B.L. Hansaria, J.— The short question that needs to be answered in this petition under Article 226 of the Constitution is the category of electricity supply made available to the petitioner by the Assam State Electricity Board, hereinafter the Board. The petitioner is a limited company carrying on buriness of hotel in the name of Highway Hotel Ltd. at Tinsukia. The case of the petitioner is that it is liable to pay for its power consumption at the rate applicable to industries and in any case meant for bulk consumers. The contention of the Board on the other hand is that the category to which the petitioner's hotel belongs is category 2 of Schedule of Tariff, 1981 which is meant for supply for commercial purpose. 2. The supply of electricity was made available to the petitioner following two agreements dated 3.2.79 by which a total load of 45.15 KW was sanc­tioned. At that time'General conditions of Supply and Schedule of Tariff, 1977'was in force as per Schedule VI of which `hotels' was one of the specified establishments mentioned under the head `Supply for commercial purpose'. In the aforesaid two agreements made by the petitioner the class of application was specified as `Lights and Fans Commercial' and `Power Commercial'. It is thus clear that the petitioner was under an obligation to pay as per its agreement with the Board on the consumption of power at the rate meant for those categories of establishments and installations which were clubbed under the heading commercial purpose. 3. Despite the above, the contention of the petitioner is that as hotel is no longer included in category 2 of Schedule of Tariff, 1981 of which category 2deals with supply for commercial purpose, the petitioner can not be regarded lobe consumer of electricity falling under'category 2. A reference to this category shows that instead of hotel of which mention was made in the old Tariff of 1977, the establishment now mentioned is `Lodging and Boarding houses'. Shri Bajua has contended that a hotel can not be ragarded as lodging and boarding house. A reference to this category shows that instead of hotel of which mention was made in the old Tariff of 1977, the establishment now mentioned is `Lodging and Boarding houses'. Shri Bajua has contended that a hotel can not be ragarded as lodging and boarding house. To satisfy us in this regard we have been referred to the definition of `Lodging house' as given in Black's Law Dictionary (5th Edn) wherein this expression has been defined to mean: `A house where lodgitigs are let, houses containing furnished apartments which are let out by the week or by month, without meals, or with limited meals' . It is stated by Shri Baruah that in a hotel a person can even stay for a day which would make it conceptually defferent from a lodging house where apartments are let out by the week or by month. In this coanection our attention has also been invited to the definition of'Hotel'as given in the aforesaid dictionary where this word has been defined as below : "A `hotel' is a building held out to the public as a place where all transient persons who come will be received and entertained as guests for compensation and it opens its facilities to the public as a whole rather than limited accessiblity to well defined private group " 4. In so for as the boarding house is concerned the same indicates a house where there is provision of meals without lodging, vide definition of `Boarder' in the aforesaid dictionary. A hotel embodies in itself both the functions of lodging and boarding as in all hotels there is provision of meal. In this connection we may point out that the petitioner had described itself in the cause title as carrying on business of `Boarding and lodging* in the petition filed before this Court. For these reasons we are satisfied that though in category 2 of the Schedule of Tariff, 1981 the word `Hotel' does not find piacc that would make any difference because of the mentioning of `Lodging and Boarding Houses' in this category. 5. Shri Baruah nextly contended that the petitioner would in any case fall under category 7 meant far bulk supply inasmuch as the character of supply is AC 11000 volts. 5. Shri Baruah nextly contended that the petitioner would in any case fall under category 7 meant far bulk supply inasmuch as the character of supply is AC 11000 volts. As to this, the contention of the Board is that the total power sanctioned to the petitioner was 45.15 KW whereas for the bulk supply the load has to be not less than 50 KW as mentioned under category 7 of the Schedule of Tariff, 1981. As to the giving of power from 11000 volt line it has been stated in para 4 of the counter that though the petitioner had applied for 440 volts energy but as per the policy then followed by the Board the petitioner was given connection from 11000 volts. The counter affidavit further states in this regard in para 4 that this policy was based on the experience that for consumers above 20 KW if current is supplied in 440 volts the distribution system is disturbed. Hence to maintain stability hrthe voltage, connection was given from high voltage line for which a transformer was required to be installed. Thus the only fact that the supply was from high voltage line is not sufficient to accept the contention of the petitioner that it must be charged at the rate meant for bulk consumers. Though- it is true that the nature of the supply is one of the relevant considerations as mentioned in Rohtas Industries vs. Bihar State Electricity Board, 1984 (Supp) SCC 161 which has been referred by Shri Baruah, the only fact that the petitioner was given connection for 11000 volts is not enough to regard the petitioner as bulk consumer inasmuch as the total installed capacity was less than 50 KW. As to the giving of connection for 11000 volts the case of the Board has already been noted and the reason given is quite tenable and only because of the fact that the connection was given for 11000. volts we are not inclined to accept the petitioner as a bulk consumer. 6. The last submission of Shri Baruah is that the petitioner has to charged at the rate meant for industrial consumer of which mention has been made in category 6 of the Schedule of Tariff, 1981. volts we are not inclined to accept the petitioner as a bulk consumer. 6. The last submission of Shri Baruah is that the petitioner has to charged at the rate meant for industrial consumer of which mention has been made in category 6 of the Schedule of Tariff, 1981. As to this we would only like to observe that the fact that a hotel may be an industry for the purposes of Industrial Disputes Act is not enough to take it out from the purview of commercial establishment because of the specific mention of `Hotel' under Schedule VI of the old Tariff and under category 2 of the Schedule of Tariff, 1981, which has mentioned about `Lodging and Boarding Houses' in this connection. 7. In the result we are not in a position to accept the contention of the petitioner because of which the petition is dismissed and the Rule is discharged.