kumarsain by having installed a Saw-Mill thereon. The circle Patwari reported this fact to the Assistant Collector on 1-6-1987. Upon the report of the Patwari, the Assistant Collector II Grade, Kumarsain initiated proceedings against the petitioner (encroacher) under section 163 of the H. P. Land Revenue Act and passed an order for his ejectment on 30-6-1987. 3. The petitioner, feeling aggrieved by the order, dated 30-6-1987 of the Assistant Collector I Grade, preferred an appeal before the Sub-Divisional Magistrate-cum-Collector, Rampur Tehsil. But the latter, by his order dated 16-8-1987 up-held the orders of the Assistant Collector I Grade. Thereafter, the petitioner moved the learned Divisional Commissioner, Simla Division in Revision against this order. The learned Divisional Commissioner by his order, dated 6-9-1988 has rejected his petition Hence this second revision petition before this Court by the petitioner against the impugned order of the learned Divisional Commissioner. 4. I have heard the learned Counsel for the petitioner and have gone through the papers/documents produced by him at the stage of admission. The main pleas of the petitioner are as follows: — (i) The petitioner has alleged that the knowledge of the State and its officials existed regarding his possession of the land in suit in 1972, when he allegedly installed his Saw Mill on the same. The main pleas of the petitioner are as follows: — (i) The petitioner has alleged that the knowledge of the State and its officials existed regarding his possession of the land in suit in 1972, when he allegedly installed his Saw Mill on the same. The State is now estopped from ejecting the petitioner from land in question because of its knowledge of existence of the said encroachment since, 1972; (ii) Even otherwise the State should not eject him from this site under section 163 of H. P. Land Revenue Act, 1954, as exercise of jurisdiction under section 163, ibid, is discretionary ; (iii) The above discretion of the State should have been exercised in favour of the petitioner and that the matter should have been referred to the Civil Court, and (iv) Otherwise the encroachment should have been regularised under the encroachment circular of the Government. 5. During arguments, the learned Counsel for the petitioner has further stated that the particular land in question is situated very close to the Government offices (belonging to various Departments) of the Tehsil. So by not raising any objection to the petitioners construction of the Saw-Mill for so many years, the State has already acquiesced in his possession of the same and that under the circumstances the State is now estopped from starting the proceedings of ejectment against the petitioner. In support of this claim, the petitioner has relied upon the ruling of the Madras High Court in the case AIR 1977 Madras 342 6. All these arguments have already been analysed and countered in full by the learned Divisional Commissioner through his impugned order First of all, regarding the claim of the petitioner that he encroached upon land as far as back in 1972, his contention is not supported by any corroborative evidences, except the petitioners own statement. On the other hand, according to Jamabandi of 1984-85, the land in dispute, belongs to Government and the petitioner has clearly encroached upon it before its grant to him in Nautor. 7. The related arguments of the petitioner, as to the principle of the estoppel acting against the State based on the Madras High Court ruling is also not relevant. On the other hand, according to Jamabandi of 1984-85, the land in dispute, belongs to Government and the petitioner has clearly encroached upon it before its grant to him in Nautor. 7. The related arguments of the petitioner, as to the principle of the estoppel acting against the State based on the Madras High Court ruling is also not relevant. The ruling relied upon by the Counsel for the petitioner is distinguishable and is not applicable under the circumstances of the case In the case relating to the said ruling, the owner of a private land did not do anything when the tresspass was building a part of his building on the tresspassed land. But in the instant case, none was present at the spot when the encroachment on the Government land was taking place. Secondly as distinguished from private land for which the owner or his authorised agent can precisely be identified, for State property, there exists no precisely identified personality as owner or owners agent The Government and the administration are run through numerous agencies and officers, who perform their work in limited spheres i. e. with limited authorities imposed by their very nature of work. So even assuming that the alleged construction of the Saw-Mill was taking place within the possible presence of some Government field functionaries belonging to some departments or other, it does not necessary to follow that the concerned officials, duly authorised to deal with State property in respect of ownership or alienation of ownership, had witnessed the same. So the alleged omission or commission on the part of such non-specified official of the Government does not and cannot attract the principle of estoppel by the acquiescence against the State. It is well known that the authority grant land in nautor formally lies with the Deputy Commissioner. It has not been the case of the petitioner that the alleged encroachment was taking place in the personal presence of the Deputy Commissioner at site. 8. So obviously the Madras High Court ruling cited by the petitioner is not helpful to him. Also the principle of estoppel cannot operate against the State, as claimed by the petitioner. 9. It has not been the case of the petitioner that the alleged encroachment was taking place in the personal presence of the Deputy Commissioner at site. 8. So obviously the Madras High Court ruling cited by the petitioner is not helpful to him. Also the principle of estoppel cannot operate against the State, as claimed by the petitioner. 9. Now according to the Revenue records, including latest Jamabandi of 1984-85, the land belongs to the Government and since the ejectment proceedings under section 163 of the H. P. Land Revenue Act, has been instituted within the period of limitation prescribed under Indian Limitation Act, the proceedings are in order. 10. The other arguments of the petitioner that such ejectment suit against him under H P, Land Revenue Act was not mandatory on the part of lower Revenue Court and that the discretion of the Court should be exercised in his favour, does not hold any water. Even if the exercise of powers by the Revenue Court is discretionary, the petitioner cannot claim as a matter of right benefits of such discretion On the other hand, the Governments declared policy is to remove encroachment, wherever the specified mitigating conditions are not met. According to the encroachment policy circulars of the Government contained in communication Nos, Rev. 2-F (8)-l/?0-Vol II, dated 20-M987 and dated 29-8-1988 respectively an encroachment would be eligible for regularisation, provided the same are from a period prior 1-1-1985 and that formal proceedings for ejectment in the said cases had been pending in any court as on 1-1-1985 or earlier. In the instant case, encroachment was identified and the ejectment proceedings were started much later i. e. on 1-6-1987. Hence, the petitioner does not come within the purview of the encroachment regularisation instructions of the Government. 11. Finally with regard to the arguments of the petitioner that the Revenue Court should not have exercised its jurisdiction and that the matter should have been referred to the Civil Court, I am of the view that the petitioners contentions are mis-placed. The issues for consideration is, whether the Revenue Court has jurisdiction in the case or not. The land according to revenue record belongs to the Government. Section 163 of H.P. Land Revenue Act is, therefore, clearly attracted. There is, therefore, no irregularity in the lower Revenue Courts invoking jurisdiction under section 163 H. P. Land Revenue Act. The issues for consideration is, whether the Revenue Court has jurisdiction in the case or not. The land according to revenue record belongs to the Government. Section 163 of H.P. Land Revenue Act is, therefore, clearly attracted. There is, therefore, no irregularity in the lower Revenue Courts invoking jurisdiction under section 163 H. P. Land Revenue Act. Under these circumstances, I am of the view that the lower courts have not committed any irregularity and illegality in deciding the case against the petitioner. I, therefore, upheld the decision of learned Divisional Commissioner and the revision petition is rejected. Revision petition dismissed.