S. P. RAJKHOWA, J. ( 1 ) THIS appeal is directed against the judgment and decree, dated 17. 8. 85 passed by Sri S. P. Dutta, the Learned Additional District Judge, 11th Court, Alipore in Title Appeal No. 687 of 1984 affirming the judgment and decree, dated 7th July, 1984 passed by Sri B. Das, the Learned Second Munsif, Alipore dismissing the Title Suit No. 15 of J. 982. ( 2 ) THE plaint case in brief is that Smt. Rama Devi was previously the sole owner of the premises No. 107b, Karaya Road, Calcutta who by a registered deed of lease, dated 30th October, 1960, leased out the said premises for 21 years with effect from 1st November, 1960 to the defendant, and to Sri Dhirendra Narayan Das who is the husband of the plaintiff. The premises was divided into two parts. One bed room on the Southern side together with one kitchen, one latrine and bath with common water tap in the ground floor were leased out to the defendant as shown in Schedule B of the said deed of lease at a monthly rental of Rs. 55 payable to the lessor according to the English Calendar Month. The other part of the premises consisting at two bed rooms in the 1st floor, one bed room in the ground floor with a separate kitchen, latrine and bath as described in Schedule 'a' of the deed of lease at a monthly rental of Rs. 120 payable according to English Calendar Month was leased out to Dhirendra Narayan Das, husband of the plaintiff. During the continuance of the said lease, the said Lessor Smt. Rama Devi sold her right, title and interest in the said premises (both A and B Schedules) together with her lessor's right to the plaintiff by a registered deed, dated 16. 4. 81 and delivered possession thereof. As the period of lease of the defendant was going to expire on 1st November, 1981, the plaintiff caused a notice, dated 12. 8. 81 served on the defendant making him to vacate and quit the suit premises under the said lease within the expiry of his lease but despite receipt of the notice the defendant did not vacate the suit premises and from the date of expiry of his lease, he has been in illegal possession of the suit premises as a trespasser. 81 served on the defendant making him to vacate and quit the suit premises under the said lease within the expiry of his lease but despite receipt of the notice the defendant did not vacate the suit premises and from the date of expiry of his lease, he has been in illegal possession of the suit premises as a trespasser. So the plaintiff filed the suit for eviction of the defendant and for other reliefs. The defendant's case is that he and the husband of the plaintiff Sri Dhiren-4ra Narayan Das became the joint lessees under the common lessor by a deed of lease, dated 30th October, 1960 for a period of 21 years. He authorised Sri Dhirendra Narayan Das to negotiate with the former lessor, Smt. Rama Devi for purchasing the property in question for their common benefit. But Sri Dhirendra Narayan Das purchased the property in the benam of his wife Smt. Sova Das (plaintiff) only to defraud him. But when this fraud came to his knowledge, he wanted to assert his right of Specific Performance of Contract and Sri Dhirendra Narayan Das agreed in presence of common friends in the middle of July, 1981 that he would have a tenancy for life in respect of the suit property and on this assurance he paid rent to the plaintiff and the last rent receipt, dated 7. 8. 81 would show, according to him, that a new tenancy had been created between him and, the plaintiff with effect from 1st August, 1981. ( 3 ) THE Trial Court dismissed the suit. An appeal taken by the defendant in the First Court of Appeal met with the same fate as already referred to above. ( 4 ) BEING aggrieved the defendant has come before this Court in Second Appeal. ( 5 ) THE point for determination, under the facts and circumstances of the case as narrated above, is whether the earlier lease, dated 30. 10. 1960 (Ext. 1) was determined by the efflux of time at the end of the stipulated period of the lease or whether by realising rent by the plaintiff/respondent from the defendant/appellant for the month of July, 1981 by the rent receipt, dated 7. 8. 1981 (Ext. A) a new tenancy for life in favour of the defendant/appellant has been created in respect of the suit premises. 8. 1981 (Ext. A) a new tenancy for life in favour of the defendant/appellant has been created in respect of the suit premises. ( 6 ) SRI Sarkar, the Learned Counsel for the appellant has drawn my attention to the rent receipts for the months of May, June and July, 1981 in which it was mentioned that the rent was realised 'as per lease deed', but the rent receipt marked Ext. 'a' was conspicuously by the omission of the words 'as per lease deed'. From this, the Learned Counsel wants to impress upon me that time onwards a new tenancy had been created. In this regard he has disputed the finding, of the First Court of Appeal that a. tenancy for life can be created only by a registered instrument as required under Section 107 of the Transfer of Property Act. But from a perusal of the provisions of Section 107 of the Transfer of Property Act I find that the observation of the First Court of Appeal is correct. Section 107 lays down that a lease of immovable property from year to year, or for any term exceeding one year, or reserving a yearly rent can be made only by a registered instrument. All other leases of immovable property may be made either by a registered instrument or by oral agreement accompanied by delivery of possession. Here in our case, if the defence version is to be believed that tenancy for life had been created then it is clearly seen from the provisions of Section 107, that the lease exceeding one pear must have been registered. In absence of any such registered instrument I am not prepared to accept the defence version that Sri Dhirendra Narayan Das, the husband of the plaintiff agreed to the creation of the tenancy for life in favour of the defendant/appellant. Even then the First Court of Appeal was ready to have a second look on the defence version in the light of the surrounding circumstances but the First Court of Appeal has discussed the evidence of the defendant (D. W. 1) thoroughly and found that he was setting up inconsistent pleas and therefore no credence could be given to his evidence. Furthermore, according to the defendant the oral agreement for creation of new tenancy between him and the husband of the plaintiff was made in presence of a common friend named Nishit Das, this most important witness was not examined and it transpired that Sri Nishit Das had already died. Thus we are left without any cogent evidence either documentary or oral that a new tenancy in favour of the defendant had been created. ( 7 ) THE Learned Counsel further submits that upon purchase of the suit property by the plaintiff before the lease was determined by the efflux of time, the interest of the co-lessee, that is, the husband of the plaintiff merged with the interest of the buyer, that is, the plaintiff and thus a new tenancy was created on and from the date of purchase (16. 4. 81 ). According to the Learned Counsel the plaintiff has been using the self-same instrument, i. e. , the deed of lease both as a shield and as a sword which she cannot. He has referred to Section 111 (d) of the Transfer of Property Act which says that a lease of immovable property determines in case of the interests of the lessee and the lessor in the whole of the property become vested at the same time in one person in the same right. By quoting this section, the Learned Counsel submits that although the plaintiff has bought the suit property in her name yet in fact, it was the co-lessee Dhirendra Narayan Das (husband of the plaintiff) who is the real purchaser. So the interest of both the lessor and the lessee merged in one and the same person. And therefore the prior lease for 21 years was determined before the efflux of time. On the other hand, Sri Roychowdhury, the Learned Counsel for the plaintiff/respondent has drawn my attention to the note under Section 111 at page 739 of Mulla's Transfer of Property Act, 7th Edition. This note says that the interests of the lessor and of the lessee must be in the whole of the property, otherwise there is no merger. Sri Roychowdhury submits that Dhirendra was not a lessee in the whole of the property under the deed of lease as executed by Smt. Rama Devi. This note says that the interests of the lessor and of the lessee must be in the whole of the property, otherwise there is no merger. Sri Roychowdhury submits that Dhirendra was not a lessee in the whole of the property under the deed of lease as executed by Smt. Rama Devi. Even after the plaintiff purchased the leasehold property, the defendant continued to be a tenant along with Dhirendra till the end of the period of the lease and thus both Dhirendra and the defendant continued to be lessees under the plaintiff. I find sufficient force in the contentions of Sri Roychowdhury. As society advances, the interests of individuals cut across family relations. In modern age it is quite conceivable that the wife owns a property in which the husband lives as a tenant. In the eye of law there is nothing illegal or absurd in such a proposition. Under the facts and circumstances of the ease I do hold that there was no determination of the tenancy by the principle of merger as provided in Section 111 (d) of the Transfer of Property Act. ( 8 ) THEN Sri Sarkar submits that the prior tenancy under Ext. 1 came to an end by implied surrender as provided in Section. 111 (f) of the Transfer of Property Act. I find that this submission of the Learned Counsel is also not tenable. By realising rent for the month of July, 1981 of the tenancy which was to determine by efflux of time, no new lease was created in favour of the defendant. ( 9 ) THERE is no other important point for consideration. ( 10 ) IN the result, the appeal fails and the same is dismissed. The judgment and decree appealed against are affirmed. There is no order as to costs. Appeal dismissed.