P. R. GOKULAKRISHNAN, R. A. MEHTA, J. ( 1 ) THIS matter was heard at the admission stage at length on several days and with the consent of the parties it was treated as final hearing. We therefore issue rule. Mr. G. D. Bhatt learned Addl. P. P. waives service of rule on behalf of the respondent. ( 2 ) THE petitioner has come forward with the present Special Criminal Application for the purpose of issuing a writ of habeas corpus or any other writ order or direction in the nature of habeas corpus declaring the detention of the petitioner as illegal. There are further prayers to the effect that the petitioner should be released on bail with necessary terms and conditions and that the Designated Judge before whom the case of the petitioner is pending should be directed to proceed forthwith without any delay. ( 3 ) THE petitioner (accused No. 25) is one of the accused among the 63 accused committed to the Court of Designated Judge City Civil and Sessions Court Ahmedabad under the Terrorist and Disruptive Activities (Prevention) Act 1985 in pursuance of the complaint lodged by P. S. I. Mr. M. K. Parmar on 12-7-1986 regarding the incident which had taken place at about 9-00 hours on 12-7-1986. The petitioner was arrested on 12-8-1986 and a case was registered as Terrorist Case No. 1 of 1987. On 4-12-1987 the Designated Judge has framed the charge against the present petitioner and 62 others and the petitioner pleaded not guilty to the charge on 4-12-1987. From 4-12-1987 till today according to the petitioner the case was adjourned for more than 65 occasions and has not yet been concluded. It is the further say of the petitioner that it is only on 9-3-1988 the prosecution has examined the first witness in Terrorist Case No. 1 of 1987. From 4-12-1987 till today according to the petitioner the case was adjourned for more than 65 occasions and has not yet been concluded. It is the further say of the petitioner that it is only on 9-3-1988 the prosecution has examined the first witness in Terrorist Case No. 1 of 1987. ( 4 ) THE petitioner alleging that the detention as an under-trial prisoner as and from 12-8-1986 which is the date of his arrest is against the basic principle of the criminal jurisprudence and violative of Art. 21 of the Constitution of India which confers right to have a speedy trial and that there is a violation of Sec. 309 of the Criminal Procedure Code in passing the orders of adjournments and remand by the Designated Judge prays for an issue of writ of habeas corpus and also for necessary orders releasing the petitioner on hail. ( 5 ) MR. Bharghav Bhatt the learned Counsel appearing for the petitioner contended that the right to have a speedy trial is a funda- mental right and if the petitioner is languishing in jail as an under-trial prisoner for such a long time he is entitled to be released by virtue of Art. 21 of the Constitution of India. It is the say of Mr. Bharghav Bhatt that for no fault of the petitioner herein the case is being adjourned as many as 65 times after framing of the charge by the Designated Judge as early as 4-12-1987. Pointing out the Roznama regarding the adjournments granted in this case Mr. Bharghav Bhatt submitted that the inordinate delay in hearing the case is sufficient ground for granting the prayers made in this petition. Mr. Bharghav Bhatt further submitted that there is no remand orders as contemplated under Sec. 309 of the Criminal Procedure Code and hence the continuance of the prisoner in prison is against the fundamental right guaranteed to a citizen of India and as such the petition has to be allowed as prayed for. Mr. Bharghav Bhatt contended that the High Court under Arts. 226 and 227 of the Constitution of India can interfere and grant the prayers made in this petition since the petitioner has stated that Art. 21 of the Constitution of India has been violated by illegally detaining the petitioner in jail. ( 6 ) IN this contention Mr. Mr. Bharghav Bhatt contended that the High Court under Arts. 226 and 227 of the Constitution of India can interfere and grant the prayers made in this petition since the petitioner has stated that Art. 21 of the Constitution of India has been violated by illegally detaining the petitioner in jail. ( 6 ) IN this contention Mr. Bhatt brought to our notice the decision in the case of Usmanbhai Dawoodbhai v. State of Gujarat reported in [1988 (2)] XXIX (2) GLR 859 (SC ). This is a case decided by the Supreme Court regarding the lack of powers in the High Court to interfere under Secs. 439 and 482 of the Criminal Procedure Code in respect of matters arising out of the proceedings under Terrorists and Disruptive Activities (Prevention) Act 1987 The Supreme Court observed (at page No. 866 of GLR):at the very outset Shri Poti learned Counsel appearing for the State Government with his usual fairness unequivocally accepted that the provisions of the Act do not take away the Constitutional remedies available to a citizen to approach the High Court under Art. 226 or Art. 227 or move this Court by a petition under Art. 32 for the grant of an appropriate writ direction or order. It must necessa- rily follow that a citizen can always move she High Court under Art 226 or Art. 227 or this Court under Art. 32 challenging the constitutional validity of the Act or its provisions on the ground that they offend against Arts 14 21 and 22 or on the ground that a notification issued by the Central Government or the State Government under Sec. 9 (1) of the Act constituting a Designated Court for any area or areas or for such case or class or group of cases as specified in the notification was a fraud an powers and thus constitutionally invalid. Finally the Supreme Court agreed with the High Court and stated that the High Court has no jurisdiction to entertain an application for bail under Sec. 439 or Sec. 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. ( 7 ) MR. Bhatt also cited the decision in the case of Ram Narayan Singh v. State of Delhi reported in AIR 1953 SC 277 . This is a case arising out of Art. 32 of the Constitution of India praying for a writ of habeas corpus. ( 7 ) MR. Bhatt also cited the decision in the case of Ram Narayan Singh v. State of Delhi reported in AIR 1953 SC 277 . This is a case arising out of Art. 32 of the Constitution of India praying for a writ of habeas corpus. In that case there was no remand order detaining the person in custody. After the original remand order expired there was no fresh order of remand committing the prisoner to further custody while adjourning the case under Sec. 344 of the old Criminal Procedure Code. In those circumstances it is held that the detention of the prisoner is illegal. ( 8 ) MR. Bharghav Bhatt contended that there must be a specific order of remand of the accused signed by the Judge under Sec. 309 of the Criminal Procedure Code or otherwise the detention will be illegal. For this proposition the learned Counsel cited the above decision in the case of Ram Narayan Singh v State of Delhi reported in AIR 1973 SC 277 wherein the Supreme Court considering the old Sec. 344 corresponding to Sec. 309 of the Criminal Procedure Code came to the conclusion that the detention of a person in custody after the expiry of remand order without any fresh order of remand committing him to further custody while adjourning the case under Sec. 344 of the Criminal Procedure Code is illegal. In the said case the section applied is Sec. 344 of the old Criminal Procedure Code wherein it is provided that:every order made under this section by a Court other than a High Court shall be in writing signed by the Presiding Judge or Magistrate. In the present Sec. 309 corresponding to Sec. 344 of the old Criminal Procedure Code there is no such direction to the Court to pass the remand order in writing signed by the Judge. The present section only says that the Court may adjourn the trial for such time as it considers reasonable and may by a warrant remand the accused if in custody. Mr. Bhatt states that there is no warrant of remand signed by the Judge himself and as such the detention is illegal. He states that the above said decision squarely applies to the facts of this case. Mr. Bhatt states that there is no warrant of remand signed by the Judge himself and as such the detention is illegal. He states that the above said decision squarely applies to the facts of this case. ( 9 ) THIS judgment is based on the express language of old Sec. 344 which expressly requires the order of remand to be signed by the Presiding Judge/magistrate. While re-enacting the said provision in Sec. 309 of the New Code this provision of remand order under signature of the Presiding Judge is deliberately removed and therefore this judgment is of no assistance to the petitioner. ( 10 ) MR. Bharghav Bhatt also relied on the decision in the case of Natabar Parida v. State of Orissa reported in AIR 1975 SC 1465 wherein Supreme Court held that the power to remand the accused to custody is not inherent power but has to be found from the provisions of the Code and the Supreme Court held that Sec. 344 (Old Code) corresponding with Sec. 309 (of the New Code) gives express power to the Court for remand. This decision cannot have any application or hearing to the facts of the present case. ( 11 ) SECTION 309 of the Code of Criminal Procedure reads as follows:309 Power to postpone or adjourn proceedings: (1) In every inquiry or trial the proceedings shall be held as expeditiously as possible and in particular when the examination of witnesses has once begun the same shall be continued from day to day until all the witnesses in attend- ance have been examined unless the Court finds the adjournment of the same beyond tire following day to be necessary for reasons to be recorded. (2) If the Court after taking cognizance of an offence or commencement of trial finds it necessary or advisable to postpone the commencement of or adjourn any inquiry of trial it may from time to time for reasons to be recorded postpone adjourn the same on such terms as it thinks fit for such time as it considers reasonable and may by a warrant remand the accused if in custody. Provided that no Magistrate may remand an accused person to custody under this section for a term exceeding fifteen days at a time. Provided that no Magistrate may remand an accused person to custody under this section for a term exceeding fifteen days at a time. Provided further that when witnesses are in attendance no adjournment or postponement shall be granted without examining them except for special reasons to be recorded in writing. Provided also that no adjournment shall be granted for the purpose only of enabling the accused person to show cause against the sentence proposed to be imposed on him. EXPLANATION 1: If sufficient evidence has been obtained to raise a suspicion that the accused may have committed an offence and it appears likely that further evidence may be obtained by a remand this is a reasonable cause for a remand. EXPLANATION 2: The terms on which an adjournment or postponement may be granted include in appropriate cases the payment of costs by the prosecution or the accused. This Section specifically empowers the Court to remand the accused while adjourning the case. ( 12 ) IT is the say of the petitioner that in the absence of a proper remand order and adjournment as envisaged by the Sec. 309 of the Criminal Procedure Code the detention becomes illegal and that if that be so this Court under Art. 226 of the Constitution of India can interfere and release the petitioner since there is a violation of Art. 21 of the Constitution of India owing to the illegal detention of the petitioner. Mr. Bhatt the learned Counsel appearing for the petitioner pointing out the Roznama contented that the adjournments and the remand orders are not in accordance with the provisions of Sec. 309 of the Criminal Procedure Code and cited the decisions to support his contentions In (Urroz Abbas v. State of U. P.) 1973 Cri. L J 1458 a Full Bench of the Allahabad High Court had occasion to consider Sec. 344 of the old Criminal Procedure Code which is akin to the present Sec. 309. The difference between old Sec. 344 and new Sec. 309 of the Criminal Procedure Code is material and significant. L J 1458 a Full Bench of the Allahabad High Court had occasion to consider Sec. 344 of the old Criminal Procedure Code which is akin to the present Sec. 309. The difference between old Sec. 344 and new Sec. 309 of the Criminal Procedure Code is material and significant. As regards the remand contemplated under Sec. 344 of the old Code the Full Bench of the Allahabad High Court in the above said decision observed:thus though there is no mandate of the law compelling production of an accused person before a Magistrate for purposes of remand ordinarily such Production should take place unless it is prevented by some circumstance which can be regarded as reasonable and proper. A Magistrate cannot act arbitrarily in the matter and has to follow well recognised precedents and principles in the exercise of his judicial discretion in the matter. In the circumstances the remanding of the petitioner without his production before the Magistrate cannot be characteri- sed as illegal so as to enable the Court to set him at liberty on that basis. ( 13 ) CONTINUING further and also referring to the adjournment of the case the Full Bench observed:it is only a postponement or adjournment which requires an order in writing and the reasons therefore and not the act of reminding which if I may say so can be signed by Magistrate. The Full Bench agreed with the observations made in the decision in the case of In re Kunjan Nadar reported in AIR 1955 Travancore-Cochin 74 = 1955 Cri. LJ 740 wherein it is stated:the reasons to be stated as per the above provision are the reasons for the adjourn ment of the case and not the reasons for the remand. When a person charged with the commission of a non-bailable offence is produced before the Court unless he is admitted to bail the Court remands him to custody. This is done as a matter of course and is the only way to make him available for trial. Mr. Bhatt states that inasmuch as there are no reasons given for remand the continued imprisonment of the petitioner is illegal. We do not think that this decision spelts out that irregularity in the remand and adjournment ipso facto results in the illegality of the detention. ( 14 ) IN the decision in the case of In re Madhu Limaye and Ors. We do not think that this decision spelts out that irregularity in the remand and adjournment ipso facto results in the illegality of the detention. ( 14 ) IN the decision in the case of In re Madhu Limaye and Ors. reported in AIR 1969 SC 1041 the Supreme Court observed:hence it is shown that the arrests made by the Police Officers were illegal it was necessary for the State to establish that at the stage of remand the Magistrate directed detention in jail custody after applying his mind to all relevant matters. This the State has failed to do. The remand orders are patently routine and appear to have been made mechanically All that Mr. Chagla has said is that if the arrested persons wanted to challenge their legality the high Court should have moved under appropriate provisions of the Criminal Procedure Code. But it must be remembered that Madhu Limaye and others have by moving this Court under Art. 32 of the Constitution. complained of detention or confinement in jail without compliance with the constitutional and legal provisions V their detention in custody could not continue after their arrest because of the violation of Art. 22 (1) of the Constitution they were entitled to be released forthwith. The orders for remand ate not such as would cure the constitutional infirmities. This disposes of the third contention of Madhu Limaye. ( 15 ) PRESSING this decision into service Mr. Bhatt submitted that the order of remand in this case is mechanical and has to be treated as illegal. We are afraid that the decision rendered by the Supreme Court lays down no such principle that even in a case where a person has been taken into custody under the Terrorist and Disruptive Activities (Prevention) Act 1985 and proper trial is proceeded with by periodically remanding the undertrial prisoners he is to be released. In the above said Supreme Court decision the detention itself is questioned as violative of Art. 22 (1) of the Constitution of India and in facts and circumstances of the case of illegal arrest the Supreme Court held that the order of remand is a mechanical one and cannot cure the Constitutional infirmites in the arrest. Hence this case cannot have any bearings to the facts of the present case. ( 16 ) THE next decision cited by Mr. Hence this case cannot have any bearings to the facts of the present case. ( 16 ) THE next decision cited by Mr. Bhatt is the one reported in (Nanumal v. S. M. Khan) 1976 Cri. LJ 1782 wherein a Bench of the Allahabad High Court observed:these is no order directing the accused to be kept in custody. The warrant of intermediate custody on the basis of which the petitioner is said to be detained was produced before us on the last occasion. It contained a warrant directing the remand of the accused to custody for the period 10th August to 23rd August 1915 Thereafter these is no warrant of remand for keeping the accused in custody. Under Sec. 309 of the Code of Criminal Procedure the custody of an accused can be maintained and continued only by a warrant issued by the Magistrate. without such a warrant the custody cannot be justified. As there is no warrant of remand issued by a Magistrate directing the continuance of the custody the custody of the Petitioner must be held to be without authority of law The petitioner Is therefore entitled to be released as in the return no other authority for detaining the petitioner has been shown. ( 17 ) PRESSING this decision into service Mr. Bhatt contended that the Designated Court itself has not signed any remand order as per the Roznama produced before the Court. Mr. Bharghav Bhatt further contended that after 9-8-19899 though the remand order expired and even though the Judge was on leave mechanically the remand order was passed by Registrar or other Officer of the Court. Hence according to Mr. Bhatt such remand others are illegal. Mr. G. D. Bhatt the learned Additional Public Prosecutor brought to our notice Rules framed by the Government High Court etc. under various Acts. This particular Rule deal with the City Civil and Sessions Court at Ahmeda- bad. Hence according to Mr. Bhatt such remand others are illegal. Mr. G. D. Bhatt the learned Additional Public Prosecutor brought to our notice Rules framed by the Government High Court etc. under various Acts. This particular Rule deal with the City Civil and Sessions Court at Ahmeda- bad. This Rule in Preamble reads as follows:the Honourable the Chief Justice and the judges of the High Court of Gujarat at Ahmedabad with the previous sanction of the Government of Gujarat are pleased to make the following Rules for regulating the practice and procedure to be followed in the Court of Sessions for the City of Ahmedabad: (1) The Registrar and the Deputy Registrar of the Ahmedabad City Civil Court shall also be Registrar and Deputy Registrar of the Court of Sessions for the City of Ahmedabad. (2) Save as otherwise provided in the Code of Criminal Procedure and in these Rules an summonses precepts rules orders and mandatory processes shall be issued from and returned into the office of the Registrar and shall be subscribed and sealed by the Registrar Deputy Registrar or such other Officer as the Principal Judge may by general or special order authorise in that behalf. ( 18 ) THUS it is seen that such orders of remand can also be signed by such of the Officers of the Court prescribed in this Rule. No doubt Mr. Bhatt states that offence under the Terrorists and Disruptive Activities (Prevention) Act 1985 (Act No. 31 of 1985) spelts out the procedures and powers of the Designated Court. It is clear from the provisions of Sec. 12 (4) of the Act that subject to the other provisions of this Acts a Designated Court shall for the purpose of trial of any offence have all the powers of a Court of Sessions and shall try such offence as if it were a Court of Sessions so far as may be in accordance with the procedure prescribed in the Code for the trial before a Court of Sessions. Thus reading Sec. 12 and also the Rules extracted above do not ipso facto make the remand orders passed in this case illegal. Sub-sec. (2) of Sec. 309 of the Criminal Procedure Code contemplates that reasons have to be recorded only for adjourning the enquiry or trial. As regards the remand order there is no such inhibition of recording reasons signed by the Court. Sub-sec. (2) of Sec. 309 of the Criminal Procedure Code contemplates that reasons have to be recorded only for adjourning the enquiry or trial. As regards the remand order there is no such inhibition of recording reasons signed by the Court. Even the provision of restriction of remand of 15 days only at a time applies to a Magistrate and not to a Sessions Court or a Designated Court. The petitioner who was arrested under the Terriorist and Disruptive Activities (Prevention) Act 1985 and who is facing the trial along with 62 others in our opinion has been correctly remanded as provided under the Rules extracted above. ( 19 ) IN the decision in the case of In re Kunjan Nadar reported in AIR 1955 Travancore-Cochin 74: 1955 Cri. LJ 740 a Bench of the Travancore-Cochin High Court has clearly observed:the reasons to be stated as per sub-sec (1) of Sec 344 Criminal Procedure code are the reasons for she adjournment of the case and not the reasons for the remand When a person charged with the commission of a non-bailable offence is produced before the Court there is admitted to bail the Court remands him to custody This is done as a matter of course and is the only say to make him available for trial Tale order of remand is not therefore invalid on the ground that no reasons are stated therein for remand. The Bench further observed:where a charge-sheet is submitted againt the accused and they are remanded to judicial custody under Sec. 344 Cri. Pro. Code their proper remedy is to move for bail before the appropriate Court and not to move High Court for a writ of habeas corpus. This decision in all force applies to the facts of this case. This decision of the Travancore-Cochin High Court was also approved by the Pull Bench of the Allahabad High Court in the decision reported in (Urooz Abbas v. State of U. P.) 1973 Cri. LJ 1458 (supra ). It is clear that the orders of adjournments effected in this case are within the powers of the Designated Court and signing of remand orders by its Officers cannot be termed as illegal. ( 20 ) IN the decision reported in (Umakant v. State of U. P.) 1982 Cri. LJ 1836 the Allahabad High Court after extracting sub-sec. It is clear that the orders of adjournments effected in this case are within the powers of the Designated Court and signing of remand orders by its Officers cannot be termed as illegal. ( 20 ) IN the decision reported in (Umakant v. State of U. P.) 1982 Cri. LJ 1836 the Allahabad High Court after extracting sub-sec. (2) of Sec. 309 of the Code of Criminal Procedure observed:under the above provision the remand is to he granted by a warrant. There is no requirement under sec 303 that the warrant of remand must be on the prescribed proforma. It is true that this court has prescribed a proforma for granting remand to an under-trial but if the requirements of that proforma have been substantially incorporated in the warrant of remand actually issued in my opinion that would be sufficient compliance with the requirements of law and the remand will not be invalidated merely because the prescribed proforma had not been used and instead the remand warrant had been prepared on an ordinary piece of paper. . ( 21 ) MR. Bhatt also cited the decision in the case of Prabhu Dayal v. District Magistrate Kamrup reported in AIR 1974 SC 183 for the proposition that this Court under Art. 226 of the Constitution of India can interfere and release the petitioner who is according to him under illegal custody. The Supreme Court in this decision held that the remedy of a detenu before the Advisory Board was no bar to the jurisdiction of the Supreme Court under Art. 32 of the Constitution of India. ( 22 ) WE are not able to appreciate how this decision can be of any assistance to the petitioner in the facts and circumstances of the present case. It was a case pertaining to preventive detention and not a case of under-trial prisoner who has been refused bail by judicial Court. ( 22 ) WE are not able to appreciate how this decision can be of any assistance to the petitioner in the facts and circumstances of the present case. It was a case pertaining to preventive detention and not a case of under-trial prisoner who has been refused bail by judicial Court. When an under-trial prisoner is charged with the commission of an offence he cannot insist that the question of his innocence or guilt be tried or determined by the High Court or Supreme Court alleging violation of fundamental rights during the pendency of the trial whom fairly triable questions of fact and/or law are pending and can be gone into by the trial Court which is constituted under the provisions of Terrorists and Disruptive Activities (Prevention) Act 1985 nor can he be released by the High Court in a habeas corpus petition when he has been refused fail by a judicial order and is kept in judicial custody. ( 23 ) THE decision in the case of Usmanbhai Dawoodbhai. State off Gujarat reported in [1988 (2)] XXIX (2) GLR 859 (SC) (supra) clearly affirms the decision of the Gujarat High Court to the effect that the High Court has no jurisdiction to entertain any proceeding either under Sec. 439 or under Sec. 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure arising out of an order passed by the Designated Court under the Terrorist and Disruptive Activities (Prevention) Act 1985 In that case the Supreme Court also did say that the powers of the High Court under Arts. 226 and 227 of the Constitution of India are unaffected and a citizen can always move the High Court challenging the Constitutional validity of the Act or its provisions of the Constitutional validity of the notification under Sec. 9 ( of the Act constituting the Designated Court on the allegation that there was fraud on powers and there is consti- tutional invalidity. In the present case there is no such challenge to constitutional validity. The prayers of the petitioner are pure and simple to release him from the judicial custody which can be only by way of bail for which the appropriate forum is the Designated Court. In the present case there is no such challenge to constitutional validity. The prayers of the petitioner are pure and simple to release him from the judicial custody which can be only by way of bail for which the appropriate forum is the Designated Court. It has already refused bail against which the only forum is the Supreme Court and as held by the Supreme Court in Usmanbhais case (supra) the High Court has no jurisdiction in matters of bail under the Terrorist and Disruptive Activities (Prevention) Act? 1985. ( 24 ) MR. Bharghav Bhatt also relied on the decision in the case of Hussainara Khatoon v. State of Bihar reported in AIR 1979 SC 1360 for the proposition that to have a speedy trial is a fundamental right of the accused. In that decision the Supreme Court held that:this petition for a writ of habeas corpus discloses a shocking State of affairs in regard to administration of justice in the State of Bihar. An alarmingly large number of men and women children including. are behind prison bars for years awaiting trial in Courts of law The offences with which some of them are charged are trial which even if proved would not warrant punishment for more than a few months perhaps for a year or two and yet these unfortunate forgotten specimens of humanity are in jail deprived of their freedom for periods ranging from three to ten years without even as mach as their trial having commenced. xxx xxx xxx xxx if a person is deprived of his liberty under a procedure which is not reasonable fair or just. such deprivation would be violative of his fundamental right under Art 21 and he would be entitled to enforce such fundamental right and secure his release Now obviously procedure prescribed by law for depriving a person of his liberty cannot be reasonable fair or just unless that procedure ensures a speeds trial for determination of the guilt of such person. No procedure which does not ensure a reasonably quick trial can e regarded as reasonable fair or just and it would foul of Art. 21. No procedure which does not ensure a reasonably quick trial can e regarded as reasonable fair or just and it would foul of Art. 21. There can therefore be no doubt that speedy trial and by speedy trial we mean reasonably expeditions trial is an integral and essential part of the fundamental right to life and liberty enshrined in Art. 2t The question which should however arise is as to what would be the consequence if a person accused of an offence is denied speedy trial and is sought to be deprived of his liberty by imprisonment as a result of a long delayed trial in violation of his fundamental right under Art. 21. Would he be entitled to be released unconditionally freed from the charge levelled against him on the ground that trying him after and unduly long period of time and convicting him after such trial would constitute violation of his fundamental right under Art. 21? That is a question we shall have to consider when we hear the writ petition on merits on the adjourned date. Bat one thing is certain and we cannot impress it too strongly on the State Government that it is high time that the State Government realised Its responsibility to the people in the matter of administration of justice and set tip more Courts for the trial of cases We may point out that it would not be enough merely to establish more Courts but the State Government would also have to man them by competent Judges and whatever is necessary for the purpose of recruiting competent Judges such as improving their conditions of service would have to be done by the State Government. if they want to improve the system of administration of justice and make it an effective instrument for reaching justice to the large a masses of people for whom justice is today a meaningless and empty word. ( 25 ) AFTER that judgment of 12-2-1979 wherein the Court had left the question open for considerations the Supreme Court passed further order ors 26-2-1979 at page 1367 of the Report. ( 25 ) AFTER that judgment of 12-2-1979 wherein the Court had left the question open for considerations the Supreme Court passed further order ors 26-2-1979 at page 1367 of the Report. The Supreme Court noted that the chargesheets were not filed for more than two years women prisoners were kept in jail even though they were not accused of any offence and prisoners were not tried after filing chargesheet in the year 1972 till 1979 and there were undertrial prisoners undergoing custodial detention exceeding the maximum punishment which could be awarded to them even if they are found guilty of the offences charged against them and a person who was in prison as an undertrial prisoner for more than 81 years for an offence where the maximum punishment was two years. After taking note of such cases the Supreme Court further adjourned the hearing and on 9-3-1979 passed another judgment reported in Hussainara Khatoon v. Home Secretary State of Bihar) AIR 1979 SC 1369 and the Supreme Court directed release of such undertrial prisoners who were in jails for a period longer than the maximum awardable punishment. The Supreme Court also directed that where undertrial prisoners have been in jails for a period longer than half the maximum term of imprisonment such prisoners were directed to apply for bail to the trial Court. Thus it is seen from the Supreme Court judgments in Hussainara Khatoons case I II and Ill (supra) that even though the Supreme Court has held that speedy trial is the right of the accused. it has to be examined in the facts and circumstances of the case. While applying the right to speedy trial of an accused the Supreme Court did not release any accused who was in judicial custody for a period longer than the maximum possible punishment. Only such persons who had undergone undertrial confinement beyond the period of possible maximum punishment were released. Even those persons who had completed more than half the possible sentence were not released by the Supreme Court and were directed to make applications to the trial Court. Even where chargesheets were not filed for more than two years the Supreme Court had not released them on bail and the prosecution was directed to file the chargesheets within three months. Even where chargesheets were not filed for more than two years the Supreme Court had not released them on bail and the prosecution was directed to file the chargesheets within three months. Thus the right to speedy trial is not counted with a right to get bail whenever there is adjournment or some delay in the trial of an accused. Thus we find from the above said decisions that the question as to whether the delay constitutes violation of fundamental right under Art. 21 of the Constitution of India has to be decided on facts and circumstances of each case. ( 26 ) IN the decision in the case of Kadra Pahadia v. State of Bihar reported in AIR 1982 SC 1167 the Supreme Court has reiterated the principle that a speedy trial is a fundamental right implicit in the guarantee of life and personal liberty enshrined in Art. 21 of the Constitution. It has also stated that in such cases the accused is entitled to approach the Supreme Court for the purpose of enforcing such rights and the Supreme Court in discharge of its Constitutional obligation has the power to give necessary direction to the State Governments and other appropriate authorities for securing this right to the accused. ( 27 ) THE question as to whether the delay in the trial straightaway lands to quashing of the conviction on the ground of delayed trial only has to be decided on certain principles. Those principles are succinctly stated in the decision in the case of State of Maharashtra v. Champalal reported in AIR 1981 SC 1675 and they read as under:2 What is the remedy if a trial is unduly delayed ? In the United States where the right to a speedy trial is a constitutionally guaranteed right the denial of a speedy trial has been held to entitle an accused person to the dismissal of the indictment or the vacation of the sentence. But in deciding the question whether there has been a denial of the right to a speedy trial the Court is entitled to take into consideration whether the defendant himself was responsible for a part of the delay and whether he was prejudiced in the preparation of his defence by reason of the delay. But in deciding the question whether there has been a denial of the right to a speedy trial the Court is entitled to take into consideration whether the defendant himself was responsible for a part of the delay and whether he was prejudiced in the preparation of his defence by reason of the delay. The Court is also entitled to take into consideration whether the delay was unintentional caused by over-crowding of the Courts Docket or under staffing of the Prosecutors. Struck v United States (1973) 37 Law Ed 2d 56 is an instructive case on this point. As pointed out in the first Hussainara case AIR 1979 SC 1360 ) the right to a speedy trial is not an expressly guaranteed constitu- tional light in India but is implicit in the right to a fair trial which has been held to be part of the right to life and liberty guaranteed by Art. 21 of the Constitution. While a speedy trial is an implied ingredient of a fair trial the converse is not necessarily true. A delayed trial is not necessarily an unfair trial. The delay may be occasioned by the tactic or conduct of the accused himself. The delay may have caused no prejudice whatsoever to the accused. The question whether a conviction should be quashed on the ground of delayed trial depends upon the facts and circumstances of the case. If the accused is found to have been prejudiced in the conduct of his defence and it could be said that the accused had thus been denied an adequate opportunity to defend himself. the conviction would certainly have to go. But if nothing is shown and there are no circumstances entitling the Court to raise a presumption that the accused had been prejudiced there will be no justification to quash the convic- tion on the ground of delayed trial only. ( 28 ) AS far as the present case is concerned it is an admitted fact that as many as 63 accused have been committed to trial before the Designated Court for the offences punishable under the provisions of the Terrorist and Disruptive Activities (Prevention) Act 1985 and out of 65 adjournments 41 have been sought by the accused. It is not shown that any particular adjournment was objected by the petitioner and the Court without valid reason had granted adjournments for unreasonably long period. It is not shown that any particular adjournment was objected by the petitioner and the Court without valid reason had granted adjournments for unreasonably long period. ( 29 ) SECTION 7 of the said Act deals with the Designated Courts and Sec. 7 (2) states that: xxx xxx (2) A Designated Court shall be presided over by a Judge to be appointed by the State Government with the concurrence of the Chief Justice of the High Court. Section 7 (3) states that:7 xxx xxx (3) The State Government may also appoint with the concurrence of the Chief Justice of the High Court additional Judges to exercise jurisdiction in a Designated Court. SECTION 12 deals with the procedure and powers of Designated Courts. Section 12 (4) reads as under:12 xxx xxx (4) Subject to the other provisions of this Act a Designated Court shall for the purpose of trial of any offence have all the powers of a Court of Sessions and shall tty such offence as if It were a Court of Sessions 60 far as may be in accordance with the procedure prescribed in the Code for the trial before a Court of Sessions. Section 13 deals with the protection of witnesses and Sec. 13 (1) states that:13 Notwithstanding anything contained in the Code all proceedings before a Designated Court shall be conducted In camera;provided that where the Public Prosecutor so applies any proceedings or part thereof may be held In open Court. SECTION 16 of the Act deals with appeals and it reads as follows: (1) Notwithstanding anything contained in the Code an appeal shall lie as a matter of right from any judgment sentence or order not being an interlocutory order of a Designated Court to the Supreme Court both on facts and on law. (2) Except as aforesaid no appeal or revision shall lie to any Court from any judgment sentence or order of a Designated Court. (3) Every appeal under this section be preferred within a period of thirty days from the date of the judgment sentence or order appealed from;provided that the Supreme Court may entertain an an appeal after the expiry of the said period of thirty days if it is satisfied that the appellant had sufficient cause for not preferring the appeal within the period of thirty days. ( 30 ) FROM a reading of the above Sections it is clear that the procedure taken from the Criminal Procedure Code is in addition to the procedure contained in this self-contained Act called The Terro- rist and Disruptive Activities (Prevention) Act 1985 (as substituted by Act XVI of 1987) and that is why it is stated in Sec. 12 (4) of the Old Act So far as may be in accordance with the procedure prescribed in she Code for the trial before a Court of Session. Thus the procedure set out in this Act overrides the procedure in the Criminal Procedure Code and as far as may be the procedure in the Code is taken for the limited purpose mentioned in the Act. If the orders of adjournments and remand are not in accordance with Sec. 309 of the Criminal Procedure Code it is open to the party aggrieved to apply to the said Court for necessary relief. either for grant of bail or for get- ting directions for a speedy trial. Section 16 of the Act of 1985 (Sec. 19 of Act of 1987) specifically mentions that no appeal or revision shall lie to any Court from any judgment sentence or order of a Designated Court except to the Supreme Court. The provision in this self-contained Act when there is especially a decision of the Supreme Court (Usmanbhais case supra) prohibiting any revision or appeal before the High Court under Sec. 439 or Sec. 482 of the Criminal Procedure Code cannot be circumvented by invoking the jurisdiction of this Court under Art. 226 of the Constitution of India alleging as if there is a violation of Art. 21 of the Constitution of India. Looking into the Roznama and the facts of this case we are of the view that the orders of adjournments and also the orders of remand are within the powers of the Designated Court and its Officers and as such there is absolutely no illegality in such remand orders and the adjournments granted by the Court. ( 31 ) IT is clear from all these decisions that the remedy for the petitioner is only to move the Designated Court for appropriate relief either for bail or for carrying on with the case day to day. ( 31 ) IT is clear from all these decisions that the remedy for the petitioner is only to move the Designated Court for appropriate relief either for bail or for carrying on with the case day to day. In any event the petition under Art. 226 for issuing a writ of habeas corpus on the facts and circumstances of the case is misconceived. As we have observed in paragraphs supra the Supreme Court which has decided that illegal remand and inordinate delay may come under the sweep of constitutional guarantee given under Art. 21 of the Constitu- tion of India has taken care by observing that the question as to whether there is such on illegal remand or inordinate delay is a question of fact and law which have to be decided by going into the facts of each case on merits. When especially these are all questions which have to be decided on factual aspects of the case the party concerned can as well invoke the jurisdiction of the Designated Court and draw its attention on this aspect of the case and if any adverse order is passed thereon the remedy of the party concerned lies by filing appropriate petitions before the Supreme Court. When such efficacious and effective legal remedy is available to the petitioner either before the Designated Court or before the Supreme Court to set right any illegality that may have been perpetrated in the trial of the cafe or in the remand of the prisoner it is too much for the petitioner to invoke the jurisdiction of this Court under Art. 226 or Art. 227 of the Constitution of India when especially there is a clear provision under Sec. 16 of the said Act (Sec. 19 of the Now Act) ousting the jurisdiction of this Court in a case pending before the Designated Court. When especially the main appeal or revision cannot be entertained by the High Court a fortiori the High Court cannot interfere in any proceedings of the Designated Court on the mere allegation of the violation of the constitutional right of the party concerned. When especially the main appeal or revision cannot be entertained by the High Court a fortiori the High Court cannot interfere in any proceedings of the Designated Court on the mere allegation of the violation of the constitutional right of the party concerned. They are not without remedy when especially the Supreme Courts jurisdiction is wide open to them both under the Constitution and also by virtue of Sec. 16 of the Terrorist and Disruptive Activities (Prevention) Act 1985 ( 32 ) FOR all these reasons we do not find any merits in this Special Criminal Application and as such the same is dismissed. Rule is discharged. ( 33 ) AT this stage Mr. Bharghav Bhatt makes a request for grant of leave for appeal to the Supreme Court. We have elaborately considered the impact of Sec. 309 of the Code of Criminal Procedure vis-a-vis Sec. 344 of the Old Code. We have considered Art. 21 of the Constitution in relation to the present case in which the petitioner has been an undertrial under the T. A. D. Act. We do not find any question of law which is of general importance to be decided by the Supreme Court arises in this case. Accordingly the request for leave is rejected. (KMV) Rule discharged. .