JUDGMENT : ( 1. ) THIS first appeal is presented by defendant No. 4, Lilabai, wife of Dhulchand, and legal representatives of defendant No. 5, Smt. Kanchanbai, wife of Hukumchand, against the judgment and decree dated May 12, 1978, passed by Shri V. S. Yadav, Seventh Additional District Judge, Indore, in C. S. No. 24-A of 1976. By the said judgment and preliminary decree, defendant No. 1, Himmatlal and Co. , Maharani Road, Indore, a partnership firm, the legal representatives of defendant No. 2, Jawaharmal, and defendant No. 3, Lakhmichand, were jointly and severally, ordered to pay to the plaintiff Rs. 86,555 with interest at the rate of 6. 5 per cent, per annum (shown in schedule A of the plaint) in the manner set out in the judgment and redeem the property mortgaged with the plaintiff-respondent No. 1 within a period of six months from the date of decree. On failure to redeem the mortgaged property within six months of the decree, the final decree for sale of the mortgaged property was ordered to be passed. ( 2. ) DEFENDANT No. 3, Lakhmichand, had, vide sankalp dated April 9, 1959, and gift deed dated December 28, 1969, made a gift of house No, 58, Maharani Road, Indore, one of the items of mortgaged property, in favour of defendants Nos. 4 to 6 (Smt. Lilabai, Smt. Kanchanbai and Ramanlal) and sold plot No. 101, Pardeshipura, Indore, on June 8, 1960, to Dhulchand, husband of Lilabai (defendant No. 4, appellant No. 8) and Hukumchand, husband of the deceased-defendant No. 5, Kanchanbai. The learned Additional District Judge held that the gift deed did not confer any title on the donees and the sale deed executed by defendant No. 3, Lakhmichand, also did not confer any title on the vendee. The present appellants and respondent No. 5, Ramanlal, are the donees and vendees of the mortgaged property. ( 3. ) THE plaintiff-respondent (hereinafter called "the plaintiff"), State Bank of Indore, constituted under the State Bank of India (Subsidiary Banks) Act, 1959 (38 of 1959), filed a suit against the appellants-defendants, Himmatlal and Co. , Jawaharmal and Lakhmichand (since deceased his legal representatives brought on record), claiming a preliminary decree for Rs. ( 3. ) THE plaintiff-respondent (hereinafter called "the plaintiff"), State Bank of Indore, constituted under the State Bank of India (Subsidiary Banks) Act, 1959 (38 of 1959), filed a suit against the appellants-defendants, Himmatlal and Co. , Jawaharmal and Lakhmichand (since deceased his legal representatives brought on record), claiming a preliminary decree for Rs. 86,555 with future interest and directions to the defendants to redeem the mortgaged property within the stipulated time and on failure to pay the amount within the time given, a final decree for sale of the property mortgaged. The plaintiff also claimed a personal decree against the defendants in case the entire decretal amount with interest was not realised from the sale of the mortgaged property. ( 4. ) THE case of the plaintiff, in short, was that defendant No. 1, Himmatlal and Co", a partnership firm, consisting of two partners, Jawaharmal and Lakhmichand, who were brothers, carried on business in cement, mill stores and colours, etc. The firm, defendant No. 1, Himmatlal and Co. , first approached the plaintiff on February 21, 1952, for revolving letters of credit for Rs. 25,000. The credit arrangement with the plaintiff continued for some years as per details shown in paras 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9 and 10 of the plaint and paras 3, 4, 5 and 6 of the lower courts judgment. From January 2, 1957, the defendant-firm personally maintained cash credit loan account with the plaintiff with a limit of Rs. 1,10,000 against the security of cement, mill stones, colour, dyes and chemicals and also enjoyed facilities of letters of credit. On September 4, 1959. the amount due to the plaintiff from defendant No. 1, was Rs. 77,749. 74. In order to secure payment of the amount, the defendant-firm, acting through the partner, Jawaharmal, defendant No. 2, executed a simple mortgage dated June 4, 1959, in favour of the plaintiff. The mortgage money was Rs. 80,000 and the period of redemption twelve months. The mortgaged property is described in schedule A attached to the plaint. By the end of the stipulated period of one year, the defendant had not paid the principal amount or the interest thereon. The plaintiff, through its counsel, served a registered notice dated May 14, 1960, demanding the principal amount and the interest thereon, but the defendant had not paid the amount. By the end of the stipulated period of one year, the defendant had not paid the principal amount or the interest thereon. The plaintiff, through its counsel, served a registered notice dated May 14, 1960, demanding the principal amount and the interest thereon, but the defendant had not paid the amount. Defendant No. 3, Lakhmichand, declined the plaintiffs claim by evasive replies. Smt. Lilabai, Smt. Kanchanbai and Ramanlal (defendants Nos. 4, 5 and 6) informed the plaintiff that they are the owners of the mortgaged property and the rent of the suit property be paid to them. The plaintiff then filed the suit claiming reliefs against the defendants as already set out above. Defendants Nos. 4, 5 and 6 (Smt. Lilabai, Smt. Kanchanbai and Ramanlal) were impleaded as defendants because they were claiming title to the mortgaged property. ( 5. ) DEFENDANT No, 1 remained absent and was proceeded against ex parte. Defendant No. 2, Jawaharmal, admitted the mortgage, but amongst other objections, contended that his liability was for only half the amount. Defendant No. 3, Lakhmichand and defendants Nos. 4 to 6 filed two separate written statements contesting the plaintiffs claim on similar grounds. In their written statements, they denied that the mortgaged property on the date of mortgage, belonged to defendant No. 1-firm, Himmatlal and Co. It was submitted that in 1956, there were disputes between the partners, Jawaharmal and Lakhmichand, and the matter was referred to the arbitration of Shri Shivlal Porwal, barrister and Shri Bisheshwar Dayal Choubey. The two arbitrators gave their interim award dated March 15, 1957. By the said award, amongst other things, the partnership firm (Himmatlal and Co.) was dissolved with effect from March 15, 1957, and the assets and liabilities of the firm were partitioned between the two partners. As a consequence of dissolution and partition, the business of the cement section of the partnership business was exclusively allotted to defendant No. 2, Jawaharmal, and the remaining business of colour dyes, etc. , was exclusively allotted to defendant No. 3, Lakhmichand. The house No. 58 (old) new No. 8, situated at Maharani Road, Indore, and Plot No. 1, Pardeshipura with factory amongst other properties fell to the share of defendant No. 3, Lakhmichand, to the exclusion of defendant No. 2, Jawaharmal. A new partnership firm, Himmatlal and Co. , was exclusively allotted to defendant No. 3, Lakhmichand. The house No. 58 (old) new No. 8, situated at Maharani Road, Indore, and Plot No. 1, Pardeshipura with factory amongst other properties fell to the share of defendant No. 3, Lakhmichand, to the exclusion of defendant No. 2, Jawaharmal. A new partnership firm, Himmatlal and Co. , cement section with Jawaharmal, Kanhaiyalal, Ratanlal and Himmatlal, came into existence on March 15, 1957, and another partnership firm, Himmatlal and Co. , dyes section, consisting of Lakhmichand, Dhanraj and Dhulchand came into existence. ( 6. ) BY letter dated July 1, 1958, exhibit P-82, defendant No. 3 intimated the fact of dissolution of the firm, Himmatlal and Co. , to the plaintiff and a copy of the award was also delivered. The plaintiff-bank, by its letter dated July 9, 1958, exhibit P-108, duly acknowledged receipt of the intimation. These defendants pleaded that from March 15, 1957, or at any rate, with effect from July 1, 1958, defendant No. 2, Jawaharmal, and defendant No. 3, Lakhmichand, had no concern or right over the business and the property of each other. The property shown in the schedule A of the plaint, i. e. , the mortgaged property exclusively belonged to defendant No, 3, Lakhmichand, and defendant No. 2, Jawaharmal, had no power to alienate or mortgage the same. The mortgage was executed by Jawaharmal without any right or title to it and in collusion with the plaintiff. The plaintiff thus acquired no title or interest in the same. It was also pleaded that the alleged bill amounting to Rs. 77,749. 37 covered the period from December 21, 1958, till March 1959, which clearly pertains to the distinct new and separate business of defendant No. 2, Jawaharmal, and the new partnership in the cement section, etc. , constituted by him. Defendant No. 3, Lakhmichand, after the above property was allotted to him, made sankalp nama of House No. 58 (described above) in favour of defendants Nos. 4 to 6 on April 9, 1959, and got executed and registered a gift deed in their favour on December. 28, 1959. Again Lakhmichand sold the Pardeshipura property to Dhulchand and Hukumchand on June 8, 1960, by a registered sale deed. 4 to 6 on April 9, 1959, and got executed and registered a gift deed in their favour on December. 28, 1959. Again Lakhmichand sold the Pardeshipura property to Dhulchand and Hukumchand on June 8, 1960, by a registered sale deed. It was further; pleaded that the arbitrators delivered an interim award dated Match 15, 1957, exhibit D-1, another award dated June 24, 1957, exhibit D-II described as the final award and the final award dated May 21, 1962, exhibit D-III. These awards were registered. ( 7. ) ON the above pleadings of the parties, the learned Additional District and Sessions Judge framed a number of issues and found that the partnership firm, Himmatlal and Co. , was dissolved on March 15, 1957. Its assets were divided between the two partners. In partition, the property in dispute was given to Lakhmichand and the cement business of the firm was allotted exclusively to Jawaharmal and other businesses came to the share of Lakhmichand, but the learned Additional District Judge also held that this does not absolve defendants Nos. 2 and 3 from the liability to plaintiff. After dissolution of the old firm, Jawaharmal formed a new partnership firm known as Himmatlal and Co. (cement section) and Lakhmichand commenced a new business in the name and style of Himmatlal and Co. (dyes section ). At the request of Jawaharmal, the facility of a revolving letter of credit was provided to the firm, Himmatlal and Co. , from November 21, 1952, and this facility was renewed from time to time on certain conditions and was continued up to December 31, 1959. On June 4, 1959, Rs. 77,749. 74 were due from Himmatlal and Co. to the plaintiff. The firm, Himmatlal and Co. , mortgaged the property with plaintiff on June 4, 1959, for paying the amount due on account of credit advanced by the plaintiff and Jawaharmal executed the mortgage deed in the capacity of partner and acting on behalf of the firm. The mortgage deed was legally executed and attested. On the date of execution of the mortgage deed, the firm, Himmatlal and Co. , was not in existence, but the mortgage deed is binding on the defendants and their heirs. It is binding on the legal representatives of Lakhmichand and donees and Vendees (defendants Nos. 4, 5 and 6 ). The mortgage deed was legally executed and attested. On the date of execution of the mortgage deed, the firm, Himmatlal and Co. , was not in existence, but the mortgage deed is binding on the defendants and their heirs. It is binding on the legal representatives of Lakhmichand and donees and Vendees (defendants Nos. 4, 5 and 6 ). The gift deed dated December 28, 1959, does not confer any title on the donees, defendants Nos. 4 to 6. Lakhmichand, defendant No. 3, sold the property bearing No. 101, Pardeshipura, Indore, on June 8, 1960, to Dhulchand, Hukumchand, but this did not confer any title on the vendees. The suit is not barred by limitation. ( 8. ) THE learned Additional District Judge held that as no public notice under Section 45 of the Indian Partnership Act, 1932, was given of the dissolution of the firm, the defendants are liable to pay the amount and the mortgaged property was liable for its satisfaction. He accordingly decreed the plaintiffs suit as already set out above. ( 9. ) AT the hearing, Shri Waghmare for the appellants and Shri Chitale for the plaintiff-respondent-bank were heard. Shri Oberoi who appeared for the legal representatives of the deceased-defendant No. 2, Jawaharmal, adopted Shri Chitales argument. ( 10. ) THE first point to be seen is whether the firm, defendant No. 1, Himmatlal and Co. , was dissolved by the award dated March 15, 1957, exhibit D-1, at page 419 of the paper book and the assets and liabilities of the firm, defendant No. 1 were divided between the partners, Jawaharmal and Lakhmichand, and the property mortgaged by defendant No. 1, Jawaharmal, fell to the share of Lakhmichand. The learned Additional District Judge found these issues in the affirmative. Nevertheless, Shri Waghmare, learned counsel for the appellants, took us through the history of the case, important dates and events and in particular, through the award dated March 15, 1957, Exhibit D-l, at pages 419 to 431 of the paper book. The learned Additional District Judge found these issues in the affirmative. Nevertheless, Shri Waghmare, learned counsel for the appellants, took us through the history of the case, important dates and events and in particular, through the award dated March 15, 1957, Exhibit D-l, at pages 419 to 431 of the paper book. He emphasised that though the words "dissolution of the firm" were not used therein, read as a whole, there was no doubt that by the award, the firm was dissloved and its business, the assets and liabilities divided between the two partners, Jawaharmal and Lakhmichand, and that the property mortgaged by Jawaharmal, defendant No. 2, had, by the award, fallen to the share of Lakhmichand, defendant No. 3. In this connection, he drew our attention to exhibit P-82, dated July 1, 1958, page 353 of the paper book, by which defendant No. 3, Lakhmichand, intimated to the plaintiff-bank the dissolution of the firm and the plaintiffs reply dated July 9, 1958, exhibit P-108. By this letter addressed to Dhanraj Jain and other partners, the plaintiff acknowledged receipt of the letter dated July 1, 1958, in the words : "we are in receipt of your letter of the first instant informing us that you have dissolved the present firm and have divided it into two sections with different partners. " (The plaintiff, however, in the letter for the reasons stated therein, replied that it could not absolve the existing partners of the firm, Himmatlal and Co. ). ( 11. ) SHRI Waghmare also took us through the award dated June 24, 1957, exhibit D-2, described as the final award, at page 434 of the paper book, and the final award dated May 21, 1962, exhibit D-3, at page 442 of the paper book. He submitted that the awards clearly brought out dissolution of the firm and exhibit D-1 left no doubt that the mortgaged house and plot had fallen to the share of defendant No. 3, Lakhmichand. In this connection, he also drew our attention to the statement of Kanhaiyalal (PW-1 ). ( 12. ) SHRI Chitale, learned counsel for the plaintiff-respondent, however, countering Shri Waghmares arguments, submitted that earlier, the interim award dated February 25, 1957, was not produced. In this connection, he also drew our attention to the statement of Kanhaiyalal (PW-1 ). ( 12. ) SHRI Chitale, learned counsel for the plaintiff-respondent, however, countering Shri Waghmares arguments, submitted that earlier, the interim award dated February 25, 1957, was not produced. He took us through the material portions of the award dated March 15, 1957, exhibit D-l and submitted that it contained directions as to how the affairs were to be managed until final accounting. He referred to certain portions of the same--in particular to page 425, paras 18 to 27, according to which, until the final accounting, business was to continue in the name of the firm, Himmatlal and Co. (page 425), no change to be made in the constitution of the firm until final accounting (page 427), the funds of the firm to be in the possession of both partners in the interim period cheques to be signed by Dhanraj and Jawaharmal (page 427), future profits to remain in the common hotchpot (page 421), transfer of agencies in sole partnership after accounting. Referring to the arbitrator, Shivlal Porwals statement at pages 117 and 118, he submitted that the accounts of the firm, Himmatlal and Co. , continued as before in the books of account. The accounts in the books were not closed, nor were new accounts opened. Np intimation was given to the bank of the awards by way of copies. He referred to exhibit P-119 (page 395 of the paper book) acknowledgment of defendant No. 2, Jawaharmal, and defendant No. 3, Lakhmichand, acknowledging the liability of the firm, Himmatlal and Co. For the same purpose, he referred to exhibit P-120, dated January 11, 1958, at page 399 of the paper book and exhibit P-82, at page 353, dated July 1, 1958. Shri Chitale, learned counsel submitted that this letter from Himmatlal and Co. (dyes section) through Lakhmichand, Dhanraj and Dhulchand as partners, was only an intimation of the division of the firm in two sections with different partners, Himmatlal and Co. (cement section) and Himmatlal and Co. (dyes section ). The letter, exhibit P-82, contains only a request to separate the accounts into two sections and split the banking facilities. There was no intimation of dissolution of the firm by exhibit P-82. Fresh partnership deeds were not furnished, nor was any request to close the account made. ( 13. (cement section) and Himmatlal and Co. (dyes section ). The letter, exhibit P-82, contains only a request to separate the accounts into two sections and split the banking facilities. There was no intimation of dissolution of the firm by exhibit P-82. Fresh partnership deeds were not furnished, nor was any request to close the account made. ( 13. ) THERE was no intimation to the plaintiff of the awards, nor were copies of the same forwarded. About the plaintiffs reply dated July 9, 1958, exhibit P-108, at page 381 of the paper book, he explained that this letter was rather loosely written, because it was addressed to Dhanraj who was not a partner and it referred to the dissolution of the firm to which exhibit P-82 to which it was itself a reply did not refer. Learned counsel referred to exhibit P-55, dated July 1, 1958, at page 319 of the paper book, exhibit P-56, dated July 2, 1958, at page 321, exhibit P-57, dated July 2, 1958, at page 323, exhibit P-58, dated July 14, 1958, at page 325, exhibit P-59, dated July 17, 1958, at page 326, exhibit P-60, dated July 19, 1958, at page 327, exhibit P-61, dated August 11, 1958, at page 328, exhibit P-62, dated August 13, 1958, at page 329, exhibit P-63, dated September 15, 1958, at page 330, exhibit P-64, dated September 25, 1984, at page 331 and exhibit P:65, dated October 4, 1958, at page 332 for the submission that with reference to the agreement of pledge dated January 2, 1957, Lakhmichand, defendant No. 3, had signed these letters on behalf of Himmatlal and Co. and in these letters, no mention of the dyes sections was made. However, to a question from the Bench, Shri Chitale replied that after March 15, 1957, there was no letter from Lakhmichand showing that he had, in any way, dealt with the cement section of the business which according to defendant No. 3, had fallen to the share of defendant No. 2, Jawaharmal. He also submitted that the awards had not been properly proved. ( 14. ) SHRI Waghmare, learned counsel, in reply, submitted that the suit dealings pertain to the period December 24, 1958, to March 20, 1959, i. e. , after the dissolution of the partnership firm as seen from the bills, P-17 to P-37. He also submitted that the awards had not been properly proved. ( 14. ) SHRI Waghmare, learned counsel, in reply, submitted that the suit dealings pertain to the period December 24, 1958, to March 20, 1959, i. e. , after the dissolution of the partnership firm as seen from the bills, P-17 to P-37. The three awards, exhibits D-1, D-2 and D-3, clearly brought out the dissolution of the firm. He drew our attention to the statement of DW-1, Shivlal Porwal, at page 114 of the paper book who had proved the award. He also drew our attention to the statement of Kanhaiyalal son of Pyarechandji (CW-2) at page 119 of the paper book according to which the firm defendant No. 1, continued till 1957. Exhibit D-3, at page 445, which recites that the partnership firm came to an end on March 15, 1957, page 446 which referred to the mortgage in favour of the plaintiff without Lakhmichands consent and directs defendant No. 2 to pay the amount and deliver the property to Lakhmichand defendant No. 3. The statementof DW-1, Basantilal, at pages 110 and 111, referring to the appointment of arbitrators and proving the signatures of Jawaharmal and Lakhmichand on the awards and exhibit D-l, at page 432--the admission of Jawaharmal, D-2 at page 442--where Jawaharmal made a similar statement and exhibit D-3 where there is a similar statement by Jawaharmal. He thus submitted that the awards had been properly proved. ( 15. ) IN our view, the three awards have been properly proved by the statements of Shivlal Porwal (CW-1) and Kanhaiyalal (CW-2) and Basantilal (DW-1 ). The three awards, read as a whole, leave no manner of doubt that the firm was dissolved on March 15, 1957 (vide exhibit D-l ). ( 16. ) IN this connection, the plaintiffs own letter, exhibit P-108, at page 381 of the paper book, is significant. In this" letter, the plaintiff, while acknowledging the letter dated July 1, 1958, of Lakhmichand, exhibit P-82, at page 353 of the paper book from Himmatlal and Co. (dyes section) signed by Lakhmichand, Dhanraj and D. M. Parekh, in the very first sentence replied : "we are in receipt of your letter of the first instant informing us that you have dissolved the present firm and have divided it into two sections with different partners. (dyes section) signed by Lakhmichand, Dhanraj and D. M. Parekh, in the very first sentence replied : "we are in receipt of your letter of the first instant informing us that you have dissolved the present firm and have divided it into two sections with different partners. " During arguments, questioned by the Bench, Shri Chitale admitted that the plaintiff led no evidence to explain this letter and it was not the plaintiffs case that the letter was written without proper authority. The letter would show that according to the plaintiffs understanding also, the firm was dissolved. We, therefore, uphold the finding of the lower court that the firm Himmatlal and Co. was dissolved with effect from March 15, 1957. ( 17. ) THE next point to be seen is whether the property mortgaged by Jawaharmal with the plaintiff had fallen to the share of defendant No. 3, Lakhmichand. Exhibit D-l award dated March 15, 1957, leaves no doubt that the property mortgaged had fallen to the share of Lakhmichand, defendant No. 3. At page 432 of the paper book, the property falling to the share of Jawaharmal is listed and the award says that Lakhmichand was the owner of the remaining property. The property mortgaged is not one of the items of property, Exhibits B-1, B-2, B-3, B-4 and B-5, falling to the share of Jawaharmal. We partly uphold the findings of the lower court on this issue. ( 18. ) THREE awards have been registered, but not made a rule of the court. In that connection, during arguments, one of us (myself) had put a question whether awards, not having been made rule of the court, could be set up for defence by defendant No. 3 ? In that connection, both the parties drew attention to the Supreme Court decision in Satishkumar v. Surinderkumar, AIR 1970 SC 833 , which, in para 8, refers to its observations in an unreported decision in Uttamsingh Dugal and Co. v. Union of India (Civil Appeal No. 162 of 1962, dated October 11, 1962 (SC) ). In view of this agreed legal position, it is not considered necessary to reproduce from the decision or to enter into this question. ( 19. ) DURING arguments, Shri Chitale, learned counsel for the plaintiff, also submitted that the arbitration agreement leading to awards had not been produced. In view of this agreed legal position, it is not considered necessary to reproduce from the decision or to enter into this question. ( 19. ) DURING arguments, Shri Chitale, learned counsel for the plaintiff, also submitted that the arbitration agreement leading to awards had not been produced. We see no force in this argument, when there are in fact awards and the parties have acted upon them as seen from the evidence of the parties. Besides, no particular mode of dissolution of the firm is laid down in the Partnership Act. The awards show that there was dissolution of the partnership and this was accepted by the two partners, Jawaharmal and Lakhmichand. In view of this, on the facts and circumstances of the case, we reject Shri Chitales argument as untenable. ( 20. ) THIS brings us to the third and more important question as to the effect of the public notice of the dissolution of the firm not having been given as stipulated under Section 45 of the Indian Partnership Act, 1932. On going through the judgment of the lower court, paras 32 and 43, it is seen that what mainly weighed with the lower court for holding the appellants and defendant No. 3 Lakhmichand as also the mortgaged property liable for satisfaction of the mortgage money, is that no notice as required under Sections 32 and 45 of the Indian Partnership Act was given, though the learned judge, in para 42 of the judgment, refers to the plaintiffs letter dated July 9, 1958, already referred to above. In this connection, Shri Waghmare, learned counsel, has drawn our attention to certain observations in Lindley on the law of Partnership. In the fourteenth edition of the book, at page 349, the following is stated : "special notices : As against persons who dealt with the firm before any change in it took place, an advertisement without more is of little or of no value, whether it be in the Gazette or elsewhere. But if notice in point of fact can be established, it matters not by what means, for the Partnership Act 1890 does not require, nor has it ever been held that any particular formality must be observed. " ( 21. But if notice in point of fact can be established, it matters not by what means, for the Partnership Act 1890 does not require, nor has it ever been held that any particular formality must be observed. " ( 21. ) LEARNED counsel also referred to the following three decisions : (i) Central United Bank Ltd. v. B. A. Venkatarama, AIR 1963 Mad 302 ; (ii) Jani Nautamlal Venishankar v. Shri Vivekanand Co-operative Housing Society Ltd. , AIR 1986 Guj 162 and (iii) Jwaladutt R. Pillani v. Bansilal Motilal, AIR 1929 PC 132. ( 22. ) IT is not necessary to deal with all the decisions because the Gujarat High Court decision refers to all the material decisions on the point including the Privy Council decision and the Madras High Court decision referred to above. The provisions of Section 32 (3) dealing with notice as to a retiring partner and discharging him from liability to third parties and Section 45 (1) excluding the proviso, are in similar terms. The Gujarat High Court, after noticing the two provisions and different High Court decisions, approving and following the Madras High Court decision, held as under (at page 173) : "in our opinion, the proviso to Section 32 (3) and the corresponding provision in Section 45 with its proviso indicate beyond doubt that only persons who were not aware of the retirement of a particular partner could take advantage of Section 32 (3) or Section 45. The purpose of Section 32 (3) is more to specify how a notice should be given. Its main object is to avoid the necessity of giving actual or private notice to the various persons. In other words, it specifies the mode by which the retiring partner may be relieved of the responsibility of issuing notice to the various classes of persons who might enter into transactions. With the surviving partners, public notice is intended only to serve a purpose, namely to bring home to the persons concerned the fact of retirement. That purpose will undoubtedly be served in a better way by personal or actual notice. To contend that actual notice cannot take the place of the public notice, is to miss the substance of the matter and argue counter to the very principle on which the retiring partners liability is based. " ( 23. That purpose will undoubtedly be served in a better way by personal or actual notice. To contend that actual notice cannot take the place of the public notice, is to miss the substance of the matter and argue counter to the very principle on which the retiring partners liability is based. " ( 23. ) AT page 174, there is a reference to a specific case of dissolution of a firm. A decision of the Division Bench of the Gujarat High Court, speaking through D. P. Desai ). , held in the following words : "in the case of dissolution of the firm, the persons who ceased, to be partners would not be liable to third parties for acts done by other partners subsequent to the dissolution, if the third party had actual notice of dissolution when the acts were done. This would be so notwithstanding the omission to give public notice of dissolution as contemplated by Section 45 (1) of the Indian Partnership Act in such a case. " ( 24. ) SHRI Chitale, learned counsel, no doubt attempted to argue as to how there was a difference between the old Section 264 of the Indian Contract Act, 1872, and the present provisions in the Indian Partnership Act, We, however, in view of the direct Gujarat High Court decision, do not think that Shri Chitales attempt to distinguish the decision, advances the plaintiffs claim any further. The plaintiff-bank, through its letter dated July 9, 1958, had admitted receipt of defendant No. 3s letter dated July 1, 1958, and dissolution of the firm. In view of this actual notice, the absence of a public notice under Section 45 of the Indian Partnership Act, 1932, would not make defendant No. 3 liable (or the acts of defendant No. 2, Jawaharmal, nor would it affect the gift and sale of the property made by defendant No. 3 to the appellants and respondent, Ramanlal. We find accordingly. ( 25. ) SHRI Chitale, learned counsel also submitted that copies of the awards were not forwarded to the plaintiff by any of the partners of the firm. The evidence is not clear on the point whether copies of awards were forwarded to the plaintiff, while according to defendant No. 3, letter, exhibit P-82, was accompanied by a copy of the award. This is denied by the plaintiff. The evidence is not clear on the point whether copies of awards were forwarded to the plaintiff, while according to defendant No. 3, letter, exhibit P-82, was accompanied by a copy of the award. This is denied by the plaintiff. Be that as it may, the plaintiff cannot derive any advantage from copies of the awards not having been forwarded to the plaintiff. The awards were compulsorily registrable under Section 17 (1) (b) as they operated to create right, title or interest in immovable property of the value of one hundred rupees and upwards. They were in fact registered. Before getting the mortgage deed executed by defendant No. 2, Jawaharmal, in its favour for satisfaction of the loan, the plaintiff should have made necessary inquiry. Having failed to do that, it cannot take any advantage from the fact that copies of awards were not forwarded to it. ( 26. ) THE legal representatives of Lakhmichand, defendant No. 3, and Ramanlal, respondent No. 5 (defendant No. 6), have not preferred any appeal against the judgment and decree to this court. Rule 33 newly added in Order 41 of the Code of Civil Procedure, however, gives wide powers to the appellate court as the appeal may require to exercise in favour of all or any of the respondents or parties although such respondents or parties may not have filed any appeal or objection. In view of our discussion above, and having regard to this rule, there would appear to be no legal objection to granting relief to the legal representatives of the deceased-defendant, Lakhmichand, defendent No. 3 and the donee, Ramanlal, defendant No. 6, although they may not have filed any appeal to this court. ( 27. ) AS a result of the aforesaid discussions, it is ordered and decreed that the legal representatives of the deceased-defendant, Jawaharmal, namely, respondents Nos. 3 (a) to (d) do pay to the plaintiff-respondent No. 1 from out of the assets of Jawaharmal in their hands the amount decreed by the lower court with interest as ordered by it with costs in the lower court. The plaintiffs suit for enforcement of the mortgage deed dated June 4, 1959, against property shown in Schedule A of the plaint against the appellants and other defendants is dismissed. ( 28. The plaintiffs suit for enforcement of the mortgage deed dated June 4, 1959, against property shown in Schedule A of the plaint against the appellants and other defendants is dismissed. ( 28. ) THE appeal is thus allowed in the terms indicated above and the judgment and decree passed by the lower court are modified accordingly. Looking to the circumstances of the case, the parties are ordered to bear their own costs as incurred in this court. Counsels fee according to Schedule or certificate whichever is less.