Judgment L.P.N.Shahdeo, J. 1. This is an application under Sec. 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure for quashing the criminal prosecution and the order, dated 3-8-1988 passed by the 1st Assistant Sessions Judge, Hassari-bagh, in Sessions Trial No. 194/88 whereby he has rejected the prayer of the petitioner for his discharge under Sec.227 of the Cr. PC and framed charge under Sec.366-A of the IPC against the petitioner by the impugned order, dated 3-8-1988. 2. The brief facts giving rise to the prosecution case is that one girl named Parmila Kumari said to be the niece of the informant aged about 16 years had disappeared from her house on 7-10-1987. On enquiry the informant learnt that she was taken away by this petitioner and the petitioner was also found traceless from that date. 3. On the basis of the aforesaid allegation the police registered a case under Sections 363 and 366 of the Indian Penal Code and charge-sheet was also submitted at the close of investigation. 4. After usual commitment the case was transferred to the Court of the 1st Assistant Sessions Judge, who was holding trial in Sessions Trial No. 194/88 where he had passed the impugned order which is being challenged in this application. 5. Mr. S.N. Lal assisted by Mr. B.K. Dubey, learned Counsel appearing for the petitioner, submitted that no case is made out against the Petitioner as the victim lady was major and she had voluntarily gone with the petitioner and was living with him as if they had a wedded life It was also asserted that out of that holy wedlock, a male child had been recently born which fact has been mentioned in Paragraph 19 of this application The last argument is that the girl was subjected to different medical tests including the Medical Board and always the girl was found to be major. It was therefore, contended that the learned Assistant Session judge, instead of giving the benefit of the variation of age detected by the Medical Board to the accused-petitioner, has given that benefit to the prosecution and, therefore, he had framed charge, otherwise no case at all is made out against the petitioner. 6. It appears that the girl was also examined under Sec.164 Cr. PC on 16-12-1987 and her recorded statement is contained in Annexure 3. 6. It appears that the girl was also examined under Sec.164 Cr. PC on 16-12-1987 and her recorded statement is contained in Annexure 3. It appears that the girl had given her age as 21 years and the same was assessed by the Court also. Therefore, according to own estimate of thegirl she was aged about 21 years which fact is corroborated be the estimation made by the court itself 7. In this background the claim of the age made in the F.I.R by the informant that she was about 16 years of age does not hold good and stand discredited as the medical examination of the girl was done on 1-11-1987 as contained in Annexure-2. From the perusal of this annexure it appears that the doctor had determined the age of the girl between 18 to 21 years This shows that the girl was major. If the girl was 18 years of age still she would be treated as major and this being the position the benefit of variation of age must go to the accused-petitioner and not to the prosecution. 8. In this connection it must be noted that it is the settled principle of law that if any benefit is to be given in a criminal trial of any material fact, that must go to the accused and not to the prosecution. If this principle is applied, then, the reasonable conclusion would be that the girl was major at that time. 9. The second Medical Examination of the girl was done by a Medical Board of Bhojpur on 1841-1987 as contained in Annexure-2/1 On this medical examination, the age of the girl was determined as 18 to 19 years which also indicates that she was major, at any rate, not minor. 10. The last medical examination was done with respect to the age of the victim girl in July, 1988 in which also her age was determined to be 18 to 19 years. Thus, we find that there is consistency of evidence that the girl was, at any rate, major. If the benefit of variation or differences of age is given and the higher side is accepted, then the girl is much more major that required under the law. 11. Thus, we find that there is consistency of evidence that the girl was, at any rate, major. If the benefit of variation or differences of age is given and the higher side is accepted, then the girl is much more major that required under the law. 11. From the aforesaid scrutiny of the age of the lady done by the medical examinations, there cannot be any doubt, in any manner that the girl, at that time, was a major one and if she was major, she had married out of her own volition and free-will and she had gone with the petitioner add had married in the Court and also in the temple, and was leading a married life like husband and wife and, admittedly, out of that wedlock one son had also been born to them, then, it cannot be said that any case of kidnapping is made out against the petitioner. 12. Therefore, in the facts and circumstances of this case the question of having kidnapped and taking away the girl be deceitful mean or for any purpose does not arise. Both of them are leading a happy wedded life which, in view of the age of the girl, does not require any interference by this Court, the ultimate result of which is bound to generate a feelings of bitterness between them. 13. A major girl is entitled to marry any person of her own choice. No other person can raise any grievance or can obstruct to such marriage. If Parmila Kunuri has selected her husband of her own choice, I think, nobody should raise any finger against them but should reconcile to that position and must have sympathy for them for having chosen a satisfactory wedded life. The statement of the lady and the medical evidence, if these two factors arc taken together into consideration, there is no scope to arrive at any other conclusion than a conclusion that no case is made out against the petitioner, who cannot be said to have kidnapped any minor girl for which he has been charged. 14. There is absolutely no evidence to justify the framing of the charge under Sec.366-A of the Penal Code against the petitioner, as has been done in this case by the trial Court. 15. 14. There is absolutely no evidence to justify the framing of the charge under Sec.366-A of the Penal Code against the petitioner, as has been done in this case by the trial Court. 15. The ultimate result of such nature of criminal prosecution cannot be ignored and in view of the nature of the evidence available and discussed above, there is no possibility of conviction in such type of case if the trial is allowed to continue. Therefore, the continuance of such nature of trial amounts to abuse of the process of the Court and requires interference by this Court to secure the ends of justice. 16. It must be made clear that the Court cannot shut its eyes from the present state of affairs and circumstances made available and the relationship that has developed between the parties. The Court can take into consideration these facts even in the exercise of its inherent power so that a settled, happy and wedded life should not come to a turmoil by unnecessary and futile criminal trial. 17. In the result, this application is allowed. The criminal prosecution of the petitioner and the impugned order framing charge against the petitioner are quashed.