Judgment Satyeshwar Roy, J. 1. By this judgment both the writ petitions are being disposed of. 2. In C.W.J.C. No. 93 of 1989(R) respondent No. 2, Singh, was at the relevant time working as Officer-in-Special Duty. According to him, on 2-11-1987 he attended the Labour Court in connection with a case. After he returned to his office, he was called by S. A. Hasan, Executive Vice-President of the Company to his office. He asked Singh to resign as he had no future and there was no need to retain him in service. Singh submitted his resignation which was immediately accepted by Hasan. Singh filed a complaint under Sec.26 of the Bihar Shops and Establishment Act, 1953 (the Shops Act for short), on 3-11-1987, a copy of which is Annexure-5 to C.W.J.C. No. 93 of 1989(R). In the complaint it was stated that Hasan by using force, coercion, threat and intimidation created a situation and forcibly procured his signature on a typed resignation letter. Hasan thereafter handed over the letter of acceptance. Singh did not intend to give up his employment voluntarily. The reason for the action taken by Hasan was not disclosed to Singh. There was no reasonable cause for dispensing with his service and it was a case of termination of service without reasonable cause which was bad in law in view of Sec.26 of the Shops Act. 3. The petitioner filed show cause in which allegations aforesaid made by Singh were decided. It was assured that resignation given by Singh was voluntary. 4. The Labour Court recorded a finding that Hasan gave allurement to Singh of non-existing voluntary resignation scheme and he was induced to resign. On the basis of this finding, the Labour Court held that the action of the management would amount to termination of service of Singh without reasonable cause and by order as contained in Annexure-3 nulligence for re-instatement with full back wages. 5. In C.W.J.C. No. 2234 of 1988(R) respondent No. 2 Dr. Rao was in the Tata Main Hospital at the relevant time. According to him, he was charge-sheeted for causing death of an indoor patient. Rao denied the charges. The matter was enquired into. According to Rao, Director, Medical Services, Dr. Singh sent for him in his office. Dr. Singh informed him that he had been found guilty of the charge and the Company proposed to dismiss him from service. According to him, he was charge-sheeted for causing death of an indoor patient. Rao denied the charges. The matter was enquired into. According to Rao, Director, Medical Services, Dr. Singh sent for him in his office. Dr. Singh informed him that he had been found guilty of the charge and the Company proposed to dismiss him from service. Instead of doing that, in the interest of Rao the Company would allow him to resign so that he could avoid stigma which might hamper his profession as a medical practitioner. Rao submitted his resignation letter which who accepted by Dr. Singh. 6. Rao filed a complaint under Sec.26 of the Shops Act in which it was alleged that he was forced to resign, and it was obtained under duress. In the show cause, the Company denied it and asserted that Rao voluntarily resigned to avoid stigma. Respondent No. 1 by holding that as no opportunity was given to Rao to pause and pondor into the matter and as his resignation was obtained by undue influence it amounted to termination of service. It ordered for re-instatement and allowed Rao half back wages by order as contained in Annexure-1. 7. It will thus be noticed that in both the cases, according to the complaints, they did not voluntarily resign and their resignation was obtained by undue influence and intimidation, whereas according to the Company they resigned voluntarily. 8. The dispute between the parties was whether termination of services of Singh and Rao was brought about by the employee or by the employer. It was not disputed by the learned counsel for the parties that if the termination was brought about by the employee Sec.26 of the Shops Act and no application. According to the employees, in the circumstances of these cases, must be held that the termination of employment would come within otherwise terminated of Sec.26 of the Shops Act. Relevant portion of Sub-section (2) of Sec.26 reads as follows: Every employee dismissed or discharged or whose employment is otherwise terminated, may make complaint in writing in prescribed manner. 9. Mr. Chatterjee, learned counsel for the Company, submitted that in a case of resignation it cannot be held that employment of the employee was otherwise terminated by the employee, therefore, the complaints under Sec.26 of the Shops Act were not maintainable. 9. Mr. Chatterjee, learned counsel for the Company, submitted that in a case of resignation it cannot be held that employment of the employee was otherwise terminated by the employee, therefore, the complaints under Sec.26 of the Shops Act were not maintainable. For this proposition, he relied in C. R. Ramaswami V/s. Needle Industries (I) Ltd., 1981 LIC 765, a Division Bench judgment of Madras High Court. Mr. Das followed by Mr. Sen, learned counsel for the employees, submitted that if it was a device adopted by the management to terminate the employment of the employees, it must be held to be a case where employment has been otherwise terminated within the meaning of Sec.26 of the Shops Act. Reliance was placed by them in Southern Roadways Ltd., Bangalotre V/s. K. Padmanabhan and Anr. 1979 LIC 234, judgment of a learned Single Judge of Karnataka High Court, and in Shriram Swami Shikshan Sanstha, Nagpur V/s. Education Officer, Zila Parishad, Nagpur, 1984 LIC 100, a Division Bench judgment of Bombay High Court. 10. Complain under Sec.26 of the Shops Act will be maintainable only when the employment of an employee is brought to an end by the employer. The Shops Act was enacted for the benefit of the employee. It was noticed that persons who were working in shops and establishments and to whom Industrial Employment (Standing Orders) Act, 1946 does not apply have no statutory service conditions. The result was that employer made them to work for unlimited hours in a day, no weekly paid rent and paid holidays were provided, the employer used to hire and fire at their whims. In these cases we are concerned with the object of the Shops Act noticed last, i.e. hire and fire. As the object is to prevent this, in a given case Court is entitled to tear the veil to see whether even if it appeared to be a case of resignation by an employee, it was merely! a ruse and the termination of employment was in fact brought about by the employer. Otherwise terminated will include such cases where resignation is obtained by force, fraud, coercion, undue influence and the like, that is where it was not voluntary. 11. a ruse and the termination of employment was in fact brought about by the employer. Otherwise terminated will include such cases where resignation is obtained by force, fraud, coercion, undue influence and the like, that is where it was not voluntary. 11. In both the cases before the Karnataka and Bombay High Court, Court was called upon to interpret the word otherwise terminates appearing in Section 2-A of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 (the I. D. Act for short). In both the cases, the workmen tendered resignation and the question was if it was proved that resignation was obtained from the workmen by force or against his will whether it would come within otherwise terminates. In Southern Roadwayss case (supra) it was observed that if an employer secures resignation of any of his employees by force or against his will, in substance, it amounts to the termination of the services of the concerned workman, and to cover such cases of termination brought about in any form whatsoever the Legislature has designedly used the words or otherwise terminations the services in Sec.2-A. Therefore, if a workman complaints that he has not tendered his resignation voluntarily, but his resignation was secured under threat or coercion and by that process the termination of his service is brought about, such a dispute between an individual workman and the employer is squarely covered by the provisions of Sec.2-A of the I. D. Act. 12. In the case of Sikshan Sanstha (supra) a teacher was alleged to have resigned which was accepted by that Sanstha. The teacher made a complaint under the provisions of Maharashtra Employees of Private Schools (Conditions of Service) Regulation Act (3 of 1973) (Regulation Act for short) that his resignation was forcibly obtained by the President of the Sanstha. The matter was contested by the Sanstha and one of the objections taken by the Sanstha was that the Education Officer, Zila Parishad before whom the complaint was filed had no jurisdiction to entertain that complaint. That was up-held by the Bombay High Court. It, however, recorded its opinion with regard to Section 9 of the Regulation Act. In Section 9 of the Regulation Act, the words otherwise terminated have been used. The Bombay High Court agreed with the Judgment in Southern Roadways (supra) and held that it shall include the case where a person is forced to resign. It, however, recorded its opinion with regard to Section 9 of the Regulation Act. In Section 9 of the Regulation Act, the words otherwise terminated have been used. The Bombay High Court agreed with the Judgment in Southern Roadways (supra) and held that it shall include the case where a person is forced to resign. Southern Roadways case was noticed by the Madras High Court in Ramaswamis, case. It appears that in the Madras case, the employee filed an appeal under Sec. 41 of the Tamil Nadu Shops and Establishment Act, 1947 on the ground that there was no reasonable cause for dispensing with his services, as his resignation was obtained by coercion and theat. The maintainability of that case was challenged by the management by filing writ petition in Madras High Court. A learned Single Judge allowed the writ petition holding that the appeal was not maintainable under Sec. 41 of the Tamil Nadu Shops and Establishment Act. An appeal was filed against the judgment of the learned Single Judge. Both the learned Single Judge and the Division Bench, hearing the appeal, noticed the Southern Roadwayss case (supra) and held that the language of Sec.2-A of the Act is not similar to Sec. 41 of the Tamil Nadu Shops and Establishment Act. 13. It will thus appear that neither the learned Single Judge nor the Division Bench of the Madras High Court disagreed with the interpretation of the Karnataka High Court in Southern Roadways Ltd. but held that it has not application to the case of the petitioner in view of the difference in language used in the two Acts. The decision in Ramaswamys case (supra), therefore, is of no assistance to Mr. Chatterjee. The reasons given by Karnataka and Bombay High Courts in interpreting "otherwise terminates" are available in interpreting similar words in the Shops Act. It must be held that if in a given case it is proved that resignation was not submitted by the employee of his own accord, it shall amount to termination of employment by the employer and shall come within otherwise terminates in Sec.26(2) of the Shops Act. 14. It was urged by Mr. Chatterjee, that whether the resignation was obtained from Singh and Rao by un-due influence, coercion or intimidation, was a question of fact and for this the employees ought to have pleaded the same in the complaints. 14. It was urged by Mr. Chatterjee, that whether the resignation was obtained from Singh and Rao by un-due influence, coercion or intimidation, was a question of fact and for this the employees ought to have pleaded the same in the complaints. He submitted that as the facts were not pleaded, the finding recorded by the Labour Court cannot be sustained. In this connection relevant paragraphs of the complaint of Singh (copy of which is Annexure-5 to his writ petition) are paragraphs 6 and 7 which run as follows : 6. That the complainant was called in the office of Sri S. A. Hasan, Executive Vice President of the Company who shouted at the top of his voice and by using force, coercion, threat and intimadation he created a situation and forcibly procured the signature of the complainant on a typed resignation letter which he was having with him and simultaneously handed over to the complainant a signed letter of acceptance of resignation which he had kept ready with him and in this manner the services of the complainant were illegally motiyetedly and wrongfully terminated. "7. That the complainant never intended to give up his employment of his own sweet-will and never intended to resign of his service. The complainant wanted the Executive Vice-President to let him know the reasons for such a cause of action adopted by him which he did not disclose and said that the complainant cannot go out his office without signing of his resignation letter and without further great peril. These were traversed by the Company in the show cause (copy of which is Annexure-6 to that writ petition) in paragraphs 8 and 9 which read as follows : 8. That in reply to the contention made in paragraph-9 of the complaint it is submitted that the same are false and frivolous and are denied It is further submitted that the complainant was never forced to sign or write the letter of resignation as has been alleged and from the contents of the letter of the complainant it is manifest that he resigned voluntarily for personal reasons. It is further submitted that the letter was handed over the Executive Vice-President by the complainant which he did without any coercion. 9. It is further submitted that the letter was handed over the Executive Vice-President by the complainant which he did without any coercion. 9. That in reply to the para 7 of the complaint it is submitted that the allegations contained therein are denied as false and being without any foundation. I may mention that in paragraph B reference of paragraph 9 of the complaint was a mistake and it should be paragraph 6. Similarly, paragraph 10 of the show cause was mistake for paragraph 9. 15. The Company denied the allegations made by Singh and asserted that he resigned volutarily. It will thus appear from the two paragraph of Annexure-5 which have been quoted that Singh took the stand that Hasan shouted at the top of his voice, used force and by coercion, threat and intimidation created a situation and forcibly procured signature of Singh on typed resignation letter. Further, he stated that he did not give his resignation voluntarily. 16. Rao in his complaint, copy of which in Annexure-6 to his writ petition, quoted in paragraphs 8 and 17 that : 8. That in the evening of 16-7-1983, O. P. No. 2 summoned the applicant in his office and told that he has decided to dismiss the applicant from service. The O. P. No. 2, read out the contents of the dismissal letter to the applicant which contained a number of stigmas. Besides, O. P. No. 2 gave out that the Management had least confidence in the applicant. Other persons present in the O. P.s room at that time were Dr. Ranjit Pandey, Registrar and Mr. Ranjit Sinha, Senior Personnel Officer. The applicant was taken aback and was scared at the show sceptre by the Head of the Department. The stigmas read out from the dismissal letter and announcement of loss of confidence by the Management and the thought of the past 40 years unblemished service of the applicants father in the same Main Hospital as Medical Officer and the innocence of the applicant himself coupled with the thought of his 22 years of devoted service in the Company created an emotional utter dismay in the mind of the applicant. The O, P, No. 2 made best use of the same and pushed. Previously typed letter of resignation in the name of the applicant in his hands and asked him to sign the same. The O, P, No. 2 made best use of the same and pushed. Previously typed letter of resignation in the name of the applicant in his hands and asked him to sign the same. If the applicant wanted to save his prestige in the field of Medicine in the Town of Jamshedpur wherein the influence of Management prevailed in all walks of life of the citizens. At that time of psychological trap and utter confusion brought about under duress, the O. P. No. 2 got the signature of the complainant in the letter of" resignation still held in the hands of the O. P. No. 2 which ultimately became instrumental in terminating the services of the applicant. Immediately after obtaining signature of the applicant on the letter of resignation the O. P. No. 2 handed him over a letter of acceptance to the applicant which was kept ready typed and signed previously". "17. That the applicants services have been illegally terminated through a forced resignation under duress notwithstanding the unblemished loyal and faithful service of the applicant for the past 22 years. 17. The above facts have been traversed by the Company in the show-cause (copy of which is Annexure 6 to that writ petition) in paragraphs 13 and 17 which read as follows : 13. That the complainant was found guilty of the charges levelled against him, and in view of the graveness and seriousness of the charges, the punishment warranted was of dismissal and accordingly the management-Opposite party decided to dismiss him from the services of the Company. However, in similar case, an offer is made open by the management to such persons to tender resignation, and this offer was also made to the complainant. The complainant, therefore, submitted resignation to avoid the punishment of dismissal. This was a concession to the complaint. The complainant resigned on 16-7-1983. It is submitted that if there was any grievance about the manner in which the complainants resignation was procured and accepted against his will, he could have immediately made report about it to any higher authority but first representation that the complainant made to the company was after lapse of 93 days on.... That the allegation made in paragraph 8 are emphatically denied, "17. The allegations made in paragraphs 14, 15, 16, 17, 18 and 19 are unfounded, incorrect, baseless and without any merit. That the allegation made in paragraph 8 are emphatically denied, "17. The allegations made in paragraphs 14, 15, 16, 17, 18 and 19 are unfounded, incorrect, baseless and without any merit. Besides, the allegations of unfair labour practice and victimisation, are irrelevant for the purposes of present proceeding. 18. The question is whether there was sufficient pleading in the complainants on the basis of which the Labour Court could have given opportunity to Singh and Rao to lead evidence whether the resignations were given under undue influence, coercion or confusion. In other words, whether it were voluntary or not. There is no provision in the Shops Act that in all cases in which a party relies on any misrepresentation, fraud, undue influence or coercion particulars with dates and items shall be stated in the pleading, Mr. Chatterjee submitted that on the ground fairplay, the procedure laid down in Order 6 Rule 4 of the Civil Procedure Code should be followed. On behalf of Singh and Rao it was submitted that as no such procedure has been laid down in Shops Act provisions of Code should not be made applicable, 19. It is true that there is no provision similar to Order 6 Rule 4 of the Code in the Shops Act. When an employee who has resigned wants to bring his case within "otherwise terminated" to show that it was not given voluntarily although prima facie, it is a case of resignation, Court shall be required to "tear the veil" for this, the employee must give the particulars in the complaint to enable the other side to know what case he is to meet to "prevent surprise", as is generally said, during trial. Order 6 Rule 4 is meant to prevent such a situation. On the ground of public policy, as was done by the Supreme Court in Sarguja Transport V/s. State Transport Appellate Tribunal, -- . I am of the opinion that unless that particulars of undue influence, misrepresentation, fraud or the like are stated to show that the resignation was not voluntary, the complainant cannot be allowed to lead evidence on those. 20. I have quoted above in extenso the relevant paragraphs of the complaints and the reply thereto made in the show cause. Nothing has been stated in either of the complaints that Singh requested Hasan or Rao requested Dr. 20. I have quoted above in extenso the relevant paragraphs of the complaints and the reply thereto made in the show cause. Nothing has been stated in either of the complaints that Singh requested Hasan or Rao requested Dr. Singh to allow them time to think over the matter. Neither of them stated that they tried to come out of the office of Hasan and Dr. Singh, but they were physically restrained. Neither stated that they had protested to Hasan or Dr. Singh about their conduct. Merely saying that signature was obtained by undue influence or coercion will not be enough unless these and similar particulars are pleaded and proved, so that in law an inference that employment was "otherwise terminated" may be drawn. The findings recorded by the Labour Court that their resignation was obtained by inducement, or undue influence or under duress are mere conjectures. The Company, therefore, in both the cases must succeed. 21. In the result, both the writ petitions are allowed Annexure 8 in C.W.J.C. No. 93 of 1989(R) and Annexure 1 in C.W.J.C. No. 2234 of 1898(R) are quashed. In the circumstances of these cases Singh and Rao should be given opportunity to amend their complaints and state the particulars regarding coercion or undue influence or the like with opportunity to the Company to file additional show cause. Both the cases are, therefore, remanded to the Labour Court which shall give opportunity to Singh and Rao to amend their complaints. The Labour Court shall give opportunity to the Company to file additional show cause. It shall also give opportunity to the parties to lead further evidence on these facts, if prayer is made. On the basis of the materials already on record and those that may be brought on record by the parties, the Labour Court shall dispose of the complaints in accordance with law.