JUDGMENT : P.C. Misra, J. - The Petitioner in this case has challenged the order of the Revenue Officer, Athgarh allowing an application for review. 2. The Petitioner claims to be a tenant in respect of a piece of land measuring Ac.0.32 decimals out of plot No. 1046 in Khata No. 221 of mouza Solabandha which stood recorded in the name of Chaitanya Mahprabhu at Kanpur with a note of tenancy right in the name of the grand-father of the 'Petitioner. By virtue of a registered deed dated 27-6-1974 purporting to transfer the land in his favour, the opp. party No. I cultivated the said land. The Petitioner thereafter filed an application u/s 23 of the Orissa Land Reforms Act (hereinafter referred to as 'Act') (in O. L. R. Case No. 166/76) praying for declaring the transfer as invalid on the ground that the Petitioner is a person belonging to Scheduled Caste and no permission for transfer had been taken from the Revenue Officer in compliance of Section 22 of the Act. The Sub-Divisional Officer, Athgarh, who was the Revenue Officer authorised to deal with this matter by his order dated 13-4-1977 (Annexure-1) held that the deed of transfer (which he described as a kabala) executed by the Petitioner in favour of opp. party No. 1 was void as it contravenes the provisions of Section 22 of the Act and consequently it was directed that the opp. party No. 1 be evicted from the land and the Petitioner be restored with the possession thereof. The Petitioner claims to have been restored with possession after evicting opp. party No. 1 on 4-5-1977. Opp. party No. 1 did not file any appeal against the said order though it was appealable u/s 58 of the Act. He, however, filed an application on 10-5-1977 praying for review of the order alleging inter alia that the transaction was not a sale, but mere contract permitting him to cultivate the land and therefore, the same is not a transfer which is prohibited u/s 22 of the Act. The order of eviction of the present opp. party No. 1 and restoration of possession in favour of the present Petitioner was sought to be reviewed on the ground that the Revenue Court had proceeded on an erroneous conclusion that it was a transfer which would be hit by Section 22 of the Act. The order of eviction of the present opp. party No. 1 and restoration of possession in favour of the present Petitioner was sought to be reviewed on the ground that the Revenue Court had proceeded on an erroneous conclusion that it was a transfer which would be hit by Section 22 of the Act. The present Petitioner challenged the maintainability of the application for review on the ground that it is beyond the scope of Section 60(1) of the Act to reopen the matter for fresh disposal on the aforesaid ground. The Revenue Officer however by his order dated 20-11-1981, which has beep impugned in this writ application, held that he had jurisdiction to entertain, the application and allowed the same on the ground that the document in question was not a sale deed but it was an istamarari patta for which reason the previous order passed by the S. D. O. declaring the document void and evicting the present opp. party No. 1 therefrom was illegal. 3. The sale question urged in this writ application is that the order passed by the Revenue Officer on review is completely without jurisdiction as the ground on which review was sought for is neither it clerical mistake nor an error in course of the proceeding. Thus the sole question for consideration in this case is as to what would be the scope of review u/s 60(1) of the Act. 4. "Review" means a judicial re-examination of the case in certain specified and prescribed circumstances. It is well established in law that a right or review does not exist unless conferred expressly or by necessary implication by law. For an authority a decision reported in Patel Narshi Thakershi and Others Vs. Shri Pradyumansinghji Arjunsinghji, may be referred to Section 60(1) of the Act provides that any order passed under the Act may, after notice to all persons interested, be reviewed by the officer who made the order or his successor in office on the ground of any clerical mistake or error in course of 'any proceeding, under the Act. The Supreme Court dealing with a case reported in Master Construction Co. (P) Ltd. v. State of Orissa and Anr. 1966 S.C.D. 368, under the Orissa Sales Tax Act examined the scope at Rule to of the Orissa Sales Tax Rules read with Section 152 of the CPC Code. The Supreme Court dealing with a case reported in Master Construction Co. (P) Ltd. v. State of Orissa and Anr. 1966 S.C.D. 368, under the Orissa Sales Tax Act examined the scope at Rule to of the Orissa Sales Tax Rules read with Section 152 of the CPC Code. Rule 83 empowers the Commissioner of Sales Tax to correct any arithmetical or clerical mistake or any error apparent on the face of the record arising or occurring from accidental slip or omission in an order passed by him or it. The position of law has been explained by their Lordships by observing that the jurisdiction of the Commissioner under this rule is limited and is confined only to the correction of mistakes or omissions mentioned therein. An arithmetical mistake is a mistake of calculation a clerical mistake is a mistake in writing or typing. An error arising out of or occurring from an accidental slip or omission is an error due to a careless mistake or omission unintentionally made. 5. Review in this case was not sought for on the ground of any clerical mistake. The ground on which the review was prayed for is that the alleged deed of transfer is not a Kabala but an "Istamarari patta" which merely authorised the transferee for cultivating the land for which reasons the document is nothing but an agreement and thus the proceeding u/s 23 of the Act was thoroughly misconceived and the order passed therein was illegal. The Revenue Officer, Athgarh on a perusal of the document came to hold that the proceeding u/s 23 of the Act was decided on the basis that the registered deed of transfer dated 27-6-1974, was in fact an "Istamarari patta" and not a "Kabala" and that the transferor was erroneously taken to be the raiyat in respect of the land though he was a tenant under a deity, who was the owner thereof. According to the learned Revenue Officer, the transfer in question does not attract the provisions of Section 23 of the Act and in the circumstances the jurisdiction to review the earlier judgment is available to be Exercised. 6. According to the learned Revenue Officer, the transfer in question does not attract the provisions of Section 23 of the Act and in the circumstances the jurisdiction to review the earlier judgment is available to be Exercised. 6. Exercise of jurisdiction of the Revenue Officer to review the order passed in the proceeding would therefore, depend upon whether the aforesaid ground on which review of the order was sought for comes within the clause "error in course of the proceeding" under this Act. The scope of review cannot he equated with the appellate powers which can only be exercised by a superior Court. In a case where the court finds that on account of an error committed by the court itself one of the litigants before it suffered injury it may come under the clause "error in course of the proceeding. That is because of the accepted principle that no act of the court should harm a litigant and it is the bounden duty of the courts to see that if a person is harmed by the mistake of the court he should be restored to the position he would have occupied but for that mistake vide C.P.C. Motor Service, Mysore Vs. The State of Mysore and Another. There may be cases where the procedure followed by the courts amounts to violation of the mandatory provisions of the Act or the Rules or breach of the principle of natural justice, in which event it may be possible to categorise the same as error in course of the proceeding". In" the review application the allegation is that the status of the transferor was wrongly described and the document in question was not a transfer within the meaning of Section 22, of the Act. The said allegation in our view does not amount to "error 'in course of the proceeding". The illegality in the order, if at all was therefore due to the reason that either the present opposite party No. 1 did not place all the materials before the court which were within his knowledge and power, or the court was wrong in its interpretation of the document which was a matter for the appellate court to rectify. The learned Counsel appearing for the opp. party No. 1 relied upon two decisions of this Court reported in Utsaba Pradhan and Ors. v. Kandhuri Choudhury and Ors. The learned Counsel appearing for the opp. party No. 1 relied upon two decisions of this Court reported in Utsaba Pradhan and Ors. v. Kandhuri Choudhury and Ors. 1972 (2) C.W.R. 1763, and Nidhi Padhi and Ors. v. Brahmananda Padhi and Ors. 39 (1973) C.L.T. 693, both of which are cases dealing with the power of review of a court under Order 47. Rule I. Code of Civil Procedure. In the first mentioned case it was held that errors of law apparent on the face of the record can be corrected in exercise of the powers of review vested in the court. In the second case it was held that the clause "any other sufficient reason," occurring in Order 47, Rule 1, CPC must mean a reason sufficient on grounds at least analogous to those specified in the rule. In the facts of that case it was observed that when important documentary evidence already on record was not brought to the notice of the court by either party when the appeal was heard all the same the document being already there, the error is apparent on the face of the record and such an error whether it occurs by reason of the counsel's mistake or it creeps in by reason of an oversight on the part of the Court, can always he a good ground for exercise of the jurisdiction of the Court to reverse its decision. Total non-consideration of an important document stands on a different footing which is not the case here. The document of transfer was considered by the Revenue Officer construing it as a deed of sale and, therefore, it may at best be a case improper consideration of a piece of material evidence and not a case of total non-consideration thereof. Even assuming that the grounds on which review is permissible under Order 47. Rule 1. CPC would also come within the clause "error in course of the proceeding", no case for review within such extended meaning was at all made out by the present opp. party No. 1. The scope for review must be confined to the limitations prescribed in the Statute which confers such right. It, therefore, follows that unless the ground on which review was sought for comes within any of the two clauses of Section 60(1) of the Act, the Revenue Officer would have no jurisdiction whatsoever to review the same. party No. 1. The scope for review must be confined to the limitations prescribed in the Statute which confers such right. It, therefore, follows that unless the ground on which review was sought for comes within any of the two clauses of Section 60(1) of the Act, the Revenue Officer would have no jurisdiction whatsoever to review the same. 7. Learned Counsel for the opp. parties, however, placed reliance on a decision reported in Shivdeo Singh and Others Vs. State of Punjab and Others in support of the legal proposition advanced by him that apart from the power of review u/s 60(1) of the Act, every Court has an inherent power to review its own order. It was a case where in a writ application the High Court cancelled the order of allotment of land in favour of a person, who was not a party in the writ application. He subsequently filed a separate petition under Article 226 of the Constitution for impleading him as a party to the earlier writ petition and for rehearing the whole matter. The Supreme Court held that the 2nd writ application was maintainable and the High Court had not acted without jurisdiction in reviewing its previous order at the instance of a person who was not a party in the previous writ petition and whose rights were substantially affected by the order passed by it. In this connection it was observed by their Lordships that there is nothing in Article 226 of the Constitution to preclude a High Court from exercising the power of review which inheres in every Court of plenary jurisdiction to prevent miscarriage of justice or to correct grave and palpable errors committed by it. The Supreme Court on the other hand in a decision reported in Patel Narshi Thakershi's casel (supra) has dearly indicated, that the power to review is not an inherent power. It must be conferred by law either specifically or by necessary implication. 8. Even assuming that the Revenue Officer had the jurisdiction to entertain the application for review on the grounds already discussed, we do not find any merit therein. Section 22 of the Act imposes a restriction on alienation of land by persons belonging to Scheduled Tribe or Scheduled Caste. 8. Even assuming that the Revenue Officer had the jurisdiction to entertain the application for review on the grounds already discussed, we do not find any merit therein. Section 22 of the Act imposes a restriction on alienation of land by persons belonging to Scheduled Tribe or Scheduled Caste. Any transfer made by such class of persons to a person not belonging to a Scheduled Tribe or Scheduled Caste, without the previous permission in writing of the Revenue Officer is void as per the provisions of the said Section. The definition of " transfer of property" as given in the Transfer of Property Act can be borrowed for the purposes of this Act by virtue of Section 2(34) of this Act which says that words and expressions used in this Act but not defined shall have the same meaning as assigned to them in the Tenancy Act etc. and the Transfer of Property Act as the case may be. Since possession is an interest in the land, transfer of possession by way of lease also amounts to "transfer" within the meaning of Transfer of Property Act. By a lease an interest in the land is created in favour of the lessee and therefore, lease is a transfer within the meaning of Section 22 of the Act. In this view of the matter even if the document in question is said to be an "istamarari patta", which is nothing but a "'perpetual lease"'. It would be bit by Section 22 of the Act it there was no previous permission of the Revenue Officer in writing. Thus the ultimate conclusion of the Revenue Officer allowing the review must be held to be untenable on merits. 9. In the result, the order of the Revenue Officer in Annexure-3 reviewing the earlier order dated 13-4-1977 of the Sub-Divisional Officer, Athgarh is quashed. The writ application is therefore allowed. No costs. A. Pasayat, J. 10. I agree. Writ application allowed. Final Result : Allowed