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1989 DIGILAW 148 (MP)

ORIENTAL INSURANCE COMPANY v. MANDAKINI KISHANRAO SAHUKAR

1989-04-25

T.N.SINGH

body1989
JUDGMENT : ( 1. ) SHRI S. S. Bansal, counsel for the appellant. Shri R. D. Goyal, counsel for the respondents. Heard counsel. ( 2. ) AT the admission stage counsel for parties are heard. Shri R. D. Goyal has entered appearance for the claimants, Smt. Mandakini Kishanrao; and he is also heard. ( 3. ) BECAUSE I have found no ground to admit the appeal and I am satisfied that there is no warrant for my interference with the impugned order I have considered it unnecessary to notice the other two respondents. ( 4. ) SHRI Bansal has challenged rightly the impugned order with reference mainly to the provisions of sub-section (2-A) of section 110-C of the Motor vehicles Act for short, The Act. ( 5. ) THERE could be no doubt that in view of the provisions of section 96 (2) of the Act the insurer-appellant is statutorily handicapped in challenging award passed under section 110-B of the Act on merits and as such I have merely to consider the grievance made in this appeal with respect to the provision aforesaid, which I quote : - "110-C (2-A ). Where in the course of any inquiry, the Claims Tribunal is satisfied that - (i) there is collusion between the person making the claim and the person against whom the claim is made, or (ii) the person against whom the claim is made has failed to contest the claim. It may, for reasons to be recorded by it in writing, direct that the insurer who may be liable in respect of such claim, shall be impleaded as a party to the proceeding and the insurer so impleaded shall thereupon have the right to contest the claim on all or any of the grounds that are available to the person against whom the claim has been made. " ( 6. ) IN this connection the few facts which are to be stated are about the averments of the insurer-appellant made in the written statement and the disposal of the objection in that regard by the Tribunal. It appears that "special plea" in regard to the objection aforesaid was taken on 4-1-1988 by the Insurer and by application made on that date amendment of the written statement was prayed. The amendment was allowed and para 11 was added in written statement. It appears that "special plea" in regard to the objection aforesaid was taken on 4-1-1988 by the Insurer and by application made on that date amendment of the written statement was prayed. The amendment was allowed and para 11 was added in written statement. That is quoted here : - It is unfortunate that the insurer did not state any fact in para ll in regard to the alleged "collusion" between the claimant and the registered owner, who was covered under the policy in question by the insurer-appellant on the basis of which award has been passed in the instant case against the insurer. The only fact stated is that the registered owner, who had taken the policy, had not co-operated with the insurer in opposing the claim and beyond that there is nothing to be read in para 11. That being the pleading, no wonder that the Tribunal found that there was no material before it to be satisfied that there was a "collusion" between the claimant and the registered owner of the concerned motor vehicle involved in the accident. Let it also be noted in this connection that despite deficient pleading tribunal still allowed the insurer to adduce evidence with respect to the averment aforesaid and the insurer examined one witness, who was none else than the Assistant Administrative Officer in the Gwalior Office of the company. The only statement that he made in his evidence in regard to objection aforesaid is that notice was issued to the registered owner by post and that was returned unserved. He also stated that he could learn that the vehicle had been transferred to one Jaipal son of Jethanand. There is nothing else to be read in the evidence of the sole witness examined by the insurer on which indeed could any finding be recorded by the Tribunal or even by this Court that there was "collusion" between the registered owner and the claimant. No facts are stated to establish any kind of privity between the two and on the other hand the plea of "collusion" is negated by insurers own statement that the vehicle had been transferred and the person who could be responsible for the claim could only be the transferee, jaipal. ( 7. No facts are stated to establish any kind of privity between the two and on the other hand the plea of "collusion" is negated by insurers own statement that the vehicle had been transferred and the person who could be responsible for the claim could only be the transferee, jaipal. ( 7. ) IN the instant case it is also not possible to obsolve the insurer of the liability under the award as the Tribunal had rightly recorded its conclusion on due appreciation of entire evidence adduced in the case that the alleged transfer has not been proved. Mere allegation of a witness made in evidence that transfer had taken place and that information he had gathered from undisclosed source could be no basis for the plea to claim exemption from liability on the ground that insurers liability had ceased on the vehicle being transferred and the transfer not being notified to the insurer. ( 8. ) AS earlier alluded, it is not open to me to consider on merits challenge of the insurer-appellant either as to the validity of the liability adjudged or of the quantum adjudged payable to the claimant. A sum of Rs. 42,0007- only has been awarded for the death of a person employed in a responsible post by the State government, though he was aged about 58 years and was at the verge of retirement. No case is made out about breach of any of the conditions of policy, which are to be read in sub-clause (b) of section 96 (2) of the Act. It is difficult for me to accept the contention pressed by Shri Bansal that the liability saddled on the insurer be voided for breach of the condition by which the registered owner or the insured person was required under the terms of the policy to notify the accident to the insurer. Such a condition is not one of the prohibited/prescribed conditions to be read in section 96 (2) (b ). ( 9. ) FOR all the aforesaid reasons I find no merit in this appeal and indeed mainly for the reason that the appeal at the instance of the insurer is not maintainable. It is dismissed. Appeal dismissed.